A Dvar Torah on the Subject of Democratic Public Finance

By Anna Minsky

The following speech was read on March 28th at a progressive New York City synagogue, a guest sermon by one of the congregants. In the Jewish tradition, each week we read one part (a “parsha”) of the Torah (the first five books of the bible) aloud in Hebrew. Then someone, often a Rabbi, offers “words of Torah” (dvar Torah or drash). At this synagogue at least, the idea is to use the text as a jumping off point. There is no presumption that the text is true or just, only that it is worth discussing.  The terms haShem (literally, the name) and The One are used here in lieu of “G-d” to convey that such a thing is too big to be known or personified.

Shabat shalom.

Obligation. Honor. Reckoning. Redemption. These are all words that have both a moral meaning and a money meaning.

Today’s Torah reading comes from Parshat Tzav.  Tzav means oblige. It has the same root as mitzvah. s/ Tzav is an absolutely *riveting* passage that goes back over how to perform five different ritual offerings that were already described in last week’s parsha, but this time with more attention to the role of the priest. But seriously, Parshat Tzav must be important because it is a list of instructions and Torah means instruction. The ritual for each offering begins with, zot torat ha: now this is the torah of… And, more-or-less, the description of each offering is punctuated with, kadosh kedushim hu: it is a holiest holy portion, referring to the part of the offering that goes to the priest.

So, this is the Torah of Obligation. What do we owe to haShem and what do we owe to each other? In the text, we owe a shlamim offering. It could be from the herd or the flock or a goat. We owe a minhah offering. It must be grain, with salt, oil, and frankincense, but no leavening. And, significantly, we are told the exact amount to bring each morning and evening, and we are instructed that the priests get to eat a part of it. These two offerings and the olah offering are considered obligatory.  In contrast, the last two offerings, the hattat and asham, are accrued based on your behavior.  More about those later.

In late temple times the instructions in the Torah about obligations to The One likely shaped the local economy more than obligations to the state. Roman authorities were content with minimal tribute, and their local governors were mostly unstable. Meanwhile, the Torah had already been entrenched for centuries. There was even a sacred currency that could be used for offerings and tithes. People likely took the Torah instructions seriously, but paid a priest to make offerings, rather than literally bringing a tenth of an efa of grain in the morning and another tenth of an efa in the evening. They saw their relationship with haShem as transactional.

Kadosh kedushim hu. It is a holiest holy portion.

Now this is the Torah of Honor.  So, what do you think? Is it impure to owe money? Is it a sin not to repay a debt?

It is no secret that cartels and bullies use debt as a pretext for violence and cruelty. For example, in 2014 credit agencies downgraded Puerto Rico’s bonds, forcing them to pay off their debts by reducing services and pensions, that is by reducing care for the people who live there.  There is no honor in paying off a debt if it is a cause for neglect. But also families and friends use debt as a pretext for companionship. I am in the debt of this community for creating a meal train when I was sick, and that’s a good thing because it makes me want to sign up for a meal train for someone else. The difference between cruelty and connection has to do with who keeps the ledger. If we think of money as a thing that can be hoarded that might prompt us to be cruel. But if we think of money only as an abstraction, that might prompt us to use it to coordinate care.

Kadosh kedushim hu. It is a holiest holy portion.

Now, this is the Torah of Reckoning. Is it possible that one origin of money was in temple ledgers?  For example, the temple might record that Linda hadn’t brought a shlamim offering. Perhaps, also, Carol wants some of Linda’s saplings to plant a vineyard.  She could say to Linda, give me a few saplings, and I will promise to bring a shlamim offering to the temple on your behalf. Linda could then bring that promissory note to the temple, and they could record that the obligation of the shlamim offering had been switched from Linda to Carol.  All of a sudden, we essentially have paper money, and what makes it possible is the ledger that is being maintained by the temple. So the verses about how a shlamim offering could be from the herd, the flock, or a goat could be interpreted as important material information about exchange values that allow for the coordinated distribution of resources within a community of friends and neighbors. Although we no longer make offerings at the temple, Parshat Tzav is still relevant because we still coordinate the distribution of resources. And to give an honest reckoning, we do it badly.

Thinking about our relationships with The One and among ourselves as something transactional might feel yucky, but I would offer that we can reject the fake morality pedaled by banks that it is honorable to “honor” a debt incurred to a usurer. We *can* organize transactions around caring.

Kadosh kedushim hu. It is a holiest holy portion.

And finally, this is the Torah of Redemption. I am going to spend the remainder of this drash talking about Democratic Public Finance, an idea I’ve been learning about from the Money on the Left editorial collective. Today is the perfect day to talk about it, not just because of Parshat Tzav, *but also* because today is No Kings Day, *and also* the state budget is due on Wednesday.

I think we’re all on the same page that when the President claims the unilateral right not to spend funds that Congress has appropriated, that is King behavior and we won’t stand for it.  But I also want you to think about this unitary executive theory of money, not as a departure from, but a continuation of the austerity framework of our much-too-powerful governor, Kathy Hochul, who says that we can’t “afford” to invest in renewable energy.  Just as we shouldn’t let the president be the arbiter of when money can be spent, so too, we should not let the banks, traders, and hedge fund managers be the arbiters.

Under the current regime corporate banks, and not democratically elected local governments, have the power to create credit.  What kind of democracy is that?  Kathy Hochul claims that money is a scarce private resource, but Democratic Public Finance thinks of money as just a way to coordinate the distribution of resources and capacities.  If there is enough food in New York City to feed every person in New York City, then it is simply not the case that we can’t afford to feed everyone. If there are enough people to shovel the snow, then it is simply not the case that we can’t afford to have the sidewalks passable for people in wheelchairs.  If it is physically possible to build solar and wind farms and a pipeline to bring hydropower from Quebec, how can we afford *not* to do these things? All we, as a multiracial small-d democratic city and state, have to do is ask what we wish to accomplish together and then take control of the ledger to credit the people who step up to do the accomplishing. For example, one way to do this would be to issue literal credits that could be redeemed to pay taxes or obtain food from state-run groceries.

Another idea from democratic public finance is to borrow money from people rather than banks. Instead of donating money to centrist democrats to defeat MAGA, we could invest our money in arts programs, libraries, and parks in New York City, Cincinnati, Seattle and Tulsa, expanding blue cities so that people can live in them free from cars and guns, and organize together to take back their state legislatures.

These are policy ideas we could advocate for. If you are interested in taking some smaller first steps together, I am always looking for study partners, and maybe we could consider writing a joint letter to the mayor or governor, or starting some inventive crediting systems within our own community, perhaps for kids or teen assistants.

I said I would return to the hattat and asham offerings. These are offerings you would make if you needed purification or to atone for a sin. The implication is that you had incurred some debt for impurity or, perhaps, cruelty. It is not wrong to have a debt, but it is wrong to usurp the ledger.  The premise of Parshat Tzav is that haShem controls the ledger, but post-temple, I think that we all should control the ledger, democratically.

What’s more, while it might seem like Parshat Tzav is just instructions for the priests, let’s not forget Parshat Yitro, where we read v’atem t’hiyuli mamlechet cohanim: we should be a *nation* of priests. 

On top of Parshat Tzav, no kings, and an impending state budget deadline, today we observe Shabbat haGadol, the last shabbat before Pesach, the holiday of redemption. To redeem is literally to acquire something by paying off a debt, perhaps by making a hattat or asham offering.

But I say redemption is meaningless if we are not a nation of priests, if we do not wield the ledger to distribute our labor and resources to care for one another.

Kadosh kedushim hu. It is a holiest holy portion.

Good Shabbos.

* The featured image above features an ancient silver Shekel of Tyre from the Second Temple period dated 64/3 BC.

** Watch Anna Minsky read her remarks here:

Reparative Internationalism

Toward an International Democratic Public Finance Framework

By Will Beaman

The liberal international order faces a crisis of legitimacy, and the struggle to define its aftermath is already being organized through competing visions of global order. In the present turn, the far right has seized that terrain to stage a false choice: either accept imperial internationalism or retreat into nationalist rivalry.

This essay develops the Democratic Public Finance (DPF) framework into the domain of foreign policy and international economic governance. Reparative internationalism names the political horizon of that extension. DPF begins from a simple premise: public money and fiscal authority should be organized to expand democratic participation and shared capacity rather than to enforce artificial scarcity or market discipline.

The international monetary system makes this premise unavoidable. Nowhere is the tension between democratic participation and financial hierarchy more visible than in the global institutions that govern liquidity, development, and employment across borders.

This also requires a broader understanding of economic democracy and internationalism than political economy often supplies. Economic democracy is too often reduced to questions of workplace control, redistribution, and ownership, while international solidarity is not yet joined to the kinds of public design and institutional coordination that would support democratic repair and reconstruction in the present. A Democratic Public Finance approach insists that institutions of money, credit, and employment are central to both.

Even where strands of political economy have under-theorized money, credit, and employment as constitutive of economic democracy, or the role of internationalist architecture in liberation struggles, these questions remain open. They belong to a heterogeneous problem space shaped by developmental economics, mid-century postcolonial thought, and the 1974 call for a New International Economic Order. That declaration, advanced by newly independent states, demanded structural changes to trade, finance, technology transfer, and development governance. These questions stand alongside more recent decolonial monetary and macroeconomic work, including Fadhel Kaboub’s analyses of postcolonial economic relations and advocacy for political and climate reparations and Ndongo Samba Sylla’s critiques of monetary imperialism and neoliberalism’s colonial roots. What is more, Kaboub and Sylla join Andrés Arauz in calling for forms of regional monetary solidarity across Africa and Latin America. Democratic Public Finance revives and recomposes these longstanding questions through a focus on international public design and interoperability: the construction of institutions that widen fiscal space, coordinate liquidity, and secure full employment across borders without reinstalling the nation-state or any imperial power as the singular anchor of economic order.

What appears as an external constraint is often already an effect of how cross-border obligations are organized, recognized, and supported. International architecture, in that sense, is not a downstream consequence of discrete political achievements. It is part of the contested infrastructure through which those achievements become possible, legible, or durable in the first place.

These questions remain live today in debates over what happens when countries must use up their stocks of dollars and other widely accepted reserve assets to pay for imports, service debts, and steady their currencies. When that cushion runs down, governments face mounting pressure. They may be forced to cut spending, suppress demand, or seek outside support on punitive terms simply to keep external payments flowing.

When countries struggle to secure the dollars they need for imports, debt service, and other external payments, the resulting instability should not be mistaken for a self-moving market process. It reflects an international monetary architecture in which dollar support is selectively provisioned rather than organized around democratic participation or fiscal space. That selectivity is not incidental. It is an imperial design logic that recasts questions of public monetary design as matters of U.S. charity and benevolence and, in the present authoritarian turn, is increasingly restaged as a pageantry of opening and closing windows of solidarity and support according to loyalty and fealty.

The consequences then appear in the specific exchanges through which domestic money is traded against dollars, in the pricing of imports, and in the servicing of foreign debts. Governments and central banks then try to keep those arrangements from breaking down by using up their dollar holdings, keeping domestic currencies from falling further against the dollar, making borrowing more expensive, or taking other steps to resist the reorganization of claims in favor of dollar-denominated assets and to preserve the payment relationships on which imports, debts, and public responsibilities depend. These are defensive responses to terms that are rendered legible as neutral, ordinary, and unavoidable, while making other ways of organizing support, obligation, and participation across borders harder to name and sustain.

Too often, these dilemmas are staged as a choice between insulated national monetary autonomy and permanent exposure to external discipline. International Democratic Public Finance begins elsewhere. It treats those pressures not as fixed conditions within which each country must fight for survival, but as symptoms of a global monetary architecture organized around hierarchy, scarcity, and competitive vulnerability.

For decades, the dominant vision of international order presented itself as a framework for shared prosperity, development, and stability. In practice, however, liberal internationalism organized economic life across borders through hierarchically structured financial and trade institutions, which repeatedly treated austerity, privatization, and unemployment as the price of participation for countries facing external payment pressures.

As faith in this institutional order has eroded, the far right has offered its own alternative: nationalist competition among strong states, each seeking advantage in a world of strategic rivalry.

Neither model addresses the underlying problem. Liberal internationalism preserves hierarchical financial arrangements that restrict fiscal space for most of the world. Nationalist internationalism abandons cooperation altogether and risks normalizing economic fragmentation and geopolitical conflict.

What is needed instead is a different framework for international economic governance—one grounded not in hierarchy or withdrawal but in participation.

A reparative foreign policy therefore requires more than a change in diplomatic posture. It requires treating the international monetary system itself as a site of democratic public finance rather than as an instrument of imperial hierarchy.

I. Authority as Participation

A reparative international architecture begins by reframing how authority operates. In the prevailing international order, authority is exercised through hierarchy: a small number of powerful states and financial centers shape the conditions under which other societies must govern their economies.

The alternative is participation. Participation does not simply redistribute power within an existing hierarchy. It reorganizes the institutions through which economic life is governed so that societies can participate in shaping the economic conditions that govern their lives.

This shift has a certain experimental quality. Participation is not merely a new map of who belongs within an existing order. It is a world-making practice through which democratic capacity is built across borders.

A participatory international architecture continues the unfinished work of decolonization by changing the institutional conditions under which political and economic decisions are made. Instead of requiring countries to navigate rules designed elsewhere and enforced through external discipline, it creates institutions through which societies can participate in shaping the economic and financial environment that governs them.

In this sense, decolonization is not only a political project but a monetary one: it requires transforming the institutions that govern liquidity, credit, and employment so that they expand democratic participation rather than enforce financial hierarchy.

For Democratic Public Finance, foreign policy therefore begins with the institutions that govern money, liquidity, and fiscal space across borders.

Internationalism, in this sense, means organizing the institutions of money, credit, and employment so that societies can participate in shaping the economic conditions that govern their lives.

Anti-imperialism, correspondingly, means building institutions that prevent any power from monopolizing the monetary and financial conditions under which other societies must govern their economic lives. What these debates too often share is a survivalist baseline: a picture of self-enclosed political units forced to defend themselves within a hostile monetary environment rather than participate in designing the institutions that govern that environment in the first place.

II. The Monetary Question

Countries pursuing ambitious domestic programs are often forced into austerity, unemployment, privatization, or political retreat not because those outcomes are economically inevitable, but because access to dollars and reserve assets remains scarce, hierarchical, and politically managed.

International Democratic Public Finance does not treat externally denominated debt as a settled social fact. Even the most sophisticated MMT discussion has often treated foreign-currency debt as a stable marker on a spectrum of sovereignty, agency or capacity, as though “externality” were simply there to be measured. But what counts as external denomination is itself conditioned by an ongoing order of collective design: by the legal, financial, administrative, and discursive arrangements through which receivability, refinancing, reserve practice, enforcement, and public support are organized across borders and rendered durable as common sense. The topology is therefore the reverse of what it often seems. Sovereign refusal, denomination, or imposition does not stand prior to international monetary design. It is itself organized through that design. The issue, then, is not simply what degree of room for maneuver a country possesses in advance. It is how the international monetary order organizes the terms on which its obligations will count, travel, and be supported.

This is why the dollar’s global role cannot be treated as neutral—and certainly not as a foundation for democratic renewal. When access to dollars and other widely accepted reserve assets is concentrated at the top of the system, fiscal space everywhere becomes organized around imperial asymmetries. In the current order, that fragility is often resolved through austerity: governments are told to cut spending, suppress wages, privatize assets, or tolerate unemployment in order to regain access to the external means of payment they need for imports, debt service, and exchange-rate support.

Reforming this system requires expanding the institutional mechanisms through which countries can gain access to the external means of payment they need when they face dollar shortages and other external payment pressures, without sacrificing domestic democratic priorities.

One concrete example already exists in the network of central bank swap lines that the Federal Reserve extended during the global financial crisis and again during the pandemic. These facilities stabilized global financial markets by allowing foreign central banks to access dollars when they faced payment shortages. Yet access to these lines remains restricted to a small group of privileged partners.

A reparative international architecture would expand such mechanisms and place them within multilateral institutions so that access to the external means of payment countries need is not a discretionary tool of imperial power but a normal feature of global economic governance.

Other paths point in a similar direction. In Africa and Latin America, regional monetary proposals associated with thinkers such as Ndongo Samba Sylla and Andrés Arauz have emphasized currency cooperation, regional clearing, and solidarity-based reserve arrangements as ways to reduce dependence on hierarchical dollar mediation. These efforts underscore that reparative internationalism need not mean a more benevolent top-down order. It can also mean building interoperable institutions below and across the current hierarchy.

Such reforms would not eliminate international inequality overnight. But they would reduce the ability of financial hierarchy to discipline democratic governments pursuing full employment in an inclusive way.

III. Employment, Industrial Strategy, and Participation

Debates about development strategy often frame employment as a byproduct of industrialization. According to this view, jobs should emerge naturally from successful sectors and industries institutionally positioned to attract investment and external demand.

A participatory framework reverses that priority. Employment is not merely an outcome of economic strategy; it is a condition of democratic participation.

This does not mean abandoning industrial policy. It means recognizing that industrialization can proceed under different background conditions. One option is to organize economic life around unemployment as a disciplinary mechanism, forcing workers and communities to compete for access to livelihood and public standing. Another is to establish employment as a public commitment, ensuring that participation in economic life is not contingent on meeting a narrow test of market usefulness.

That distinction matters because unemployment is not simply an economic shortfall. It is also a way of sorting people into more and less legitimate forms of social contribution. A participatory framework rejects that sorting function. It insists that industrial transformation should widen the terms on which people can appear as contributors to public life, rather than narrowing them around one dominant image of usefulness.

Economic democracy, in this sense, means organizing the institutions of money, credit, and employment so that participation in public life does not depend on meeting a narrow test of market usefulness.

Full employment has long functioned as a public aspiration, especially in the postwar period, when mass unemployment came to be seen as incompatible with democratic legitimacy. But over time the concept was narrowed. In much mainstream economic theory, full employment no longer means that everyone who wants to work can do so. It names a moving threshold consistent with a certain tolerated level of unemployment, often justified through concepts such as the Non-Accelerating Inflation Rate of Unemployment. Under that definition, full employment becomes a vague macroeconomic target rather than an institutional obligation.

This narrowing is often defended through the language of inflation. Inflation is treated not only as a technical problem of prices but as a signal that participation has exceeded its proper bounds: that wages are rising too quickly, that public spending has become excessive, or that “make-work” has replaced disciplined production. In this way, inflation discourse helps naturalize a background level of unemployment as a necessary restraint on social excess. It also organizes distinctions between forms of labor that are recognized as productive and those that are cast as marginal, redundant, or improperly supported—distinctions that have long been entangled with judgments about skill, disability, and social worth.

Democratic renewal has to reject those logics more fundamentally. When unemployment is treated as the necessary price of order, and inflation as evidence of improper public spending or socially excessive participation, the ground is laid for harsher distinctions between worthy and unworthy labor, disciplined and undisciplined populations, productive and burdensome life. Those distinctions do not mechanically produce fascism, but they help make fascist categories newly legible. A democratic politics of full employment cannot simply soften those judgments at the margins. It has to reorganize the terms on which participation, contribution, and public support are recognized in the first place.

A participatory framework rejects that narrowing. Full employment is not simply a desirable aggregate outcome. It is a democratic commitment that requires institutions capable of creating work when private markets do not. It also reframes the problem of inflation, not as a reason to withhold participation, but as a question of how to organize spending, production, and pricing so that expanded participation can be sustained without reproducing the categories of excess and exclusion that authoritarian politics exploits.

A job guarantee is one way of giving that commitment concrete form. It is a public commitment to provide employment to anyone who wants to work, rather than leaving access to livelihood to the disciplinary terms of the market. It belongs to a longer history of demands for democratic inclusion, civil rights, and public responsibility for livelihood. Its importance here is not only programmatic but conceptual: it names a form of full employment that refuses to treat access to work as a privilege allocated through unemployment, exclusion, or externally imposed scarcity.

This commitment should not be confined within national borders. In the current international order, even the effort to secure full employment is constrained by dollar dependence and external payment hierarchies. If unemployment is treated as an acceptable adjustment mechanism in the global economy, the result will be recurring cycles of austerity, migration crises, and political instability.

A reparative international architecture must therefore treat full employment as a shared global objective. Job guarantees provide one way to institutionalize that commitment. By establishing employment as a right rather than a privilege, they ensure that industrial transformation occurs within a framework of participation rather than exclusion.

IV. Beyond Benevolence

This framework is not a call for American benevolence. A system in which the United States occasionally extends support while retaining the power to withdraw it would simply reproduce the exceptional and discretionary character of imperial governance.

The goal instead is to embed access to external means of payment, balance-of-payments support, and employment commitments within international institutions. Balance-of-payments support here means securing and stabilizing access to the international currencies needed to meet external payment obligations without slashing jobs, wages, or public spending. This matters in part because currencies are never singular or self-enclosed objects. As I have argued elsewhere, “the dollar itself is not a coherent entity. It is already a choreography: a composite of coins, notes, deposits, reserves, and credit instruments—issued across the balance sheets of banks, treasuries, courts, and municipal governments, each with their own histories, idioms, and institutional rhythms. It has never been a single thing.”

