Zohranโ€™s #ZcavengerHunt was a Rehearsal

by Will Beaman

What yesterdayโ€™s New York City #ZcavengerHunt made visible is a coalition rehearsing public works before even winning the general election. It was not just people spending time together. With simple, posted invitations carried on cards, the campaign coordinated routes, rooms, roles, and care so that participation became possible and clear. That is a public task, not an extracurricular one. It was also a rehearsal for what a mobilized coalition needs to do next: move together for joy as well as safety, travel in groups while an administration tries to turn the city into a spectacle, and build turnout habits without waiting for a single big event. It is a model other cities can watch and adapt.

The right frame is not volunteerism, but insurgent fiscal policy. When Mamdani convened a citywide scavenger hunt for fun, he did not need Governor Kathy Hochul or Bill Ackmanโ€™s tax dollars; it ran on endogenous creditโ€”playful and quietly powerful. The cards created circuits of doing things together (meet here, staff this corner, escort this path, prep the kitchen window, check in); responsibilities were posted and settled. Grown-ups effectively parallel played: individual and group progress stayed private, while social media and campaign reports posted the size and pace of the crowd. The result was a massive public coordination of democratic lifeโ€”not an authoritarian mass, but a coalition limbered up and ready for the next project. For a concrete build path, see our proposal for how Zetro Cards could be scaled up for fiscal insurgency, from campaign swag to coalition-building to public works, which shows how this same pattern can move people through rooms, routes, trainings, and care on wider scales.

Just as Mamdani mobilized the human and cultural capacities of a city that hide in plain sight every day, he also mobilized gamification techniques the left usually consigns to neoliberal behaviorism. Stamps, punch cards, routes, and check-ins were not used to manipulate individuals; they were used to coordinate a publicโ€”rules posted, goals shared, privacy respected, and the โ€œprizeโ€ defined as more capacity to act together. As many pointed out on social media, he figured out how to make โ€œPokรฉmon Go to the Pollsโ€ actually work. It worked not as clicks or gimmicks, but rather as mapped routes, opened rooms, staffed corners, and kitchen windows that made movement legible and safe. In that register, play is not a nudge; play is public works. It turns dispersed willingness into organized time and space with tools people already understand.

Much will be written about the brilliance of Mamdani as a campaigner, and the charisma that eager establishment Democrats hope to replicate with a Pete Buttigieg or a Gavin Newsom. But the Mamdani coalition did not just rally behind a leaderโ€”it rehearsed the enfranchisement of one. Think of Mamdaniโ€™s charisma here as a kind of coalitional line of credit extended with conditions: people offer a line of trust and attention to a would-be convener, linked to responsibilities and democratic accountability. โ€œDark Brandonโ€ hinted at this nationallyโ€”a charisma on offer if the officeholder accepted a movement mantle (he did not). In New York, Mamdani is being chosen as a convener; the scavenger hunt and the Zetro credit circuit are tests of credit issuance, not โ€œbrandingโ€ in some narrow sense. He credits the public with usable roles, routes, and rooms; the public credits him with the authority to keep issuing. It is an analogical, public accreditationโ€”the two forms of crediting are not the same, but they are related and each is predicated on the other. If either side stops honoring the posted terms, the fiscal circuit weakens and the star power fades. In other words, leadership here is not intrinsic to the leader; it is a coordination with a very practiced and well-rehearsed public.

Seen this way, the coalition is the main character. It has repeatedly offered charisma on condition of genuine progressive politics. Biden and Harris were given that credit line and then lost their piece of the franchise by declining the democratic responsibilities that would have kept it open. Mamdani has retained his credit by meeting those responsibilities and using them to transform the municipal public sphere into a place of hope and rehearsals of full employment. The deeper story, however, is the coalition that dreamed him upโ€”and keeps provisioning public life whether or not a single figure is in the spotlight.

The wide open question for the Mamdani coalition is: what else this coalition event was rehearsing? We at Money on the Left are a bit biased: we want to see an insurgent fiscal politics defend cities and states from Trumpโ€™s authoritarianism, and we see opportunities for this everywhere. But the most important thing for democratic renewal after Trumpโ€”the step that comes before everythingโ€”is that members of a political coalition see themselves as participants in democratic design, not the neoliberal end-users of a technocratic solution or deals brokered with power on our behalf.

How the Zetro Card Can Save NYC (Really)

by the Money on the Left Editorial Collective

A domestic occupation is currently being staged in the United States. National guard units have been deployed to Washington, D.C., with similar moves signaled for Chicago and New York. The script pairs visible deployments with their fiscal equivalent: threats of impoundment, selective audits, procurement slow-walks, and last minute deals that convert liberal institutions into collaborators one by one. A military showdown is the point for Trump; it is the terrain the regime wants. Likewise in Albany, a fiscal showdown over tax increases is the terrain that liberal collaborationists prefer: a ritualized crisis designed to brand a Mamdani administration as a failure between rounds of austerity. The playbook is the same: manufacture a crisis, force a spectacle, and make the rest of the year about forcing victims to pick up the pieces.

When most people think of โ€œinsurgency,โ€ images of guerilla warfare come to mind. But even where historic insurgencies have included armed struggle (which we do not endorse in the United States), combat is not the most essential component. Successful insurgencies succeed by sustaining daily civilian life under occupation. Civil societies endure by keeping ordinary routines going: schools that still teach, kitchens that still serve, routes that still move people, meetings that still convene, mundane responsibilities that people still meet. That continuity erodes the occupierโ€™s legitimacy, stretches its capacity, and ensures it cannot outlast the people.

Military clashes and ritualized budget standoffs are already on the next page in Trumpโ€™s playbook. The durable answer to Trumpism is a fiscal insurgency: visible, practical, reproducible ways to keep the payments that sustain public life flowing so that recruitment and retention for deployments struggle, as residents continue to work, learn, care, and govern themselves. Rather than just play the showdown game, we keep the city on scheduleโ€”and build capacity as we go.

Fiscal insurgency

Fiscal insurgency creatively rereads what money already is in practice: credit issued, accepted, and retired through infrastructures that already operate. In addition to cash and bank accounts, we are all familiar with EBT, transit passes, tuition remissions, union stipends, city vouchers, and fee waiversโ€”all variously posted ways of paying for participation. 

Under pressure, the task is to keep payments aligned with capacity. Groceries, rides, childcare, rooms, translation, training, and pathways into responsibility must remain accessible even during a fiscal blackout. The practical goal is twofold: first, to route around staged fiscal choke points so that routine civic coordinations do not pause; second, to shrink the labor pool for occupation deployments by offering better work, learning, and debt relief at home.

This approach does not meet occupation with spectacle or force. It meets deployments where they actually live: recruitment and retention. When a city pays for participationโ€”public-works fellowships in libraries, parks, and transit; childcare and travel coverage for trainings and meetings; tuition offsets at community colleges; clear ladders into union roles and civic responsibilityโ€”the material case for enlistment weakens. Recruitment shortfalls and morale depletion follow, which is a fitting answer to a regime that wields austerity to get its way.

Why the Zetro Card, what it is now, and why it matters

There are countless everyday tools with public potential in plain sight. As a separate example of the appetite for this, the Mamdani campaign just launched a citywide โ€œScavenger Huntโ€โ€”distinct from the Zetro Cardโ€”that shows how eager New Yorkers are for playful, card-based participation; early events blew through the first batch of cards. The point in this article is not to crown one instrument, but to activate what is already familiar. The Mamdani campaignโ€™s โ€œZetro Cardโ€ is one such tool.

What the Zetro Card is today. The Zetro Card is a playful paper punch card in the Mamdani campaign. Supporters receive stamps at canvasses, phone banks, and pop-ups; after a set number of stamps, the card is redeemed for campaign merchandise. Because selling merch became constrained after certain fundraising thresholds, items are given away at volunteer events and DIY printing tablesโ€”so the punch card doubles as a tangible way to recognize participation and pick up posters, tees, and totes. It lives inside a high-energy field operation with frequent events and check-ins.

How it scales without changing its feel. The same formโ€”stamp, QR, or SMSโ€”can carry credits that partners agree to honor for posted items tied to real capacity (for example: childcare blocks during meetings, off-peak community-room hours, produce bundles, modest travel support on action days, training seats, and even reserved speaking or facilitation time). Individual balances remain private; weekly program totals are public; a brief monthly check-in evens small differences with next-month service or modest dollars. In that expanded form, Zetro becomes a practical way to pay for participation without permission, while staying playful, legible and low-friction.

Zetro grows in three lanes at once:
1. Coalition Lane: Partners post menus of Zetro-receivable items
2. City Lane: Municipal agencies comp or cover what they already can in Zetro credits
3. Public Digital Payments Lane: A targeted amendment to State Banking Law ยง131, which currently prohibits corporations from receiving deposits, would be sufficient for Zetro to merge with a public digital payments system along the lines of what has already been proposed at state-level with the Inclusive Value Ledger Act. Same Zetro system, but even more doors and menu items open. 

The types of work credited on the card and the forms of participation those credits unlock can widen month by month and year by yearโ€”from campaign tables to coalition partners (DSA chapters, WFP affiliates, union training arms, worker co-ops, cultural venues) and then into public venues (library class seats, after-hours school auditoriums, parks fieldhouses, union halls, community-room hours, partial fares). Over time, credits can help residents purchase municipal groceries, arrange childcare and transit for organizing and training, and access professional on-ramps into union ladders and a renewed municipal care-and-organizing sector. Swap lines to other cities and allied campaigns can make the pattern replicable and coordinative nationwide.

What follows is a one-year plan in four quarters, a year-two continuation, and a horizon where Zetro Cards and other coalition credits grow together with โ€œBlue Bonds.โ€ Hereโ€™s how it could work:


Year One

Quarter 1โ€“2: Posted menus with offline-capability

  • Posted coverage sheets (โ€œwhat this card covers hereโ€). At initial partners (DSA chapters, WFP affiliates, supportive worker co-ops and public venues like libraries and community centers), list covered items with clear limits matched to actual capacity: bundled produce at a co-op table; modest transit support on canvass days; childcare blocks during meetings; off-peak community-room hours; small print runs; reserved speaking/facilitation time.
  • Privacy by default; public totals. Individual balances are private. Weekly program totals are public (dashboard-style).
  • Monthly check-in. Partners bring two numbersโ€”what they issued and what they honoredโ€”and even out any small differences with next-month service (extra room hours, print runs, childcare blocks) or modest dollars. A small rainy-day amount smooths one-off bumps and is refilled at the check-in.
  • Offline-first tools. Paper cards with serials, SMS codes for basic phones, QR badges for smartphones, and a simple web ledger where participants see only their own balance; stewards sync when connected.

Insurgency-specific provisioning (safety and movement)

  • Safe Walk & Ride corridors. Posted hours and mapped routes between meeting sites, libraries, schools after-hours, parks, fieldhouses, transit hubs.
    Menu items: escort hours, corner posts, route leads; modest travel support for route volunteers.
  • Buddy and check-in protocols; door marshals; de-escalation teams.
    Menu items: marshal shifts, de-escalation shifts, check-in desk.
  • Kitchen windows at evening meetings (community kitchen cadence) hosted in libraries/community centers.
    Menu items: prep/serve shifts; ingredient runs; take-home food bundles for late routes.
  • Dispatch table for ride pools (carpool grids).
    Menu items: dispatcher shifts; driver mileage allotments; maintenance credits.
  • Accompaniment pilot (court/clinic/ICE check-ins) with faith/legal partners.
    Menu items: escort hours; language access; staging-site stewards.

Quarter 3: Scale under known rules

  • Review coverage and limits against observed demand; keep balances private and totals public; maintain simple grievance and appeal routes.
  • One-page coverage sheets per site, reviewed quarterly, so people know exactly what the card covers where.
  • Mentored on-ramp for new issuers (co-issuance with small, posted starting limits and a graduation path once delivery is demonstrated).
  • Union-linked training access. Partners begin accepting Zetro for defined allotments of training seats in union programs (safety workshops, evening classes). Framed as an extension of existing education supports.

Insurgency-specific provisioning (citywide habits)

  • Route maps go citywide; relay rooms in libraries and community centers host hand-off windows.
    Menu items: relay room stewards; wayfinding/signage crews; neighborhood route coordinators.
  • Clinic and pharmacy relays for prescriptions and supplies (privacy rules posted).
    Menu items: intake desk; pharmacy runs; cold-chain handling.
  • Observer teams at sensitive sitesโ€”visible, trained, non-confrontational.
    Menu items: observer shifts; alerts desk.

Quarter 4: Public venues, groceries pilot, and formal accompaniment

  • Public venues with narrow, posted coverage. A set number of library class seats; off-peak community-room hours; partial fares for travel to trainings. Coverage lists, clear limits, privacy, and the monthly check-in remain standard.
    If the Public Digital Payments Lane opens, we can mirror these posted menus there; if not, the Coalition Lane and City Lane continue.
  • Municipal groceries pilot (petition window). The Mayorโ€™s Office opens a petition process for organizationsโ€”campaign-linked or notโ€”to request coverage for defined grocery bundles with posted maximums and periodic review.
  • Formal accompaniment lanes with faith and legal partners; posted procedures and privacy rules.

Year Two (selected extensions)

Quarter 5โ€“6: Union issuance and civic rebrand

  • Unions begin limited issuance of credits through strike support and childcare stipends, following a transparent, bounded framework aligned with coalition standards.
  • City rebrand. The administration rebrands Zetro under a civic name (for example, โ€œCity Cardโ€), signaling its shift from campaign experiment to city-backed fiscal infrastructure without changing privacy or monthly check-in rules.

Quarter 7โ€“8: Payable labor time and public venues

  • Union issuance expands to stipends for stewards, interpreters, and trainersโ€”more forms of labor time become payable.
  • Coalition credits recognized for a set number of seats at public venues (libraries, community centers, municipal groceries), knitting the system further into daily civic infrastructure.

Quarter 9โ€“12: Tuition offsets, debt relief pilots, swap lines

  • Tuition offsets and student-debt relief pilots for CUNY programs that support public work (ESL, EMT/first-aid, IT support for schools). Offsets are clearly defined, privacy-respecting, and guided by simple equity rules.
  • Demilitarization lanes. Offsets scale once receivability is wide enough to undercut debt-for-ICE recruitment offers directly.
  • Swap lines with other cities. Credits earned in New York can be honored in Chicago for defined uses, and vice versa, on posted terms and routine settlement schedules.

The horizon: Blue Bonds + coalition credits (two tools to save our cities)

Blue Bondsโ€”a proposal of the Money on the Left Editorial Collectiveโ€”offer a way for city and state governments to finance an urban full-employment buildout that broadens receivability. They are ordinary dollar bonds, offered in small denominations to residents and anchored by public pensions and union funds (with solidarity subscriptions from other cities and states). Proceeds are tied to visible municipal options that coalition credits already move people through: grocery depots and cold-chain upgrades, childcare hubs and accessibility retrofits, community kitchens and repair cooperatives, library classrooms, transit access, and municipal broadband. Retirement is stated up front: as pressures recede and revenues normalize, the series winds down and the books close. Legislative changes in the Public Digital Payments Laneโ€”a no-fee, real-time public walletโ€”make this even easier, but Zetro + Blue Bonds work already in the Coalition and City lanes. 

Paired with Zetro/coalition credits, Blue Bonds and credits create political space for each other. Credits route around staged choke points so everyday provisioning continues; Blue Bonds draw in dollars on public terms to expand the very programs those credits already make usable. To cautious audiences, Blue Bonds read like familiar โ€œborrowing.โ€ To a coalition living with credits, they read as one denomination of credit among many: another way the city measures and coordinates provision, retired according to plan rather than by some supposed law of physics.

With capacity increased, receivability widens so credits can meet a substantial share of a householdโ€™s monthly essentials. Agencies and partners post coverage lists that expand steadily: groceries via municipal depots and co-ops; local travel through transit and bike programs; childcare and elder-care blocks; language access and legal aid; device repair and broadband; library and community-center programs; CUNY training and certifications; cultural access; tool-lending and community-kitchen time. Each item carries clear limits tied to real capacity; privacy is the default; weekly public totals keep everyone oriented; a brief monthly check-in keeps books even.

The employment premise is simple: there is always work to do and a way to step into it. Roles in facilitation, safety, translation, outreach, maintenance, logistics, kitchen prep, route escorting, and accompaniment are paired with training and mentoring. Credits earned here are immediately usable for listed needs, and tuition and student-debt offsets scale so the cityโ€™s offer competes directly with Trumpโ€™s enlistment promises; the better path is at home, in public life.