One existing coordinate for thinking through that transition is the IMF’s Special Drawing Rights (SDRs). Created and allocated by the IMF, SDRs are an international reserve asset—a potential claim on widely usable member currencies—that can widen access to external means of payment without reducing support to bilateral favor or market punishment. They do not solve the problem on their own, but they point toward forms of international monetary coordination less dependent on unilateral U.S. discretion and more compatible with a reparative architecture.

Balance-of-payments support from the United States to postcolonial countries could be a step in that direction. But it should be understood as transitional—part of a broader effort to embed these responsibilities in multilateral frameworks that prevent any single state from monopolizing the conditions of global economic governance.

Nor does reparative internationalism require Americans to endure economic hardship as a form of reparation. On the contrary, it requires domestic fiscal policy in the United States itself to be organized around full employment and job guarantees. A country that manages its own economy through unemployment and scarcity cannot credibly support a more participatory global order.

The issue is not simply that support has too often been distributed cruelly rather than kindly. It is that support itself has been organized as an instrument of selective favor rather than as an ordinary condition of international participation. In the present authoritarian turn, that selectivity becomes more theatrical–and more spectacularly brutal–but it is not new.

The aim is not sacrifice but an order in which coordination is institutionally secured: a world in which societies can pursue democratic economic strategies without being disciplined by external financial constraints.

V. Practicing Reparative Internationalism in the Present

Progressive lawmakers do not need to command international institutions in order to begin advancing this framework. The present already offers ways to begin institutionalizing it.

Part of that work is rhetorical. It involves recognizing people, places, and forms of labor as public capacities where dominant policy language still treats them as fiscal burdens or economic costs, while refusing the assumption that unemployment, migration, or underdevelopment represent excess human lives to be managed through discipline. Even before institutions change, political language can begin to reorganize what counts as value, capacity, and participation.

Part of the work is domestic and programmatic. Public employment initiatives, care infrastructure, green development, debt relief, and other DPF-style policies do more than address local needs. They rehearse a governing logic in which public money is used to widen participation and build collective capacity. They help establish that full employment is not a fantasy or a slogan, but an institutional obligation.

Part of the work is transitional and international. Progressive lawmakers can support debt restructuring, oppose austerity conditionality, advocate for expanded swap lines, and back reforms that give other countries greater room to pursue inclusive social provisioning. These measures fall short of a fully reparative architecture. But they help soften the ground for one by weakening the idea that global order must be organized through scarcity, punishment, and hierarchy.

Because these hierarchies are continuously organized rather than simply inherited, they can be contested in the present through rhetoric, program design, and transitional institutional demands.

Reparative internationalism, then, is not only a future arrangement at the level of global institutions. It is an inter-temporal practice of recognizing capacity where others see cost, widening participation where others impose discipline, and advancing reforms that loosen the grip of hierarchical finance.

VI. Conclusion

The crises of the twenty-first century—financial instability, climate change, migration, and geopolitical fragmentation—cannot be addressed through a return to the institutions and assumptions of the late twentieth century.

What is required instead is a reparative internationalism centered on participation.

This means building and revising institutions to widen fiscal and democratic space rather than restricting it through austerity and external payment discipline. It means refusing to predicate participation in public life on a narrow test of economic usefulness. And it means treating participation as a world-making practice through which democratic capacity is built across borders.

The point is not merely to redistribute capacity within a fixed world order, but to reorganize the terms on which capacities, obligations, and claims come to count at all.

The goal is not a world organized around hierarchy or benevolent patronage, but one in which societies can participate in shaping the economic conditions that govern their lives.

In that sense, reparative internationalism names the unfinished institutional work of decolonization: a world organized around democratic participation.

Animal Spirits and Public Promises: Phantom Beavers and the Politics of Monetary Design

By Rob Hawkes

There is a spectre haunting Nigel Farage. The spectre of a beaver.

On 11 March 2026, the Bank of England announced that, following a public consultation, its next series of banknotes will feature images of the UK’s wildlife in place of historical figures, which have adorned our currency since the 1970s.

Mr. Farage was quick to describe this move as “absolutely crackers” (and, of course, “woke”) in a social media video which begins with a triumphant hailing of “our great British banknotes” and their images of “giant figures like Winston Churchill.” Soon, however, his tone shifts to one of ridicule: “And yet, they’re proposing that we replace people like him with a picture of a beaver. No I’m not making it up, this is actually what they’re proposing.” The Reform UK leader has never been one to let the truth get in the way of a good bit of faux outrage, but, if his “I’m not making it up” wasn’t enough of a clue that the facts might have undergone some stretching, a brief check of the BoE’s press release confirms that the “specific wildlife” the public would like to see depicted on the currency has yet to be determined via a further consultation process. Mr Farage, it seems, has conjured a phantom beaver.

One can only speculate as to why this particular animal spirit haunts Farage’s paranoid imagination but, considering Reform UK’s deep commitment to women’s rights, it is surely a mere accident that his mind landed on a word with a history in misogynistic slang. There is no knowing, either, why the thought of losing Jane Austen, JMW Turner, or Alan Turing from the “great British banknote” has not proved quite so distressing, either to our political leaders (Kemi Badenoch is also very cross), or to the BBC Question Time audience member who saw the replacement of Churchill as “surrendering to the radical left wing.” One of the panelists, the broadcaster Kay Burley, responded: “I think as long as we’ve got enough of them in our pockets at the end of the week, I don’t really care what’s on the back of my banknote.” Indeed, from the point of view of mainstream economics, which sees money as a politically-neutral medium of exchange, the material and aesthetic properties of monetary tokens are of no consequence. However, while we can question the motives underlying this week’s eruption of “anti-woke” anger, the questions of monetary design this episode opens up are anything but trivial.

As Alfred Mitchell Innes wrote in 1913, money is “credit and nothing but credit.” Indeed, in a powerful sense, Churchill, Austen, Turner, and Turing are all the posthumous recipients of public credit in the form of recognition, celebration, citation, and acknowledgement via the visual design of the existing £5, £10, £20, and £50 notes. In Turing’s case, in particular, this credit is also an act of reparation following the violence he endured at the hands of the British state in his lifetime. As well as bearing images of Churchill, Austen, Turner, and Turing, our banknotes announce that they “promise to pay.” And yet, this public promise also encompasses a commitment to redeem, to receive, to acknowledge, and to accept. In broader terms, the UK’s monetary system as a whole recognises the contributions of those who serve the public purpose – from health, to education, to social care – in the form of public credit.

As one of the world’s most nature-depleted countries, you could argue that the UK now owes far more to its wildlife than to its revered historical figures. And yet, the panic over the removal of Churchill points to the ingrained logic of austerity at the centre of British politics today. Acknowledging our past need not come at the expense of provisioning the future, but for Farage and those who share his worldview, these will always appear as zero-sum trade-offs. Despite living in one of the world’s richest countries, we are told, there is not enough to go round – someone must be left out, whether it’s animals vs. dead politicians or hungry children vs. cold pensioners, we’re always in a world of either/or and never both/and. Thus, striving for ecological sustainability and renewal, averting climate breakdown and arresting species loss, or meeting the needs of those our society marginalises (including migrants, people of colour, LGBTQIA+ communities, women, and disabled people), are imagined to be achievable only as a consequence of someone else’s suffering. However, as we at Money on the Left have been arguing in our work on Democratic Public Finance, while systemic exclusion is baked into the present logic of monetary design, this is not and has never been inevitable – we can design another, more inclusive and sustainable system just as we can redesign our banknotes.

Farage’s phantom beaver betrays an even deeper fear of democratic inclusion. As a thought experiment, let us imagine for a moment that a twenty-first century political leader might deliberately and unsubtly choose to imply that Churchill, the warlike epitome of masculine strength and defiance, was to be replaced by a euphemism long used to belittle and sexualise women. Might this indicate a wider hostility to women’s inclusion in the political and public spheres? Might the lack of comparable concern over the loss of a woman writer, an artist, or a gay man from the “great British banknote” also be telling? The BoE made the decision to feature wildlife on its new notes after an extensive public consultation. This was a more democratic choice than could ever have been arrived at had the Bank simply asked Nigel Farage what he might consider too “woke” or asked the man in the Question Time audience what would count as “surrendering to the radical left wing.” As we saw in the aftermath of the recent Gorton and Denton by-election, which saw Farage’s party’s candidate Matt Goodwin losing to the Greens’ Hannah Spencer, Reform UK’s instinct is to blame the public when it makes a decision it doesn’t like. By contrast, Democratic Public Finance invites everyone to join the conversation, not just about who or what we recognise and celebrate in the visual design of our currency, but how the monetary system itself functions, which people, places, and causes truly deserve public credit, and how acknowledging our shared past need never be pitted against our ability to build a better, more just, inclusive and sustainable future.

As Robyn Ollett and I wrote for Money on the Left last August, “the stories we tell about our communities and the people that build them are intimately bound up with the way we account for them in monetary terms.” We have since launched the Where Credit’s Due project in Middlesbrough with the aim of building intersectional solidarity and fostering conversations about monetary design in both visual and systemic senses. We began with a screening of Maren Poitras’s 2023 documentary Finding the Money – in which Lua K. Yuille observes that: “If money is natural, who has the money is natural as well” – and followed this with a series of workshops at Middlesbrough’s Dorman Museum, where our participants have experimented with designs for their own “Dorman Dollars” (see the image above). As these events have explored, neither the aesthetics nor the politics of monetary design are natural or inevitable. In place of the orthodox story, which tells us that the suffering of marginalised people and neglected places is necessary and that austerity’s exclusionary logic is the mark of responsible government, we have been learning how to tell new stories of money’s creative potential. In place of the phantom of inclusion-as-zero-sum-competition and the fear of democracy that haunts Nigel Farage, we offer Democratic Public Finance’s vision of ecosocial justice, which refuses to imagine false binary oppositions between wildlife and people, between men and women, or between the past and the future.

The Ontology of the Monetary Image: Référance and Reconstruction

By Will Beaman

Money is often introduced in critical theory as a problem. It appears as the medium that makes unlike things commensurable by reducing them to sameness, the abstraction that removes social life from the conditions that give it substance, or the sign that circulates by displacing the relations on which it depends. In one register, this is the Marxist account of commodity abstraction and estrangement. More specifically, it is the tendency within Marxist political economy to identify money with the value-form, and the value-form with a mystifying equivalence that becomes socially real and destructive. In another register, money becomes part of a deconstructive account of debt, mediation, and the impossibility of meanings or values ever being wholly self-identical. What these approaches share is the claim that money is bound up with failed identity: either it asserts an equivalence that does not in fact exist, or it reveals that equivalence never fully holds. Money is therefore treated either as a false identity or as a site of identity’s failure.

I want to start from a different premise. Money does not need to be understood first as the positing of identity. Commensuration is not exhausted by equivalence in the strongest sense, and credit should not be understood only as false unification or as a relation whose non-identity appears primarily as failure or guilt. Money is better understood as a practice of open public reference. At its most basic level, it stages comparison without requiring identity. By reference I do not mean only precise signification. References can also sample and remix, compare partially, cite selectively, echo playfully, or suggest likeness without exhausting what they carry forward. What matters here is a public act of relating—one that makes coordination, valuation, and obligation possible without discovering a pre-given sameness beneath them. The question, then, is not whether money imposes identity on a heterogeneous world, but what kind of reference money is.

Marxist criticism is most useful when it shows how capitalist monetary forms narrow what can count as socially intelligible. When labor appears only as wage labor, when production appears only through profitability, and when public capacity appears as fixed, money becomes a disciplinary medium. But it is not enough to say that capital captures money and thereby generates socially real abstractions. That still risks treating reification as the basic ontology of money rather than as one historically powerful monetary idiom. What appears here as private value or abstract equivalence is better understood as a genre of reference—a way of organizing relations that presents its own ratios as self-grounding while treating the conditions of issuance and receivability as if they were already settled. Even in these privational forms, money is not ontologically private. It remains a contested public utility, and the terms on which claims are issued, received, and made to count are never fully removed from political struggle.

A similar point can be made about deconstructive accounts of debt and mediation. These traditions are right to insist that identity does not close. Debt is never just a neutral balancing of accounts but is bound up with obligation, memory, punishment, and the effort to make a claim hold over time. More generally, settlement never arrives in a final and self-contained form, because any act of meaning or repayment depends on signs, conventions, and contexts that exceed it. Derrida’s term différance combines difference and deferral to name this condition: meaning is never simply present all at once in a self-identical form. A word becomes intelligible through its differences from other words, through traces of prior use, and through its repeatability across contexts. What appears self-grounding or immediately given is therefore mediated. Applied to economic life, the point is that a price does not contain the full reality of the good it prices, and a wage does not contain the full reality of the labor it measures. Monetary signs are in no objective sense equal to the world they organize. If one begins from identity or presence, non-coincidence appears as différance.

If différance clarifies the mediated conditions of signification, we might use référance to clarify the mediated conditions of reference. Derrida’s altered spelling marks a difference that is visible in writing but not audible in speech, making the temporal discontinuity of signification legible at the level of the word itself. Référance transvalues that gesture. It marks not only the non-presence of meaning, but the inscribability of claims across the spacing of currency issuance and uptake. Just as writing happens here and reading happens there, issuance happens here and receivability is negotiated there as a reversible stagecraft rather than a closed transfer. Rather than starting from identity and its failure, référance begins from relations that are non-identical from the start and do not require identity as their ground. If one begins instead from analogy and provision, from a shared problem that referential coordination across non-identity helps organize and contest, the same field appears as référance. The inadequacy of identity is the site of différance; non-identical relation is the site of référance. These do not necessarily name different empirical objects. They name different descriptions of the same mediated field. Référance names an open public reference: a way of suggesting likeness and holding claims together without discovering a final identity beneath them. Money, on this account, is not the successful representation of a prior economic reality, and it is not merely the symptom of a constitutive lack. It is a partial articulation of the social world as countable and revisable.

In monetary life, référance works through analogy: a way of holding heterogeneous things in accountable relation without making them identical. Analogy here does not mean approximation to a fixed norm. It means that likeness can be suggested and coordinated without being gathered into identity. A wage does not make labor the same thing as money. A price does not make a good identical with a number. A budget line does not make a public need identical with its accounting expression. Identity fails, but coordination still takes place.

The reparations movement offers a political example. A cash payment may form part of reparations for slavery without being identical to reparations or exhausting their meaning. Indeed, reparations are possible in part because money is not exhausted by any punctual scene of settlement. Its non-identity makes it intertemporally inscribable as a medium of repair, capable of carrying past harms, present claims, and future obligations in relation. The relation is not merely metaphorical or supplementary. It is analogical. Payment participates in a broader project of repair that can also take juridical, institutional, pedagogical, and aesthetic forms. This is part of how reparations remain durable across changing media and struggles: not because the claim is reducible to one self-identical demand, but because it can be carried forward across different scenes of reference. Reparations, in this sense, name an open historical and political problem-space rather than a single settled form.

Existing monetary forms often conceal the work of reference. We might think of this in terms similar to the continuity system in cinema. Continuity editing does not literally create seamless space-time. It produces continuity as an effect while hiding the cuts, conventions, and labor that make it possible. Some monetary forms work in the same way. They stage commensurability as a simple fact and obscure the referential work by which non-identical terms are brought into relation. What appears as neutral equivalence is often the product of historically specific conventions that present themselves as natural.

For that reason, reconstruction matters as much as critique. Reconstruction begins not from failed closure but from non-identical relation. Monetary institutions are never complete, never innocent, and never outside power. But they are not simply illusions waiting to be exposed. They are infrastructures through which claims become receivable, contestable, and revisable. To reference is also to cite: to carry something forward and make it count within a shared scene of recognition. Credit clarifies the connection. To credit is not only to finance but also to acknowledge, attribute, and extend receivability in monetary terms.

The historical period of Reconstruction after the U.S. Civil War extends the reparations analogy. In that moment, the terms under which social life could count within public institutions were reorganized. New images were put forward in which labor appeared as employable beyond the plantation. Citizenship appeared as enfranchisable across race. Land appeared as redistributable rather than fixed within the slaveholding order. Credit appeared as more issuable to newly recognized participants in public life. Black participation appeared as precious and indispensable to public life. None of these predicates produced stable identities, and all were violently contested. Yet they established new relations through which claims could be made and received within a multiracial democracy. Reconstruction therefore names not only a historical period but a problem of reference: how heterogeneous lives can be sustained together within shared institutions without collapsing their differences into a single form.

The political economic question is therefore what kinds of open public references monetary forms establish, and whether they do so reflexively or under the cover of objectivity. A reconstructive critique of money asks who may issue, who may count, what may be valued, which obligations are recognized, and which forms of life are treated as worthy of support. The task is to reconstruct money as accountable relation rather than failed identity.

Fiscal Chronotopes: #ZcavengerHunt, the Zetro Card, and the New Finance Franchise

By Will Beaman

This essay is lightly adapted from a talk delivered at the 2026 American Comparative Literature Association conference. It contributes to a growing body of endogenous money theorization that we at Money on the Left call Democratic Public Finance (DPF). DPF begins from the distributed and publicly mediated character of political-economic life, approaching money, credit, and accounting as contested infrastructures that are at once citational and coordinative. My contribution to that project here concerns the conditions of legibility for political-economic imaginaries.

Fiscal practices and counter-practices unfold within spatial and temporal genres that rehearse what feels like a “realistic” order of operations: where money is imagined to come from and what must happen for it to name and remunerate social capacities. In those genres, design questions are often staged as discoverable facts about economic reality that necessarily constrain politics. But they can also be staged additively, so that public spending expands who and what can count. At stake throughout is how public money is imagined and how public obligation is organized.

One familiar name for this problem in endogenous money discourse is the finance franchise: the idea that monetary power is extended through licensed issuers and delegated circuits. That mapping matters, but it can mislead when it encourages us to treat monetary agency as primarily top-down. My wager is that the finance franchise is also organized from the middle, through durable genres and rehearsals that make monetary agency legible in public life. The franchise, in other words, is not only a legal architecture. It is also a genre environment that trains what public agency can look like and when it can count. Borrowing from Mikhail Bakhtin, I call these patterned organizations fiscal chronotopes: time-space forms through which a world becomes legible as a sequence of events, obligations, and thresholds.

A key feature of these chronotopes is that they are often polyvocal. The same practice can remain stable while supporting more than one coherent reading. That is one reason fiscal forms travel across heterogeneous publics. It also means analysis cannot treat perception as passive reception, as if fiscal reality simply presents itself and we merely record it. What is often called “fiscal reality,” including in MMT and endogenous money discourse, is too often treated as a stable object waiting to be revealed. Here I treat it instead as reversible stagecraft: a field of gestures and formats that can sustain more than one stable reading and that trains what becomes legible as responsibility and what becomes actionable, or receivable, as public obligation.

Duck-Rabbits and Fiscal Reality

We can think about this with the famous duck-rabbit optical illusion. The drawing can be seen either as a duck facing left or a rabbit facing right. The same lines support two incompatible but equally stable readings, and that is precisely why the image circulates. Gestalt phenomenology took this as evidence that perception is not passive reception but active organization. What we see depends on both figure and orientation. The duck-rabbit shows that the same object can support different gestalt wholes without collapsing into incoherence.

That claim matters here for two reasons. First, it helps describe a dynamic that shapes the present: an inherited neoliberal temporality of passive administration amid crisis can be flipped into open authoritarian bullying without becoming identical to it. Neoliberal governance has long rehearsed a fiscal chronotope in which government is staged as the administration of scarcity. Capacity appears fixed, and the acquisition of scarce funds takes the form of a hostage negotiation in which the rich and powerful must be satisfied before money can be spent legitimately. In that chronotope, the destruction of infrastructure and capacity – austerity, underemployment, deferred maintenance – is moralized as a settlement required to keep the public books balanced.

Authoritarian politics plays off that form. It preserves the scarcity framing and the hostage structure, but converts the earlier posture of impotence before “the market” into a spectacle of punishment and reward. The “winners and losers” of globalization become something closer to the “winners and losers” of The Apprentice. Where neoliberalism moralizes constraint as necessity, the shakedown celebrates it as domination and as proof of the exceptionality of Trump’s supporters. The two chronotopes therefore share recognizable features, which is part of what makes collaboration and institutional capture possible. But they organize those features into different narratives of agency and responsibility.

Second, the duck-rabbit offers a rule for reading the campaign practices I turn to next. Last summer, Mamdani’s campaign ran a citywide scavenger hunt called the #ZcavengerHunt and introduced the Zetro Card, a playful punchcard through which volunteer contributions became receivable for campaign merchandise. The question is not whether these practices are really fiscal governance in disguise. The point is that they can be participation formats and, at the same time, rehearsals of public credit and fiscal authority. They make participation legible, and they can later help make other kinds of fiscal action feel actionable. In that sense, they point toward a new finance franchise whose conditions of possibility are distributed and democratic: authority gathered and renewed through rehearsal rather than granted only from above.

With this in mind, I read #ZcavengerHunt and the Zetro Card as formats that organize fiscal time and space. They are not policy proposals in disguise, but participation devices whose polyvalence trains what counts as collective action and what later counts as legitimate public work. The point is not to decide whether they are “really” fiscal politics or “merely” campaign theater. It is to track what they make variously legible (and hence variously actionable), and how their multi-legibility lets them travel across heterogeneous publics without requiring doctrinal consensus.

The #ZcavengerHunt

I begin with #ZcavengerHunt, which composes a bounded public present, and then turn my attention to the Zetro Card as a more durable rhythm of participation and completion. In the #ZcavengerHunt on a warm day in August, people moved through a sequence of locations, following prompts posted in real time and showing up in large numbers. It was playful and conspicuously gamified, but it was also immediately recognizable as a campaign event: a way to generate momentum, attention, and contact.

The chronotopic question, though, is what kind of time and space the format composed, and what that composition made legible. #ZcavengerHunt organized routes and gathering points so that participation took a clear, shared shape. A city that often appears as dispersed constituencies and isolated commutes was briefly refigured as a coordinated circuit: a public moving through space together according to a posted order.

This helps explain why so many people on social media reached for the same comparison and said Mamdani had finally made “Pokemon Go to the Polls” happen in earnest. The comparison points to more than fun. It names the way a game can give political participation a navigable form, one that does not require prior expertise, ideological unity, or even a single reason for being there. You do not have to be converted to join. You just have to be able to read the next move and keep going.

Campaigns sit awkwardly within the dominant governance chronotope. They happen before governance, and much of their labor is volunteer-based, informal, and hard to count. In a genre environment that tends to recognize work only once it is officially authorized and paid, campaigning can become strangely unreal: “just politics,” “just vibes,” or “just messaging,” as if the labor of coordination does not count as labor.

#ZcavengerHunt pushes against that occlusion. It renders campaign labor legible as a visible, shared activity while remaining playful, and that playfulness matters because it lets participation count without first taking on solemnity. A scavenger hunt does not require participants to share the same inner narrative about why they are there; it requires only that they inhabit the same sequence. People can show up for different reasons and still cohere as a public. That is not a weakness but part of how democratic forms remain durable across heterogeneous readings.

#ZcavengerHunt is not public works in the sense of a municipal project. But it does rehearse public work by rendering coordination labor legible and staging completion as something a public can do together in the open. It rehearses turnout and GOTV, but also the broader premise that collective activity can be organized as an ordinary feature of public life rather than dismissed as a break from “real” administration. A related form appears in the more recent snow-shoveling mobilization: a public standard is set, capacity is scaled to meet it, and the work itself is the primary obligation rather than a revenue-constrained aspiration.

The Zetro Card

The Zetro Card began as a workaround. At one point in the campaign’s fundraising, election-law rules constrained the sale of campaign merchandise. The usual sequence could no longer operate in the same way. Rather than treat that constraint as a hard stop, the campaign invented another format for recognition and circulation. The Zetro Card is that format: a playful punchcard that volunteers receive at canvasses, phone banks, pop-ups, and other events, stamped for contributions and made receivable for campaign merchandise once enough stamps accumulate.

It is immediately recognizable as gamification, and it is partly that. But the origin story matters because it shows how quickly constraints become questions of form. The card does not arise from a neutral design space. It emerges within a rule-bound environment that forces the campaign to ask how value and recognition can keep moving when a familiar channel narrows. That is endogenous improvisation in miniature: a practical restaging of how participation can be honored under constraint.

As I suggested at the time in a joking-not-joking piece for Money on the Left, the punchcard format also invites expansion. It offers a way of thinking through how organizing labor might become legible as something closer to public work without pretending the campaign had already become the city. The Zetro Card’s meaning was flexible from the start. The same format reads equally well as merch logistics, volunteer morale, or a revisable experiment in how recognition might be formalized and scaled.

Where #ZcavengerHunt gave campaign mobilization the form of an attraction, the Zetro Card established form that can persist across time. Contributions that are otherwise informal and hard to count are gathered into a shared rhythm rather than fading back into the background as “just politics.” That continuity should not be confused with seamlessness. The card works because it is modular: it can absorb uneven moments of participation while preserving a stable form. Continuity, in this sense, is not the absence of interruption but the achievement of a repeated public rhythm.

If #ZcavengerHunt made campaigning legible as collective movement all at once, the Zetro Card makes it legible as ongoing work that can persist without constant spectacle. The duck-rabbit point holds here too. The card can be read straightforwardly as morale, retention, and branding. It can also be read as a rehearsal of public credit in miniature because it stages a relationship among contribution, recognition, and redemption. Those readings do not cancel each other. Its political usefulness depends on remaining legible in both registers at once.

From Campaigning to Governing

What this adds to the campaign-versus-governance question is not a fantasy of immediate substitution but a shift in genre. The Zetro Card treats participation as something that can carry forward and return as recognition over time. It offers a small but suggestive model of how collective capacities get named and taken up through repeatable formats. When the scene shifts to snow shoveling as paid public work organized around an accessibility standard, the register changes. But the underlying wager remains familiar: the work comes first as an obligation we can name, and the question of coordination follows from that obligation rather than preempting it.

Many commentators described #ZcavengerHunt and the Zetro Card as Mamdani’s way of responding to fascist terror with fun and levity, and that is true enough. But fun and levity are chronotopic. They organize political time differently from the rhythm of fiscal and political crisis that has dominated neoliberal governance and returned in Trump’s threats and shakedowns. Within dominant fiscal chronotopes, crisis appears as something that suspends public obligation rather than reinforcing it.

The campaign practices matter because they elaborate a different, more democratic public chronotope. #ZcavengerHunt exemplifies an event whose form is nonetheless repeatable, while the Zetro Card extends that same participatory logic into a more continuous sequence of recognition and coordination. In both cases, levity is not a retreat from politics but an effect of agency: a way of making collective capacity feel present and repeatable under conditions designed to make agency feel foreclosed. If neoliberal and MAGA temporalities narrow the field of action, these practices widen it by building forms in which people can act together without waiting for permission in advance.

That framing also helps clarify why the shift from campaign to governance is not a clean break. The same administration can operate in more than one chronotopic tense at once because it inherits institutions and media habits that keep staging money as if it originates in private pockets and enters public life only through reluctant concession. In the early months of Mamdani’s term, that tension has been visible in real time. Libraries were cut recently in the name of efficiency, a recognizably neoliberal move that treats capacity as fixed and management as the art of trimming. Last weekend, by contrast, snow-shoveling capacity was dramatically scaled up around a clear public standard of sidewalk accessibility. The public messaging around recruiting shovelers had its own playful, mobilizing energy, closer in spirit to the campaign experiments than to the dour genre of austerity.

The snow-shoveling episode matters because it puts a different orientation on display. Productive capacity appears here as a political variable rather than a ceiling. The public standard comes first — accessibility as constitutive of public space — and labor is then scaled to meet it. Operationally, the cash management and accounting settlement for that expansion happens afterward through ongoing negotiation and coordination. That, too, can be read in duck-rabbit fashion. In a familiar neoliberal reading, belated settlement is framed as debt that must be “paid back,” as if the city has put extra shoveling on a public credit card that will eventually come due. But belated settlement also makes something else visible: once scale becomes adjustable in order to meet a standard, the question “how are you going to pay for it?” is already being treated as a design question rather than an external veto on what counts as an obligation.

That is the fork in the road these campaign rehearsals help make visible. One path translates public need back into scarcity management, with the destruction of capacity repeatedly framed as responsibility. The other treats care capacity and employment as public ends and treats settlement as an ongoing political task rather than using it to delay action. Fiscal chronotopes are the genre environments in which those paths become legible in the first place, where some sequences of permission and closure feel natural and others do not. The wager behind these playful practices is that changing what a public can recognize is often the first step toward changing what it can do, and that democratic public finance, especially amid open sabotage and non-cooperation from the federal government, depends on rehearsing alternative temporalities and keeping them publicly legible.

Out of the Shadows: Public Banking for Municipal Finance

By Tyler Suksawat & Scott Ferguson

Editor’s Note: The following essay, originally published on March 3, 2026, offers a foundational theoretical framework for what has since been concretized as The Seattle Loop. The Seattle Loop is a fiscal strategy that utilizes municipal banking to purchase city debt, “looping” interest payments back into public provisions like social housing and green jobs. While this piece was written prior to our specific pivot toward the Seattle-based organizing effort, it articulates the core logic of public credit and municipal finance that underpins the current project.

In a recent essay, we advanced a proposal for sub-federal governments to sell municipal bonds to their own public banks. We took the city as our primary point of departure, but the same lessons are applicable to U.S. counties and states. Establishing a public bank that regularly purchases municipal debt, we argued, would not only significantly expand a city’s fiscal capacity to support its communities and environs, but also reclaim regional public finance from a parasitical and punishing bond market. 

Since the publication of our essay, some commentators have criticized the proposal for involving city finance in so-called shadow banking, precisely because it places public credit creation outside traditional private capital markets. Such concerns are rooted in a legitimate wariness toward the unregulated and often fragile credit structures that trigger financial crises. However, this criticism fails to distinguish between speculative private ventures and institutionalized provisioning by the municipal public purse. Indeed, such a critique mistakes the absence of private middlemen for a lack of financial oversight and security. Our plan, by contrast, replaces the opaque and volatile shadows of private intermediation with a transparent, public-facing mechanism anchored in the enduring fiscal authority of the city government.

Today, municipal finance remains trapped in an exploitative and convoluted cycle. When a city issues debt, it is immediately subjected to a gauntlet of private intermediaries: banks underwrite the bonds, rating agencies perform a gatekeeping function via risk assessment, and institutional investors claim interest as a form of social rent. Crucially, these investors are often not traditional depository banks, but rather volatile non-bank entities such as money market mutual funds and hedge funds, which treat municipal bonds as liquid shadow money to be leveraged for short-term gain. As it stands, then, the public purse is already precariously entangled in shadow banking, with municipal debt serving as a primary asset for the volatile and uninsured money markets that dominate the status quo. Every stage of this process, meanwhile, is governed by a “fiscal discipline” that prioritizes private profit over public need. Thus, far from a stable, above-board process, the current municipal model represents an architecture of austerity that embeds the public interest within the murky, predatory, and destabilizing mechanisms of market-based finance.

Our proposal replaces the fragility of the shadow market with an architecture of public provisioning. Before we turn to the specific mechanisms of financial stability, we must first establish the basic institutional design. We propose a publicly owned institution with chartered banking powers–including direct access to the Federal Reserve’s discount window–that allows the city to bypass the private gauntlet and recapture its own credit. Under this arrangement, the interest generated by municipal debt is no longer captured as social rent; instead, it is credited back to the issuer’s general fund. While both the private market and our public model acknowledge that credit is fundamentally elastic, the divergence lies in who controls and benefits from that elasticity. By internalizing debt service and neutralizing the power of rating agencies, our proposal transforms the financial model from an extractive regime into a regenerative one.

This formalization—grounding municipal debt finance in a chartered public bank, regulated oversight, and direct access to central bank liquidity—moves our model firmly into the light of the regulated banking system. If critics wish to argue about the risks of aggressive credit expansion or the blurring of fiscal and monetary lines, those are legitimate debates over localized monetary and credit governance. But to label a chartered, transparently regulated public utility as “shadow banking” is a category error. Our plan does not evade regulation; it institutionalizes public purpose through it.

Regarding the safety of deposits, public ownership is no barrier to FDIC insurance. A state-chartered public bank meeting standard capital and supervisory requirements can qualify for federal backing. However, even in the absence of the FDIC, the Bank of North Dakota provides a proven roadmap: deposits can be backed by the full faith and credit of the municipal government itself. In this architecture, deposit safety is a design constraint managed through robust capital buffers and strict regulatory adherence, rather than an impossibility.

In this context, the risk of default on deposits is a feature of any bank lacking sufficient capital or insurance. Critics often raise the specter of “portfolio concentration,” but a public bank purchasing its own city’s bonds is simply internalizing fiscal risk. This shifts the concern from “depositor loss” to the broader question of municipal insolvency–a condition that, in our schema, is mitigated by the bank’s ability to coordinate with the city’s broader fiscal agenda. We address concentration not through the fickle discipline of the bond market, but through diversified asset management and the elimination of capitalist underwriting.

The most powerful engine of this model is its mandated retention and concerted utilization of public deposits, serving as a foundation for proactive public provisioning. By directing city payrolls, vendor payments, contractor accounts, and the collection of taxes, fines, fees, and even utility payments (as seen in Seattle) through the public bank, we create a massive, stable foundation of liquidity to be deployed for the common good. This capacity becomes particularly transformative when paired with a local Job Guarantee program. The bank provides the strong accounting infrastructure for such a program, ensuring that municipal payrolls for public works are settled within the public’s own credit circuit to build and sustain community wealth. Consequently, the interest payments that currently “leave” the city as social rent are instead retained, further expanding the city’s financial system and its capacity to support collective wellbeing with every cycle.

Finally, we must correct a persistent metallic-standard myth: the idea that a bank’s ability to purchase bonds is constrained 1:1 by its existing deposits. As any modern banker knows, loans create deposits. Banks expand their balance sheets first and manage reserves afterward. The true constraints on our model, then, are not “available deposits,” but rather regulatory capital ratios and liquidity coverage rules. We acknowledge these constraints and embrace them. Our goal is not to evade regulation, but to use the inherent elasticity of credit to activate municipal democracy and provision the public good.

Contesting the End of India’s Job Guarantee with Khush Vachhrajani

For over twenty years, India’s national rural jobs program provided a legal right to work for over 265 million people–the majority of them women–serving as a vital lifeline against poverty and a global model for social security. Tragically, however, that lifeline is now being cut.

In this episode, we speak with Khush Vachhrajani, writer and national coordinator at the Social Accountability Forum for Action and Research in India, about his recent article in The Wire, “How to Kill a Golden Goose: MGNREGA Repeal Reveals More than it Hides.” Vachhrajani contextualizes the sudden 2026 demise of the Mahatma Gandhi National Rural Employment Guarantee Act (MGNREGA) and its replacement by the new Viksit Bharat–Guarantee for Rozgar and Ajeevika Mission (VB-G RAM G). As he explains, this shift effectively “kills the golden goose” for millions of rural workers by replacing a demand-driven legal guarantee with arbitrary budget caps and centralized control. We discuss the neoliberal money politics behind this move: a calculated transition from a rights-based framework that empowered workers to a supply-led scheme that prioritizes fiscal austerity over human dignity.

Still, our dialog is not merely a post-mortem of a fallen policy. From the “Save MGNREGA” nationwide agitations to defiant resolutions passed in thousands of Gram Sabhas, the people of India are actively fighting to reclaim their right to work. This episode explores both the devastating effects of the repeal and the growing movement of workers, unions, and activists who refuse to let this Golden Goose go quietly, proving that the struggle for democratic accountability is far from over.

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Music by Nahneen Kula: www.nahneenkula.com

Transcript

This transcript has been edited for readability.

William Saas

Khush Vachhrajani, welcome to Money on the Left.

Khush Vachhrajani

Thank you so much. Delighted to be here.

William Saas

Could you start by just telling us a little bit about your background and what brought you to the kind of questions that you’re asking in your most recent research, which you’re producing through your position at the Social Accountability Forum for Action and Research, or SAFAR, and sharing on your Substack?

Khush Vachhrajani

Sure. So, I’m from India. I’m from this city called Ahmedabad, which is in the western state of Gujarat. That’s also where the Prime Minister comes from, so, I think it has gone on the maps because of that. But it’s also the state where Gandhi was born and a very long part of his life after coming back from South Africa, when he started his journey in India, began from the state that I come from. I studied in a school that was sort of built on the foundation of some of the principles that Gandhi himself sort of taught us as a society. I currently work with a collective called the Social Accountability Forum for Action and Research.

We are a group who’s just interested in making democracy work on a day to day basis for the most marginalized. We don’t see democracy as just an election-to-election arrangement, but also in terms of a person’s right to be heard, a person’s right to grievance, a person’s right to participate in the smallest decision making that affects the person or the society as a whole.

The work also is sort of anchored in some of these democratic principles. Apart from that, I love to read. I have been a follower of many of the progressive ideas that you all have sort of built over a period of time on Money on the Left and also have learned immensely from the writing, and the guests who have come here which has also sort of shaped a very core part of my own politics around money, around looking at monetary design. I enjoy music. I enjoy sports, and I have a lovely dog who’s going to turn five years old this year, and her name is Estelle. And that’s it. That’s more or less about me.

Scott Ferguson

That’s great. Can you maybe talk a little bit about some of your experience? You also studied in the United States and worked in the United States for a little bit.

Khush Vachhrajani

I did, so I did my master’s in public affairs. In the US, I was at Brown University in 2019 and 20. So my education was over when the pandemic sort of kicked in. During my time in the US, I also spent three months working in Houston, in the Mayor’s Office of Complete Communities, which was an initiative largely to identify and then work towards supporting under-resourced and historically underrepresented communities in Houston. My task was to sort of look at the habitability question in one of those communities called Gulfton, where I learned a lot around some of the challenges that the United States also face in terms of the politics of, at times, immigration, challenges around creating a safer environment for many of the people who come to the United States with a lot of ambition or aspirations, and sometimes also out of desperation.

So, I had a great time working with the mayor’s office and also sort of learnt a great deal about what are some of the day-to-days of the immigrants who live in Houston and how a mayor could support them through that administration. So, yeah. Before that, I was also sort of engaged in working with governments and civil society in India.

My education built on my lived experiences in India and sharpened my imagination, I would say, as well as my ability to contribute to some of these things that sort of affect the lives of people.

Scott Ferguson

What occasions this conversation today is the publication of an article that you wrote titled “How to Kill a Golden Goose: MGNREGA Repeal Reveals More Than It Hides,” and it was published in a publication called The Wire. It’s essentially criticizing and diagnosing the radical curtailment and maybe even demise of this public works program that’s been around for decades, since the 90s, I believe, in India.

It’s a terrible situation, but we found that your analysis and your framing of the argument to be really thorough and quite inspiring, despite the fact that it’s such a tragic situation, precisely because you frame these politics as a politics of not just money, but monetary design.

So I don’t know where you’d like to start. We could potentially start by talking about the nature of this program. Some people who listen to this show might be aware of this program, but, probably a lot aren’t. So maybe we can just start with, where did this program come from? Where did it arise? Maybe the happy part of the story before we get to its dismantling, very recently.

Khush Vachhrajani

Right. The more hopeful part, I would say. These state backed public employment programs have been around in different parts of India since the 80s and the 90s, largely framed around Social Security for rural workers in absence of decent agricultural work, but more so as a protection against famine or any sort of climate crisis which might affect the agricultural work itself.

So whenever there was absence of work due to these kinds of scenarios, the government would come in and they would focus on largely rural public works, which can be done through manual workers. Against that kind of work, they would provide them wages for sustenance. So these kinds of programs have been around in India since the 80s and 90s in some parts.

And the experiences of those programs became a backbone for a broader advocacy in India, especially after the 1990s, where India sort of liberalized, opened up its economy, adopted the neoliberal, market-based framework in the economy, which brought in a lot of resources, finances and money to a very, very small section of society in a sense.

But the precarity in rural areas amongst workers, especially manual workers, agricultural workers, construction workers, deepened over the entire decade. So in the late 90s and early 2000s, the experiences of these public works programs in other parts of India sort of became a central piece of argument that India needs a federal job guarantee kind of a framework.

It was also sort of demanded or was framed as a program, or a demand, as a state’s obligation to its people. It was articulated as people’s right to work within the constitutional framework. It was framed as a sort of politics of money that the people are deeply interested in and which sort of breaks away from the neoliberal framework that the state was pushing, in a sense.

So, in 2005, after the advocacy of about 7 to 8 years, the Mahatma Gandhi National Rural Employment Guarantee Act came about. So MGNREGA is what it is called, in a shorter sense, or sometimes in India, we also call it NREGA. So, NREGA was sort of conceptualized with this vision that every single person who wants to work can get work under this program.

There will be wage parity amongst men and women. Again, it was a breakthrough at that time. The government sort of decided a particular floor at which people are to be paid and that the floor will be revised every year based on inflation. So it’s sort of created a progressive framework which was rooted in creating a public option for employment.

While it was demanded to be a program which is running throughout the year, the government sort of enacted this law where each household will get work for up to 100 days a year. So instead of every person, it was like one person per household for 100 days. And, in terms of its design, if there are four people in a household who are above 18 – the working age – let’s say, for example, then all four people would be a part of, what was called, a job card.

Amongst those 100 people, anybody could come out and work. So it was again like 100 days per household. That’s how the program was shaped. In addition to creating this public employment option, it also created, as I said, a wage floor which was equal for men and women.

It also sort of provided 10 rights to the workers themselves; to each and every one of them will have a job card, they can go and demand work at any time, they will get work within five kilometers of their radius, they will get certain facilities at the worksite, they will get paid within 15 days of completing work, they will have the power to audit the kind of work that is happening around them (etc.). It was a very, very progressive legislation which was fought for by people’s campaigns and struggles for almost a decade. So that was basically the foundation of how the law came about. When it was passed in the parliament in 2005, it was passed unanimously, across all party lines, across all different political ideologies.