Beyond the city, swap lines make the pattern replicable and coordinative. Posted agreements allow defined items to be honored across jurisdictions and settled on a routine schedule. Credits earned here can be used for named needs there, and residents can subscribe to one anotherโ€™s Blue Bonds. The result is a durable fabric: credits keep patterned flows of provision steady; bonds fund expansion in plain view; together they cultivate a public that understands these instruments as democratic coordination, not deference to gatekeepers.

Appendix

A. Blackout readiness (why this matters)

One reason this infrastructure is urgent is simple: an administration hostile to cities will try to exert power over everyday payments as leverage. If a single processor, platform, or office can be squeezed, it will be. The response is to build many ways of paying that cannot be shut off by flipping a single switch switch.

That is why the plan mixes paper, SMS, and QR; has menus of โ€œwhat this card covers hereโ€ are important; has stewards learning to settle up together on a simple schedule even if systems are temporarily offline; and why ordinary municipal bonds held by residents, small dollar donors and public pensions can fund visible programs that credits already carry people through. No single vendor or account holds the keys; if one lane is squeezed, others stay open. Pursuing public banking and a Public Digital Payments Lane in parallel adds redundancy and cuts private choke points, but the Coalition and City lanes are enough to keep going in the meantime. Payment follows the work that people are doing, and the rules are posted in public so everyone can keep moving while the politics catch up.

B. How we will track and share progress (in plain language)

People should be able to see what is happening with Zetro Credits without surveilling their neighborsโ€™ transactions. Each week, it is essential to post totals by program and neighborhoodโ€”how many childcare hours, room hours, training seats, rides, grocery bundlesโ€”along with how quickly credits are being used. Once a month, partners can sit down for a short check-in to even out differences: if one site provided more than it issued, the group will agree on make-goods for next month (extra room hours, added training seats, more kitchen time) or a small cash adjustment. Every quarter, the city can publish a short summary of what was made possible, where pressure points were, and what will change on the coverage lists to keep pace with real demand.

C. Money on the Leftโ€™s seven principles for coalition credit (Our standard for support and endorsement)

  1. Coalitional responsibility, not sovereign enclosure
    Credits are commitments to a wider public supported in coalition. Issuance and acceptance are accountable to relationships across organizations and agencies, not only to a membershipโ€™s pre-defined ends.
  2. Responsibility to full participation (the full-employment principle)
    Every issuer has a duty to open real ways to earn creditsโ€”especially for undervalued labor (care, language access, accessibility, logistics)โ€”and to pair earning with pathways into responsibility (facilitation, training, strategy roles).
  3. Responsibility to recognize others (bounded cross-coalition receivability)
    Each issuer provides a clear pathway to receive credits from trusted partners that meet a published threshold of coalitional trust and solidarity. Recognition is bounded and menu-defined (what is accepted, where, and in what amounts) and is periodically reviewed in public.
  4. Structured paths to enfranchisement as an issuing authority
    There is a transparent route for new groups to become issuers: mentorship or co-issuance periods, capacity checks tied to real infrastructure, defined caps while ramping, and clear criteria for advancing to full issuer status.
  5. Duties and accountability that come with enfranchisement
    Issuers steward capacity (do not over-promise), publish aggregate issuance and redemption by program, participate in monthly clearing, honor grievance and appeal processes, and accept time-bound suspension or revocation if they violate standards.
  6. Privacy as public trust
    Individualsโ€™ balances and transactions remain private by default. Public oversight operates through aggregates and due-process audits for suspected misuse. Privacy is not a perk; it is how coalitions extend trust without control or surveillance.

Tied to real infrastructure and needs
Receivability menus must map to concrete capacitiesโ€”passes, rooms, classes, childcare, groceries, trainingsโ€”and be adjusted regularly to meet demonstrated needs, with special attention to reducing participation barriers.

Tax the Rich Campaigns Need Coalition Credits

By the Money on the Left Editorial Collective

As Zohran Mamdani and allied progressives turn a campaign victory into governing capacity, the primary weapons used against them will be fiscal. Centrist state legislatorsโ€”already hostile to progressive tax policyโ€”will be doubly pressured by a Trump White House threatening to impound funds and condition support for core institutions on political loyalty. In New York and other cities, Tax the Rich campaigns will likely escalate from letters and canvasses deliberately ignored by collaborationist lawmakers to protests and statehouse occupations met with brutal crackdowns. One trajectory is hopeful: the showdowns become a national, party-wide rally strong enough to keep Democrats from siding with governors like Kathy Hochul. Another outcomeโ€”one powerful actors are counting onโ€”is coordinated non-cooperation: institutional co-governance withheld from progressives with the same dogmatic vigor Tea Party Republicans showed President Obama. Where does the movement go from there?

This accelerationist showdown politics is a fascistic continuation of the neoliberal โ€œShock Doctrineโ€: engineer a crisis, paralyze the public response, fracture democratic movements with half-measures for some. The trick works by organizing the political conversation around middle-class and billionaire bank accountsโ€”and now routine threats of impoundmentโ€”instead of the existing capacities of everyday people. It tees up bottlenecks and headline spectacles meant to distract from a simple fact: the capacity to provision public life already exists in the workers, infrastructure, and institutionsโ€”the grassroots and member-driven organizations, unions, tenant groups, cultural partners, mutual-aid networks, and neighborhood branchesโ€”that made Mamdaniโ€™s win possible in the first place. When politics is reduced to pleading with mobile wealth, every concession looks like prudence and every defeat looks like inevitability.

Capacity is already here

Our cities do not lack capacity; they lack control over public credit at the very spot opponents have staged as the lever. Schools, clinics, transit systems, housing expertise, organizers, volunteers, mutual-aid supply chainsโ€”these exist already. What austerity politics withholds is the means to recognize and sustain participation in public life while we use that capacity.

That is why recruitment offers into punitive state functions matter. High salaries and student-debt forgiveness for enforcement deployments do not merely โ€œfund jobs.โ€ They decide who has time, stability, and standingโ€”who belongsโ€”much as private wealth does. So when we say that we can build without billionaire tax dollars, we are not saying that we can build without money. Money and payment are the difference between austere rationing from a defensive movement posture and a durable public that keeps people housed, fed, mobile, and engaged.

This is the same pressure point that Tax the Rich campaigns confront. Coalition credit does not replace that fight; it keeps participation pay-able while the fight is underway, so staged fiscal blockades do not stall the very public we are building.

We already run payments systemsโ€”just without payments

Coalitional politics already coordinates large volumes of labor and resources across organizations. Every canvass shift, child-care rota, jail-support thread, translation queue, rides list, venue hookup, design favor, spreadsheet of phone-bank leads, and shared pantry run is coordinated through informal credits: reputation, vouching, IOUs, and remembered favors. Our sign-up sheets are routing instructions; our Signal threads are clearing and settlement; our spreadsheets are shadow ledgers. This is not small. It is the logistics layer that keeps thousands of hours of organizing moving in New York every month.

But you cannot buy groceries with your reputation. The difference between a heroic but austere movement and a durable public is receivabilityโ€”whether the credits people earn for real work can be used for the things that keep them in the fight: groceries, transit, childcare, dues, training, tools, and structured pathways into higher-stakes roles. That is what a payments system is, in essence: not suburban taxpayersโ€™ approval, but the concrete list of where your credit is accepted and for what.

Layered credits for layered publics

The constituent parts of Mamdaniโ€™s coalitionโ€”neighborhood branches, unions, tenant groups, mutual-aid networks, libraries, and cultural partnersโ€”are the right places to grow a politics of insurgent credit that sustains participation through staged fiscal showdowns without disruption. We do not need one grand new currency. We need many credits that already exist, and coordinating infrastructures to help them scale. This is an intentional extension of how coalitions already work: groups give endorsements, share lists, trade rooms and volunteers, align calendars, and memorialize it in MOUs. Credits simply make that coordination legible and usable to participants.

Credits already appear everywhere. Think of these as existing โ€œcredits,โ€ even when unnamed: ratios, patterns, and arrangements of obligation, responsibility, and inclusion.

  • Organizing โ€” credit-like arrangements of obligation and responsibility: canvassing, translation, running meetings, childcare, strike support.
  • Service and care โ€” credit-like patterns of mutual provision and inclusion: hours in mutual-aid kitchens, co-op groceries, cultural events, trainings.
  • Civic access โ€” credit-like arrangements of public inclusion: transit passes, library admissions, course slots, public fee waivers, utility discounts.

Read through a flat lens of โ€œvolunteerism,โ€ these credit forms are misdescribed as charity or good will and their politics is disavowed. In practice they are entangled from the start with the official infrastructures people need to surviveโ€”transit agencies, schools, libraries, utilitiesโ€”and with the circuits of paid work and the for-profit institutions that dominate food, housing, and care. In the dominant policy script, the boundary makes one sphere look like โ€œvolunteeringโ€ and the other like โ€œthe economy.โ€ When a mass movement elects a mayor to create municipal grocery stores, that boundary shows itself as a designed limiterโ€”meant to keep movements from going big until a mythic โ€œtomorrow.โ€ Naming these arrangements as credit, and making them receivable across partners and agencies now, refuses that delay. It turns the boundary from a horizon we wait on into a configuration we can reorganize together.

That simple act is solidarity and recognition. It says: your work, your time, your commitments count beyond your immediate circle. It is also how we recognize siloed efforts as part of a shared public infrastructure. And when we see our time, effort, and commitments as gestures that reach beyond the room, we can align them with what is happening elsewhere now. Work in one locale choreographs recognition and use in another. That readiness to meet one another is the seed of coalition: what you do here moves something there. Small actions scale up into shared capacity without asking anyone to abandon local priorities.

This is also how social causality works in practice, even when coalition is disavowed or treated as a fleeting event. The daycare shift that frees a canvasserโ€™s evening, the translation that unlocks a meeting, the room booking that anchors a trainingโ€”each is already shaping what becomes possible down the line and across town. They are remote from the startโ€”addressed to people you may never meet and to moments you will not occupy. These are already credit infrastructuresโ€”ratios and arrangements of obligation, responsibility, and acceptance. Credits do not invent them; they further name, steady, and make them receivable where life happens. Once that is acknowledged, the line between โ€œinsideโ€ and โ€œoutsideโ€ politics looks arbitrary. If a city library accepts campaign-issued credits for after-school programs, or a union local honors them for training sessions, then credits stop being a mutual-aid side hustle and become part of the public itself. Power maps shift because coordination is happening through channels that choke-point politics cannot fully control.

During a fiscal blackout or manufactured crisis, receivability lets organizers, caregivers, translators, and trainees keep moving through rooms, rides, childcare, and trainings now, with partners settling in kind or in dollars later. That is how the coalition holds its form instead of shrinking.

Public responsibility, not private money

Some will ask whether these credits are just another private money scheme. They are notโ€”because the premise is different. Both cryptocurrency culture and the Wall-Street-backed fiscal choke-point politics of the Democratic establishment share a deeper story: money as a pre-political emanation of a private worldโ€”white families, founders, and โ€œentrepreneursโ€โ€”that stands outside obligation and instructs public life from above. That settler-colonial fantasy treats credit as something private actors bestow, and government as a bookkeeper for their decisions.

We reject that. Money is a public responsibility. It names, coordinates, and sustains the capacities people already build together. Our approach is accountable where life is actually organizedโ€”schools, unions, libraries, clinics, transit, tenant groups, and campaignsโ€”and it is governed in public.

Framed this way, a coalition credit system is the coalitionโ€™s way to carry through when fiscal crises are staged as political discipline.

Call for Printing (CFP)

Turning from argument to practice, we invite every part of the New York coalition that made this victory possibleโ€”neighborhood branches, unions, tenant unions, mutual-aid networks, cultural partners, public programs, and campaignsโ€”to begin issuing and receiving their own coalition credits, coordinated where useful and federated where necessary. The aim is simple: make participation pay-able across the coalition now, so staged fiscal showdowns do not interrupt the public we are already building.

What Money on the Left can do

As an editorial collective, Money on the Left will direct our capacity to create reporting, toolkits, and convening power to projects that follow the ethical and political principles outlined below. We will profile pilots; publish template kits (receivability menus, credit designs, privacy policies, aggregate dashboards); host brief clinics with organizers and public partners; and help align shared measures so successes are visible and copyable.

Principles of coalitional responsibility (our coalition standard)

(This is our endorsement standard for complementary credits. It defines responsibility as coalitional, public, and open-endedโ€”rather than a closed, sovereign enclosure accountable only to itself.)

  1. Coalitional responsibility, not sovereign enclosure
    Credits are commitments to a wider public supported in coalition. Issuance and acceptance are accountable to relationships across organizations and agencies, not only to a membershipโ€™s pre-defined ends.
  2. Responsibility to full participation (the full-employment principle)
    Every issuer has a duty to open real ways to earn creditsโ€”especially for undervalued labor (care, language access, accessibility, logistics)โ€”and to pair earning with pathways into responsibility (facilitation, training, strategy roles).
  3. Responsibility to recognize others (bounded cross-coalition receivability)
    Each issuer provides a clear pathway to receive credits from trusted partners that meet a published threshold of coalitional trust and solidarity. Recognition is bounded and menu-defined (what is accepted, where, and in what amounts) and is periodically reviewed in public.
  4. Structured paths to enfranchisement as an issuing authority
    There is a transparent route for new groups to become issuers: mentorship or co-issuance periods, capacity checks tied to real infrastructure, defined caps while ramping, and clear criteria for advancing to full issuer status.
  5. Duties and accountability that come with enfranchisement
    Issuers steward capacity (do not over-promise), publish aggregate issuance and redemption by program, participate in monthly clearing, honor grievance and appeal processes, and accept time-bound suspension or revocation if they violate standards.
  6. Privacy as public trust
    Individualsโ€™ balances and transactions remain private by default. Public oversight operates through aggregates and due-process audits for suspected misuse. Privacy is not a perk; it is how coalitions extend trust without control or surveillance.
  7. Tied to real infrastructure and needs
    Receivability menus must map to concrete capacitiesโ€”passes, rooms, classes, childcare, groceries, trainingsโ€”and be adjusted regularly to meet demonstrated needs, with special attention to reducing participation barriers.

We are not making up a new world; we are taking responsibility for this one. Credits formalize the recognition already circulating in our movements and make it usable where people live, learn, travel, care, and govern.

Technology and design: many paths up the same mountain

Democracy has always involved design problemsโ€”ballots, mail-in envelopes, early vote windowsโ€”different tools serving the same civic function. Credit is the same way. There is no need to worship a platform; choose what is practical and accessible for your members and partners.

Tool options (examples, from low to higher tech):

  • Paper cards with serial numbers and short expiries
  • Stamp books or tear-off chits
  • SMS or voice codes for basic phones
  • QR badges on printable cards
  • Prepaid or closed-loop cards for specific partners
  • Simple web ledger (individuals see their own balances; the public sees only aggregates)

Designing according our Principles of Coalitional Responsibility

  • Keep balances private by default; publish simple public totals so scale is visible
  • Use posted receivability menus (limit by use and amount, not surveillance)
  • Ensure offline operation so tables and doorways work when the network does not
  • Make replacement easy when something is lost
  • Set a regular cadence to settle books across partners (compare ledgers and receipts; clear modest imbalances in kind or small dollars)

The point is not technology for its own sake; it is fit, access, and flexibility in service of the shared principles above. With that posture in mind, we turn to the case study.

Case study: โ€œA Million Doors to a Million Votesโ€ (what it proposes)

In โ€œA Million Doors to a Million Votes: NYC-DSAโ€™s Plan for a Mamdani Mandate,โ€ รlvaro Lรณpez lays out how NYC-DSA can convert a primary win into governing capacity. The piece frames the next phase as both a mass field operation and a neighborhood-level infrastructure that protects and implements a Mamdani administration. It aims to widen the coalition and electorate; keep a train-the-trainers field machine running past Election Day; turn neighborhood branches into โ€œLittle Local City Hallsโ€ for everyday access to services, rollouts, and mobilization; build standing co-governance tables for real, regular access to decision-making; pursue a broad public mandate in November; pair inside/outside tactics against coordinated opposition; and retrofit the organizationโ€™s finances and operations to match a governing coalition rather than a single campaign.

Lรณpezโ€™s plan already names the political infrastructures that must keep running if Albany withholds revenue or Washington impounds funds. Coalition credits give the coalition continuity under pressureโ€”these rooms stay open.