It was passed with a very emphatic belief that this is creating a right to livelihood or at least a path for people to claim the right to livelihood, but also with sort of an understanding that within the new liberal economic framework, this is the least a country could do for its people, which is sort of a public option at a particular rate for just 100 days a year.

So that has always been there and that is also something that I address in my article that this has never really been a revolutionary program the way that we all want, but it was still fundamental as a cornerstone in people’s politics in India.

Scott Ferguson

Was it restricted to rural areas or did it also operate in urban areas?

Khush Vachhrajani

It was restricted to rural areas, which would be about almost 70% of India. So it’s still pretty universal in that sense. What emerged after all these years of NREGA being operationalized is also that, during Covid, there were several urban employment guarantee programs, which were designed and launched in urban areas as well by different state governments.

In 2023, my neighboring state, Rajasthan, enacted an urban employment guarantee law itself, which mandated 125 days of urban employment on very similar lines of NREGA . So that is also one of the contributions, which I don’t really talk about in the article that has come out, but this is definitely something that I’m writing in my next piece reflecting on these kinds of effects that NREGA has had in the political imagination of Indian society as well.

Scott Ferguson

What’s your sense of the kind of work that has gone on in the auspices of this program, that I would assume is pretty various? There’s not just one type of employment. Do you have a sense of the variety of work?

Khush Vachhrajani

Absolutely. So another beautiful part of the design of the law, since it was fought for by a people’s movement and struggle which sort of informed the overall design, every local unit in India – that local unit in rural areas is called a Gram Panchayat, you can also sort of understand that it’s GP – every GP has to first think about all kinds of work that they can do under NREGA.

So it is not a top down design. It sort of stems from the most decentralized local unit, and each Gram Panchayat is supposed to create, what we call as basket of works, at least 2.5 times the demand that may exist in the local area. So they have to make sure that they are able to imagine and they’re able to create enough work in their area so that they are able to meet demands up to two and a half times, which is quite great. The works that we’ve seen in India has varied a lot also because of the kind of geographies that have been we have seen in the northeastern part of India, which is very, very remote, with very deep forests and hills where this program has been used to build pathways for people living in the valleys to come up on the main road and get connected to the public transportation system in the southern part of India or even in the western part of India where the droughts are very, very common. We’ve seen this program creating step wells in villages, which is sort of a local traditional mechanism of storing rainwater. In the northern part of India, there are mountains in the Himalayas which are prone to landslides. We have seen this program creating a more ecologically sound infrastructure that is needed for the local community to not only commute, but also to sort of earn a livelihood.

Another aspect of the program has also been that different kinds of people can access the program. So if, let’s say, I’m a person with a disability, then the program design allows me to work either in my own backyard or in my house, and it will be counted under the NREGA. If I come from an historically marginalized community, which in India we call scheduled tribes and, the scheduled castes (Dalits).

So if I come from the Scheduled Castes or Scheduled Tribes, I can work up to 200 days. Sorry, actually, 150 days in a year. If I am a person with disabilities, I can work up to 200 days a year. So all these progressive thoughts of who’s working, where they are working, and who is sort of making claims, is rooted in the design of the program.

There is enough documentation, a lot of writing, and several documentaries which have also been able to record the range of work that NREGA has been able to create. Even in the program design, they are all called assets. The NREGA has been building assets and not just work because these are all rural social infrastructure which is aiding the economic, political, social lives of people.

It’s been quite extraordinary in my experience, I have seen this operate in multiple geographies, multiple parts of India. I have also worked at a NREGA site during my experience in Rajasthan. These are all manual works. Imagine they are creating a small canal to make sure that the water flows smoothly between farms sometimes. In popular opinion writing, all these works are sort of termed as low skill works. Okay, but anybody who has worked in NREGA would be able to say  how highly skilled these works are. It’s not easy to both design and plan and then dig a stepwell. It’s not easy to build roads. 

Scott Ferguson

I don’t know how to do that.

Khush Vachhrajani

Exactly, exactly. Right. All these works are sort of termed as low skill, manual works, but I always term them as manual works which are building social, political, economic, architecture in many of these villages.

William Saas

So I don’t know if you’ve attended any meetings of the GP’s, or if they are documented in these documentaries, which I am absolutely excited to take a look at later, but do you have a sense for what those meetings are like? It strikes me that they’re probably more than just getting together and writing down a list of tasks to complete, but might end up being more expressive of community values and, as you say, social relations at the same time as they are about identifying work to do. Can you just provide any kind of overall broad or personal description of what goes on at these things?

00;21;59;12 – 00;22;26;18

Khush Vachhrajani

Absolutely. These meetings, at the GP levels, are called Gram Sabha, which are basically convenings at the village level, in translation, and all the decisions which pertain to the GP or the village or the local unit are supposed to be taken only in Gram Sabha.

So it is like a general body of all the voting members of a GP. Right. From deciding what kind of work that needs to be done to the kind of money that will be needed to do this work, which, in the program, is called the Labor Budget. It is also developed in these Gram Sabha. To understand how these Gram Sabha work, and the picture that I’m going to sort of share is also how a Gram Sabha is really well organized, right, or is very well planned because like all other democratic functions, it is also a function of how active the voter is, how much power are they exercising as citizens of the Gram Sabha. There will always be vested interests. There will always be attempts toward the participation of people. But in some of these most thriving Gram Sabha that I have seen or many of us have seen, it takes place in layers.

First and foremost, there is a caste layer in India. India is a very deeply caste society, where the caste hierarchies govern many of these social relations, power struggles, control over resources and MGNREGA plans for these kinds of things. So if, let’s say, a well has to be built or a tree plantation has to be done to develop a garden, for example, which area would it take place in the village? Which are the communities that would benefit out of it? All these conversations are quite central to these discussions in Gram Sabha. So the first layer that these Gram Sabha try to facilitate, again these Gram Sabha, which are organized with an intent to make many of these things work, is to unpack what are the needs of different groups and communities within that village, wherever they are located and situated in terms of infrastructure.

The second layer that it unpacks is the layer of gender. I have said in my article that more than 50% of these workers are women workers. They are the ones who are in the villages. They are raising kids. They’re taking care of elderly parents. They are taking care of the farmlands. They are the ones who have not really migrated out of the villages to urban areas for work. So, the gender layers are very important in these kinds of conversations and the kind of infrastructure that women might need. Most of the time, the way Indian villages are organized is the responsibility of fetching water.

If I do not have access to piped drinking water or water for domestic chores, it falls on women. So where a well will be built or where the location or the site of a step well or even a canal depends on how women participate in these Gram Sabha. And then the third very, very critical layer comes as to what are the social needs of a community?

Does a school need, let’s say, a toilet or a playground or, does a hospital require a boundary wall sometimes, or a library requires a bit of renovation or a person wants to build, let’s say, a cowshed, or a small poultry kind of a mechanism to earn a livelihood. So these are the conversations that also take place in Gram Sabha and based on all these engagements the basket of work is developed. Based on the basket of work, then the Legal Budget is prepared. How much money will be required in the form of wages to execute the work? What will be the material cost?

How much of this material would we need to build all the assets under the NREGA for that year. So that is how these Gram Sabha sort of function and, again, we have also seen these Gram Sabha as places for deep contestation amongst the community sometimes. 

So in India, the person who’s elected and who’s the chair of the Gram Sabha is called Sarpanch, who is like the elected mayor of the GP. Mayor equivalent for a rural area. So it will also depend on the community where the Sarpanch comes from or if the Sarpanch is a woman or a man, if the Sarpanch is from the Dalit or the scheduled caste community, or if a Sarpanch is a graduate. All these things will sort of factor in how that Gram Sabha is being governed.

Then, in many areas where we have seen really transformational work happening or these really productive assets for people are being developed, there is also a role that the state has played in facilitating it. We have seen some really progressive bureaucrats, progressive governments, state governments especially facilitate these conversations in terms of providing more support to the village in bureaucratic functionaries, or on the role that they can play in facilitating this dialog between the elected members of the government and the general body, what are the kind of insights that they can provide, in terms of what might benefit the village in the long run vis a vis short term? So all these sort of permutations and combinations go into creating the basket of works which are then required for the Panchayats to submit under the NREGA program.

Scott Ferguson

So, we wouldn’t want to overly romanticize this program, because as you said, it’s, you know, in the context of a neoliberal era, it’s sort of the least that can be done. Yes. At the same time, I think it’s worth drawing out some of the radical potential here. I mean, I feel like you’re already talking about it, but I just kind of want to bring more meta language to it.

So we’ve got the context and the geopolitical context is neoliberalization. I mean, there’s lots of ways of describing what neoliberalization even means in the first place, but certainly a market ordered society where non-democratic, private allocation, is supposed to be the best, the most efficient, etc., etc..

The market is supposed to perform certain kinds of mechanisms that are dada dada da, and so on. All these basic questions about “who we are as a people,” “how do we organize and cooperate,” “how do we organize our labor,” “what is the mode of production,” “are there multiple modes of production,” “how should we go about this in the first place,” are just off the table. That’s the power of the neoliberal paradigm as a kind of, you know, radicalized reboot of the liberal paradigm. It seems like the jobs program in India really deeply contests that paradigm and offers an alternative, beginning not just with the kind of the democratic impulses in these local GP organizations and meetings, but also the way that these basic questions are being reposed from the bottom up once again. I mean, not just bottom up in terms of democratic participation, but bottom up ontological, conceptually. I think, so often neoliberal market logic presumes that if there are needs, the market meets them. And if the market isn’t meeting the need, it’s not a real need.

Khush Vachhrajani

Exactly.

Scott Ferguson

This is not new to anybody who’s familiar with any of the writings about public works programs and job guarantees. It’s not news to anybody who follows Modern Monetary Theory. Nevertheless, I think it’s worth really underscoring the way that this program just poses the question of: who are we to one another? What do we owe one another? How are we going to participate? And what are the needs of our community that are not de facto reduced to a reified neoliberal market?  I still teach Karl Marx all the time, for as many issues I have with Marx’s work nowadays, one of the fundamental questions he’s posing and what his critique of the alienation of labor is all about is not just, “oh, I’ve made something and my product has been yanked away from me by the owners of production,” but the very democratic question of how do we organize our labor together as a community? How do we even do that in the first place? And what should we be doing together? It seems like, again, not romanticizing it, but as an impulse this program has potential to pose that question in a very deep way.

00;33;14;15 – 00;34;06;23

Khush Vachhrajani

Absolutely. There was no better way of putting it than what you’ve already done, Scott, really. The program was in action for the last two decades and even a little bit before that, but in the last two decades, we have seen so many GPs, Panchayats, really understanding the democratic power that they have as a unit in the larger schemes of affair. Progressive, elected leaders of these Panchayats would make sure that their claim to democratic money is heightened and it is sort of demanded for. Even from civil society and progressive groups, they have sort of latched onto this program to unionize some of these workers who have been working under NREGA and not just workers, but also, there is a concept of a “mate”, the mate is basically a friend who’s just supposed to sort of supervise a work site so we can also call them a work site supervisor.

So there have been civil society groups and unions to sort of unionize these workers and the mate to demand for full implementation of the program in the community, to demand expansion of the basket of works in the community, to sort of innovate at times as to the kind of infrastructure and assets that can be built, and their relationship with the village itself. Many of these really macro imaginations and philosophies come together in a program like this in a very real sense. One thing that I also mentioned in my writing is how it shapes the relationship between a landlord or a contractor and the workers themselves. In absence of a program like this, my power to negotiate wages is very, very limited.

And in the Indian context, it has been documented quite well that before this program was introduced in the villages, irrespective of how good or bad it was being implemented in the village, the fact that this design existed automatically pushed rural wages a lot. It really shifted the conversation from working at almost slave wages to working at dignified wages.

If, let’s say, the rural wage is set at 100 for now, the shift that we saw in the earlier years was not a 101 or 105. It was huge. It was 150, 200 at times. So it shifted, and in the one, it also sort of set what workers were actually losing by this program not being in existence.

We have seen that throughout two decades, even in Panchayats, where this program has not really worked because of many reasons. With the government in power that we have today in India, the last 5 to 6 years have been really, really difficult. Actually, the last whole decade has been really difficult for this program. There have been budget cuts. There has been public mockery by the Prime Minister inside the parliament about this program, despite all the structural challenges, the loss of wages has not come down. The faith that people have on the ground about the potential that this program could have in their lives and in their environment has not really gone anywhere.

Yes, there has been disappointment that the program has not been implemented, but we saw it in Covid that when state governments really pushed from their sides to implement these programs, people were coming out demanding for work. People were coming out to think about the kind of infrastructure that they need during pandemic and after.

What you also articulated so well, and this is something that I’ve tried to even sort of hint at in my article and I’m not really sure if I have been successful at it, but political imagination of a common person, and most times, a woman living in a village in India, really changed, as to what is possible in their lives.

The women workers, even today, are coming together protesting against repeal of NREGA from all different parts of India. Not because they were very happy with this framework and they were all hunky-dory. But it is the faith in the design that this is their democratic right, this is their claim to democratic money, and it is their faith that if one day I have an equal power to operate in this economy, which otherwise is extremely unfair to me.

That, I feel, has been the crux of the last two decades of NREGA. With all its ebbs and flows, the people, every time when they were offered an imagination of a progressive, public, employment program or a job guarantee kind of a program, people latched on to it and they really made sure that it works, wherever it works.

00;39;48;07 – 00;40;32;01

William Saas

Just want to give us a pass for a bit of romanticization. I want to underscore and emphasize a bit more. The NREGA seems like a program out of time in a couple of ways. One is that it’s under appeal now, that’s the obvious one. But “out of time” in terms of the two decades, as you just described, are periods noted for their intensification of neoliberal logics rather than their lessening. As I’m hearing you narrate and reading your work, it becomes, I think, obvious why and from what trajectories this program would be challenged and undermined, but that it has taken so long to get there is remarkable and I think a testament to the people who make up the NREGA projects, that do the baskets of work. Before we get to the repeal, I feel like we’re almost there, but living in the romance just a little bit longer. Was there any kind of more cultural work, artistic work commissioned or called for in these meetings and identified in the baskets of work? So, public art, public music?

Khush Vachhrajani

Fantastic question and not really, but I’m very glad that this has come up. And a colleague of mine who might listen to this podcast would be really happy to listen to this question as he comes from a community… 

William Saas

What’s his name, let’s shout him out.

00;41;28;24 – 00;42;02;03

Khush Vachhrajani

Oh, yeah. His name is Paras, Paras Banjara. He comes from the community that traditionally has been the nomadic tribes in India. His whole identity is also of a cultural activist among many of the other hats that he wears. But, unfortunately, in this regard, the ambit of works are limited to manual works and not really art cultural in that sense.

But in 2022, if I am getting the year right, I think it was around 2022 or 2023 again, in the aftermath of the Covid pandemic in India, which was disastrous for many communities economically, and the communities were already recovering from a demonetization experience in 2016 that really terribly implemented tax reforms in 2017, which was then followed by a pandemic. So there was this long period of real economic distress. So Paras, along with some of the other friends in, again, the state of Rajasthan, who are all sort of cultural activists and who look at culture as commons, work with local traditional artisans who specialize in folk music and different folk instruments.

They advocated for a very similar public employment program, 100 days for Rural Artisans in Rajasthan. It was centered around folk musicians, and the design was again very, very similar, where it would provide a 100 day wage employment to all these rural artisans, wherever they are. The basket of works were kept very, very wide, but it ranged from teaching in a school to performing a government function or to sort of participate in these Gram Sabha as cultural artists and entertaining people and talking to people about their art forms. It was quite a broad ambit. Implementation of that program was very, very haphazard. But the imagination was there, and it was something that has been fought for by Paras and some of these groups for a very long time. These are all traditional art forms and, really very, very strong and almost culturally extinct practices of folk music that stem from years and years – and in my understanding – centuries of traveling around the world as gypsies or as nomadic tribes from which they’ve picked up all these different art forms and music, and they’ve sort of made it more Indian. In one of the conversations on culture as commons, we saw many of these come together to perform a very different version of a bagpipe, a very different version of drums, a very different version of a string based instrument in that sense.

So that imagination has been tried. Not very successful, but the state did try to push for something like that. I remember, I think, in the US there was something just after the Second World War, tried in Washington state, if I’m not wrong, a public arts program. I think it was one of those states in the US. So it just tried.

Scott Ferguson

So I have a question, which I guess, in my mind, both comes from a place of ignorance and insight. So I want to ask about the so-called informal economy in India, which I know nothing about. All I know is that people tell me that it’s a large informal economy and by this I take to mean that it is not being directly organized by the rupee.

My ignorance is, I just don’t know how this works because I don’t study it. I don’t live there. The maybe slightly more insightful part of this is the Money on the Left presumption in our analysis is that there’s no ultimate outside or absolute inside and outside between a formal monetary economy and what might lie beyond that. In fact, what we call informal economies themselves have their own forms of language and accounting and responsibility and capacitations.

We, at Money on the Left, tend to try to blur the distinction between the so-called formal and the so-called informal. But I’m wondering if A) is anything I’m saying just off, and B) especially since the program was not year round or if it worked year round, but for only 100 days, so it wasn’t full time, right? I guess that’s what I’m looking for. It, of course, must have interacted in complex ways with the so-called informal economy. Do you have any sense of how this played out?

00;47;30;23 – 00;47;57;00

Khush Vachhrajani

A limited sense. I would try and sort of put out what I feel, and my understanding and I think the more general understanding in India about an informal economy also sort of stems from the fact that more than 90% of the Indian workforce is engaged in informal work. And what we mean by that is also that that work is not on any contract.

They don’t really have an employer of any kind. There is no fixed salary that is credited to their account by the end of the week or the month. There is no Social Security and it’s almost always a daily wage earning. So if I am a construction worker in a city, I would just go stand in, what we call a “Labour Chowk”, or, let’s say, a corner in a neighborhood where all these workers would come, let’s say, around seven in the morning, eight in the morning, and they would be picked up by a contractor to, let’s say, fix somebodies house for the day and that would be their job, and they would earn from the day. The second day would be something new, a new task, with a new contractor, a new place.

Scott Ferguson

But they’d be paid in rupees?

00;48;50;23 – 00;49;24;19

Khush Vachhrajani

Yes. They will be paid in rupees. Most of these people would earn in cash, physical cash. There have been several policy decisions which have tried to get many of these workers to be a part of the formal banking systems, largely through direct payments to their accounts. But still a lot of the Indian informal workforce earns in physical cash.

That’s also because that’s how they spend on a day to day basis, with the emergence of fintech and again, a very, very deep neoliberal financialization of banking itself, where they are charged every time they take out money from the ATM, there is no way that they can afford to lose any more than sort of what they’re getting, which is also really, really very low.

So these are the kind of people that we generally imagine as informal workers and in rural areas, where the NREGA was implemented. Actually it is still implemented till March 31st. The informal economy would be implemented in multiple ways. There is, one, direct agricultural labor. So I could be a farmer but with a very, very small landholding.

So it would not be enough for me to sustain. So along with working on my own farm, I would also be working in somebody else’s farm on an hourly basis or task basis or a day to day basis and I would sort of get money based on that. Or I would be a landless farmer and I’m working as a laborer, either as a contractual laborer with a farmer and then I would be employed for the entire season. Sometimes it is also out of precarity of different kinds where I could be a landholding farmer sustaining myself, but, for any reason, my crop got destroyed or there was a drought and I have loans on me, so I’m not able to pay off those debts. So, I am forced to work as a local. A lot of rural work is also construction. So again, it’s like what I describe for a city, it is  very similar to what would also exist in a rural area, where I could go to a worksite in the morning, and I could work from morning to evening doing manual work, and I would be paid for that.

These are the kinds of ways in which the informal economy is sort of organized in villages. What NREGA did was just push how the engagement with the contractor would be. That contractor could be a person who is working in the worksite, or the contractor could be a farmer themselves or the landlord at times, in just helping them negotiate at what price the manual work would be offered.

Scott Ferguson

So let’s talk about the devastation of this program. I mean, I’m assuming there were reactionary forces who wanted to end it the whole time. I’m assuming that it gained traction, but how did this all play out?

00;52;22;10 – 00;52;48;28

Khush Vachhrajani

Yeah, the trauma, the trauma. So, as I said, when the current BJP (Bharatiya Janata Party) government came in power in 2014, the prime minister, in his very first speech in the parliament, made a huge public mockery of NREGA by saying it’s a program where there is no pothole, so people first would dig that pothole and then they would fill that pothole. It’s that kind of a program that has been running and, he also said that he would make sure that this program sort of survives long enough for people to remember how big a joke this has been in the Indian economy. That was sort of a proclamation of where the public policy would be geared towards, in one sense. The program, however, was not killed directly through a new law, like what we’ve seen now, but it was sort of dismantled structurally through three means from 2014 to 2025, when they got a new law in itself. It’s also quite interesting because to many of us, who have been looking at how the repeal came about, it caught us by surprise along with the swiftness with which it was done. And, even the parliamentary procedures around this new law was quite something for us to see. But, our analysis and understanding has been that over the last 11 years, the program has been dismantled slowly to a level where people, many of these Panchayats, have not really seen works opening for three or four seasons now.

So for them, the program has always been dead. So this new program coming in makes very little impact on NREGA. But coming back to how I think it was dismantled over the first 11 years were three ways. 1) A very, very big focus on introducing very modern digital technology infrastructure in a reality where there is no phone connection or there is no internet connection. They introduce things like, digital identity based payments. India has one of the largest biometric programs called Aadhaar. They made sure that every single worker’s bank account is linked to this digital ID card, which is called Aadhaar. It is just a biometric identity program, nothing else.

It was proclaimed as that. So each and every person is sort of tagged to this unique ID, and then the money would be transferred directly to their bank account instead of it first coming to the Panchayat, or the GP and then through the GP, then getting it in the form of cash. And it was sort of introduced as a means to curb corruption, reduce inefficiencies and to make the whole payment mechanism very transparent.

Again, there is an Indian reality that has been narrated ever since the Aadhaar was launched in 2008, there would be difficulties in matching names of people on one document to another document. There will be typing errors. There is not enough infrastructure on-ground to make sure that these things are rectified. Then it is forced, from top down, in a manner where if there is any error, my money would be stopped, then it’s a catastrophe. That is what happened. So when they introduced this, we call it ABPS, which is the Aadhaar Based Payment System, it led to many bank accounts where the money sort of never reached the worker because there was a problem with the name.

There was a name mismatch or there was a mismatch in the biometric. As I said, it’s a biometric program. So they have to go and make sure that they verify at the branch location in rural areas that they are the same people and any reasons that the biometric has failed. So that is another reason why, despite working, they would not get their money.

And thirdly, it also sort of created an architecture where we’ve seen cases where, like, I think in 2022 or 23, close to 60 to 70 million people were just not paid because of these kinds of inefficiencies. So this was one of the first things which was introduced. The second thing which was introduced then was a biometric based attendance system at worksites where every worker before beginning their work on a particular day would have to go in and make sure that they are at a geotagged worksite.

They would have to do the fingerprints and make sure they match what we called a “muster roll”, which is just like a list of all people who are going to work at the worksite. So basically this was a digital attendance mechanism date. The geolocation of the work site and the geolocation of that worker has to match to make sure that the worker is not sitting at the houses and getting paid for not doing the work.

All this sounds fantastic, but it is just not practical. There will be issues with geotagging and that is what we realized. The person who is doing the geotagging has, let’s say, geotagged the wrong work site. Workers have come to the right work site because they know in that area in the village where the work site is, and it would just not match. Or everything is okay, the work site is matched, it is geotagged correctly, the workers are at the correct site, but there is no internet, so they have to move 500m up and down. Then the moment they move, the work site goes beyond the geotag range. So, people would come to work, but they would not be able to start their work because the attendance is not marked.

So there are so many people who came to work, but they were just not able to work. And that also creates a huge disappointment and a disincentive for workers to make their way all the way to the work site.

Scott Ferguson

Real quick. A meta comment on what you’re saying here. In the States, we call this “death by a thousand cuts,” right? It was eroded from the inside before the big blow knocked it out. The main point I wanted to make here is that, it’s not just that the development and implementation and ongoing evolution of the program was a question of contestation over monetary design in both narrow and capacious senses of that term, but the counter forces, the reactionary forces, the contestation against the program was also a function of monetary design in multiple senses.

01;00;49;28 – 01;01;22;09

Khush Vachhrajani

Absolutely. You have got it absolutely right, that it is a death by a thousand cuts. This is something that we also have spoken about and written about quite a lot. One of the most insidious ways in which the program was killed was also around the democratization of money where the union government stopped paying state governments their dues.

The way this program is organized is that all the wage payments, 100% of the wage payments, come from the union government, who is the monetary sovereign government. And for all the material costs which are involved in any public work, 75% come from the union government, 25% comes from the state government. That has been a design that has been agreed upon which has been ruling since 2005.

But over the last seven, eight, nine years, we’ve continuously seen wages being withheld. So imagine workers are working on the ground and they’re just not being paid and the pressure is being felt by the state government and the state government doesn’t have the kind of money that is required to pay these wages. So if the wages are withheld, workers are not going to come to work. At the same point in time there is a provision for what is called a social audit in NREGA, which is basically going beyond the financial audit, but giving power to the Gram Sabha – the fundamental unit that is responsible for running this program – to also monitor how the program is being implemented, considering all these different parameters around how people are working with these worksites, how their experiences have been. Now, social audit has been a mechanism which has been fought for by people’s campaigns and struggles to ensure that people have a right to monitor the implementation of this program.

It is not left to a third party or the government to dictate how the program is to be functioning. The way it has been designed is, 0.5% of NREGA’s annual expenditure is earmarked for social audits. So the money has also been kept aside in the monetary design of this program. Then, in order to facilitate the social audit, each state has to create these social audit units, which are supposed to be independent autonomous bodies and that 0.5% of state’s total expenditure would come to them. Then they would make sure that they go to a  Gram Sabha, they prepare a team from the  Gram Sabha to then audit what has been happening.

So this has been an inbuilt mechanism for transparency and accountability within NREGA, which has been weaponized against different state governments where they have been told that “we are not going to release money to you because social audit reports have been terrible,” without understanding that when a social audit report is bad or whether it is sort of unearthing corruption, unearthing misuse of money, the department that is supposed to act on those findings and fix those gaps is supposed to be the rural development department.

It is not supposed to be these social audit units whose job it is to figure out what is happening, no. So even their money will be withheld, so the social audit units are left to dry and the states are also not getting money. This is something that we have documented systematically through our work as well, that there have been social audit units who have not received their dues for five, six years.

There have been state governments who have not received the wages of the workers who have worked in the state governments for several years. There have been court battles. The state of West Bengal went to the High Court of the state. They won. They went to the Supreme Court and the Supreme Court said that the government has to release the money.

But what I mean to say is, and this is something that also sometimes troubles me, that our understanding of what a monetarily sovereign government can do, this is actually a flip side of that. They’ve decided to not really provide that democratic money to the money users in their federal mechanisms. The state government was to compensate these autonomous independent units, they were supposed to be the checkers in the system in that sense.

All these things have been used systematically to kill the program when all these digital interventions that I spoke about earlier were also introduced under the name or under the guise of transparency and accountability. It was to say workers are not working at the worksite.

Hence we are sort of introducing this worksite monitoring mechanism. It is insane because there are more than 100 million workers across India who work at these worksites and India does not have the kind of technological sophistication, infrastructure, architecture to be able to facilitate any of these big tech interventions and these are also not just benign interventions thought to make the program work.

These are also data and a very strong market linked surveillance of testing certain hypotheses, like whether the biometric attendance system in general could work in a place like India with 100 million rural workers. They don’t want to introduce this system for rural workers. They want to introduce this for something else, but this is a proof of concept.

Can direct payments to bank accounts work and what are the kinds of complications? So how do we then design a structure for these high scale financial transactions which happen amongst the top 5% of Indian users today? India has something called UPI, Unified Payment Interface, which is this free and open source payments protocol for digital payments, which is sort of different from Venmo in that sense.

But this is also a kind of proof of concept for interventions like those which are deeply market linked, which are all financialization of finance. It’s been really terrible to see the kind of experimentations which have been done on these hundreds and millions of rural workers, whose daily earnings are peanuts even under a program like this.

What we heard last year was that they also want to do facial recognition technology through drones at these rural worksites. The amount of money that is being spent on these technological interventions vis-a-vis the amount of money that the simple rural or manual worker is earning, it is insane. It just doesn’t make sense in the traditional public policy cost benefit analysis framework.

It just doesn’t add up. Right? So whose interest it is serving, is something that I think has been fundamental to many of us. We’ve followed the evolution of these digital architectures that have been forced upon people where there is no Opt-Out option. If I demand that I want my wages in the form of physical cash, I just can’t.

It has to come to my bank account, right? This takes away the idea of a monetary design which is free, fair, and just, which is democratic in that sense. There is a little bit of a technicality to clarify.

So they’ve come up with this new law, which is called the VB GRAM G Law. It’s a very long, complicated, full form. So I’ll just cut it out and call it VB Gram G. So they, one, have legitimized all the digital technology architecture that they introduced to NREGA as part of law, which is crazy and which is scary and which is unacceptable by all means, because all these interventions, which they did earlier in the NREGA were just through circulars and guidelines, there was no legal legitimacy of any of these things. Now it has that. Second, it also has sort of passed the law but then not on-paper repealed NREGA.  There is confusion around whether both of these will coexist, not coexist and how it will sort of play out.

But in the new law, they’ll also sort of change the fiscal arrangement of the program. Instead of the Union government being responsible for 100% or wages, which is the majority of expenditure in the program, they’ve shifted that burden onto the states and they said that the entire expenditure will be borne by states and the Union government with the share of 60/40.

The state governments do not have that kind of money. There’s no way any of the state governments could actually shell out 40% of the expenditure. So it’s just impractical. There is no way this can be done. Another crucial aspect of the new law is that – earlier, as I said, the labor budgets or the budget for the program would emerge from bottom up through these discussions and deliberations in Gram Sabha and Gram Panchayat, which would feed into the state and then the Union government budget – now, they have said that the Union government arbitrarily determined based on “normative” parameters, how much the allocation for this program in the current state would be. What those normative parameters are, we don’t know. They’ve not really specified that.

Scott Ferguson

I just want to point out to the listeners that you put scare quotes around normative, when you said normative. You were not using it straightforwardly. 

01;12;26;01 – 01;13;01;02

Khush Vachhrajani

Absolutely. And anybody who reads the law multiple times, it would become more and more evident that some of these arrangements in the new law are insidious designs of killing federalism and sort of completely turning the monetary design upside down, making it extremely top down. As to why they would not specify what that normative allocation would be, they said that any state government or any local government, whatever program schemes they’re running on their own, can be merged with this new VB GRAM G law. There will be no consultation, no dialog with the state government on what they are okay with, what they are not okay with in terms of the arrangement or the normative allocation itself. If a state government wants to opt out of the mechanism, they either have to enact a law that is in line with the VB GRAM G law or better, or they completely let go of the money under the program. So even that 60% shared they can let go. 

One more thing, NREGA was a universal mandate. It was implemented universally across all GP’s. Anybody could ask for work anytime in the day. In the new law that they proposed, they have said that the Union government would notify the states and the districts in the sub-units where the program would be implemented. No consultation, no check-in, nothing with nothing.

It’s just like they will determine where all it will be implemented, and it’s also that they can change that each year. So there is a switch-on, switch-off clause. So today they can notify, let’s say there are five areas in XYZ states without consulting the XYZ states and putting the burden of spending 40% of that amount. Then next year they could very well be, “okay, XYZ States are done, no I’m going to move to ABC states. XYZ states are done and they have no power to really sort of claim the right of democratic money in that sense. So the way they have structured the new law is they will notify the area, they will notify the works, the state governments will have to spend 40% – there is no opting out of that – and I, as a union government, can notify, let’s say, all villages of a particular state, let’s say it’s an opposition ruled state, but normatively allocate only ₹1 to that state and say that, “okay, 60% will come through me, which is like 60 cents that would come from me, 40 cents you spend.”

Any expense that is over and above the normative allocation, the state has to spend. So now for all those villages where the Union government has notified work, the state will end up spending and there is no way it is implemented. So it is also to kill some of the politically opponent states financially, which is detrimental for the Indian economy.

It is not a matter of political preferences, but also the fiscal structure in the federal structure of the state itself.

Scott Ferguson

Well, you’ve begun to answer a question I had, but I’d like to pose it explicitly and have you contemplate it, which is: what you’re making clear, is that the new law didn’t end the program. It just crippled it. It created such new designs and strictures that it’s just now designed to fail.

But the question is, why didn’t they just get rid of it? Why didn’t they just pass a law that said, this is over?

01;17;10;20 – 01;17;35;19

Khush Vachhrajani

Because the political stakes are very high, I would say. What I was also describing earlier, even in areas where it has not been functioning or it has not been doing very well, or the democratically making has not really been at par with many of the other high performing states. The sentiment and the significance of the program has always been there.

To take away that absolute final thread that people are hanging on to in a very deeply unequal neoliberal economic framework would be a bit too much. It would be something that would be politically unacceptable and that is my reading. I could be partially wrong in this, but the reason why I feel that this is one of the major reasons is because they’ve got this new law with full intention to repeal NREGA.

The intention is not to change its nature. The intention is to repeal it, but they also want to repeal it in a gradual manner. So in the Union Budget, which was announced a couple of weeks back, we had allocated a little money for the new law as well as they have allocated some money for NREGA. Our understanding is that the money that is mandated is also for some of the spending expenditure under NREGA, but they’ve not really passed legislation in the Parliament saying that NREGA is over now and from April 1st, this new law begins. April 1st is the start of the financial year, so we have April 1st till March 31st. They’ve not yet made that clear. So our understanding is that they’re going to go along with both these laws sort of simultaneously existing while keeping state governments in limbo, because the state governments have no idea what are the notified areas in their states.

They don’t know the normative allocation. They don’t know how much they are supposed to budget from their own limited resources. So they’re going to continue that for a little while. And maybe in 6 to 8 months, then completely phased out NREGA. They would then implement the VB GRAM G Act, which practically would destroy fiscal federalism in India because there is no state government that is anyway close to even implementing a program like that. The amount of financial burden that the state governments would have is just enormous. In our understanding of monetary operation and how sort of public money works, it’s just not possible that the state governments are able to deliver on anything like this even remotely.

William Saas

The critical part of the story that you’re articulating is the big tech intervention, as you put it.

And this might be one place where we can learn the kind of cutting edge of the neoliberal playbook. These biometric systems, do you know if they’re intellectual property of private firms that have been licensed by the Indian government? Or are these state run software that are monitoring these work sites and doing precisely the opposite of what they’re supposed to do on the tin, which is to make things more efficient. Of course, they’re breaking these work sites.

01;22;28;24 – 01;23;13;07

Khush Vachhrajani

I think it’s a mix of both.That is why the Indian state has really been an interesting case study. How they’ve created a market of monetizable data of almost each individual or each citizen of India.The way Big Tech is functioning at the moment in a program like NREGA is private corporations working with the the Union government in developing and designing these software, they’re housed within the ministry of IT or what we call as National Informatics Centers as well. NIC, whose task was the digitalization age of Indian society. So these softwares are sort of housed within the NIC and they are the intellectual property of the state. What we don’t know enough of is how some of the data that is being generated through these softwares and actually it is that, none of these things are working because if you’ve seen the kind of images which have been uploaded on these digital attendance monitoring systems where people would just click like a photo of a cow or they’ll click a picture of an empty drawer and they just upload it and the ministry and the NIC don’t have the capacity to go through these millions of photographs which have populated. Right? So in that way, it’s also garbage in and garbage out.

But I think what they are trying to do – and this is a little bit of a leap of faith assumption – is attempt to understand what are the complexities of a biometric system that big tech needs to be aware about. There’s something that is being tested and trained across such a large mass of population that would sort of give a lot of information just on the design of the kind of infrastructure that has been set up and it will also start creating new forms of data of individuals who otherwise were completely out of this whole market economy. They were not making digital payments. They were not part of a formal banking system.

They were not part of the whole cellular revolution in one sense. They were not using mobile data. So a lot of things have happened in the last ten years where because these workers had to access more and more digital banking, they are forced to get on smartphones, they’re forced to buy data packs.

Their presence in this neoliberal economic system has been heightened almost by force and design and many of these things are linked to Aadhaar, it would also start generating very unique information about a very large set of population whose footprints otherwise were invisible in an economic sense. You might have actually heard this, they’re all called DPI, digital public infrastructures which have been sort of pushed by the Gates and the Fords and the Rockefellers of the world, who are part of the digital governance reform initiatives. Our whole understanding of the way DPI has come about in India is that it is very, very closely linked to the state-market nexus.

In one sense, it has not emerged organically from people or democratically through participation. It has been coerced through exercises of demonetization, exercises of linking bank accounts to the Aadhaar, transferring rural wages or subsidies or scholarships, all the public money only through digital banking. Earlier, India also had a very thriving post office system so if they wanted to digitize it, they couldn’t just very easily digitize post offices. A post office exists in every single village. Banks don’t exist in every single village, but this systematically clears the post office mechanism to pave ways for these banks and financial intermediaries to have access to biometric information, payments information, and attendance information in some sense even though it is not really useful.

It’s a design which is really screening of human rights violations, but also techno feudalism in a very concrete manner, which is now legitimized through a law like this, there will be rural stack of works. I don’t understand what that means, but the conversation of stacks and DPIs has become mainstream through this new act that has been passed.

Many of these reflections are also coming from a place where we, as a part of SAFAR, teach a course at National Law School, Bangalore, on digital technology, society and governance. Many of our conversations sort of revolve around the India stack, which is a payment infrastructure, the application infrastructure, and the identity infrastructure, that has been sort of promoted as the most ingenious thing that the Indian Government has done in decades.

But it’s also only to monetize data and information of common people at a very, very large scale in India but also outside India.

Scott Ferguson

So as we turn to wrap up this conversation, I guess I’d like to hear a little bit about current resistance, if there is any. Clearly you are resisting and clearly your organization is resisting, but I’m kind of curious to hear what’s the nature of resistance to this new law and the undermining of this program?

01;29;45;28 – 01;30;17;12

Khush Vachhrajani

The resistance is definitely there in areas where workers are organized. There have been protests, there have been sit-ins, there have been petitions to bureaucrats or to elected members, there have been district level convenings of workers, there have been long marches of workers in different parts of India. So the resistance is there for sure.

A belief is, that while it may take a bit of time, because of the size and the scale of the country and the complexity of the country, the resistance will start showing up more tangibly when the Panchayats or the local rural unit goes into election or the local district goes into election.

That is one way. The second is also that there are many progressive groups, associations and networks who have started advocacy with progressive state governments on creating an employment guarantee framework that is backed by state governments. How practical would that be considering the fiscal challenges that the state government would face. The attempt is to also try and imagine, collectively, how it can be done as an alternative to what the government is offering and also to build public consciousness around the limitations of this new law that is coming about.

It’s also an attempt at public education. Just yesterday, 12th of February, there was a total strike across the country, not just on the issue of NREGA but also on several other anti-labor, anti-worker legislations that had been passed by the Union government. Close to 300 million workers had come out on the streets to resist and protest, segmented in different parts and not really sort of gathered at one place.

But again, the news is out there and these resistances are going to build up, that is what my understanding is, and I am a bit hopeful, a bit optimistic about the medium and longer future of a program like this in the short run. I think because the program was so systematically dismantled and a counter narrative by the ruling government has already started spreading on the ground that the new program is going to give them 125 days instead of 100 days, there will be a phase where we will see in the short run, for lack of a better word, inaction from people on the ground or resistance of very minor scale, but nothing really tangible in that sense. But our understanding, while working with several movement campaigns has been that the inequality, the precarity, the status of falling household incomes, the debt levels, these are all growing so fast and it is all so acute that a void of a program like NREGA will be felt in very, very tangible terms. It will also be felt in cities, we assume. Women who are staying behind in villages, taking care of farms and cattle and the elderly, the children, in absence of a program which will employ 50% of those women, they really have no choice with their dignified livelihood for they to start migrating to cities in search of employment that is paying them their daily wages. That is yet to be seen.

The macroeconomic impact of the repeal of NREGA will be felt for a very long time. It is again, another piece that I’m sort of building towards. The austerity politics of this government over the last 11 years has now led us to a stage where the debt levels are alarmingly high, incomes are falling and wages have stagnated for the longest period in the history of the last 30 years or even in the history of Indian independence in that sense. So I think it’s all a very terrifying sign for the Indian economy. With public employment and, in all honesty, all of us have been even writing to the government, talking to the government, telling them that, if the aim was to just 125 days of work, that could have been done even within the NREGA form, they could have just amended the law, added 25 days more because the long standing demand for the last ten years have been that if you do 365 days of NREGA you increase the minimum floor wage from 200 to 500 rupees. All these conversations could have been taken into consideration. Looking at where the Indian economy stands today, it is very unfortunate to see that the government’s fiscal policies are very, very stagnant, I have written a couple of more articles actually that highlighted how the government in their public communication, has been constantly grappling with the fact that the industry or the market is not investing enough in the economy.

My whole point is, yes, because the sales are not happening. There is no demand. When there is no demand in a capitalist economy, nobody’s going to invest. There’ll be unemployment, there’ll be stagnation of wages and no matter what tinkering that they do through the monetary policy, it’s not going to work. It has to be done through a very, very strong fiscal policy, through fiscal stimulus, by putting money in people’s pockets, through wages to incomes, through pensions, through scholarships, so that they’re able to then save and spend in the economy.

But it seems that this is a very alien concept to the government in power, which has been taken over by the neoliberal economic thinkers who are caring more about the stock market than the lives and livelihoods of people.

William Saas

So no consumer demand, but a surplus of pictures of cows at work sites or around work sites.