From a complementary-currency perspective, the planโ€™s constraint is that it ultimately totals DSAโ€™s capacity as dues + volunteer hours. Dues are the non-government analog to taxesโ€”important, but still organized around revenue permissionโ€”and volunteer labor, read through a flat lens of โ€œservice,โ€ remains bounded by peopleโ€™s unpaid time. That pairing undercounts the real logistics already moving through the coalition (care, translation, transit, rooms, training) and leaves participation exposed to the very bottlenecks opponents stage: when money is tight or burnout rises, capacity shrinks. In practice, this risks treating enthusiasm as the main fuel and dues as the only meter, rather than making participation pay-able across the rooms the memo builds.

Case study: translating the memo into coalition credit (โ€œRosesโ€ for NYC-DSA)

Within the NYC-DSA context, the coalition credit can take a name that fits the organizationโ€™s iconography and history: Rosesโ€”a nod to DSAโ€™s rose and to โ€œbread and roses.โ€ Here, the rose is not deferred as leisure after labor. It becomes participatory infrastructure, a way to provision the bread and invite people into responsibility at the same time. The name is specific to the DSA pilot; the principles are general.

Translating the memo into Roses (one possible sketch)
Turn โ€œLittle Local City Hallsโ€ into issuing and accepting locales with a short, public receivability menu (transit, childcare, rooms, trainings, and a modest grocery line via partners). Let the mass field earn-as-you-organize and advance-as-you-learn, with Roses opening pathways into responsibility (facilitation, spokesperson preparation, strategy rooms). Run co-governance as logisticsโ€”a simple monthly check-in that tallies aggregate issuance/redemption and settles leftover imbalances in kind or small dollars. Pair the mandate push with continuity planning so participation does not stall under pressure. Recast the dues drive as an inclusion drive, allowing Roses to cover a defined share of dues for undervalued labor while widening who can stay in the work.

Most importantly, a coalition-credit layer lets expenditure come before โ€œtaxation.โ€ Partners provide rooms, care, transit, and trainings first; credits are retired at use. What changes for dues is their function. Instead of serving mainly as a direct financing stream for a small slice of on-the-books activity, dues become a way to make organizational credits desirable and to retire them. If members can satisfy a defined share of dues in creditsโ€”and those credits are earned through undervalued labor and paired with pathways into responsibilityโ€”then dues policy helps distribute work more fairly and lowers barriers to participation for working-class members. Month to month, remaining imbalances are settled through reciprocal acceptance, in-kind capacity swaps, or small dollar transfers (dues/donations). This reverses the choke-point logic and lets the coalition go bigger when needed, while keeping issuance aligned with real capacity through simple public totals and regular check-ins. 

How it could work
Branches and partners issue Roses for defined uses they can already provision (rooms, childcare, transit support, trainings, groceries via co-ops). Members earn Roses for undervalued labor and use them where a posted menu says they are accepted. Most redemption is in kind at the point of use; a periodic check-in reconciles leftovers through reciprocal acceptance, capacity swaps, or small dollar transfers (dues/donations). Individual use stays private; only aggregate totals are published. That is enough for the coalition to keep its rhythm during a fiscal blackoutโ€”or when one is threatened.

Coalition credits during a fiscal blackout

If Albany triggers a fiscal blackout on Monday, field still runs because canvassers use credits for transit that night; parents attend trainings because childcare is payable in credits; translators keep meetings accessible; branches book rooms with partners who accept credits for a portion of fees. On Friday, the coalition tallies aggregates and schedules settlement in kind or dollars. The rhythm holds; the showdown does not become a shutdownโ€”and the coalitionโ€™s continuity demonstrates a model for city government to emulate and support.

Coalition credits here, Blue Bonds there

Coalition credits work in tandem with another fiscal strategy for city and state governments we have called Blue Bondsโ€”a Money on the Left proposal to politicize municipal debt issuance without inventing a new medium of payment. Blue Bonds are ordinary municipal or state bonds issued for dollars, but placed and held differently: small-denomination subscriptions for residents and workers, anchor orders from public-sector pensions and union funds, and distribution through public-facing portals and community finance partners. The goal is to reconstitute the investor base so funding for transit, housing, food, care, and education depends less on ratings agencies and Wall Street gatekeepers, especially under federal hostility.

Blue Bonds are deliberately national-politics friendly. To cautious audiences, they read as familiar โ€œborrowing.โ€ To a coalition already practicing public credit through organizing, they read as democratic control of the buy-sideโ€”who holds the bonds, on what terms, and to what public purpose. Figures like Mamdani can pursue a Blue Bonds drive now within existing law and disclosure rules, while narrating it as a community subscription to the cityโ€™s future.

Coalition credits shape the horizon for Blue Bonds in two ways. First, they surface concrete pipelinesโ€”rooms, routes, trainings, childcare, kitchens, and clinicsโ€”that make bond use legible and urgent to everyday subscribers. Second, they organize the constituency that will buy and hold the debt: union locals, tenant unions, co-ops, cultural institutions, and small savers who already coordinate through credits. In practice the two tracks can move in parallel: coalition credits keep participation pay-able during fiscal showdowns; a Blue Bonds drive democratizes the dollar side of public finance by anchoring ownership with residents, unions, public pensions, and mission-driven institutions. Together they reduce veto power over public investment and align financing with the people building the city.

Stakes for Tax the Rich

Right now, Tax the Rich campaigns that lack insurgent credit infrastructure are organized around a choke point constructed and enforced by the enemy: state-controlled revenue and the threat of impoundment. A coalitional strategy treats finance and credit not as a single fix or a strict sequence but as overlapping layers that operate together:

  • Coalition credits keep participation pay-able inside the movement and across partners during a fiscal blackout.
  • Agency receivability extends that continuity into public programs by accepting a defined share of credits for defined uses.
  • Blue Bonds do not act as a complementary currency; they democratize the dollar side of public finance by shifting ownership to residents, unions, and public pensionsโ€”including national small savers and cross-state pension solidarityโ€”reducing gatekeeper vetoes.

These layers can start in any order and reinforce one another. If a city moves first with Blue Bonds, coalition credits become lived on-ramps for community engagement and political backing. If coalition credits move first, they generate partners, practices, and evidence that strengthen a public bond constituency. Agencies can pilot both at once by posting narrow receivability menus while bond subscriptions gather. In every configuration, the campaign holds two fronts: it pushes the revenue demand and it operates a governable provisioning network that keeps rooms, rides, childcare, trainings, and pathways into responsibility open. If Albany concedes, additional resources flow into a system already working. If Albany stonewalls, the public sees that capital flight is an empty threat because the people, the infrastructure, and the organizing are hereโ€”and there is already a way to pay and a way to borrow without handing Wall Street a veto.

Call to organizations and campaigns

We invite neighborhood branches, WFP affiliates, unions, tenant unions, mutual-aid networks, cultural partners, and chapters to formalize the credits you already use informally and to connect them across partners and agencies. Begin with modest, concrete steps that fit local capacity:

  • Map the work that already earns trust (care shifts, translation, logistics, training) and publish a minimal receivability menu (transit, rooms, childcare, trainings, a small grocery line through partners).
  • Pair earning with pathways into responsibility so credits open access to facilitation, spokesperson preparation, and strategy roles.
  • Keep individual use private; publish simple public totals and regular check-ins; settle leftover imbalances through reciprocal acceptance, capacity swaps, or small dollars.
  • Invite one public partner to accept a defined share for a defined use; document what works; share the pattern so others can copy it.

Money on the Left stands ready to support this work. We can convene briefings and co-design sessions; help draft receivability menus, pilot MOUs, and privacy policies; publish case notes and templates; host clinics with organizers and public partners; and coordinate shared measures so successes are visible and portable. Projects that follow the principles of coalitional responsibility outlined above will be prioritized for reporting, toolkits, and ongoing advising.

By 2027, New York could have a base that already lives the alternative: public capacity organized as public credit, embedded in daily life, with municipal and state partners joining where they can and following where the coalition has shown the way. The aim is not to wait for capital to return or permission to be granted. It is to recognize that we are already building the world we needโ€”and to make that work payable.

Blue Bonds: Duck or Rabbit?

Chronicle of a Summer

by Will Beaman

We are living through a strange reversal of the monetary story many of us have spent the last decade telling. Modern Monetary Theory helped a broader public see that the federal governmentโ€”the so-called โ€œmonetary sovereignโ€โ€”does not fund itself like a household and should not be bullied by austerity myths. That framing made sense when we could imagine a democratic or progressive White House using those capacities for public purpose. But in a Trump 2.0 world, sovereignty thinking hits a wall: the very office that issues and coordinates the currency is run by an executive who can impound appropriations, starve local services, and force austerity by other means. The question shifts from what could a benevolent sovereign do to how do we keep democratic life funded while the โ€œsovereignโ€ is hostile?

The answer is not to throw out MMTโ€™s core insight, but to bring it closer to how people actually experience money. What matters is endogeneity: money is created inside our institutionsโ€”up and down the hierarchyโ€”through ordinary acts of issuing, accepting, and managing public claims. Banks and credit unions create deposits when they buy public paper; pensions rebalance portfolios; the Federal Reserve can support municipal markets if it chooses. And when it comes to the timing and terms for redeeming bonds and other public assets, that is a contested political outcomeโ€”not an act of nature. A municipal lending facility does not have to mimic a short-term loan; it can be set up for steady, long-term support. In a healthier political order, state and city bonds could be treated more like U.S. Treasuries held at the central bank: not โ€œborrowingโ€ in the household sense, but one among many tools for organizing public investment.

Money on the Left has been known in MMT circles for pushing back against โ€œmonetary sovereigntyโ€ framings, even the โ€œspectrum of sovereigntyโ€ version meant to address critiques that MMT only applies to the U.S. federal government. Those frames still tend to narrow the conversation to nodes of power for whom sovereignty is the natural goal. But much real-world monetary authority is improvised, contested, and backstopped at sites of issuance and receivability that we would rather see as responsible than sovereign. That is why ideas like the Uniโ€”a complementary credit issued for large university fiscal circuitsโ€”are not about making universities โ€œmore sovereign.โ€ They are about structuring public responsibility across the institutions that already knit democratic life together.

Now that traditional monetary sovereignty is, for practical purposes, off the table for progressives in U.S. national politics, this shift in emphasis feels less like a theoretical tangent and more like a necessity. Keep the endogeneity; drop the sovereignty reflex; and show how democratic institutions at many scales can provision the peace now, while building toward a political order where honoring public commitments is routine.

Two Tracks

When we began talking about what to propose in this moment, we quickly realized we were thinking on two tracks at once. On the one hand, we think it is important to promote experiments with complementary currenciesโ€”local scrip, university credits, and other tools that give communities fiscal space when dollars are scarce or deliberately withheld. On the other hand, when we imagined what someone like a Mayor Zohran Mamdani in New York or Illinois Governor J. B. Pritzker might plausibly get behind in the near term, the memory of war bondsโ€”and the image of a public bond driveโ€”already had wide cultural recognition. People know what it looks like to line up, to contribute to a shared fund, and to get a certificate in return.ย We called our proposal “Blue Bonds” in recognition that they would mostly be issued by Democratic -controlled “blue” states.

Which Bonds?

That familiarity is why we first reached for bonds, but it did not stop there. While bond issuance is commonplace for US cities and states, the idea of a bond drive for democracy evokes the memory of World War II bonds. 

This raised a question for us to consider internally: what are the ideological implications of the wartime analogy?

Coretta Scott Kingโ€™s observation about the United States never confronting the idea of a peacetime economy became a kind of touchstone in our discussion. We asked ourselves: if we lean on the war bonds image too heavily, are we quietly reinforcing the idea that full employment and public belonging only make sense when there is an enemy to defeat? If so, that would be a dangerous starting point for democratic renewal. We do not want to bring people into public life only to leave them adrift when the โ€œthreatโ€ disappears.

Then another, more practical worry surfaced. While the idea of a โ€œnational debtโ€ owed to Chinese bond vigilantes sounds to many Americans like a cartoonish boogeyman, the public perception of bonds as debt feels more real at the state and local level. Here, concerns about bond ratings, refinancing terms, and investor confidence do not seem so far-fetchedโ€”they are the stuff of budget fights, service cuts, and โ€œtough medicineโ€ austerity campaigns. We have seen the same pattern play out internationally, where postcolonial governments are labeled โ€œirresponsibleโ€ and punished through capital flight and IMF conditionality.

One Personโ€™s Debt โ€ฆ

From our perspective, bonds are always endogenous. But the way they are experienced depends on the political and institutional surround. Sometimes they feel like a millstoneโ€”a debt plus interest hanging around the neck of some unfortunate city agency whose finances are under water. Other times, they feel more like a savings versus checking account: an interest-bearing claim in the broader circulation of public credit. The standard MMT framing would call this the difference between being the sovereign issuer of a currency and being a user. Yet it is just as accurate to say that the difference is designed into the political context. When, in the early days of COVID, the Federal Reserve created a facility to make municipal bonds receivable for dollars, it turned debt into cash almost overnight. โ€œTrade your debt for moneyโ€ sounds impossible until politics makes it happen.

That realization shifted our sense of what the war bonds analogy could do here. We are not trying to win a war (hopefully). The โ€œvictoryโ€ is a post-neoliberal government that can retire bonds or convert them to other kinds of assets without much fanfareโ€”because they have already done their job of keeping democracy funded and public employment steady.

The Duck-Rabbit Problem

And here is where what we call the duck-rabbit problem comes in, named after the famous optical illusion. The duck-rabbit illusion is an illustration that looks to some people at first glance like a rabbit, and to others like a duck. While the drawing is purposely ambiguous, it illustrates a universal premise in Gestalt psychology: our first impressions are โ€œwholesโ€ before we can perceive parts, new combinations and new assemblages. You see a duck or a rabbit first, and then with a bit of time you can see both images.

The duck-rabbit idea is central to how we move and learn in coalition. Members of a coalition see the same policy in their own terms, idioms and vernacularโ€”if not completely differently. By narrating these thoughts publicly, we hope to do coalitional communication more democratically. At Money on the Left, we will always say out loud that bonds are just another form of credit. Rather than borrowing funds that must be paid back at interest, bonds initiate new circuits of spending and receivability that can be structured in all kinds of ways. But whether the public understands them that way is not fixed in advanceโ€”it is something that the actual experience of Blue Bonds will shape. If they are used to provision a peacetime full-employment economy, and people see with their own eyes that this can be done whether or not Trump and his billionaires agree, then the idea that bonds must be โ€œpaid backโ€ in the punitive sense will look like the cruel joke that it is.


That, at least, is the horizon we are trying to open up: not just a fiscal tool to survive the present, but a lived demonstration that our capacity to provision the peace is real. Because that unfolds across many institutions and ledgers at once โ€” cities, states, unions, universities, and the central bank โ€” our strategies and designs should be multiple. Focusing here on Blue Bonds is not an attempt to subordinate other strategies and designs to this one. The opposite: complementary currencies and the public discourse they generate help set the long-term trajectory for Blue Bonds, making them more legible, inclusive, and durable. So when it comes to weighing our options, the more the merrier will deliver better, more democratic outcomes.

Coalition as Credit

Reading the Mamdani-Lander-Warren Coalition as a Credit Event

by Will Beaman

How do you keep governing when opponents try to stage a fiscal loss? In New York, that will be the fight: not just what to do, but how it will be underwritten as Albany and national actors slow-walk budgets until the calendar finishes them off. Our claim is simple: the technical โ€œhowโ€ is not a bolt-on. It is being rehearsed right now in coalition practice. Approach the Mamdaniโ€“Landerโ€“Warren moment as a crediting eventโ€”a scene where political credit and underwriting are made receivable across roomsโ€”and a near-term instrument, politicized bond issuance (Blue Bonds), stops looking like a leap and starts looking conceivable.

This is not the old, self-effacing triangulation that goes hunting for โ€œpolitical coverโ€ to appease moneyed interests and a โ€œsilent majorityโ€ of conservative voters. What we are seeing is public underwriting: recognitions offered in distinct idioms, in public, so claims are accepted where they would otherwise be blocked. โ€œCoverโ€ here is not borrowed; it is openly provisionedโ€”co-signed by diverse validators and accountable to diverse audiences.

Over the last months, old cues have misfired and new playbooks are being improvised. Coalition is shifting from ritual pledge to daily practiceโ€”who can speak for whom, in which rooms, without pretending to be the same. The Mamdani campaign crystallizes this shift: it may be the democratic-socialist leftโ€™s most consequential electoral win yetโ€”even including AOCโ€™s upset. Yet at the same time that it has sparked striking new instances of left-liberal solidarity, it has convened a soft collaborationist bloc linking Cuomo, national party figures, and The New York Times to Donald Trump himself.