Khush Vachhrajani

Yes.

William Saas

Useless garbage-in, garbage-out, data collected.

Khush Vachhrajani

Absolutely. And just between us, here’s a funny, funny anecdote. We had somebody come into our classroom for the course I mentioned in my earlier response. That person said that the total number of people who are employed in the federal department that oversees these technological interventions and whatever that is coming to them, is a grand total of two.

So it’s a grand total of two people in a ministry looking at the design, the development, the deployment, and what is coming out of these so-called technological master strokes. We know what the future holds. It’s unverifiable information, but I would not be surprised if it is true.

William Saas

Yeah, I can imagine a kind of absurd comedy-like novel written about those two bureaucrats in charge of the 100 million person program.

So your Substack, it’s called “The Lighthouse,” but it’s, also you can find it by going to moneypolitics.substack.com. Money politics, obviously, is a phrase that we’re very invested in and familiar with, and we’ve talked about your article “How to Kill a Golden Goose,” which engages particularly with the work of Jakob Feinig, and moral economists of money and monetary silencing.

Just a last question. On our way out the door, we, at Money on the Left, have been interested in and talking about complementary currencies in the development of alternative payment schemes. I’m ignorant also of the history of complementary currencies in India generally. But do you have any sense of any movement in that direction as a way of sort of filling the holes and addressing the gaps that are being created by the government?

Khush Vachhrajani

Not really. That is something that I’ve been thinking about as well. So I am not really aware of any such efforts. I would love to know more if there are people who are working on things like that. It’s also something that I think about in the times when fiscal federalism is under attack.

What is it that the state governments could do differently to sort of survive and sustain in such a hostile environment from a very dominant political force that is there to last? It’s something that even I need to learn more about. Again, Money on the Left has been something which has really shaped my thinking and it has really pushed my own imagination in the sense of being able to think about ideas like this. I look forward to reading more about works that are happening around unique currencies in the US and some of these other experiments which are happening in Europe, which has come up in both Superstructure and the podcast.

So, yeah, I keep my eyes open for things like these and I’m really, really curious to learn more as to what India can do or Indian states and society can do in terms of alternative currencies and just imagination of monetary design in general.

William Saas

Well, Khush Vachhrajani, thank you so much. This has been a wonderful conversation. We’re very, very glad to have had you on Money on the Left. Thank you.

Khush Vachhrajani

Thank you so much.

* Thank you to Zachary Nosbisch for the episode graphic, Nahneen Kula for the theme tune, and Thomas Chaplin for the transcript. 

Democratic Finance for New York City’s Budget Dance

By David I. Backer

I’m a professor of education policy and teach classes on public finance. I make it my business to know the government’s business, and I live in Brooklyn, so I’ve been paying close attention to the city’s finances as the new Mamdani administration takes power. In my work, like my recent book on school finance, I try to make the otherwise arcane and hard-to-understand world of municipal finance more comprehensible to the people impacted by it.

Zohran Mamdani recently (and admirably) announced a $12.2 billion city deficit left by the Adams administration, which, in the barbed choreography of the New York City budget dance with New York State, Mamdani revised down to around $6 billion. In the manic moves of that dance numerous dirty details are coming out about the booby traps Adams left Zohran, and the treacherous terrain of the city budget generally. 

I think I found another obstacle-feature of that terrain that I haven’t seen reported elsewhere. Untangling it helps to zoom in on the complexity of this budget process, which everyone cares about and no one understands, with an eye towards transforming the whole nasty apparatus (which, by the way, is why we need participatory budgeting on a mass scale). 

The thing I’m seeing is a big jump in city debt service payments next fiscal year, FY27 and FY28. 

In Andrew Perry’s excellent piece on Mamdani’s first budget, it’s notable that debt service—what the city forks over in its yearly repayments to creditors—is the fourth largest broken out category of NYC public finance:

It’s not a huge expense in raw numbers, but it’s relatively big one in the overall scheme of city budgets because debt service comes to bear on the city’s capability to pay back its creditors, and thus can impact its credit rating, fiscal stability, and ultimately the patina of fiscal responsibility of whoever’s in charge at the moment. So even though it’s 6% of the budget, it’s a big 6%.

When I was reading one of Brad Lander’s last comptroller reports, along with updated data on the city’s debt profile, a graph caught my attention.

On the left side of this graph, you’ve got the debt service the city owes. On the bottom, you have the year it’ll owe that amount. It goes from this year to 2060, when many long term bond obligations get “paid off” (though of course they never really get paid off because US municipal finance has a debt wish). 

But the colors are important too. In blue you’ve got the principal, which is the amount of the city borrowed, and in red you’ve got the interest, which is what the city pays to borrow that money. It’s the price of credit. 

First, before anything else, look at all that red interest we have to pay. Municipal bond interest payments are basically a huge tax that New Yorkers and everyone else in the country don’t really know they’re paying. For every dollar we give the city, using Perry’s chart above, we pay six cents on the city’s debt service. When we look at the red section, we see about three of those cents just go towards the interest on our loans. A lot of rich people make bank on lending to us so we can have a city. 

But that’s not even the pressing issue here.

Second, look at the huge jump in debt service obligations through 2028. It more than doubles from $2 billion to $4.5 billion. What’s happening here? 

According to municipal finance researcher Tom Sgouros, who I talked to about this situation, there could be a number of explanations here, none of which we know because we weren’t putting this debt service schedule together. All those interest payments come on debt with different interest rates, so maybe the comptroller’s office, which, in this case, was under Brad Lander, they prioritized paying higher interest debt first. There could have been a plan to defease (moving it into a separate fund, sort of like refinancing and reinvesting to get rid of it before paying it off) some debt earlier rather than later. 

What we know is that there’ll be a period of lower payments, according to this debt service schedule, after which those payments will jump up again by double. And its not just another city expense, it’s the repayment of loans taken out to finance everything else in the city. 

One conspiratorial interpretation: Perry notes a practice called “surplus roll” where “the City dispenses its surplus by prepaying subsequent year expenses… In fiscal year 2025, for instance, the City accrued a $3.8 billion surplus. It booked this as 2025 spending in the form of prepaying spending liabilities in fiscal year 2026.”

So one theory is that the Adams administration scheduled a certain amount of 2026’s debt on Zohran’s behalf without asking him first, shouldering Zohran with the payments with a big jump in 2028, threatening Mamdani’s spending power. It could be the surplus roll because these numbers above are in the Q1 2026 debt profile. When we look at the Q4 2025 we don’t see that same jump.

And yet, it might not be a surplus roll. It might be the non-malign planning to pay certain debt off at certain times, innocent defeasing. It might not be political at all. To everyone except the people working for Mark Levine, the new Comptroller, and maybe a handful of others, the process is opaque. 

All this gives you a sense of what the Mamdani administration will actually be dealing with in terms of its debt needs. It looks to me like the debt service will jump up dramatically whether that’s due to a possible surplus roll by the Adams administration or other maneuvers. As it stands, Mamdani will have to pay more in debt service during two years of his time in office to get less revenue to the diverse working class he’s promised to serve. 

All this also broaches the question of what to do about this issue of nagging debt service. There’s the short-term process of the city’s Tin Cup Day where the mayor goes to ask for money. But we know that Mamdani and company want to challenge these old dynamics. Why not take up some medium-term measures, and maybe champion longer-term transformations, that make this arcane debt service stuff a relic of the past?

The Mamdani administration, drawing from this publication’s framework of Democratic Public Finance, could use this as an opportunity to spell out a radical alternative to the present system. They could, for example, renew support for a city-owned non-profit public bank which, like the Bank of North Dakota (built by prairie socialists in the early 20th century), can buy NYC munis and deposit the interest back into the city’s general fund

The result would begin to drastically decrease the amount the city owes in interest payments. Along the way, Mamdani could call for a permanent MLF at the Fed that provides zero (or next-to-zero) interest rate financing. More radically still, he can also argue that Congress should extend credit creation powers directly to states and municipalities, a long term goal that would force the public to debate and think differently about municipal finance. 

These are broad, sweeping proposals. Are there things that the administration and their allied coalitions can put in place in the next couple years to achieve local versions of the same interventions, working towards transformation? I’ve been keeping a running list of fun brainstormy revenue ideas and, by way of open-ended conclusion, offer them here for readers’ perusal. My specialty is education finance, so the proposals are skewed towards education, but they could be adapted for other arenas of municipal finance as well.

  1. Issue taxable bonds to friendly foreign government entities with our values (the governments Bernie always mentions): reaching deals with Canadian pension funds, Scandinavian sovereign wealth funds, etc.
  2. Strengthening and integrating the Education Construction Fund to borrow for combined housing and schools financing, synthesizing borrowing capacity of the New York City Transitional Finance Authority with the ECF. There could be savings when staggering borrowing between both of them. (Combine this option with (1) to issue the taxable bonds through here.) The last bond ECF issued was in 2021 and apparently there isn’t good coordination between the Panel for Education Policy and ECF.
  3. A municipal minibond program that reaches out to communities to invest in their specific schools, matching monies with citizen participation. This would be a more socialist version of Berkeley’s proposal.
  4. Call NYC’s Build America Bonds on the grounds of extreme circumstances like the University of California system and the Maryland Transit Authority and potentially save hundreds of millions.
  5. Create a city bank, a nonprofit corporate entity specifically, and restrict public monies to deposits in non-profit cooperative entities, such as the bevy of diverse community development financing institutions (CDFIs) throughout the city, put the city’s deposits there, create public bank accounts where the residents are voting members and create a public lender (hat tip to Whitney Toussaint for this idea). Save on borrowing costs to big banks. Then create investment funds for middle income supporters to move their savings/retirement, get in on the dash for retirement investment with a public option.
  6. Design an online game for NYC that is very low cost and super fun, less than a dollar. Use message boards and DMs for announcements and citywide municipal discussion (towards mass participatory budgeting potentially).
  7. Permit Community Education Councils to create public digital currencies that residents of CECs can purchase and sell for educational services, whose revenues go directly to the CEC budgets, managed by a rotating committee of school community members. 
  8. Penny sales tax for specific projects through referendum vote (ESPLOST), like they do in Georgia. It’s a good political move: pay a penny more for your kids’ schools, eg.
  9. Create a regional borrowing authority where districts around NYC deposit reserves and lend to one another at lower rates.
  10. Pool pre-k afterschool tuition revenues in a single municipal account, invest the funds, and supplement the program’s funding with interest thrown off by the account. Ask pre-k centers to deposit with the county which then invests the funds.
  11. A city-run secondary market for used stuff that you’d put out in the street: like a public Facebook marketplace that takes a few cents from transactions or posting fees that go right into specified city programs.
  12. Allow wealthy residents to participate in auctions where they bid to pay one-time amounts to delete debt outstanding from certain funds instead of regular tax filings, like Building Aid Revenue Bond debt, thereby paying down that debt and creating borrowing capacity, while putting the rich in a weird position. Make it public and fun, like a kind of date auction, but it’s a debt auction. This wouldn’t be a secondary market trading on the debt itself but rather a traditional auction, with the rich outbidding one another to pay off city debt. (Maybe via some kind of low cost fun items of city lore, like subway tokens.)
  13. Create a municipal digital currency for the city that every resident receives a certain amount of, pegged at being worth more than the dollar (a Knick or Met could be the name). For activities the federal government undertakes in the city that threatens the city’s home rule charter, the Feds must pay a tax or purchase the currency. Locally owned and worker-owned businesses receive exemptions from the currency’s tax.
  14. Create a Parent-Teacher Association account where all PTA money is deposited and invested. The interest on the account is used to finance schools whose PTAs don’t have as much money as other PTAs.
  15. Politicize the discount rate set for city pension contributions, holding listening sessions and public events about whether to set the rate higher (which could save hundreds of millions of dollars, even if raised by 25 basis points). Make this about the people’s investment rather than investors. Then politicize the discount rates used to set repayment terms on city issued bonds, deliberating publicly on whether there’s savings there.
  16. Work with the New York Green Bank to package up green projects around the city, standardize their contracts, and mobilize private investment towards the projects further. Have them create a special instrument for city pension funds to purchase in large sizes. 
  17. Work with the NYCEEC (the New York City Green Bank) to expand investment projects across state lines, particularly to cities in red states suffering from Trump-induced disinvestment in green projects (try to work with rural communities too to build solidarity there). To avoid the risk of NYC profiting off of others’ misery, the city could follow the lead of the Yugoslavian approach to international development as per the Non-aligned Movement and structure the loans across state lines with solidarity as a framework for the loan terms.
  18. Pass a law through city council that gives city pensions first bidding rights in competitive sales of city bonds, even before private banks, lowering the underwriters discount cost to the city.
  19. Sell taxable bonds with the explicit purpose of arbitraging revenues.
  20. Coordinate school district bond sales around the state and pool them together into a loan product for the green banks to sell for green projects. Provide technical services through the School Construction Authority for districts around New York State to green their infrastructure.
  21. Do a deal with a dollar pizza network. Designate certain spots as health areas and provide city subsidies for taking care of unhoused sick and hungry people. The contract has to stipulate that the city gets a percentage of the returns, like a big investor, then leak that info to private equity funds to push investment in the dollar pizza network. Flush with more cash, get the network to build bigger spaces. Make the dollar pizza network a meme stock that takes on the financial elite on Reddit to flood it with cash.
  22. Make every road a toll road for federal agents driving in the city using license image cameras. 

Reclaiming the Public Interest: Cities Should Sell Municipal Bonds to Their Own Public Banks

By Tyler Suksawat & Scott Ferguson

Editor’s Note: The following essay, originally published on February 22, 2026, offers a foundational theoretical framework for what has since been concretized as The Seattle Loop. The Seattle Loop is a fiscal strategy that utilizes municipal banking to purchase city debt, “looping” interest payments back into public provisions like social housing and green jobs. While this piece was written prior to our specific pivot toward the Seattle-based organizing effort, it articulates the core logic of public credit and municipal finance that underpins the current project.

What chance do local governments have in fighting authoritarian austerity, especially when they are left to rely on feckless legislators at the state and federal levels who refuse to push back? Right now, we see austerity budgets appearing across every institution and major employer in the U.S. If the federal government continues to sabotage municipalities, and the state governments (even in liberal states) are proposing cuts-only budgets, then what hope do cities have? In truth, there are several meaningful alternatives to the present order, particularly if we follow the lead of what Money on the Left calls Democratic Public Finance. We only need to get creative about local monetary design. 

Extending money creation powers from the federal level directly to local governments remains an urgent political project. In the meantime, however, we propose that a powerful public option for municipal finance exists at the intersection between bond issuance and public banking. What if a city established a public bank and that public bank regularly purchased the city’s debt? Such a mechanism would liberate the city’s munis from private bond markets and punishing rating agencies, while expanding the city’s fiscal capacity beyond projected tax revenues. 

To understand why this works, we must discard a pervasive myth: banks do not lend deposits. They create credit “endogenously” through acts of authorization. Banks certainly have to meet liquidity and reserve requirements. However, meeting such requirements is a separate matter from crediting operations, which are legally enabled and protected by the Federal Reserve. A bank’s crediting operations do not recycle a limited pool of pre-existing investor funds. They actively expand the amount of total credit that is presently available. 

Therefore, when a public bank purchases its own city’s municipal debt, the result is not a closed loop in which a finite amount of money is passed back and forth. Because the public bank actively generates money to purchase the debt, the operation dramatically enlarges the city’s fiscal space. In such an arrangement, the municipal government acquires funds in the short term to meet community needs. The public bank grows its holdings by receiving interest payments from the city. The loops, then, are not redundant; they are kinetic. Far from an inert circuit, a public bank that purchases city debt is a dynamic design that defies the artificial gravity of austerity.

Most importantly, this arrangement halts the depletion of fiscal capacity by ensuring that debt service payments remain on the city’s own public ledger. Unlike with the private bond market, the public bank would be legally required to deposit earned interest into the city’s general fund. By cutting out the rentiers, the city thus transforms a parasitic financial drain into a regenerative cycle, guaranteeing that public interest is no longer just a yield for private financiers, but a shared benefit in the public interest.

We do not have to look far for a successful precedent. The Bank of North Dakota (BND) already acts as the depository for all state taxes, fines, and fees. While BND operates more conservatively than the model we propose—acting primarily as a registrar and facilitator rather than a direct purchaser of munis—it still remits its profits to the state’s general fund. In 2023 alone, the bank posted profits of $192.7 million. To put that in perspective, this figure greatly exceeds the $115 million in annual revenue projected for Washington State’s highly contested wealth tax proposal. For states like Washington, which rely heavily on regressive property tax levies to pay for almost everything, the BND model offers a wealth of untapped potential.

While the BND focuses primarily on state and municipal operations, if a new generation of public banks were chartered to provide consumer financial services alongside municipal finance, the benefits would be exponential. Private retail banks routinely generate massive profit margins of 15% to 30% through rapacious fees and predatory lending. Crucially, a public bank would not simply transfer this rentier model to the public sector. By functioning as a true public utility, it would offer high-quality, low-cost financial services instead. Public banks should provide an affordable, non-predatory alternative for working people. Even without exorbitant fees, however, it would still generate a robust and ethical source of revenue to be invested directly back into the community—funding the very policies, programs, and budgets voted on by the people the bank serves.

To realize this vision, establishing democratically accountable public banks—whether at the municipal or state level—must become a top political and legislative priority. Chartered as public utilities rather than profit-seeking enterprises, these institutions would be governed by public appointees and remain 100% accountable to city halls, county commissions, or state legislatures. By legally mandating that all net earnings (derived from interest and fees) be deposited back into the government’s general fund, municipalities can organically grow their revenues over time without continuously hiking taxes. As an added democratic benefit, their daily operations would be entirely transparent, with balance sheets published for the public.

The practical strength of this arrangement lies in the specific mechanics of the yield. With the federal funds rate currently sitting at a target range of 3.50% to 3.75%, a municipality could intentionally set its internal bond yields just above this floor. Because the public bank holds the debt, the spread guarantees a steady stream of revenue for the public ledger. Furthermore, by indexing the yield to the rate of inflation, the city constructs a resilient financial instrument in the face of unpredictable circumstances. Should an emergency or unforeseen project cost require rapid liquidity beyond the public bank’s immediate capacity, this competitive yield would generate intense demand from the private sector to hold the city’s munis—effectively subordinating private capital to the public interest.

Unlocking a municipality’s latent ability to sell bonds directly to its own public bank reveals a startling truth: the primary limits on local finance are not economic, but political. The constraints cities currently face are mostly self-imposed regulations—arbitrary debt ceilings or rules enforced by oversight boards captured by private banking interests. While every municipality will navigate different statutory limits on bond issuance, we can begin by maxing out current legal capacities and organizing to expand those horizons later. 

Consider the political implications for building local public capacity. Lately, wealth taxes have dominated local discussions around budget expansion. While taxing the rich remains a vital tool for combating economic inequality and checking the anti-democratic power of concentrated wealth, relying on taxation as the sole lifeline for municipal survival is politically precarious. A public bank shifts this paradigm. By carefully managing the yields and maturities on internally held municipal bonds, a city can steadily expand its general fund. Wealth taxes would no longer be a desperate necessity for basic funding, but rather one tool among many. 

Instead of begging for scraps from state legislatures or private bond markets, local governments can directly create the capacity to care for their communities. Once we are willing to get creative with Democratic Public Finance, we see that the blueprint is already here. We only need the political will to use it, guaranteeing that every local dollar created is an investment in the public interest. 

Defending the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau with Tyler Creighton

In this episode, we speak with Tyler Creighton about the ongoing struggle to save the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB) from defunding and closure at the hands of Russell Vought in the second Trump Administration. Creighton is a lawyer at the CFPB and a member of the National Treasury Employees Union (NTEU), Chapter 335. Before joining the CFPB, Creighton clerked for the Massachusetts Appeals Court and, prior to that, he was an organizer for pro-democracy reforms at Common Cause and ReThink Media. We talk with Creighton about life at the CFPB under the leadership of Vought, central architect of the notorious Project 2025 document and avowed opponent of the agency he now directs. 

During our conversation, Creighton details how, in spite of Vought’s attempts to defund and close the agency, the CFPB continues to survive. In Creighton’s telling, the agency’s endurance owes in no small part to the continuous labor actions undertaken by the NTEU and its members. In February 2025, for example, the union sued the Trump Administration, securing an injunction against Vought’s efforts to close the agency. (Read the judge’s extraordinary Memorandum Opinion here.) Then, in late December, a federal district court judge ruled that the Trump administration must continue to fund the CFPB through the Federal Reserve, contradicting Vought’s absurd claim that the CFPB can no longer seek financing from the Fed because the nation’s Central Bank is operating at a loss.

Despite the NTEU’s string of successes, the fate of the CFPB still remains to be determined. The good news, however, is that there are ways that you can support the bureau as it rounds into its second year of the second Trump Administration. Learn more about the fight to save the CFPB from the CFPB Union website. Follow and share news from the NTEU account on Bluesky. Join the union’s public demonstrations, if you live near or find yourself visiting Washington D.C. You can also help fund the NTEU’s activities by purchasing any number of cheeky items in their online merchandise shop

Visit our Patreon page here: https://www.patreon.com/MoLsuperstructure

Music by Nahneen Kula: www.nahneenkula.com

Transcript

This transcript has been edited for readability.