We can interpret these gestures as a crediting event that contains multitudes, with implications across time. For the present political moment, such a reading re-credits the recent historical archive, stages usable contradiction in the present, and opens a near-future move: a democratic bond drive built from todayโ€™s coalition habits.

Past โ€” Reparative credit, loosening the archive

There is a kind of coalition work that begins by loosening the archive of political memory. It asks, generously, where should credit for movement victories go, and what have we discredited with too much finality? The Lander and Warren gestures toward Mamdani invite exactly that move. They do not pretend the Sandersโ€“Warren split never happened; they treat it as a record that can be re-read. What looked like incompatible strategies in 2020โ€”movement populism and structuralist reformโ€”can now be recast as twin rehearsals of a capacity we can use today. Warren praises Mamdani in her own idiom of affordability and household relief; Mamdani accepts the recognition without translating himself into technocratic prose. Lander, after his loss, extends his political credit to Mamdaniโ€™s project, not to equate the two of them, but as an acknowledgment that the organizing he did and the organizing Mamdani did could be recorded on the same page. This is a reparative politics of citation: restoring names and credit without forcing sameness.

Reparative citation matters because neoliberal politics rehearses competitive jockeying that narrows who can be seen. Liberal progressivism often tried to insulate technocratic expertise from the unruly work of experiential pedagogyโ€”treating spreadsheets, rulemaking, and fiduciary language as if they could do politics by themselves. On the other side, certain theories of mass organization cast groups like DSA as an autonomous subject accountable only to its own inside, tasked with building โ€œindependent powerโ€ that could then be imposed on coalition partners.

Each camp protected its strategyโ€™s dignity by discrediting the otherโ€™s. Technocrats dismissed movement language as naรฏve; Jacobin polemicists dismissed everything administrative as capture. Rituals of self effacement would accompany traversals between these two camps: left intellectuals discrediting their subject position as less โ€œorganicโ€ than an imagined working class audience; official policy spaces and legacy media gatekept from activists by rituals of genuflection to seriousness and moderation. The result was a historical archive that made it too easy to tell the story of 2020 as pure antagonism rather than divergent practice.

The Lander/Warren/Mamdani moment reanimates this archive with renewed depth and potential possibility. Landerโ€™s cross-endorsement recognizes that his organizing built capacities the coalition can now mobilize through Mamdani; Warrenโ€™s praise credits Mamdaniโ€™s coalition with strengthening the very affordability politics she champions in a different register. In both cases, political idioms are preserved and props are given both ways. That is what a swap line looks like in public: interoperability without assimilation. Read this way, the point is not metaphor, but practiceโ€”who can underwrite whom, in which roomsโ€”the same kind of practice a bond drive will require.

Seeing the past this way also clarifies why these credit analogies are not just rhetorical. Progressive campaigns really are provisioning authorities that mark up all kinds of creditโ€”small dollars, volunteer hours, public endorsements, private reputationsโ€”routinely narrated as commensurable forms of contribution. Money on the Left has argued that such ecosystems function like complementary-currency arrangements: unlike claims can be recognized together without collapsing into a single accounting identity, precisely because institutions learn to value one thing in terms of another. Treating cross-endorsements as crediting acts makes the practice legible. It is not sentiment; it is the political equivalent of marking accounts up and down to update how the coalition recognizes and underwrites political credit across its own differences.

What the reparative frame accomplishes, then, is simple: it dignifies both technocratic craft and movement pedagogy as distinct forms of credit worth carrying forward. It asks us to re-value strategies written off in the heat of a political split, and re-read losses as rehearsals. It keeps the archive open so prior work can be credited againโ€”nowโ€”to advance shared projects.

Present โ€” Staging contradictions as capacity

What is striking about the Mamdani moment is how plainly it was made possible by the cross-endorsement strategy with Brad Lander. The alliance was not a late truce; it created a channel where each camp could honor the other in its own language and have that recognition count in public. Lander used his standing to say, in effect, โ€œthis also belongs here,โ€ and people who trust Lander started acting like it does. That is the practical core: Mamdaniโ€™s credit in movement spaces and Landerโ€™s credit in institutional spaces were made to count across rooms without either campaign changing its voice.

The Israel/Palestine line makes this clear. Mamdani speaks with moral clarity about Zionism as an ethnonational project and steadfast about Palestinian rights. Lander, a liberal Zionist, did not pretend to agree. He gave a contradictory (but earnest) set of affirmations: โ€œIsrael has a right to exist,โ€ Mamdaniโ€™s critiques of Zionism are not antisemitic, and Lander can vouch for his moral seriousness. Mamdani did not translate himself to fit Landerโ€™s phrasing; he named the difference and kept moving. That is coalition as a working practice: two voices introducing each other across rooms and making each other receivable where they might otherwise be gated.

Landerโ€™s arrest outside immigration court deepened the point. He was detained and released, which is not how most detentions in that building go. Instead of treating that gap as something to hide, he said it out loud and used it to sharpen the gesture: I have credit with power that you donโ€™t, so Iโ€™m going to spend it on this. The asymmetry was not scrubbed for purity; it was mobilized. That is what solidarity looks like when it treats differences in proximity to power as a resource to be mobilized, not an embarrassment to be denied. And it builds a memory: if Lander runs for another office, the Mamdani field operation now has reasonโ€”and practiceโ€”to show up for him.

Elizabeth Warrenโ€™s partnership with Mamdani works the same way in another register. She does not adopt his cadence. She takes his affordability politics and says, in her idiom of consumer protection and competent administration, this belongs in the agenda I fight for. People who track Warrenโ€™s signalsโ€”career public servants, party operatives, legacy journalistsโ€”are more likely to give Mamdani a fair hearing. The long term effect is more coverage, more open doors, fewer knee-jerk vetoes.

Put simply: the present tense of this coalition is not unison; it is harmony. Lander vouches for Mamdani where his word reaches; Mamdani honors Lander without pretending they share every premise; Warren stamps the ticket in yet another venue. Each move keeps the differences intact and makes them usable together. That is why it feels durable rather than transactional. And because these introductions hold across rooms, they also prepare the validators and venues that a democratic bond drive would rely on when the budget is made to stall. 

Before we go further, a brief note on scope. These two sections have been descriptive: how political credit is being extended across rooms. What follows is more prescriptive. It asks how that same practice might be carried into administration if obstruction is engineeredโ€”so that the coalitionโ€™s habits remain usable when the setting changes.

Future โ€” Extending todayโ€™s coalition to tomorrowโ€™s Blue Bonds

Across unions, community groups, city agencies, and neighboring jurisdictions, similar gestures happen all the time: people with standing in one room are co-signing work from another, and audiences are learning to treat that co-sign as valid.

For political campaigns, these gestures are not atmosphericsโ€”they are capacity.

They answer, concretely, how someone like Mamdani was able to win as a democratic socialist: by having validators introduce his commitments across rooms where their word travels, so the campaignโ€™s promises begin to count in more places. And they are practice for recognizing political and economic capacity writ large when Trump tells everyone from opponents to junior partners that he holds all the cards.

This last section is therefore less descriptive and more invitational. It proposes one way to carry todayโ€™s coalition habits into governance if the play is to stall and demoralizeโ€”say, by slow-walking โ€œTax the Richโ€ until the calendar delivers the final blow. Taxing the rich is worth fighting for. But when it is treated as the only pathโ€”as if money were a finite substance to be recycled before anything else can happenโ€”it becomes a Hail Mary acceleration that invites the right to run out the clock. The alternative we propose is not to abandon that fight, but to pair it with a financing route that is increasingly legible in the coalitionโ€™s own practice.

Call that route politicized bond issuance. Neoliberal common sense has trained us to hear โ€œbondsโ€ as the city equivalent of household borrowing that must be paid back before any other thought is possible. The neoliberal story about bonds can make it seem more realistic to seek the consent of Trump-aligned donors and reactionary statehouse leaders for tax increases than to mobilize ordinary bond issuance at a political scale.

But the coalitional practices weโ€™ve been tracing make it possible to tell a different story. If coalitional gestures are carried forward, then the board will already be set up for a bond drive for democracy: radical democratic sentiments, urgent public works projects, trusted validators speaking in their own idioms, and a wide base that treats small sums and steady participation as meaningful. If agencies say in advance what the bonds will fund; if unions and civic institutions publicly invest in them, and if neighboring jurisdictions open reciprocal pathways, then bonds are a safe and stable feature of public life. In other words, we can politicize bonds to say that their viability is defended and expanded through the same cross-room vouching that is already underway in coalitional politics. 

Once politicized bond issuance is on the table, it changes the politics of taxation before any showdown. โ€œTax the Richโ€ stops being a plea to gatekeepers and becomes a negotiation in which the coalition already has a working alternative to fiscal suffocation. The message is simple: we will finance transit, clinics, housing stabilization, wages, and care on timelines set by public need. You can meet us there with durable revenue, or we will proceed while continuing to organize for that revenue. Either way, the work continues.

There is presently a massive desire for public gestures of solidarity between governing bodies. For someone like Illinois Governor J.B. Pritzker to have the backs of Texas Democrats who have the back of our entire democracy. And for ordinary people to be able to invest small dollars in fighting the oligarchy. A national Blue Bonds campaign between states and allied cities makes both desires actionable. It would create channels for residents to subscribe across jurisdictions and for issuers to coordinate acceptance and timing so that solidarity can spread in policy. In short, Blue Bonds could underwrite the emergence of a cross-state, urban front capable of sustaining public life against impoundment politics.

None of this requires the movement to know every technical step in advance. It requires that the legibility we are building nowโ€”about who vouches for whom, how unlike contributions add up, and why differences do not have to be flattenedโ€”be carried into administration and policy. A small Blue Bond holding then reads as another channel in a familiar architecture: small dollars, small labor, endorsements, and now a publicly named savings instrument tied to visible projects and campaigns. The more intelligible this becomes in the present, the less it will feel like a leap when it becomes a necessity. The coalition will be extending a practice it already recognizes, not inventing one from scratch.

Credit Events

If neoliberal governance taught a reflex, it was the Hail Mary face-off: stage a crisis, wait for things to deteriorate, come in with a bad solution or none at all. We propose a different ending. When coalition is treated as structure rather than exception, then crisis is no longer the only game. A democratic bond driveโ€”organized issuance, tax receivability, union and civic subscription, cross-jurisdiction supportโ€”becomes thinkable now because the recognitions that would sustain it are already public.

We should consign the Hail Mary to the dustbin with the rest of our neoliberal relics. Keep organizing to Tax the Rich, but pair it with instruments that todayโ€™s coalition already renders receivable. Waiting for the next showdown is not a strategy; treating the face-off as fate hands initiative to opponents who script defeat through delay and procedural choke points. The stall is built, and it can be countered by arranging capacities the politics has already brought into being.

Credit events are not events in the neoliberal senseโ€”not economic or political crises. They are scenes of public underwriting that re-credit the archive, make claims receivable across rooms in the present, and name near-term administrative capacities that follow without a leap. Blue Bonds are the near-term test of this stance: coordinate issuance with acceptance for taxes and fees, union and civic subscription, and reciprocity across jurisdictions so public work continues while longer-run revenue struggles proceed. No brinkmanshipโ€”keep recognitions public and portable, and build the instruments that enact democratic values.

The Unofficial Lives of Public Money

by Will Beaman

Recent Money on the Left proposals for endogenous credit campaignsโ€”like Unis or Blue Bondsโ€”often run headlong into an unspoken but deeply rooted distinction between โ€œofficialโ€ and โ€œunofficialโ€ money. This distinction can make such projects seem peripheral, even when they are designed to work alongside and strengthen existing public infrastructures. Clarifying how this distinction works, and how it might be reframed, is essential to building a narrative in which these proposals make intuitive sense as part of a broader democratic vision.

Perhaps a more helpful axis for thinking about currency is not official versus unofficial, but democratic and publicly responsible monetary practices versus rogue and publicly irresponsible ones. This framing helps us see how the dollar itself contains multiple layers of issuance and coordination that are neither fully centralized nor always democratically accountable. It also allows us to recognize that some soโ€‘called โ€œunofficialโ€ currencies may, in fact, make their connections to public infrastructure more visible and accountable than many โ€œofficialโ€ practices do.

We have inherited contradictory public imaginaries that reinforce the official/unofficial binary. The legacy of federalism and constitutional demarcations of โ€œsovereignโ€ public authority over issuing moneyโ€”the gold standard fantasy that implies a natural, finite supply of currency, and tacit ideological assumptions about what kinds of work count as legitimateโ€”all feed the belief that there is a โ€œrealโ€ quantity of money to which everything else must conform. Each of these imaginaries narrows our sense of what money is and what it can do.

The dollarโ€™s apparent seamlessness emerges from an ongoing choreography in which multiple institutionsโ€”from Congress to municipal courtsโ€”issue and reissue credit, coordinate payments, and manage its acceptance. This takes many everyday forms: congressional appropriations, loanโ€‘originated bank deposits, markedโ€‘up reserve balances and Treasuries, and municipal bonds. It also happens through public rituals and discoursesโ€”such as the oftโ€‘repeated claim that government must tax before it can spend, or moments when state governments refuse to draw on appropriated funds, as though hoarding balances were a mark of fiscal virtue. These narratives and practices naturalize the idea of the dollar as finite, preโ€‘existing, and selfโ€‘contained, when in fact its continuity depends on countless points of issuance and coordination. The question is not whether these points exist, but whether their issuance and functions are democratically accountable.

Sovereignty and its Doppelgรคnger 

When we reframe the landscape in terms of democratic and publicly responsible versus rogue and publicly irresponsible monetary practices, sovereignty becomes a revealing figure. In one register, it names the institutional intransigence that locks fiscal authority inside gatekept procedures and narrow definitions of โ€œlegitimateโ€ spendingโ€”congressional supermajorities, balancedโ€‘budget amendments, debt ceilings, and appropriations that never reach the people they were passed for. This is sovereignty as a state of affairs: insulated, resistant to public challenge, and wielded to forestall democratic fiscal contestation.

In another register, sovereignty animates a frontier fantasy. Here it becomes the outlaw dream of escaping any collective obligationโ€”a dream with deep roots in the settlerโ€‘colonial โ€œfree bankingโ€ movements of the Jacksonian West. In the nineteenth century, โ€œfree banksโ€ were celebrated in some quarters as engines of independence, issuing notes supposedly backed by local initiative and unshackled from federal oversight. In reality, they operated inside a broader federal and state monetary order, often failing spectacularly and leaving communities to absorb the losses. This history has been reโ€‘stylized in the twentyโ€‘first century as Silicon Valleyโ€™s crypto imaginary: Manifest Destiny reborn in code and venture capital, promising a โ€œsovereignโ€ infrastructure of value beyond the reach of government.

Both registers disavow their entanglements with the wider monetary system. The first enshrines continuity ritualsโ€”like taxing before spendingโ€”as natural limits, masking the many points where the dollar is already issued and reโ€‘issued. The second glorifies breakaway issuance, pretending it can float free of public infrastructure while quietly relying on it for convertibility, legal enforceability, and market credibility. In different ways, both treat accountability as a threat rather than a foundation.

By holding these two faces of sovereignty together, we can see how rogue and publicly irresponsible currencies cut across the official/unofficial divide. The dollar itself can be made to act like a rogue instrument when its points of issuance are hidden behind sovereigntyโ€™s gatekeeping. And many โ€œunofficialโ€ projects, from speculative crypto tokens to Trump Coins, rehearse the same fantasy of unaccountable freedom that drove the free banking frontierโ€”right down to their selective nostalgia for collapse and reset.

What this framing makes possible is a different horizon: one where new currencies, like Unis or Blue Bonds, work precisely by making their embeddedness in public infrastructure visible and contestableโ€”expanding the field of fiscal coordination rather than evading it.

Postscript: On Naming and Silencing

Jakob Feinigโ€™s concept of monetary silencingโ€”the process by which institutions and experts render money apolitical, finite, and beyond democratic contestationโ€”offers a powerful complement to the framing here. His historical work shows how silencing deepens when coalitional struggles over public money recede. Though he most often applies the term to mainstream institutions, Feinig has also noted how crypto imaginaries obscure their reliance on legal and infrastructural scaffolding.

My own framing begins from the other end: the outlaw, herrenvolk ethos of cryptocurrencies and the free banking movements before them. But we converge in showing that these are two sides of the same coinโ€”each eroding democratic governance when left unexamined. That convergence highlights a deeper point: naming is not just rhetorical. If monetary silencing thrives in the absence of coalitional imagination, then how we describe monetary practices helps form the context in which public futures can be seen.

Jim Crow to Trump: Reconsidering the Psychological Wage

by Will Beaman

W.E.B. Du Boisโ€™s โ€œpsychological wageโ€ has long been treated as a metaphor. In Black Reconstruction, he describes how white workers, denied meaningful economic uplift, found compensation in racial status. Many have read this as a bribe, or as a symbolic reward for class betrayalโ€”something less real than money, but no less effective in dividing the working class.

That reading rests on a familiar split between the psychological and the material. Racial esteem appears as an illusion, set against the tangible structures of wages, land, and capital. Even more sympathetic interpretations tend to preserve that hierarchy: psychology may be powerful, but money is what counts.

But Du Boisโ€™s phrase does not merely point to a parallel between money and status. It stages something more robust and flexible than a metaphor: an analogy. Not a substitution of likeness, but a choreography between forms. The psychological is not โ€œjust as realโ€ as the material. It is staged as material across institutions.

This is not quite Du Boisโ€™s own argument. He did not frame whiteness as a currency, nor was he writing from a theory of endogenous creditโ€”that is, a view of money as something issued, distributed, and coordinated from within social and institutional life. But his formulation invites such a reading for those who are looking for it. This is a reparative approach: not an attempt to retrofit Du Bois into a monetary theory he did not share, but to extend the intuitions that his concept makes available to us, and to trace how they resonate within a broader politics of credit and recognition.

The psychological wage, on this reading, is not a stand-in for economic life. It is one of its currencies: a system for distributing value, legitimacy, and access. It operates within, against, and alongside the dollarโ€”sometimes underwriting its effects, sometimes shaping them in more violent or distorted directions. Whiteness, in this frame, functions as a rogue issuance structure: a mode of provisioning that overlaps with official systems, but is never fully secured by them.

To trace this choreography is not to reduce value to a single structure or contradiction. It is to notice how value is staged and restaged across domainsโ€”how public life is assembled through overlapping genres of credit and belonging. Whiteness is one of those genres, and its wage is not a metaphor. It is a script, a system, and a currency. And it is improvised, rehearsed, and enforced in unequal measure.

Rogue Issuance and the Choreography of Credit

If the psychological wage is a currency, it is one that does not circulate on its own. Like the dollar, it must be issued, accepted, and reissued. Its legitimacy is never self-evident. It relies on ritualsโ€”public scripts that coordinate belief, recognition, and value across domains. What Du Bois observed was not just a compensatory self-image, but a system of provisioning: a choreography of credit that names, elevates, and withholds.

This is the sense in which whiteness acts as a rogue issuance structure. It confers permissionsโ€”who is employable, electable, presumed competent or harmlessโ€”and it denies them. It rehearses who can be trusted with leadership, housing, and grace. Its credit regime is rarely codified, but it is widely rehearsed and reinforced through credentials, reputations, and soft evaluations. It sanctions not only behavior but being, reinforcing a sense of deservedness through moral idioms like work ethic, family values, and lawfulness. Whiteness, as a set of public rituals, permits the dollar in some contexts, supplants it in others, and blocks it elsewhere.

To name whiteness as a currency is not to ennoble it, or to deny the fragility and violence of the value it provisions. The forms of receivability it sustainsโ€”access to housing, credibility, or bodily safetyโ€”are pathologically unstable, rooted in exclusion, resentment, and myths of deservedness rather than in durable public life. This instability is not a flaw but a feature of its affective infrastructure. As Du Bois recognized, it binds social life by staging threat and reward along racial lines. But whiteness does not merely console the dispossessed. It conditions value itselfโ€”including among the wealthy, who are often provisioned not with security but with paranoia, grievance, and moral license. Its currency scripts legitimacy through volatility and rehearsed threat, across contexts differently staged as privilege or precarity.

None of this occurs outside the terrain of the dollar, as this suggests. But the dollar itself is not a coherent entity. It is already a choreography: a composite of coins, notes, deposits, reserves, and credit instrumentsโ€”issued across the balance sheets of banks, treasuries, courts, and municipal governments, each with their own histories, idioms, and institutional rhythms. It has never been a single thing.

Its seeming continuity is an effect of coordinationโ€”an aesthetic and procedural labor that must be sustained. Whiteness and the dollar, then, are not the same. But they are not separable. They pass through one another. From the redlining of neighborhoods to the algorithmic scoring of creditworthiness, monetary systems have always embedded racial logics of credibility and threat. The infrastructure of whiteness has helped determine which expenditures are seen as investment and which as waste, which lives are worthy of public guarantees and which are overdrawn by default.

To understand this convergence requires attending not just to violence and exclusion, but to narrative and form. Whiteness functions not as an illusion or conspiracy, but as a genre of continuity. It makes disjointed provisions feel seamless. It codes asymmetric inclusion as natural legitimacy. It smooths over the cracks between property, personhood, and security. In this way, it choreographs the alignment of public life with itselfโ€”not through mastery, but through the repetition of a script that demands constant performance.

And because that performance disavows and conceals itself, whiteness as a currency is always under stress. What whiteness stages as self-evident has to be vigilantly enforced, patrolled, and defended. It improvises stability by invoking threats and scapegoats. It requires moral panics and narrative resets to cover over its breakdowns. Its continuity is not a given, but a fragile project. And when its claim to stable continuity falters, its most invested participants improvise new affective infrastructures to make the pain go away. That is Trumpism. But before Trump, this logic of continuity has been traceable across diverse aesthetic forms: homeownership, suburban coherence, and the smoothing operations of narrative itself.

Staging Continuity

Whiteness does not operate only through forceโ€”it relies on form. Across the 20th century, institutions stylized continuity: mortgages, suburban zoning, credit markets, and municipal budgets did not just allocate resources. They offered genres of legitimacy. Financial scripts taught people how to live, while aesthetic scripts trained them to see value, coherence, and threat.

Homeownership was central to this process. As historian David M. P. Freund shows in Colored Property, federal housing policy did not simply grant white families access to homes. It constructed a credit-based infrastructure that linked whiteness to financial credibility. Banks, zoning boards, and insurance tables embedded racial exclusion into public finance. What appeared as market rationality was a selective choreography of trustโ€”coded as neutrality, rehearsed as meritocracy.

Creditworthiness, in this landscape, became a moral genre. Beyond shelter, homeownership staged stability, future orientation, and civic belonging. It made whiteness appear prudent, deserving, and low-risk. Public life was organized around this appearance. And to sustain it, credit systems needed ways of managing discontinuity: foreclosure, disinvestment, labor displacement, racial integration. These ruptures had to be smoothed over or re-narrated.

That smoothing work did not begin with housing policy. Earlier techniques for managing discontinuity appeared onscreen, where the visual grammar of cinema trained audiences to perceive order in the midst of fracture.

The institutions of housing and credit were accompaniedโ€”and often conditionedโ€”by visual forms that taught people how to recognize coherence where there was asymmetry. Chief among these was cinema. As the dominant narrative medium of the 20th century, film did not just depict public lifeโ€”it organized its legibility. Its techniques of continuity editing taught viewers how to register coherence, resolve conflict, and align emotionally with dominant scripts of legitimacy.

These techniques were crystallizing across early cinema, but The Birth of a Nation (1915) gave them their most influential and violent expression. The film did more than mythologize the Ku Klux Klan as redeemers of white civilizationโ€”it showcased an emerging grammar of cinematic continuity. Techniques meant to weave spatial and temporal continuity like match-on-action cuts, establishing shots, and crosscutting were becoming common across the industry, but here they were marshaled to render racial violence as narrative resolution. Early narrative films often staged trials, domestic order, and mob justice, turning moral panic into moral clarity through continuity techniques that led viewers through an unambiguous and seemingly undoctored social world.

The grammar of cinematic continuity was not incidental. It mirrored and anticipated the grammar of white fiscal governance. Where mortgage finance aligned whiteness with financial coherence, cinema rendered racial violence as narrative closure. Together, these infrastructures naturalized the distribution of value and threat. They made racial credit logics feel intuitive: who deserves a home, who appears as a threat, who merits rescue or redemption.

Like all systems of credit, narrative continuity requires labor. It must be sustained, defended, and updated. When dominant scripts break downโ€”through economic crisis, political rupture, or affective dissonanceโ€”new infrastructures rush in to compensate. Trumpism was one such improvisation: a recalibration of whitenessโ€™s issuance crisis.

Trumpism and the Collapse of White Credit

By the time Donald Trump descended his golden escalator in 2015, the infrastructure of white credit had begun to buckle. The housing collapse of 2008 had already exposed the racial asymmetries baked into homeownership and finance. Many white homeowners experienced foreclosure for the first timeโ€”an experience long familiar to Black communities. And yet the fallout was not interpreted as a failure of whitenessโ€™s credit regime, but as its betrayal. What followed was not a reckoning with that regimeโ€™s selective provisioning, but a furious attempt to reclaim its authority.

Trumpism emerged as a performance of that reclamation. Its aesthetic was not continuity, but improvisation. It did not restore faith in institutions, but acted out their collapse. Its power came not from restoring legitimacy, but from redistributing permission: who could speak, who could offend, who could disobey. This was a shift in genre. If whiteness had long functioned as a currency of propriety, responsibility, and quiet entitlement, Trumpism offered its rogue variantโ€”a high-yield bond issued in the voice of grievance and spectacle.

Trump did not invent this genre. He inherited it from decades of white reaction and expanded it into a total aesthetic. His rallies resembled wrestling matches more than speeches. His governance was theatrical and erratic. His authority came not from coherence but from affective asymmetryโ€”punishment without principle, entitlement without responsibility. He flipped the script of white creditworthiness. No longer the silent majority, his base became the loud minority: proud to offend, eager to humiliate, impatient with anything that delayed gratification.

Trumpism did not restore the psychological wage. It performed its inflation. What once operated through subtle cues and institutional choreography now erupted into spectacle. This was not a revival of confidence in whiteness-as-creditโ€”it was its liquidation.

Yet Trumpism also revealed what whiteness had always required: staging, repetition, narrative, and rehearsal. Even its most chaotic expressions still followed a script about grievance, betrayal, redemption, and retribution. And like all currencies, it demanded belief. The improvisation only worked because it felt authorized. It gave its audience not new power, but the feeling of having never lost it.

What came into view in this moment was not the end of white issuance, but its reformatting. Trumpism did not undo the dollar. It did not replace the mortgage or the budget or the suburban imaginary. It added to them a new affective overlayโ€”a vigilante infrastructure of vibes and vengeance, broadcasting its legitimacy through volume and pain.

The Tea Party movement began reissuing the psychological wage in a new fiscal and affective register. In the wake of the 2008 housing crash, white grievance congealed not around foreclosure itself, but around the fantasy that โ€œundeserving othersโ€ had disrupted the moral logic of debt and reward. The Obama administrationโ€™s efforts to manage the crisisโ€”via stimulus, bailouts, or mortgage reliefโ€”were reframed as theft from the โ€œrealโ€ public: a racialized middle class whose creditworthiness had long been naturalized. Birtherism, with Trump as its most theatrical spokesman, extended this suspicion from the mortgage to the presidency. It questioned not only Obamaโ€™s origins, but the very legibility of Black legitimacy within white fiscal order. This was not yet Trumpism, but its grammar was already there: suspicion, spectacle, entitlement, and the demand to be visibly re-centered.

Trump did not introduce spectacle into whiteness; he made visible what had long been disavowed. Earlier forms invited white audiences to consume racial violence as spectacle in order to condemn itโ€”reveling in fantasies of threat and punishment while insisting on their own moral distance. Trumpism recasts that enjoyment as its own justification.

That shiftโ€”from disavowed enjoyment to open indulgenceโ€”is not a departure from whitenessโ€™s affective infrastructure but a symptom of its breakdown. Trumpism draws on fantasies long rehearsed in unconscious form, but restages them compulsively, as volatility, grievance, and spectacle become the means by which whiteness shores up credibility to itself and others.

But the improvisation did not come out of nowhereโ€”and it did not arrive fully formed. It built on existing scripts of entitlement and threat, pushing them past narrative restraint into open-ended spectacle. What had once been managed through veiled cues and institutional choreography now roared through crisis aesthetics. The story no longer resolved; it repeated, frayed, and spiraled.

Trumpism and the Performance of Collapse

Trumpism did not restore the psychological wage. It performed its โ€œinflationโ€โ€”or at least, what felt like one. The term is often used to suggest that too much credit has flooded the system and eroded its value. But that is not how credit works. Value does not dilute from over-issuance alone; it breaks down when the systems that provision and coordinate meaning begin to fail. What we call inflation is often just that: a crisis in infrastructure, not in quantity.

Trumpโ€™s spectacle emerged in precisely this context. The longstanding infrastructures that sustained whitenessโ€”housing, employment, national mythโ€”had begun to collapse under their own contradictions. Epsteinโ€™s exposure did not just implicate Trump personally. It broke the script. It made visible the gap between permission and legitimacy, between continuity and the structures that had always provisioned it. Trumpโ€™s response was not to restore order, but to stage its unraveling as catharsis.

This was not a revival of confidence in whiteness-as-credit. It was a performance of collapse: flags, chants, humiliation rituals, and gaudy excess. The affective architecture of whiteness, long managed through understated cues and institutional discretion, now roared through spectacle. Not because whiteness had been devalued by overuse, but because its continuity could no longer be convincingly choreographed.

Like housing and like cinema, Trumpism attempted to stage coherence out of fragments. But where Hollywood once smoothed those fragments into a narrative of order, Trump leaned into the jaggedness. Scandal did not replace plot; it rose to the fore. Early narrative films indulged spectacle, exploitation, and scandal, but housed them within melodramatic storylines that gave audiences a way to feel unimplicated in those indulgences. Trumpism abandoned that narrative containment. The story no longer resolved; it repeated, frayed, and spiraled.

If the psychological wage was always currency, Trumpism was its dramatic foreclosure notice. Not a new issuance, but a desperate demand for back pay. The spectacle was not redemptive. It was an attempt to feel like something still backed that credit, even if all that remained was grievance and noise.

That script cannot remain the same. The infrastructure that once choreographed legitimacy through restraint and propriety now improvises through excess, repetition, and pain. Trumpism did not sever the provisioning of whitenessโ€”it restructured it around performance, resentment, and spectacle. The credits are still being issued. The roles are still being cast.

Rogue Affect and the Aesthetics of Issuance

The fantasies of rogue issuance that simmered beneath mid-century white prosperityโ€”always latent in the figure of the self-made man, the bootstrapped homesteader, the frontier entrepreneurโ€”took on new affective labor during the neoliberal era, sustaining belief in whiteness-as-credit even as public imaginaries narrowed. After the 2008 collapse, these imaginaries found new institutional form in the rise of seemingly extra-institutional cryptocurrencies, which promised not only freedom from government but a sovereign infrastructure of value. These systems echoed white credit logics: exclusionary, performative, obsessed with authenticity and deservingness. Their fascist alignments sharpened over time, culminating in open grifts like Trump Coinsโ€”herrenvolk fantasy made liquid, a brazenly scammy frontier issuance of whiteness that made the scamminess the whole point.

The rise of crypto markets trading on โ€œvibesโ€ marks not the liberation of affect from institutions, but their rearticulation in unaccountable form. What looks like freedom from governance is really a displacement of itโ€”reducing infrastructure to spectacle, and public trust to speculative mood. Affect has always helped coordinate credit, legitimacy, and trustโ€”but within the racialized order of whiteness, it has been repeatedly disavowed: dismissed as mere sentiment when it surfaced outside sanctioned scripts, cast as volatility, mood, or threat. Crypto runs with that disavowal, converting scenes of trust and belonging into extractable fluctuations in sentiment.

Even on the left, affect is often prized for its escape from institutionsโ€”its ambiguity, unruliness, or refusal of legibility. But to treat affect as excess is to surrender its infrastructural power. What appears radical in its unruliness may unwittingly echo the rightโ€™s romance of unaccountability. Both suppress the need for accounting. Both rehearse an aesthetic of issuance that disavows responsibility. Crypto does not reject institutions; it reifies their coordinated exclusions as market outcomes, staging freedom as deregulated feeling and coherence as vibes.

The Next Script

The psychological wage was never a fixed promise or a permanent station. It was a fragile choreographyโ€”improvised, enforced, and rehearsed through everyday scenes of trust, threat, and belonging. Its power came not from what it was, but from how reliably it passed for something natural.

That reliability is faltering. Trumpism did not invent the breakdown; it emerged from it. As the institutions that once sustained white continuity began to unravelโ€”housing, policing, media, civic orderโ€”so too did the ability to naturalize those provisions. What remains is not the absence of a script, but a scramble for new ones. A scramble to renew the feeling that one still belongs to something self-evident.