Billy Saas

Tyler Creighton, welcome to Money on the Left.

Tyler Creighton

Thank you. Glad to be here.

Billy Saas

It is a pleasure to have you. We are looking to talk to you about a lot of things. You work principally now as a lawyer with the CFPB, the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau. Could you just maybe kick us off by telling us a little bit about what that’s like now in January of 2026?

Tyler Creighton

Yeah. The past year at the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau has been just a little bit different than my prior few years at the CFPB. I will say, I am an attorney at the CFPB. I’m here just talking in my own personal capacity. Nothing I say can be attributed to the bureau, representing my public sector union: the National Treasurer Employees Union.

But, yeah, it’s been an interesting year. I joined the bureau in 2022, so I’m actually a relatively new employee compared to a lot of other people that have been there since the start. When Trump got elected, it was a little unclear exactly what was going to happen to the CFPB.

It’s kind of been a little bit of a political lightning rod for its entire existence since 2011. But we didn’t really know what to expect. Oddly, we kind of flew under the radar for the first month. Our former director who had been appointed by President Biden, Rohit Chopra, stayed on until the end of January, and into the first week of February before he was finally fired by the president.

That’s when everything really changed. Trump appointed the architect of Project 2025, Russel Vought, as our acting director. Within days of him being appointed, he had closed down all of our office buildings and kicked everybody out and had sent an all staff email saying, “stop performing any work task, whatsoever.”

Everything just kind of came to a crashing halt and a lot has happened since then. They have been trying to close us down since that first week in February and, although they have really mucked around with the operations of the bureau – despite the best efforts – it is still standing.

I think this is largely in part due to a lot of dedicated workers at the bureau who have been organizing through our union and using litigation to keep the bureau alive as Congress intended.

Scott Ferguson

Can you tell us a little bit about just your own personal history? How did you come to the CFPB? You’re a lawyer. What’s your background? What’s your specialty? What do you do at the CFPB in particular?

Tyler Creighton

Yeah. So, I’m actually a relatively new lawyer. I graduated law school in 2021 and I clerked for a year on the Massachusetts appeals court, and then went directly from there to the CFPB in 2022. I work in our Office of Supervision. I’ve primarily focused on the mortgage market, although I’ve also done some work on student loans and auto loans.

I think a lot of people don’t really know what “supervision” means at the CFPB or “supervision” across other financial regulators. But, at the CFPB, in terms of compliance, we kind of have our enforcement division, which is, I think, what people generally think of when they think of regulators. These are the folks that are running investigations and suing bad actors when they find potential legal violations.

That’s all very public. These lawsuits will be on the public docket and you can read the complaint and you can see all the details. Supervision is very different. It is a confidential process. This is an authority that was granted to us by Congress and the Dodd-Frank act, which established the CFPB and gives us authority to conduct periodic examinations of certain financial companies that are under our authority.

What that means is we request a bunch of information and documents from an institution, and then we have teams of expert examiners who are looking at the information and making sure that policies and procedures of the companies and their functions are all complying with our various federal statutes and regulations. If we identify any problems, we try to resolve the issues in a collaborative process with the companies.

It all remains confidential. For the most part, everything is kind of resolved in that confidential space. It only kind of comes out later if companies are disagreeing with our assessments, or it seems like the conduct is particularly egregious or intentional in which case the issue might end up getting into the enforcement side and then leading to litigation.

I’ve been doing that work since 2022. Unfortunately, as public reports show, that work has more or less not existed since February of 2025. Just hoping that we can kind of get back to actually supervising the companies that Congress intended us to.

Billy Saas

And so that’s just a function of companies, I guess. What side is that lack of continued supervision activity most attributable to. Is that a function of the top down directives from Russ Vought, or is it companies not feeling like they need to participate any longer? Can you talk to us a little bit more about that?

Tyler Creighton

It is directly attributable to Russ Vought stop work order in February that, for all intents and purposes, really hasn’t fully disappeared or really been rescinded.

Scott Ferguson

So what determines what is actionable work versus what must be stopped?

Tyler Creighton

You know, we are civil servants. We don’t go off and sort of just do our own thing. We are directed by political leadership on what our priorities are and what the work is. We have not been authorized or directed to do the supervision work that we had previously been done.

Billy Saas

It’s similar on the enforcement side, I would presume as well.

Tyler Creighton

Yes. I’m not on the enforcement side, but yes, I think public reporting shows that there isn’t enforcement going on. Investigations are not continuing. And you’ve seen publicly that a lot of open litigation has either been dismissed or settled, including a number of open consent orders that companies and the CFPB had already reached and had not yet expired have been terminated prior to the expiration date in the consent order.

Scott Ferguson

We’ve started to talk about the division of labor and the division of the institution a bit. But I was wondering, to the best of your ability, I know you haven’t been there from the beginning, but can you give us a little more detailed sense of when the CFPB arises? Under what circumstances? The specific things it was tasked to do and what it has been doing ever since.

Tyler Creighton

Yeah. So, the sort of neat and tidy story of the CFPB’s founding is that it’s really a product of the subprime mortgage mortgage crisis that triggered the 2008 global financial crisis and then the Great Recession that followed, which, as many people remember, there was kind of rampant fraud in the mortgage markets.

There was a lot of predatory lending that led people to default on their mortgage and then massive foreclosure crisis. And in the wake of that, or really in the in the midst of it, Senator Elizabeth Warren, but then-law professor Elizabeth Warren, wrote a couple of journal articles in like 2007, 2008, that talked about or envisioned a new federal agency that would really be charged principally or entirely with regulating consumer financial products with the eyes of the consumer in mind or the benefits of the consumer in mind.

She kind of analogized, saying “we have agencies to stop unsafe toys and toasters. But we don’t really have that for financial products.” And so she envisioned this agency as kind of being analogous to some agencies that already existed. Those articles resulted in Congress passing the Dodd-Frank act in 2010, which is one of then President Obama and the newly elected Democratic majorities in Congress first major bills.

The idea there was to essentially consolidate a bunch of split and overlapping authorities that are then split across a bunch of agencies and consolidate that all into a single agency that could take a more holistic and dedicated approach with consumers that would be front and center. Then it also added some  new authorities as well.

At this point, I already talked about the enforcement and supervision aspects of the bureau. There’s also the consumer complaint database, which some listeners might have used before. I think there’s been like 5 million consumers who have filed a complaint since 2011 when that started. That’s been a tremendous tool to quickly resolve individual problems between consumers and companies where previously, maybe the company didn’t feel like they needed to do anything, but now there’s kind of this public record out there when consumers are complaining and they feel more compelled. Then, at the bureau, there’s also a lot of market research that folks are doing to identify potential risks and hazards and new products, new financial markets. Then there’s a lot of consumer education resources that the bureau puts out.

In my mind, some of the clearest, concise information on what you should be thinking about when you’re getting a mortgage. Like, here’s step one here, step two… I was working at the bureau at the time, I think it was right before I started working there and was buying my first home and was just like all over the website using the resources, which have been, I think, a huge help for people.

It’s not just mortgages, it’s auto loans, or if you have problems with credit reporting, just a ton of great information.

Scott Ferguson

Is that all still up?

Tyler Creighton

It is all still up. Yeah. I definitely was worried in the early days about a lot of that stuff going away in some way. 

Scott Ferguson

It’s not too woke.

Tyler Creighton

Yeah, it’s practical enough. We haven’t gotten into a lot of the litigation that has been going on, but there is an injunction that’s still in place that is preventing the kind of full shutdown and wrap up of the bureau.

I don’t know to what extent that injunction is planning on keeping up a lot of these existing resources that the bureau has put together over the years.

Scott Ferguson

Can you tell us a little bit more about how the consumer complaint database works? I mean, I’ve never used it, so I have no idea. Is it like a Yelp review? You can just like, have an account log on or is it a little more formal? Do you need a lawyer or something like that?

Tyler Creighton

I don’t know if it’s quite Yelp-review status, but it’s closer to that than like a formal thing where you need to write out a very legalese complaint. It’s very accessible. You can log in and you put the company that you have issue with, you write a narrative about what happened and on the public facing side, if you put in any personally identifiable information that will not appear on the public side of the consumer complaint database, but other people can see what you wrote about, even if they’re just like your neighbor or whatever. There is a rule in Dodd-Frank that the companies have to provide a response.

It doesn’t necessarily say it’s got to be a substantive response or it has to rectify or agree with the consumer. I mean, the consumer can be potentially wrong, but they have to provide a response. By and large, if the consumer has raised a legitimate issue, you look at the company response and the company will have provided some kind of remedy, whether it’s erasing a charge on the person’s credit card that shouldn’t have been there or fixing some inaccurate information on the consumer’s credit report or whatever it is.

Oftentimes the complaint, if it’s legitimate, will result in some kind of action that benefits the consumer. On the bureau side, all of those complaints are taken into account when you’re thinking about enforcement and supervision. Where’s the risk? Sort of like an early kind of warning system to the regulators of where there’s risk, where there’s problems, because obviously the consumers are on the front lines. They know where the issues are and so it’s a great resource for the CFPB to figure out where to dedicate finite resources.

Scott Ferguson

Obviously, the CFPB has a history of contestation around it. This is maybe the most life threatening, so to speak, battle that the institution has faced thus far. It’s not like the first Trump administration was very happy about this institution either. So I was curious if you have a sense of the history of largely Republican challenges before this particular present moment.

I know from doing a little bit of research that there was a court case that had to do with how the director was appointed and the reasons that the director could be removed. So any of this that you can speak to, to just contextualize what’s going on now.

00;17;36;10 – 00;18;08;14

Tyler Creighton

Yeah. There’s a lot of history there. You know, it’s no secret that most politicians on the right and Wall Street banks have not been the biggest fan of the CFPB, and have tried various ways to reform it or get rid of it in whole. There have been two very high profile Supreme Court cases challenging aspects of the CFPB structure.

The first one, which you mentioned, was about the ability of the president to fire at will the director of the agency. If folks been following any of the legal cases going on in the current era, this will be very familiar to people, because we have Supreme Court cases about this very issue with regard to the FTC commissioners (Federal Trade Commission) and also potentially down the road, the Federal Reserve, and the ability of the independence of the fed and whether or not the president can can get rid of fed chairs.

So anyway, back in, I think it was in 2019, there was a challenge to the provision of Dodd-Frank, which said that the director could only be removed for cause. That was challenged. And the Supreme Court struck down that provision. Since that time, the director has been essentially removable at will by the president.

Since that happened, the presidents have used that power. So, when Joe Biden came in 2021, he used it to get rid of the existing director who had been appointed by Trump during his first term. Then when Trump came in in 2025, he used it to get rid of Chopra, Biden’s director.

The kind of more existential case was in 2024. That one challenged the constitutionality of the CFPB funding structure, or funding mechanism. We are a little bit distinct, not entirely unique, but different from a lot of other federal agencies and that we are not part of the Congress’s annual appropriations process. So, you know, all this talk of government shutdown last year, and currently they are trying to get the funding bills together so we don’t go into another shutdown at the end of January here, but the CFPB is actually not part of that. We have a dedicated funding mechanism. Where the director is required to request money from the Federal Reserve who gets money from interest payments and fees, paid by their member banks.

Our directors are required to request money from the fed to carry out our functions. Congress has tapped the total amount of money that we can request, but that funding is just always there. It doesn’t require Congress to pass a new bill each year saying like, this is how much money is available for the CFPB.

The constitutionality of that mechanism was challenged by an industry trade group. Ultimately they lost pretty bigly, in terms of our president, and I forget the exact breakdown, but it was like 7-2 or 8-1 in terms of the breakdown of the Supreme Court justices. They were not able to convince many of the justices, including some that are very far on the right and sympathetic to these types of arguments, that the mechanism was unconstitutional.

We survived that. Then, obviously, more recently we’ve come under the attack of just trying to shut down the whole place by pure legal fiat. Congress hasn’t repealed the agency or anything, but we’re just going to try to shut it down because we want to.

Billy Saas

Well, thanks for that. It brings us nice and up to date. There’s more that we can say about those current court cases. And I want to talk about the union’s efforts, and advancing those cases, and defending the CFPB from those attacks. I want to step back just a little bit.

We mentioned the complaints division or the complaints process that consumers previously had available through the CFPB. In addition to the enforcement supervision, for the complaints, I understand that those would sort of become the grounds for action. Is that correct? Like, on behalf of enforcement or from the CFPB, there could be efforts taken to address those complaints.

Tyler Creighton

Yeah. I mean, so obviously we have finite resources over a rollover of these massive markets with hundreds of hundreds of players, and we have to take in whatever information we can to help focus where we’re going to use those resources. So complaints are one of many different data streams, whether it’s enforcement or people in supervision, that we are using to help identify which companies we should be looking at, which practices we should be looking at.

Sometimes what you get with the complaints is maybe that individual consumer’s complaint was rectified. So they were charged an illegal late fee on their mortgage and the company said, “Okay, great. Yes, we did that. Sorry. We will credit your account,” but they don’t really say anything about if this affects other people or is this a one-off thing?

Was it a systemic problem? You don’t necessarily get that information. The other divisions can kind of use, “oh, there’s this one consumer, maybe there was a couple,” and it sort of indicates, okay, maybe this is more a systemic problem that requires additional looking into and ensuring that it wasn’t just this one consumer who got their issue rectified, but actually all of the impacted consumers got the issue rectified.

Billy Saas

Yeah. So in any case, it’s a line of communication between everyday citizens, consumers, and the government. That’s a highly valuable thing. I wonder if you could say something about where we’re at now with the stop work order and, it is my understanding that the closest equivalent to the complaint line is like individual state attorneys general, right?

If there are bad actors in the financial sector, and maybe you can tell me if there are others, the most charitable reading of the perspective on the argument for closing the CFPB would be like, “there are already enforcement mechanisms in place at the state level.” What exists and maybe help us see through that argument.

Tyler Creighton

Yeah. The consumer complaint database is a very, very powerful tool. I highly recommend that consumers continue to use it even in this time, because I think companies are continuing to respond to it despite the CFPB’s kind of beleaguered status at the moment.

In terms of other regulators out there, if the CFPB’s current trajectory continues and it is not operating at anything close to what it was doing in 2024 and before that, the states will step in to a certain degree. But the attorney general’s offices are already overtaxed on other things.

They also are only responsible for the actions and the residents of their own state. So, you know, if the AG of Massachusetts brings a case because they’ve noticed that some mortgage lender is selling predatory loans, that’s not necessarily going to help the person that is in Mississippi that is also getting predatory loans from the same provider.

It creates this real patchwork where, depending on where you live in the country, you’re going to be given more or less protection from these companies. The bureau has this kind of national outlook and has a lot more resources in terms of lawyers, but we also have economists and people that are familiar with the market and data technologists and all these other people that a lot of state regulators don’t really have. It really helps to identify these new products that are complicated. It’s not necessarily obvious how they work or how they might be harming consumers. I think that’s been really important to have at the CFPB. There’s been a lot of innovation in financial services. And then also, a lot of these states have just come to rely on the CFPB expertise and that they’re going to be there.

So, yeah, again, they’ll adapt, but I think, in the end, consumers will be the ones paying the price.

Billy Saas

If the CFPB continues down the way it’s going, they’re probably not going to rechannel that direct fed funding to the individual states attorney generals.

Tyler Creighton

No. Yeah. Probably not, probably not.

Billy Saas

And so those resources go away and I think it would increase the burden on those states individually, who are, under the current regime, limited to tax revenue and local politics. 

Tyler Creighton

This just reminds me of how kind of nonsensical getting rid of the CFPB is. You know, it all started when Elon Musk’s DOGE (Department of Government Efficiency) folks came in trying to eliminate fraud and waste, or purportedly trying to eliminate fraud and waste. The truth is that, at the CFPB, prior to the current administration, we had returned something like $21 billion or more to consumers through our efforts.

If you break that down in terms of how much money is going back to consumers versus how much money is going to pay for the CFPB’s operating cost, it’s like almost a $3 return on investment for every dollar that goes to the bureau is going to result in nearly $3 going back out to consumers, because we’ve identified some illegal practice and gotten refunds.

So, there’s obviously bloat in the government, and probably some bloat at the CFPB, but like, by and large, the consumers and Americans are benefiting greatly from the relatively small amount of money that was going to the Bureau to keep it running.

Scott Ferguson

So I’m chomping at the bit to hear the story of the DOGE occupation of this. But before we do, I guess I wanted to ask one more preliminary question. I have not studied this document closely, maybe I should have, but Project 2025, which is Vought’s little brainchild. As far as I’m aware, it includes language about what the intention of this administration was when it came to the CFPB. Were people in the agency reading Project 2025 and sort of like, I don’t know, bracing themselves for this or strategizing or not really.

Tyler Creighton

I don’t remember that so much. I mean, there were probably some conversations here or there of people who had taken a peek. I mean, honestly, I don’t. I don’t know if you have looked at it recently, but it’s pretty sparse on the CFPB. There’s not a lot of meat on the bones there. I mean, it kind of gestured that, “Oh, yeah, we should just get rid of this whole thing,” but then it ultimately has like a few bullets that are much less than that. It seems fixated on a completely fabricated idea. I honestly don’t even know where they got this idea from. The civil penalties fund, which is the fund that the bureau operates when we do enforcement litigation and the companies have to pay some kind of penalty to us, and then that gets redistributed back out to consumers.

They have this completely fabricated idea that the penalty fund was just the slush fund for like liberal advocacy groups. That’s like the main thing that it’s focused on in the Project 2025 document. Honestly, I just don’t even know where that comes from. It sounded like there was a minimal amount of consumer education that’s been funded through the penalty fund, absolutely tiny compared to the amount of overall money.

Maybe that went to some groups that are involved in that consumer education. But like to say that it’s just this slush fund for liberal groups and that’s the reason why we got to get rid of the whole thing, it just struck me as really grasping at straws there. 

I don’t think we talked about it too much, but there was a lot of waiting. Elon and company have been talking about taking the chainsaw to the government, and it was unclear what was going to happen because a lot of people at the bureau have been there since close to the start.

They went through Trump one. They thought, incorrectly – now we’ve all learned – that it wouldn’t be something similar to Trump one in that, things changed, things slowed down a little bit, but after some initial kind of bumpy-ness that happens with any change over administration, from what I’ve understood, I wasn’t there so I can’t speak to it from personal experience, but like they were doing similar work to what they had been doing before. Priorities changed a little bit. Maybe they weren’t using some legal theories that they had been using before. But, you know, they were doing good work. I think people kind of thought that something similar would happen, and were obviously proven wrong by that.

But, I think in those first couple of months after the election, while we waited to see what was going to happen, that I think that was sort of the optimistic take.

Scott Ferguson

So walk us through this early timeline of Musk and DOGE first. Is that prior to Vought?

Tyler Creighton

It’s concurrent, really. You’ll have to forgive me a little bit because at this point, it’s been almost a year and a lot of this was like moving quickly. I wasn’t personally one of the people who was in the building when this was all kind of going down. Musk and his folks have been infiltrating other agencies in the lead up to us.

So we had kind of already seen the USAID (United States Agency for International Development) playbook: go in there, take control of all of the computer and data systems and then just start quickly closing up shop.

The exact tick tock of this was, I think it was January 31st or February 1st, Cobra gets fired. Initially, Trump appoints Scott Bessent, the Treasury secretary, as acting director. But on the president’s first day, he sends a message to all staff with six bullet points or something like that, of the work that should stop including enforcement, oddly not supervision.

So we continued to do that.

Scott Ferguson

Is that because he didn’t know about it?

Tyler Creighton

That’s my speculation. But I don’t know for sure. So we continued and then, by the end of that first week of February, the first DOGE people started accessing the building, which is right across the street from the White House in DC. Then Trump appointed Vought right at the end of the week.

He sent out an email saying, “you can’t come into the building anymore,” and then on that following Monday sent an email saying much more explicit things, expanding on the six bulleted things that Bessent said we weren’t allowed to do and just said, “don’t perform any work whatsoever.” Then it was really in that first week under Vought when things were moving very, very quickly, we had been kicked out the building and told not to work.

The union actually organized a very quick action at the building, like that, I think even before it was officially closed. So folks were picketing out front and then Vought used that picketing as the pretext for closing the building, saying that, “my employees feel unsafe coming to the building because a bunch of folks are chanting and holding signs…”

Scott Ferguson

Who are also employees.

Tyler Creighton

Who are also employees, yeah, exactly. In that preceding week – this all kind of later comes out in litigation, we were not totally privy to it at the time – but basically there starts being leaks to members of the union that folks in H.R. are racing to fire everybody, to just completely axe the place in the same way that they did with USAID. Running just exactly the same playbook.