This collapse clarifies not only how whiteness operates, but what the concept of a wage might help us see. Du Bois named a structure of compensation and enforcement that was never merely symbolic, and never purely economic. He gave us a figureโ€”a felt, distributed wageโ€”that can be reread today as a clue to how value, legitimacy, and belonging are provisioned through institutional life. This essay has followed that clue, not to recover his meaning, but to build on its resonances: to reimagine the psychological wage not as a metaphor, but as a currency in its own right.

There is no undoing that history. But there is a responsibility that comes with knowing it. If whiteness has operated as a rogue monetary infrastructure, then refusing it means more than critique. It means building differently. It means designing public life with an eye toward recognition that does not demand erasure, toward coordination that does not require scapegoats, and toward accountability that is scripted through shared participation, with room for revision, complexity, and care.

The Radical Potential of Consumer Financial Protection with Vijay Raghavan

We speak with Vijay Raghavan, Professor of Law at the Brooklyn Law School, about his recent article, โ€œThe Radical Potential of Consumer Financial Protection,โ€ published in Boston College Law Review in April 2025. Raghavan builds on the work of constitutional money theorists, as well as his legal experience in the public sector. In particular, he argues that consumer financial protection is an essential and potentially radical response to the “finance franchise,โ€ a predominantly anti-democratic process by which modern governments delegate the money creation process to private actors like banks. The consensus in contemporary left sociological and legal scholarship dismisses consumer financial protection as a rearguard effort to sustain neoliberal capitalism. Raghavan, by contrast, reconceptualizes consumer financial protection as a vital counterweight to legally structured domination in financial markets. By tracing the history of this struggle from the early 20th century to the present, Raghavan provides a powerful legal framework for today’s debtor movements, including the national campaigns to cancel student and medical debt. In doing so, Raghavan offers a forward-looking vision for how to build a durable consumer financial protection regime capable of reclaiming democratic authority in the post-Trump era.

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Music by Nahneen Kula: www.nahneenkula.com

Transcript

This transcript has been edited for readability.

William Saas 

Vijay Raghavan, welcome to Money on the Left

Vijay Raghavan 

Thanks for having me. 

William Saas 

Just to get us started, could you tell us a little bit about your professional and personal background and how it ties in with your fabulous work that we’re going to be talking about on the consumer financial protection regime? 

Vijay Raghavan 

Yeah, sure. I’m happy to go as in-depth as you want me to, but I’m a lawyer by training. Although my license is no longer active, I graduated from law school in 2007. 

My early career was pretty conventional. I went to a big law firm to make money. I think I went to law school with some aspirations to do good, like, in a broad sense, but I ended up at a big law firm doing tax work. It was just as terrible as people say that kind of work is. I worked for really mean people for really long hours. I made what at the time seemed like a lot of money, but I didn’t really understand the work that I was doing. That might feel a little uncharitable. Itโ€™s funny, after I became an academic, I ended up contacting one of the former partners I used to work for who’s now in New York in a different firm, and he sort of copped to being a jerk when he was my boss and apologized for it. 

I was like, it’s been a decade. If I wanted to place my students there, I thought it was a good professional connection to rebuild or rehabilitate. It wasn’t hard to rehabilitate. He was like, โ€œI’m so sorry. I probably chased you away.โ€ Which, it’s all true. 

I was a tax associate at a big law firm. I guess the work was kind of intellectually stimulating, but I really didn’t understand what I was doing. I was definitely working on the tax aspects of transactions that were kind of adjacent to things that caused the world to collapse. 

In 2008, when Obama got elected, I โ€” like other people โ€” was really hopeful. I mean, his presidency was pretty disappointing, at least for the kind of work that I do, but at the time I was pretty hopeful. I wanted to be broadly involved in doing something good. The financial crisis was in full effect at that point. 

I think it started as early as April of 2006, but the world found out about it in September of 2008. I think those two things kind of pushed me to leave the firm, plus I didn’t like the work that I was doing. As someone who was a tax associated big law firm, trying to make the switch to something public oriented was a little bit hard. 

It’s hard to convince people that you have the skills or the desire to do anything. There were lots of people who were similarly situated who were not happy with the work that they were doing, saw something happening, wanted to do more, but didn’t really have a good case to make. I ended up getting this two-year fellowship at a legal aid organization in northern and central Illinois. It was called Prairie State Legal Services. It serves suburban, exurban and rural Illinois outside of Chicago. I was doing tax base legal aid work, mostly representing people who had tax debts to the IRS and then some people who were losing their home to property tax foreclosures. 

A lot of that work was kind of downstream of the financial crisis. People incurred tax debt as a result of other problems that they were facing that were more directly tied to the financial crisis. So, for example, maybe they lost their home, or they defaulted on debt and that debt was canceled. That canceled debt is treated as income under our tax code, which my last article was about that, and that creates tax consequences or one of the obligations they fell behind is on their tax obligations. I was representing these people from the IRS.  

The IRS is a really powerful creditor and has lots of remedies they can pursue that normal creditors can’t. I did that work for about two years. It was an interesting time to be doing that work. I saw things I didn’t understand at the time, but I definitely saw where things were headed or early signs of where things were headed. I would encounter lots of low-income white homeowners in rural America who had taken out predatory loans and lost their homes to foreclosures. The failure of our federal government to address their material concerns was pushing them to embrace a kind of reactionary politics. I definitely met people who were really angry that we were bailing out the banks and not going after companies like Ditech and Countrywide, these companies that had gone after them. People like Glenn Beck and the Tea Party really spoke to them.  

After doing that work for about two years, I think I wanted to be more involved with work that was at the center of post financial crisis reform. I ended up going to the Consumer Fraud Bureau of the Illinois Attorney General’s office to do consumer protection work. At the time, I didn’t really know what that was, to be perfectly honest, but it seemed closer to where I wanted to be. At the time, I joined the Illinois Attorney General’s office, there was a bunch of post financial crisis litigation that was about to get started or that was well underway that I got involved in. I also joined at a really weird time. I don’t know the extent to which you all have discussed the foreclosure crisis in the robo signing scandal on this show, but I was joining that office at the time when the terrible robo signing settlement was being negotiated, and that was a disillusioning way to start that kind of work. Then after that I ended up being involved in litigation against the rating agencies that our office was involved in. I ended up investigating all kinds of shady loans, payday lenders, title lenders, installment lenders, subprime auto lenders, contract sellers, which was this practice from the redlining era that had resurfaced after the financial crisis in the same segregated neighborhoods in big cities as the practice was originally peddled in the 1950s. So, yeah, it was fun, really rich and rewarding work. I did that for about eight years, and then for nine months I kind of ran a division, Illinois’s banking regulator, where I supervised the supervision and regulation of fringe financial lending in Illinois and credit unions and title insurers. Then I joined academia. 

William Saas 

So, you got chased out of the big bad law firm before the financial crisis fully hit. But when the financial crisis fully hit, you were already doing that kind of consumer protection or consumer advocacy sort of work. That’s amazing timing. 

Vijay Raghavan 

I left in February. I started in February 2009.  I was interviewing right around the time of the Lehman bankruptcy and the AIG (American International Group) bailout. 

William Saas 

Did you feel like you’d seen the writing on the wall or was it just โ€œthis is not the work for me.โ€ 

Vijay Raghavan 

I mean, no, I really didnโ€™t understand what was happening.  I recall one of the last things that I did at the law firm was being asked to look at the tax aspects of a collateralized debt obligation (CDO). I remember doing research. I was like, โ€œwhat is this?โ€ I was trying to wrap my head around it. Then I was out the door. I really didn’t know what I was doing. Although I’d say it was adjacent, I don’t know how close it was to what caused the world to implode. 

William Saas 

You know you’re in trouble when a tax lawyer can’t decipher the CDO. You say you got into academia. What was the last push into academia from the consumer protection work that you were doing? 

Vijay Raghavan 

You know, I’d been doing it for about a decade, and although I enjoyed the work, I was a bit disillusioned by not being able to push the bureaucratic levers of state government as fast as I wanted. There were some cases that I really wanted to launch that I wasn’t able to launch, or I wasn’t able to launch in the way that I wanted to launch them. When you’re working for the state government or for the federal government as an enforcement attorney โ€” not as a defendant where you’re defending the state, instead you’re suing businesses โ€” you’re often not on a tight timeline. You have time to develop cases and to develop ambitious legal theories. Sometimes you end up putting years into that work. The process of building that case is definitely very satisfying and you learn a lot. I spent years from 2014 to 2018 developing the case against a massive national subprime auto lender where we were doing lots of novel things like reverse engineering their credit scoring models to figure out how likely they thought people were going to default and tying that then to figuring out how to wedge that into legal frameworks. We got to take sworn statements from the heads of their decision science team but getting that case off the ground ended up being very difficult.  

Things like that pushed me to try to find something else to do. I’d always been interested in academia, and after doing this work for about a decade, I think I wanted some time to think about the work that I was doing. I wanted to try to understand what I was doing and what its value was, and I wanted to try to figure out why the reform efforts of the 2010s had largely failed to constrain debt markets.  I was unique.  With law schools there might have been a time, maybe 50 or 60 years ago, it was common for practitioners to become law professors. Today, the gap between legal academia and normal academia has more or less disappeared. The vast majority of people who get the job that I got are coming from PhD programs or fellowships. In fact, the year that I was hired, there’s this person who publishes statistics on entry level hiring every year. They do these Venn diagrams of where people come from and it is people from PhD programs, fellowships, and judicial clerkships. The Venn diagram for the year that I was hired, I was an outlier. There was one person outside of the Venn diagram and that was me. What happened was, I had been interested in academia, and we had retained Adam Levitin as an expert on the cases that we were doing. He’s a law professor from Georgetown who I read a lot. Adam sort of encouraged me to pursue this. He thought this was something that I could do. Yeah, that’s how I ended up here. 

Scott Ferguson 

Obviously, you have multiple influences in your work, but I’m wondering how you came to the legal paradigm around money that we tend to associate with scholars like Christine Desan, or adjacent to the law and political economy movement because for somebody who doesn’t necessarily know what they’re doing, it seems like you just get wrapped up in in dominant thoroughfares, in the same law and economics paradigm, which is intensely neoliberal and prioritizes the private market over governance and legal design. I’m always interested in people’s personal history, but also, beyond the personal aspect, thinking about institution building and the sociology of knowledge. How does someone like you making this move get rooted in this more critical and capacious paradigm? How did that happen for you? 

Vijay Raghavan 

Yeah, it’s a great question. I don’t totally know how it happened. Yeah. I don’t remember the exact steps, but I will say, when I became an academic, I was really interested in writing about the stuff that I did and trying to theorize it and then trying to figure out where I think I went wrong. I think for practitioners who become academics, they often are intervening in older conversations because they just are not up to date on what people are talking about. Theyโ€™re like, โ€œthe conversations that people are having probably are the same conversations that people are having when I was in law school.โ€ Those were all my touch points. In my first paper, I had an idea of why I think when things went wrong. My idea was, one of the reasons things went wrong was because consumer advocates, or people in my world, have a moral objection to indebtedness and to high-cost loans, but we don’t voice that objection in moral terms. Instead, we try to argue within conventional law and economics paradigm. We’re like, regulating consumer credit is justified because payday loans are inefficient as a result of various market failures like information asymmetries or cognitive bias or externalities. What I was doing in that paper was trying to argue that was really misguided, and it was misguided because background legal entitlements are sort of shaped like the coercive power that people have in market exchange. 

Scott Ferguson 

That’s a huge leap, right?  

 Vijay Raghavan 

It’s a huge leap. Right. In trying to figure out why I thought it was wrong, I ended up reading Hale. I don’t know how I got to Hale. I got to Hale and Barbara Fried. I was making this argument drawing on Robert Hale. Anyways, background legal entitlements shape the course of power people have in exchanges. 

If people don’t have a lot of coercive power as a result of a small safety net, then their capacity to negotiate good terms is going to be really diminished. In that context, it might be perfectly rational to take out a loan that has a 1,500% APR. It’s very hard to justify these interventions in private exchange on inefficiency grounds. That was me trying to like, scratch at there being something wrong with what we’re trying to do here, and it doesn’t even track with our own intuitions. That’s not what we think we’re doing. In doing that work, Luke Herrine was writing at the time. Before my academic career, I was reading a lot of people like Adam Levitin, and once I became an academic, I started reading a lot more of the LPE (The Law and Political Economy Project) crowd. Luke was a big inspiration, for sure. Definitely the last half decade, he’s probably been one of the most important consumer protection scholars. I don’t know how it happened. I started reading the LPE blog. We had a bunch of LPE folks on our faculty. Frank Pasquale was here at the time. Sabeel Rahman, who’s also at Cornell now, was here at the time or he wasn’t here, he was working either at Demos or with the Biden administration. Then we have Jocelyn Simonson, who’s an abolitionist and criminal law scholar, was here as well and very involved in LPE. I started reading LPE and that led me to Hale and Barbara Fried and then eventually that led me to Desan and Katharina Pistor. I think you had names like, and I might get pronounce his name wrong, Jamee… 

Scott Ferguson 

Moudud? 

Vijay Raghavan 

Yes. He was on the show, and I was listening to that episode the other day, and I think I have the same sort of intellectual trajectory just without the training in Marxist economics. I found all of the same people. Early on as I was trying to think through what went wrong, I discovered that there was this rich sociological literature and legal literature on why the reforms had failed, why the reforms in consumer financial protection had failed. Much of what I devoted my academic career or my academic writing since then, too, was trying to respond to some of the claims in that scholarship, drawing from people like Desan and Saule Omarova and Raul Carillo and folks like that. 

William Saas 

Often when we talk to folks about anything on this podcast, there’s a kind of a conversion story and it sounds like that didn’t necessarily happen. Did it sort of make intuitive sense? Was it surprising to encounter some of the arguments? I mean, you note in the article that we’re talking about, that Desan squarely turns the conventional story on its head, building on the work of others, of course. But did it seem, especially from your background, novel strange or intuitive? 

Vijay Raghavan 

When I read Hale for the first time, after being a lawyer for 13 years, Hale made sense to me. I was like, this is all correct, right? None of this is private exchange, the market exchange is downstream of law. It’s downstream of a lot of things, but law is my lens. Okay, market exchange is downstream of law. But then it was like, I need a thicker account of how law is shaping the kinds of transactions that I’m interested in. There’s some debate about whether there’s an LPE methodology and there’s lots of stuff that fits within the LPE umbrella, like legal realism. It’s big and broad, and it’ll take some time to figure out what it really was, and we need some distance from it.  

But, the parts of LPE scholarship that has definitely shaped my thinking and that I gravitate towards is the stuff that is neo-Halean. Taking that basic insight, that background legal entitlements shape exchange, and then trying to figure out what those background legal entitlements are to try to figure out how law shapes exchange in different areas of law. Once I came to Desan and then Omarova and Hockett and then Lev Menand and Morgan Ricks, they’re painting a really rich and thick picture about how the legal design of money shapes exchange and matters for the distribution of wealth. One of the core insights of that literature is that the legal design of money is upstream of exchange and that in our current system, in the American system and in most countries, we allocate this public responsibility of making money to private institutions. We rely on them to expand the money supply in this kind of franchise relationship. One of the ways they expand the money supply is through the extension of credit. This is also in David Graeber.  

I think I had read Graeber actually a decade before, but I didn’t really understand it. Once you’ve gone deep into the neochartalist stuff, Graeber makes a lot more sense. They were like, we’re expanding the money supply through extensions of credit. Once you’ve gotten there, it’s really not hard to go from there to thinking about recasting all of consumer financial protection. If private extensions of credit are not truly private, it’s just publicly accommodated private liability and that we are delegating this public function to private institutions to encourage them to expand the money supply. We are giving them all these benefits, like the capacity to charge people money and to ensure that they aren’t reckless, we regulate them. Then the interest rate that people pay on loans is not a risk adjusted rate of return, right? It’s just a tax. It’s just a tax for this public function and consumer financial protection is just one part of our larger legal and institutional framework. The best way to justify and rationalize it is as a check on anti-democratic and regressive nature of delegating this public function to private institutions. I was chasing it. I was like, I need to figure out a way to reconceptualize this. The money folks had done all that work. There was less work drawing connections between that scholarship and the work that I was doing. 

Scott Ferguson 

Now’s a great time, I think, to pivot to the focus of our conversation, which is your new article, โ€œThe Radical Potential of Consumer Financial Protection,โ€ which came out in the Boston College Law Review sometime this year, 2025. I’d like us to work through the large moves that you make in this piece, beginning with your opening gambit, in which you reckon with a certain critical response to consumer financial protection movements, especially in the wake of the global financial crisis, which tend to characterize consumer financial protection as simply symptomatic of a neoliberal worldview and instead of really helping people and creating structural change. It’s just putting a Band-Aid on a wound that is only festering more. I’d like you to set this up. Tell us about how you came to this particular argument and who you’re arguing with and what your nuanced approach is bringing to the table. 

Vijay Raghavan 

Sure. I should just back up. When I say consumer financial protection, I’m kind of generally referring to the set of federal and state laws that set restrictions on consumer lending and the institutions that are charged with enforcing that. Some of them are public institutions like the Federal Trade Commission and the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau to the extent it still exists and then there’s state entities and then there’s private actors and then there’s debtor movements that are all part of that ecosystem.  

So, yeah. Who am I responding to? After the financial crisis, a lot of sociologists were writing about our credit infrastructure and the set of choices that we’d made in the 20th century that had led to the crisis in 2008. Greta Krippner calls that work the macro sociology of credit. There’s a lot of people who are writing in that space with people like Monica Prasad and Louis Hyman and Greta Krippner and Sarah Quinn. The basic argument that they were making is that we built all this public infrastructure during the New Deal to support the expansion of credit markets. Embedded within a lot of that public infrastructure was this progressive cross-subsidy where rich people were subsidizing through taxes affordable credit to lower income people. That affordable credit was then used to expand homeownership and consumption, and we know from that history that that expansion wasn’t perfect. It was progressive, but it was also racist. It was a progressive cross-subsidy, a flawed but a progressive cross-subsidy. And then what happened?  

What happens is this creates a bunch of path dependencies. As the state started to pull back and as we started to deregulate, it became easy to mute the effects and the material effects of that deregulation by expanding access to private credit and to encourage consumption. That’s the basic contours of the sociological argument. What happens is, some sociologists, but mainly legal scholars, start to look at the role of consumer protection and consumer advocacy in the story of creating all this public infrastructure to encourage consumption to homeownership via credit and then deregulating credit markets, shrinking the social safety net in a way that turns that progressive cross-subsidy into a regressive one. What role did consumer protection play in that process?  

The story that comes out of some of that scholarship is that consumer protection really functioned to legitimize these moves and to support the expansion of credit markets and contributed to the problems of indebtedness that people are facing today. The biggest name in the legal world, and definitely the most influential is Abbye Atkinson at Berkeley. Abbye Atkinson, across three really influential articles, makes a bunch of sharp and mostly correct observations about why credit is bad. The first paper was called โ€œRethinking Credit as a Social Provision.โ€ In it, she’s like, credit as a kind of social provision is flawed because it’s it only works if you become richer in the time between when you take out the money and then you have to repay it and if you don’t become richer than you’re saddled with debt, and that debt can reinforce subordinating and dominating relationships. Credit can function as a means to commodify people’s marginalized status.  

Then another person who was writing here was, and I definitely should mention this, the late legal historian Anne Fleming, who sadly passed away in 2020. She was this really incredible historic legal scholar and historian of small dollar credit. I don’t think there’s another legal historian of small dollar credit and she really did a lot of groundbreaking work on things like the Truth and Lending Act and Unconscionability and has written this really incredible book about the history of small dollar lending regulation in New York City in the 20th century, called City of Debtors. The last article she published before she passed away was kind of making sort of similar moves. Credit is flawed as a form of social provision and that consumer advocates bear some responsibility for the situation that we found ourselves in.  

As a descriptive matter, I generally agreed with, and maybe even as a normative matter, a lot of the claims in that scholarship. I just didn’t think they had the story about consumer protection right. One, I think it wasn’t obvious to me that consumer protection always functions in a manner to underwrite a neoliberal expansion of credit markets to encase an existing distribution of wealth. Much of this work is responding to those scholars. I was trying to think of a way to reconceptualize consumer protection, what consumer financial protection is, to respond to some of those claims and to try to find ways to rearticulate what it’s doing and what the best case for it is.  

There are two places where I think that scholarship goes wrong. One, I don’t think they have a really thick account of what credit is. The money literature has a much thicker account of what credit is and what’s interesting is the money scholars were sort of writing around the same time. These two lines of scholarship were really not in conversation with one another. There was some overlap, but not much. One was arguing against credit regulation and the other was arguing for a richer articulation of the legal and institutional framework around money and banking, which would involve lots more regulation of the money supply, including publicizing aspects of that framework. One of the big moves of the paper was kind of trying to find a way to respond to that scholarship.  

The main way that I respond to that scholarship I derive from the money literature. I recast consumer financial protection as a downstream response to the anti-democratic and regressive costs of delegation. Once you recast it as a response to the choices that we’ve made in designing our monetary framework, then you can kind of think about the ways in which it’s been a productive countervailing force and what ways it’s been an unproductive countervailing force. Much of what the paper does is it sort of takes that reconceptualization and then applies it to look at different legal and institutional forms consumer financial protection took across the 20th and early 21st century and the problems that consumer financial protection was responding to in each of those eras. Also to try to surface ways in which consumer financial protection has worked as this productive countervailing force to the cost of delegation and the ways in which it’s worked as a more of an accommodation of this enterprise.ย 

Scott Ferguson 

I want to get into that history, and how you work through, if I recall, four different key moments and movements. But before we do so, I’d like to invite you to flesh out a little bit more what you mean by delegation. You brought it up in our introductory remarks, but I’d like to give you a chance to really explain it. Then, where does consumer financial protection fit into that realm and problem of delegation. 

Vijay Raghavan 

One of the key themes from Desanโ€™s work is that the state creates demand for money through taxes. Early money was fully public, and it was issued directly by the state. I don’t know if I have my history fully right, but sometime around the 16th century, states started delegating this public function to private institutions, or to public-private institutions. In America, the arrangement we’ve settled on is a kind of public-private hybrid where we have a bank of banks, a federal reserve, and that bank then delegates expansion of the money supply, not exclusively, but primarily to financial institutions that are either regulated directly by the federal government as national banks or regulated indirectly by the federal government as state banks. Financial institutions expand the money supply in lots of different ways, but one of the primary ways they expand the money supply is through extending credit. That’s delegation. Weโ€™re delegating this public function to private institutions. In exchange for the privilege of delegation, these private financial institutions are really well compensated but they’re subject to oversight to prevent that enterprise from collapsing.  

Lev Manand writes a lot about the political economy of delegation. One of the things you get from his work is, we settled on delegation because there was lots of concern about a fully public system โ€” you see some of this now with the concern about central bank digital currency โ€” and granting one national public entity the exclusive authority to expand and contract the money supply. Maybe for other reasons we thought these private banks could do a better job of allocating money and expanding the money supply. I’m not arguing that this is descriptively accurate, but I think it reflects the original rationalizations that we thought about. They could do a better job of efficiently, in neoclassical terms, expanding the money supply. That’s why we settled on delegation. Much of the way to understand a lot of our institutional arrangements around money and banking is to constrain that anti-dumping choice to grant private institutions this privilege to expand the money supply and to curb the potential regressive nature of delegation where those expansions may privilege people who have resources already and not privilege people who don’t have resources because it’s more profitable to lend to wealthy people than it is to lend to poor people. One way to understand a lot of the public infrastructure we built is in response to some of the inherent tensions in the choice to delegate this public responsibility to private entities. 

Scott Ferguson 

Meanwhile, we’ve got a Constitution and both hard laws and soft ideologies โ€” or hard ideologies โ€” that restrict us from using or imagining sub federal governance structures as credit allocators. Even though they do all the time, we don’t even frame them as credit allocators. We just understand them as sort of recycling private money that already exists out there. To me, that’s a huge part of the delegation problem. If you’re delegating to private actors, but you still have strong public entities that can allocate credit at the local level, that might not be quite as asphyxiating as our current system. 

Vijay Raghavan 

Ultimately, in terms of where I’m at, I personally would prefer a system that’s much closer to something like a National Investment Authority or a public ledger or things like Saule Omarova has written about. A fully public system which could have sub federal entities and federal entities, a set of like state-based entities that are expanding the money supply and that are very democratically accountable and doing it in a way that it doesn’t track some fictitious market allocation, but tracks how we want money to be allocated and for what purposes we want it to be allocated for. This is a kind of a tangent, but it is kind of interesting now how one of the things that I think you see in these debates about stablecoins and crypto is maybe a public reckoning, or recognition that we do have this public-private hybrid and that banks are too connected to elite stakeholders. We need to delegate the delegation to these real private actors that are totally disconnected from the state. To the extent it happens, it will just compound the basic problems of delegation, not improve upon them in any way. So, yeah, that is my best account of delegation. 

Scott Ferguson 

In a sense, consumer financial protection is a reaction formation to delegation and its problems, but it’s not merely a sign of sickness or something. It’s potentially a countervailing force. Sometimes it aids and abets, and it’s a long complicated history and you’re making the case that history here is rich and multiform and that we need to sift through it, so to speak, in order to have a better theoretical account for the future of what consumer financial protection has been and could be. Is that fair to say? 

Vijay Raghavan 

Yeah, that’s definitely fair to say. A lot of the work that’s really critical of consumer financial protection was being written as we were rehabilitating this regulatory framework for consumer financial protection, which we did from about 2010 till November of 2024 and now we’re unwriting it. One of the things that I was trying to do in the piece is I was trying to work through the development of consumer financial protection as a response that took on these various legal and institutional forms. Try to work through that history to try to understand what we were really doing when we were reconstructing this regulatory framework. Was it just simply just a recapitulation to the failed reforms of the past or were we trying to resurrect something better and more hopeful?   

As you work through the development of consumer financial protection over the course of the 20th century and reconceptualize it as a response to the problems with delegation, you see that it has taken on these different legal and institutional forms at different times. Sometimes those forms have been productive, sometimes they haven’t. In the early 20th century, consumer financial protection emerges in response to the problem of low-income laborers who are taking out these really high-cost loans, like the early 20th century version of a payday loan. There was this movement of largely elite and wealthy white women who were driven by some charitable impulse to try to curb this practice because they thought that it was leading to pauperism and it was encouraging people to be burdens on the state, and taking away from the public fisc. Consumer financial protection is initially local and it’s a way to regulate these small lenders who are making loans to people who are shut out of the conventional banking system. Here, you see the cost of delegation and the way that this is working is, credit is scarce. These institutions that we’ve delegated this public function to are unwilling to lend to these people. They have to turn to these fringe lenders. Those fringe lenders are borrowing from major financial institutions and then they’re borrowing at low cost and lending out at high cost. That’s kind of the basic arbitrage that they engage in and that arbitrage was causing these laborers in big cities, like New York and Chicago, to become impoverished. 

That led to this early form of consumer protection that was driven by these bad anti-pauperist sentiments. It’s kind of like the rational charitable giving community. I forget what they’re called, Effective altruists. This is like the effective altruists. This is the proto-effective altruist community, and they give birth to consumer financial protection in the early 20th century. Then things really did shift in the 1930s and the 1940s during the New Deal. It’s like a really interesting and kind of understudied time. What happens there is, the focus shifts from these payday loans to credit selling, which was really pervasive at the time. What’s happening is you could go into retail stores, and you could buy goods and services on credit. A lot of the merchants who were selling you goods on time were operating outside of legal constraints. They were often marking up the goods at really high prices. You had this kind of price inflation that was occurring throughout the market as a result of price insensitivity and the ability of merchants to charge excessive prices. Then those merchants were selling this debt on the secondary market to finance companies.  

You get this new consumer movement and this consumer movement, it actually involves many of the same actors from the early 20th century financial protection, but now, these people are justifying these moves in very different ways. They’re not anti-state, they’re pro state and on the academic level, they’re making macroeconomic arguments against predatory lending. They’re really arguing that this predatory lending through this credit selling is resulting in price inflation, and that price of inflation is undermining the distributive logic of the New Deal. There’s a much more diverse coalition as well. It wasn’t just rich, white women and proto effective altruists. you now have lots of women’s groups. Black housewives and Jewish housewives who were protesting and striking against price inflation, and these interests didn’t just result in hard law, but also, we started to develop an institutional framework to deal with these problems. 

In the early New Deal, we had this thing called a consumer advisory board that was part of the National Recovery Administration, which became unconstitutional, but that was this big price setting institution at the federal level and that had a consumer component to it. Later in the New Deal, we had the Office of Price Administration that had a consumer division that was kind of a proto CFPB (Consumer Financial Protection Bureau). That consumer division’s big contribution to public thought was this project that OPA worked on with the Federal Reserve, that ended up promulgating this regulation, Regulation W, that set really broad and aggressive limits on merchant credit. These were the kinds of loans that were pervasive in the economy, and they set caps on how much you could charge, how much you could lend, what interest you could charge, etc. It was pursued for both consumer protection ends and these kinds of bigger macroeconomic justifications. This is like a massive, massive, price setting regulation.  

Scott Ferguson 

You suggest in your article that, if I’m remembering correctly, it was also somewhat democratic and participatory, and they set up all kinds of regional and local pricing and rationing boards. There were all kinds of organizations, from the big cities to small towns, that were participating in the understanding of, the contesting of, and the regulation of price setting, essentially.  

Vijay Raghavan 

Yes, that is correct. The Office of Price Administration was this federal price setting institution. A lot of it was justified as wartime rationing. It was like wartime rationing, but there were a bunch of people who had been advocating for these changes forever who now were sitting on the body that was doing a lot of the price setting. 

To make sure that price setting would work, there were lots of local OPA offices that relied on citizen enforcement of these price setting mandates. At the federal level, the consumer division of the OPA was majority female. It was integrated. We have these stories of the New Deal, and this was kind of an aberration. It functioned differently. It had this broad pricing setting power. There were democratic aspects to the institutional design. Unlike the anti-paupers movement in the early 20th century, we weren’t confronting the problem of predatory lending at the margins of the financial system. We were taking on the problems of high cross credit, the center of the financial system, working in concert with the Fed to constrain the actions of the biggest financial institutions. 

I think, to me, it’s a short-lived experiment, but it’s one where consumer protection interests are playing this big countervailing role in curbing the anti-democratic and regressive costs of delegation. That’s the New Deal. Then what happens is we get the second red scare, and all these people are chased out of government and they’re all communists. We end Regulation W and the Office of Price Administration closes and consumer financial protection interests at the federal level go dark for a little bit. It takes some time for consumer financial protection to resurface at that stage. A lot of the problems that existed in merchant selling continue to plague credit markets in the 60s and 70s. Now you have new civil rights organizations and second wave feminist organizations that are attacking these practices based on the grounds that financial institutions are discriminating on the basis of sex. They’re also discriminating on the basis of race. This is what Elizabeth Cohen calls the third wave consumer movement, which is the consumer activism in the 60s and 70s that isn’t just about consumer financial protection. It’s the big, broad, public agitation over problems in the consumer marketplace that leads to a wave of federal legislation that reshapes the way merchants market and sell goods and financial institutions price and issue credit. 

William Saas 

Well, that takes us, I think, toward the end of your article and the fourth movement or moments for consumer financial protection. I’m very conscious, and our listeners will also be very conscious if they’re listening close to this publication and as you acknowledge in your article, we are in the ashes of that movement. Maybe not the movement, but the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau is functionally defunct under the second Trump administration. 

You note that a lot of what you are describing here, with regard to the redeemable and recoverable and the aspects of the CFPB that are worth holding on to and the impulses that drive them and recovering those from the kind of blanket claim that consumer financial protection is neoliberal writ large. So, yeah, the CFPB is kind of toast at the moment, but you are bringing us this piece in full knowledge of that, published in 2025. I may be interested offline to hear about your process of publishing this and watching all this happen. I wonder if there were some late edits made at the request of the editor, perhaps. 

But you say you’re hoping that this piece will play some part in reconstructing and rebuilding a more robust, democratically accountable and hopefully more durable consumer financial protection institution of some sort, whether it’s the CFPB reanimated or something else. Could you walk us through that last portion where we have this hopeful recovery of this fourth movement of consumer financial protection alongside the razing of the CFPB under the second Trump administration. Where you would like to see us go if you. You mentioned earlier about the kinds of initiatives and policies that this new formation would need. Walking us through that last part of the article would be a great way to go. 

Vijay Raghavan 

Sure. Let me just finish the 20th century story. I’ll try to quickly finish it and lead up to an assertion. What you have in the 60s and 70s is this new consumer movement that is successful in many ways. They push for lots of new federal legislation to regulate consumer credit markets and consumer markets more generally. Now, that era is kind of viewed as a real failure because, one of the main things that I think that civil rights groups and secondary feminist groups are doing is they’re like, we have this progressive cross-subsidy that was created as a result of the New Deal. We make credit more affordable, but it doesn’t work. It doesn’t work if you’re black and it doesn’t work if you’re a woman and we need to change that. The problem is, we end up getting all these changes right as we’re entering this deregulatory era. We get all these changes and what those changes do is they mean that now people can get credit, but that credit is no longer used to address wealth inequality. It’s used to sharpen some of the problems that existed before.  