So as that information is trickling out through union members and colleagues, we are getting legal counsel through our national union to figure out what to do about that. They file a lawsuit very, very quickly in that first week and are able to get a temporary restraining order by that Friday immediately following Vought’s appointment and it later comes out when we are arguing for a preliminary injunction. A temporary restraining order is very temporary and so we’re filing for a preliminary injunction, which would hopefully stop firings, stop the shutdown going while the litigation that our union had filed precedes. While we are gathering evidence, while our attorneys are gathering evidence for that preliminary injunction, we get all of the details about what was happening in that first week. I encourage people, if you have a minute to go look at the district court’s opinion when the chief finally granted the pulmonary injunction, that’s just like documenting all of the emails and the meetings and everything that’s happening. They are just absolutely racing to fire 1700 people. It’s up until like the moment on late Friday, there are attorneys in court with the DOJ trying to argue for this temporary restraining order. H.R. is getting emails that there’s this court proceeding happening right now, and they’re like, “no, just get it done. Get the firings out the door, like we need to get them done before the court acts.” It’s like Friday afternoon. They’re trying to race to get them out. The court just got it under the wire to get the temporary restraining order in place before everybody at the agency was fired.

Scott Ferguson

Can I ask a potentially sensitive question which you may not be able to answer, but are the HR folks, they’re people in the agency who do HR? So they’re just sort of following instructions in doing all this?

Tyler Creighton

Yeah. So I mean, DOGE was a small-ish operation. They needed actual people who had expertise and some experience actually working in government and know how things work to effectuate what they wanted to do. So in the government, we have these things called reductions in force, which are effectively like mass layoffs when an agency director wants to change priorities or Congress has cut funding again. None of that happened here.

But like, they were trying to use these reduction in forces to get rid of everybody. They’re using the H.R. people within the CFPB to get that done. You can look at the litigation. A number of people filed anonymous declarations and actually then testified in court about what was going on in these meetings that they were being brought into about, where they were just trying to quickly fire everybody before the court was able to get the restraining order done.

And actually, I forgot an important detail with some of my fellow employees who were actually fired during that first week, because it was horrendous and more uncertain for them. But, yeah, there were successful firings of about 200 of our term and probationary employees in that week of February, while they were racing to get rid of the rest of us.

Fortunately, those folks were reinstated through our litigation. But it was obviously unexpected from them and there was one employee who has a big profile in the Atlantic. She was in her doctor’s office getting a cancer diagnosis when she was illegally fired, or when she received an email saying, “you’re fired.”

It’s not the worst part about it, but just kind of an insult to injury, with these notices, because they were trying to get them out so quickly, they failed the mail merges. It just said, “dear [first name, last name],” instead of like “dear, ‘the actual person’s name,’ you’ve been terminated because your skills and needs are no longer relevant to the work that we do.”

So, yeah, it was a horrendous week, but fortunately, we are still here a year later because a lot of people moved quickly to get into court and stop this.

Scott Ferguson

So what’s been going on this year after the first week?

Tyler Creighton

Yeah, it’s hard to think back on it all. In those first few weeks and months, it was very frenetic and really all-hands-on-deck with people really stepping up to make these declarations to the court where they’re essentially being whistleblowers to talk about what was going on on the inside with these firings.

The union is organizing weekly pickets out in front of our building. We had a number of court dates where we’re organizing events out in front of the court. Everyone was very fired up and working together to kind of support the litigation that was going on inside the courtroom. We weren’t the attorneys involved in it, but the rest of us were outside, telling the public the story about what was going on and why this was important.

I think that slowed down a little bit as the litigation dragged on, but we’re continuing to organize and get our message out about why the bureau is important and why we should be able to get back to work and also about workers rights. These are good working class, well-paid jobs and there’s something to be said about how we’re in the middle of an affordability crisis, and they’re trying to get rid of these jobs that are very secure for people who are in the middle class.

So we’re continuing to fight on against the immediate shutdown. One thing that Congress was successful in doing last year was actually lowering our funding cap. They cut the max funding that we can get almost in half. So we’ve been continuing to work with our legislative partners to hopefully get that reversed and get the cap back up.

Then we’re pounding the drum to get Vought impeached, which is another priority for us as a union.

Scott Ferguson

I have another question. How has the press been in your experience and the collective experience of the union? Does the press ask the right questions? Does it tell the right stories? Does it care enough? Does it focus on what’s going on enough? I’m just kind of curious to hear you talk about your experience precisely with publicity and, like, the politics of publicity around this crisis.

Tyler Creighton

I think publicity around these kinds of major rule of law, democracy stories can be tough for the press, but by and large, I think they have covered this past year of the bureau well. There obviously is the day to day of what’s going on in the litigation. But there’s also been a number of great pieces about what this means more broadly to consumers.

A lot of good consumer snapshots of people who had been helped in the past by the bureau and the fact that if we ceased to exist, that person who was facing foreclosure and was able to grab this lifeline to keep them and keep their family in their house, that won’t be there anymore.

There’s been a lot of good reporting on that front. There’s a lot going on in the Trump administration right now, it’s hard to keep anything focused. Where does the CFPB rank in the list of the many, many other things that are happening right now?

Is it the most important thing? People have disagreements about that. I think I’ve generally been impressed with the coverage. I think one difficulty is like, how do you tell the next part of the story?

It’s like, there’s only so many times you can say, “oh, here’s this consumer who was helped by the bureau, and that help won’t exist anymore,” right? Only so many people can write that story. So what’s the next page in the story as we continue. We’re coming up on the year anniversary of this whole saga.

That’s nothing unique to this particular fight. It’s true for any kind of advocacy policy fight that you’re going to have. Before I became a lawyer, I did communications advocacy for issues around campaign finance and voting rights and we had the same kind of issues on those topics as well.

Billy Saas

Journalists love a news peg. Perhaps the year anniversary will generate some additional impetus for coverage here.

Tyler Creighton

I totally agree with you. It’s something I’ve been thinking about because this conversation’s a good impetus for it. It’s been almost a year since Elon Musk tweeted “R.I.P. CFPB,” a year ago and we’re still here. That can’t necessarily be said for some other agencies that got targeted.

What’s the difference? I think the existence of our union and the organizing around that has actually been pretty key to that. There’s been some allusions in some of the reporting to that effect, but I think it’s a little bit of an untold story that the organizing of the workers themselves has been pretty critical to preserving this agency that Congress created. It might not exist if the union hadn’t been as organized and kind of jumped on the issue as quickly as it did.

Scott Ferguson

Something you told us before we started recording was that Vought is this kind of spectral presence who never shows up. You said you’ve never seen this man, who is your boss. Has anybody seen him at the agency? Presumably Musk actually showed up into the building to occupy it, and people saw him, but, has anybody had direct communication with Vought?

Tyler Creighton

Not sure. Yeah, I have not. Initially we were 1700 people. We’ve lost a lot of people. But like, you know, with organizations of that size, you’re going to get email communications talking about organization priorities and what we’re doing and have broad staff meetings to kind of keep everybody on the same page. That has not been a thing that is happening at the Bureau.

So, yeah, he is the director, but, I can’t say I’ve had any direction from him.

Scott Ferguson

So there’s been more recent litigation and litigation that has gone in the agency’s favor. Back to this funding question, maybe you can tell us about the arguments made on both sides and how this has all played out.

Tyler Creighton

Yeah. It’s funny when you said, “in the agency’s favor,” it actually technically went against the agency, if you think about the agency and who currently runs it. But, yeah, it went in favor of keeping the agency alive and protecting consumers down the road. We secured a preliminary injunction back in March against firings, against contract cancellations, against closing up shop essentially, or to kind of generalize. But, while that injunction has been in place, Russ Vought has not requested any additional funding from the Federal Reserve since he took over. The agency happened to have quite a large balance when he took over, so that wasn’t a problem for a while.

Scott Ferguson

Does that tend to be a regular periodic request, or is it just sort of as needed, whenever?

Tyler Creighton

It’s a little slightly out of my expertise on this, but I think it’s generally been quarterly. I’d have to look back at the statute on whether or not it actually needs to be quarterly or it can kind of be as needed. I think, in effect, it kind of acts as needed.

Prior directors have planned out the year and have a sense of how much money it’s going to be required and then make quarterly withdrawals for that money. But anyway, Vought hadn’t requested any money, so while this injunction against firings existed, we were quickly dwindling our reserves. It was getting to the point where he was saying that the agency wasn’t going to have any more money at some point in early 2026.

The position he was taking was this, novel and fairly ludicrous legal argument that Congress created this dedicated funding for the CFPB by allowing it to withdraw money from the Federal Reserve’s revenue. But, the language that that Congress used was the Federal Reserve’s, quote unquote, combined earnings. To date, that has been understood as the Federal Reserve revenue. So any money that it earns. He took the position that, “Oh, no, actually combined earnings is referring to profits,” which is a weird construction for a government agency that isn’t a for-profit enterprise that’s trying to make profits. But, you know, putting that aside, he took the position that it is the feds operating revenue minus their expenses.

Since sometime in 2022, if you do that calculation, it’s actually a negative. So it’s been losing money, if we were to analogize it to a for-profit institution, which it’s not. So he said, “I’m not permitted to request additional money because Congress hasn’t provided any set aside.”

Why would Congress have said, “okay, we’re going to have this dedicated funding mechanism, but it only works if the fed has profits.” But if it doesn’t, then this agency just disappears for that time. You know, it doesn’t make a lot of sense. But, our lawyers went in and filed a motion to clarify that this novel interpretation, that had not been used before, wouldn’t let the agency off the hook for complying with the preliminary injunction against firing staff, against canceling contracts, against shutting down the agency.

In late December, the district court agreed and said, “yeah, this interpretation of the statute of combined earnings makes no sense. You, Vought, have manufactured this funding crisis, and I am not going to allow this thing that you’ve manufactured totally on your own accord to take you out of the injunction that is still in place.”

Essentially, they are setting up this scenario where you could either request money and comply with the injunction or you could continue to drive the CFPB into bankruptcy and therefore be out of compliance with the conjunction and face the consequences of that. Just last week, Vought  ended up saying, “Okay, although we disagree with your opinion, federal judge, we will request the money.”

So he requested enough money for, according to the letter to the court, for this quarter, which I guess will go until March. So that’s where we’re at now. Concurrently, the preliminary injunction that started this whole thing is under appeal to the full D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals, which will hear arguments in that case in late February.

Billy Saas

We have seen a lot of things over the last year, but administration officials complying with judicial orders is not top among those. Do you have any sense for why Vought  would have proceeded or honored this? I don’t know. Do you have any ideas why?

Tyler Creighton

I don’t really, I haven’t really seen any theories put out there. He obviously didn’t do it happily. He made it very clear that he wouldn’t have done this, if he was able to act on his own accord.

Billy Saas

Well, I’ll say kudos to Russ Vought in this one instance. Compliance. Do more. He could do more.

Tyler Creighton

Yeah. Doing the bare minimum.

Billy Saas

I wanted to maybe return to the point that you mentioned, you’re here as a member of the union. The CFPB is not even 20 years old, but the union that y’all are a part of now, chapter 335, has been around for at least 100 years.

It’s associated with the Treasury. Could you talk just a bit about the union and maybe, by way of wrapping up, give our listeners some sense of what we might or what they might be able to do, and to support the union’s efforts.

Tyler Creighton

Yeah. I won’t be able to speak to the 100 year history of the union.

Billy Saas

Understandable. Yeah.

Tyler Creighton

A bit beyond my knowledge, but we’re a local chapter, 335, of the National Treasurer Employees Union, which represents employees at a number of different agencies across the federal government. As I was saying before, I came to the bureau in 2022. So, I don’t have personal experience with the union’s early days, but as I understand, it was formed towards the end of 2012.

So a little over a year into the existence of the bureau and the history between 2012 and 2020, I don’t get the sense that there was like a ton of agitation going on. You know, it was helpful for workers, but has really kind of transformed, I think once Covid was like dramatically changing workplace norms for the federal government, but also for workers in every sector of the economy.

There were a lot of open questions like, “what are the expectations around work from home?” Making sure that people had correct set-ups at their home offices as they had to quarantine and such. I think there’s just been a lot of good organizing and build-up since then. So there was a lot of work being done. 

This is kind of the tail end of when I’m coming in. So again, I’m speaking primarily from reports from other people, not my own personal experience on this, but, after Covid, as with all companies, it was like, “so what are the rules around working going to be as we kind of get back to a quasi-normal life?”

There was a lot of union organizing around the contract around remote and work from home policies and all that. I think that was a stepping stone to a bigger internal fight around pay and pay equity at the CFPB, which I think one reason why our union has such good strength is that we actually can negotiate on pay and benefits, which is, as I understand, not something that is universal across other federal agencies where their pay is set by the GS (General Schedule) scale and Congress. Our pay is not. It says something to the effect of, “we will be paid in comparable levels to people at the Federal Reserve,” which also has its own payment structure. Despite that language, our pay scale had not changed since the founding of the bureau. Meanwhile, the Fed’s pay scale kept going up.

There was this increasing disparity between the workers at the Fed and the workers at the CFPB, even though the statute said that we should be paid at a comparable level. There was a very big campaign spurred by the union that was very galvanizing for people around rectifying that issue.

Updating the pay scale to bring us closer in line. We didn’t get as far as we were intending, but closer in line to what the pay scale at the fed is, and also to help decrease disparities among similarly situated employees at the CFPB, where there were just these kind of arbitrary pay differences between people who had very similar experiences or had very similar responsibilities.

It was coming out of that that I think just set the union up very well. There were structures in place like good leadership and trust among workers that, when all of this most recent mess started in 2025, we kind of had some communications infrastructure in place to quickly gather intel about what the heck is going on at the CFPB and get in touch with appropriate outside counsel, get them the intel that all the workers are providing and then also get out into the streets and have mechanisms for getting information back out to the workers. Those kinds of early internal organizing efforts, I think, really set us up, even though the current fight is so radically different. There’s also been a lot of bumps in the road as we’ve tried to turn a union infrastructure that was mostly focused on applying pressure to our internal leaders who had their own interests, but at least were listening and receptive and we could sit at the same table with them, to, now, really focusing outwardly because our current leadership doesn’t care about the work life is like. I’ve been trying to get other people outside of the bureau to understand what’s going on and why this fight is important.

But I think it’s been pretty impressive. And I don’t think there’s any doubt in my mind that if the union didn’t exist in the way that it did in February 2025, that we wouldn’t be having this conversation about what the future of the CFPB is going to be. The future remains very uncertain, but it’s still here.

Every day that it continues, it increases the odds that it will continue to exist in the future. I give a lot of props and kudos to the leadership of our chapter to really inspire people. We had pretty good membership going into this.

Just in terms of the percentage of workers who are in the bargaining unit who actually pay membership dues and are considered members of the union, but it just went through the roof, like everybody joined. We’ve opened the merch shop. That’s a very, very long winded response to your question, but in terms of one way that you could support and get involved is we have a merch shop which has some great sweatshirts, hats, shirts, that I see all the time on people that are not from the CFPB. All that money goes to support the union in various ways. In the past, we had used it as resources for employees who had been fired and then don’t have income and were facing other kinds of hardships. So, that’s definitely one way to support the group.

As I mentioned earlier, we are advocating in Congress to increase our funding, cut back to where it was prior to the big beautiful bill, which decreased it. And then I think, most importantly, we got to get Russ Vought out. You know, he’s been terrible at the CFPB and he’s been terrible across the whole government as the head of OMB (Office of Management and Budget). So, you know, we’re continuing to beat the drum for impeaching him.

Scott Ferguson

What would be the legal grounds for impeaching him?

Tyler Creighton

The legal grounds? Well, remind me what the Constitution says about…I should know this as the attorney on the call, but he did the bare minimum by requesting funds back in January. But, you know, for the past year, he’s just been blowing through every legal safeguard around, like, around how you treat workers and firing them and withholding money that had been appropriated by Congress. I think there’s plenty of grounds to say that he’s been derelict in his duties.

Scott Ferguson

For sure. You know, I think one of the biggest revelations for me that’s come out of this conversation is, I became aware of the union and appreciating the work of the union, but not really knowing the extent of it. I don’t think I had a strong sense, and I certainly didn’t know anything about the history of the union, but I didn’t have a sense of the way that union organizing and infrastructure and activity has been constitutive for the survival of this agency.

That’s really inspiring to hear. Maybe sometimes we hear these stories like, “well, you know, one judge made a decision and it’s either good or bad or some crisis happened and people responded,” but I really appreciate this backstory too. It’s really great to hear that y’all were organizing around actually different issues, right?

Like, you were building capacity for a crisis that you didn’t even know was coming, but because you had built this capacity and taken on at least two major problems, when this major, major crisis hit, you were ready. That’s just such an inspiring story and lesson.

Tyler Creighton

Yeah. Yeah. I couldn’t agree more. At the same time, I shouldn’t forget to say that obviously other people have been involved in this outside of the union, which has been very integral. The legal counsel that NTAU (National Treasury Employee Union) retained for this case has been just like some of the best attorneys work I’ve seen.

So, you know, yes, the union’s been very integral in getting the information and doing the outside organizing and getting the message out. But inside the courtroom, our attorneys have been absolutely great. There’s been a number of other advocacy groups, whether it’s the Student Borrower Protection Center or NCLC (National Consumer Law Center) or Public Citizen who have also been involved in the litigation in various ways and then also activating their own members and doing public education around the bureau as well.

So we are not, by any means, the only folks that have been important in this fight. But, I do think it has been a very integral piece of the story and as you’re saying, kind of hidden, I think, in terms of the role that the union has played.

Billy Saas

We’re going to be sure to include a link to the union page and then also to the union merch shop. And speaking of that, I brought up a window here, and I’m going to do something I don’t think we’ve done in any show so far, but your merch is so great that I want to share it and talk about it. This Skully 335 hoodie. Yeah. Tremendous. No artist is credited, but listeners, I would encourage you to go check it out. I’m pretty sure I’m going to get one here as soon as the calls are over. But you have it.

We have some pretty provocative imagery. Can you talk to us about this, to have any context for us? 

Tyler Creighton

I’m, unfortunately, the wrong person to answer this question, because I really was not involved in it, in any way. But the folks that were. Yeah, I don’t know where they came up with the art and who did it. We honestly should make that public on the site, but yeah, it’s not what you’re going to expect from the union merch stuff.

You’re talking about the Skully hoodie, and I don’t know if it’s this specific one, I think there’s a couple of different versions, but my father-in-law has one. He lives in a town up in rural Maine and there’s weekly actions on the bridge over the water in Maine where people gather to protest whatever insanity Trump is up to that week. He’s just wearing his skully sweater out on the bridge with all of the other folks in Maine. So, yeah, there’s a lot of great stuff in there. There may have been more and some of it has been dropped over the times, but there’s also all just a lot of like inside joke type stuff that, if you were following the litigation closely at the time when we were getting all of these revelations about what was going on behind the scenes in these emails and such, there’s a lot of, good content around that as well.

Scott Ferguson

So, I saw a “Fed Up” shirt. Is that actually connected to the organization “Fed Up”, or is that just a slogan that you all came up with on your own?

Tyler Creighton

Again, I don’t know. I’m the wrong person to answer that question. My assumption is that it’s a very common slogan that if you were to be in DC with all the other federal workers, you would see that as a common sign. My guess is that we have just done it because of that. But, there might be more of a backstory to it.

Scott Ferguson

Yeah. Then something else again, we can keep this in or not, but like, I actually think it would be cool to include some of this merch in the art in our episode graphics, you know?

Billy Saas

Yeah. So in that case, we would definitely want to know who the artist is and see if they are down to share for the cover art’s collage work. But, anyway, we are having too much of a blast looking at all this stuff. It’s really great merch.

Tyler Creighton

Yeah, it’s too bad we didn’t do this before Christmas. It’s a great holiday gift. I know a lot of people that were giving it for holiday gifts.

Billy Saas

Yeah, well, there’s all sorts of great occasions. And, you know, you just want to support unions all year round, right?

Tyler Creighton

Exactly, exactly. So yeah. And it says here 100% of the proceeds go to the CFPB Solidarity Fund, which has, as I said, in the past, been used to help workers who’ve been illegally terminated and are facing various financial hardships because of that.

Billy Saas

Well, I just found the Skully 335 bomber jacket, and I’m just even more excited. This is a super, super high note to end on. Tyler, is there anything else you wanted to say before we say goodbye?

Tyler Creighton

No, I don’t think so. We covered a lot of ground today. I hope I didn’t ramble on too much and go into too many rabbit holes, but I appreciate it. I appreciate the time and the focus we could put on the union’s efforts and on keeping the CFPB alive. You know, Congress created the agency before for very specific reasons.

We went through a huge mortgage crisis. A lot of people lost their homes and it’s been doing great work since then, and there’s really no reason to get rid of it. So, we’ve kept it alive for the last year, but obviously we need people outside of the union to help us. So encourage you to get involved in whatever way that is, whether that’s buying some merch or calling Congress and telling them to make sure they don’t let Vought win and kill the agency.

Billy Saas

Excellent. Thank you so much, Tyler Creighton, for joining us on Money on the Left.

Tyler Creighton

Thank you.

* Thank you to Zachary Nosbisch for the episode graphic, Nahneen Kula for the theme tune, and Thomas Chaplin for the transcript.