One of the things that you see in some of the scholarship is to look at the anti-pauperist logic of early consumer financial protection work and then look at some of the failures of the third wave consumer movement and then argue thatโ€™s what this project is at a fundamental level. It just exists to legitimize and rationalize the worst aspects of lending. I think if you take a longer view, there’s the New Deal era, which we overlook. This was an era where we productively contested some of the anti-democratic and regressive costs of delegation. Third wave consumerism did have some radical impulses that were muted, where, particularly, black consumer groups were pushing for democratic control of the levers of credit. They got some measures, but those measures were kind of weak. I think they were really sensitive to the costs of excessive debt, however. What ends up happening is we end up going into the deregulatory era and problems with excessive debt get worse and worse and worse, and then we get the financial crisis, and we’re trying to repair this regulatory framework that was broken from about the late 1970s till 2010.  

What ends up happening is we create this thing called the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, which was Elizabeth Warren’s idea. It’s this new federal entity that was created in 2010 that operates as a hybrid between the FTC and a banking regulator. It has this broad enforcement authority over people who participate in the consumer financial marketplace and some small business lenders. It also has these bank regulator-like powers where it can examine and supervise financial institutions. It was created kind of by accident. If you believe what Adam Tooze writes in Crashed, which I think is probably correct, Ben Bernanke and Hank Paulson and the other one who I can’t remember right now, people are angry that we build up the banks and we’re not bailing out homeowners, and we are not going to nationalize the banks, but we’ll create this this dumb thing that Warren wants us to create as a way to appease some of these more radical demands.  

Then we got the CFPB, and in its early years it was pretty modest in its ambition. What happens, starting around 2020, with the election of Biden and appointing Rohit Chopra as the director, the CFPB gets really aggressive and starts leveraging the power that it has to play this really antagonistic role against other banking regulators who have stopped acting to curb the cost of delegation and instead are trying to just entrench some of those costs. Not only is the CFPB much more active, but from 2009 until 2022, 2024, we have the development of debtor movements and not consumer movements, not people who are lobbying for access to cheaper credit to facilitate consumption, but people who are lobbying for the abolition of debt. This starts with Occupy Wall Street and shifts to The Debt Collective and their work on student debt and medical debt. What you start to see is both the CFPB and then some state analogs working alongside debtor movements to develop ideas about how we ought to regulate credit and what kind of debt should be canceled. It was imperfect, but you start to see the reconstruction of this institutional framework that has some nice democratic features to contest these anti-democratic and regressive aspects of delegation. I think if things went differently in this country we could have let that experiment play out more and we could have made that institutional architecture richer and more democratic and worked in a way to really contest the regressive federal control over our money supply. Things didn’t work out that way, and so, like, what now?  

I guess I can say it online and you can see if you want to cut it or not. I had this idea in 2021, and it took me four years to write it. Towards the end, I was really racing to get it done because I was worried it was going to be out of date. I finished it in the summer of 2024, it ended up getting published in April 2025. At that point it’s weird how โ€œThe Radical Potential of Consumer Financial Protectionโ€ as a title is as, you know, my friends at the CFPB are looking for work. I’m not alone. I think that on a personal level it’s been hard to justify promoting that work, even though I think there’s value in the work. So, I’m really happy to be on this podcast. You see pictures online of dead children in Gaza and then you’re like, you can also check out my new paper. That said, what are some of the hopeful strands right now? The most hopeful thing on the horizon is, from my perspective, the Zohran Mamdani primary election here in New York City. If you look at his election and some of the other local Democratic officials that are getting elected, and some other DSA (Democratic Socialists of America) adjacent people, they’re putting out positive visions to address people’s material concerns. Their list of things that they’re trying to do includes a bunch of consumer financial protection stuff, and that’s kind of at the core of Mamdaniโ€™s antitrust, anti-corporate campaign. What’s the hopeful story? I don’t know what the hopeful story is.  

My hope from this piece is that I want people to read it, but to try to offer a persuasive case to some people about the value of consumer financial protection to help them understand what role it plays in our modern regulatory environment. It functions as an antagonistic force to the ways the financial system entrenches the status quo. It ought to be confrontational and ought to be antagonistic. In order to be effective, you need institutions that have the capacity to confront other institutional actors that are entrenching the status quo. It has to have the legal authority to effectively counteract the power that other institutional actors have, and it has to be really democratically accountable. Also, the people who are facing the bad effects of delegation have to be able to get these institutions to behave in the way they want them to behave. My hopeful story is that we understand what the project is really about and what the best case for it is. We can use that knowledge to slowly reconstruct a new set of institutions that can operate in a way that really effectively constrains the power of financial institutions to entrench inequality. 

Scott Ferguson 

I want to talk a little bit about that. One of the ways in which your essay really spoke to me, and I’m curious to hear your feedback and if it makes sense to you, if you have thoughts about it. I’m going to grope a little bit, I don’t have all the words at my fingertips, but I’m going to try. One of the key premises of public money paradigms; legal, constitutional, monetary theory, etc., is not only that but private transactions are also, as you put it, downstream from political and legal design. 

But that political and legal design or generative and constructive and constitutive, even when they’re doing evil. That productivity and that kind of world building can create zero sum outcomes and real pain and poverty, and it does, but at the same time, its conditions of possibility are not zero sum. 

The conditions of possibility are not the market versus the state. I think many people have problematized that binary from all kinds of points of view, but I think that the legal money paradigm does it in one of, if not the most important and forceful ways. One of the moments I had when I started reading your piece was that it’s not zero sum all the way down. Consumption or purchasing power in the terms of being a purchaser of credit are as constitutive in a non-zero-sum way as anything else. One way of getting at this is to pose the question, on the one hand, consumer financial protection as a problem and as a paradigm and as a history is a symptom or a response to delegation. 

One question I have that might open this up in a slightly different way is, let’s say we dramatically democratize the finance franchise or whatever we’re going to call it, the problem of delegation is no longer a giant problem. Of course, there’s no utopia. Problems always remain, but it’s so much better. 

Is there still a place for consumer financial protection? As a non-expert on the outside, the lesson of your article is โ€œyes,โ€ because it’s still constitutive of how the whole system works. I don’t know how you would respond to that or if you would put pressure on any of the moves I’m making here. 

Vijay Raghavan 

That’s really interesting. Iโ€™ve thought about this. Something that legal scholars often ask, โ€œIs this your first best world?โ€ Is your ideal case a world in which there is no consumer financial protection? Because we have the people’s ledger and I think that in a world where we’ve eliminated the delegation problem and we have a fully public money paradigm that is democratically accountable. I don’t think you would need something that resembles what we have today. It would be embedded within that system. 

Scott Ferguson 

That’s what I was going to say, is that it would be embedded, but it wouldn’t necessarily disappear. The problems that consumer financial protection as its own special problem has been addressing. It’s not that you wouldn’t need to mediate those problems, it’s that they would be built into distribution as a design problem. 

Vijay Raghavan 

Yeah, I think that’s correct. I think that’s absolutely correct. The main body of literature that I was responding to is this macro sociology of credit and the way that it’s bubbled up in legal scholarship, but I was also responding to the money folks. The money folks do have very little to say about my world, which strikes me as strange. I think that as the money folks start to think about how we are going to democratize finance and build institutions that are democratically accountable, they really need to look at consumer financial protection, which has been like one site of political contestation over the kind of distributive and democratic stakes of the legal design of money. Maybe it’s not totally clear that consumer advocates and debtors understand that’s what they’re doing, but I think that’s what they’re doing. If you’re thinking about how we make some kind of public money paradigm democratically accountable, I think you need to look at this example. How can different groups actually exert meaningful power to put pressure on the allocation of money, and the price and cost of money in some kind of public system. If you understand that it’s been one side of political contestation over the distributed and democratic stakes of the legal design of money, and it’s going to continue to be as long as we have delegation – and I don’t think delegation is going away anytime soon, nor do I want to be totally incrementalist here – but I think it has value, even though that value is as a response to the the tensions at the heart of delegation. It’s a place where we can look to start to develop meaningful countervailing power to contest the problems with delegation and not look at it as something that’s just going to manage the problems of delegations at its margins.  

I don’t know if that was fully responsive. I think that in a world where we have a public money paradigm that’s sufficiently democratically articulated, I don’t know if we need consumer financial protection. Outside of that world to the extent we have any kind of private provision of money, and that prevention is through the extension of credit, I think that we will need something like this, or we’ll have some something like this will emerge and the role that it plays is kind of dependent on how we understand what it is and how we develop it. 

Scott Ferguson 

No, that was really helpful. Thanks for indulging my rambling question. I have one more question that I wasn’t planning on asking, but it has surfaced putting together different parts of this interview. You talked about some of the early consumer financial protection movements being concerned with โ€” and you used the word โ€” inflation. I guess I’m wondering, has the post 2008 movement on the intellectual side, on the scholarly side or anywhere, have people put together the questions about the politics of inflation โ€” especially since Covid โ€” and these consumer financial protection fights, or has that been mostly missing in this fourth movement? 

Vijay Raghavan 

It’s a good question. I don’t know the answer to that just because price inflation has really kind of happened since I’ve been an academic. It’s something I’m interested in. The biggest new area of consumer credit is โ€œbuy now, pay later.โ€ Historically, one of the earliest forms of credit that we had in the consumer marketplace was credit selling, which is just like the ability to buy goods or the ability to defer the purchase price of goods by buying goods on credit. Credit selling was this big problem throughout the 20th century and kind of disappears with the advent of credit cards and the expansion of credit cards to everybody and now it’s reappeared in a really big way through โ€œbuy now, pay later.โ€ This is just taking this really old credit technology and kind of updating it for the online era. I don’t know if people have studied it, but I imagine that people are looking to regulate โ€œbuy now, pay later.โ€ I don’t know if anyone’s made the this case very directly, but to the extent that people are concerned about price inflation in a world where merchants were selling goods on credit, you’d imagine that we ought to have the same concern today that if the biggest expansion of credit in the modern economy is โ€œbuy now, pay laterโ€ and that the expansion correlates with price inflation across the economy. 

One might expect that some of that price inflation is attributable to consumer price incentive in the ability to defer those costs through extension of credit. I don’t know if that’s made it into the actual arguments that consumer advocates are making about regulating โ€œbuy now, pay later.โ€ I don’t know if there’s any empirical evidence for that, but to the extent that we think price inflation is legally constructed I think this has to be a part of that story. 

William Saas 

I think it’s a good place to leave it. Vijay Raghavan, thank you so much for joining us on Money on the Left. I really enjoyed it. 

Vijay Raghavan 

Thank you both. Thanks for having me.

* Thank you to Robert Rusch for the episode graphic, Nahneen Kula for the theme tune, and Thomas Chaplin for the transcript. 

A Forgotten Letter to W.E.B. Du Bois: Monetary Populism and the Scapegoating of Black Political Life

by Will Beaman

In July 1934, W.E.B. Du Bois received a letter from an Atlanta resident named Gus Reich. We are excited to share both Reichโ€™s letter and Du Boisโ€™s short reply below. 

A lay theologian and self-styled monetary reformer, Reich in his letter proposes a spiritual plan for economic renewal. He urges Du Bois to support a vision of Christian financial reform led by the Black church. Condemning the interest-based banking system as โ€œdevilish,โ€ Reich calls for a new kind of moral economyโ€”one rooted not in gold or markets, but in collective virtue and spiritual confidence.

Du Bois responds with a single line: โ€œThe process of curing ills by printed money has been tried many times but never worked.โ€

It is a short exchange, but a revealing one. It surfaces a longstanding tension in American political life: Who gets to issue moneyโ€”and under what terms? Reichโ€™s proposal may seem eccentric, but it reflects something serious. It points toward an alternative to gold-backed or market-driven money, one where credit is issued as a public act, grounded in shared belief and moral purpose. In short, it imagines what many now call endogenous moneyโ€”money that enters the world not from economic exchange or nature, but from institutional decisions and collective commitments.

But even imaginative ideas can carry baggage. Reich frames the Black church as a vessel for national redemption. In doing so, he risks casting Black communities not as equal participants in public life, but as moral stand-insโ€”invited to lead only when they can purify a broader system in crisis. In our reading, Du Boisโ€™s response resists this framing. It is not necessarily a rejection of public credit itself (we hope), but of the burden placed on Black leadership to deliver redemption on someone elseโ€™s terms.

This moment makes more sense when seen through two overlapping histories. First, the legacy of Black-led fusionist coalitions after the Civil War. And second, the turmoil of Depression-era monetary reform.

In the decades after Reconstruction, Black Americans joined multiracial alliances across the South, including fusionist tickets that brought together Black Republicans and white populists like the Greenback and Peopleโ€™s Parties. These coalitions briefly held real power in states like North Carolina, pushing for land reform, public education, and voting rights. They were met with relentless opposition: not just Jim Crow laws and disenfranchisement, but racist violence like the 1898 Wilmington massacre. The memory of these movements, along with the political backlash they triggered, shaped how Black politics was perceived and enlisted in the decades that followed.

Fast forward to the 1930s: the U.S. had abandoned the gold standard at home and was experimenting with new forms of federal spending. But the role of money itselfโ€”how itโ€™s created, who controls itโ€”was still treated as a technical issue. Into that vacuum stepped a range of populist proposals. Some, like Reichโ€™s, drew from moral and religious sources. Others, like those of Father Coughlin and Huey Long, veered into conspiracy and authoritarianism. Still others gestured toward the greenback tradition, but often fell back on old fears of inflation and dependency, sometimes thinly veiled in racial terms.

Reichโ€™s letter reflects this tangle of influences. It combines spiritual populism with economic idealism, yet still relies on tropes about virtue, self-sufficiency, and moral rescue. Du Boisโ€™s reply, we think, is not just about the feasibility of printed money. It is about the weight of these narrativesโ€”and who is expected to carry them.

That said, Du Boisโ€™s position is not without its own limits. His skepticism about public credit reflects a broader intellectual traditionโ€”especially among Marxistsโ€”that treats government-issued money as risky or false, especially when it is not directly tied to labor or production. While that tradition offers powerful critiques of capitalist violence, it also tends to echo Jacksonian suspicion of credit as unearned or parasitic. In doing so, it often misses how public credit has functioned historically: as a way to coordinate social life, not just to reflect economic output.

Du Bois, as always, is careful. But his reply reveals how even the most perceptive critics can find themselves caught between traditionsโ€”rejecting the burden of credit for an oppressorโ€™s redemption without fully seeing the possibilities of credit as enfranchisement. Rather than dismiss his letter or take it at face value, we offer a reparative reading: one that holds Du Boisโ€™s skepticism in tension with the deeper political insight his reply also contains. We interpret his response as shaped by a moral position grounded in historical experienceโ€”one that can, and should, be reincorporated into a renewed, critical monetary populism.

We share this exchange not to praise or dismiss Reichโ€™s proposal, but to show why these questions still matter. At Money on the Left, we believe that reimagining how we provision public life is one of the central challenges of our time. That means taking bold monetary ideas seriously. But it also means paying attention to how those ideas are framed, and who is expected to redeem what.

Too often, communities already marginalized by economic crisis are recruited to fix it on someone elseโ€™s behalf. That is not enfranchisement, but deputization. And it risks reinforcing the very exclusions it seeks to overcome.

The same dynamics are resurfacing today. As Modern Monetary Theory (MMT) is metabolized across publics, its core insightโ€”that money is issued into existence through political decisionsโ€”is being cautiously integrated across the ideological spectrum. But not all uses of this insight are emancipatory. Right-wing populists like Thomas Fazi, Tucker Carlson, and Marjorie Taylor Greene are already experimenting with expansionist monetary rhetoric to serve nationalist and exclusionary agendas. Their message is not that money is public. It is that public money belongs to โ€œus,โ€ not โ€œthem.โ€

This is why we argue that monetary politics needs to be contested from within. It is not enough to point out that the state can spend. We have to ask: for whom, through what institutions, and on what terms? The risk is not just bad spending. It is moralized and conditional spendingโ€”credit extended as a reward for loyalty and withdrawn as punishment for dissent. What could be more Trumpian?

In that light, the question is not whether we โ€œsupportโ€ endogenous money. All money is already issued endogenously before it is moralized as scarce commodities or white tax-dollars. The question is what kind of world it is made to sustain. Who is trusted to issue? Who is seen as creditworthy? Who gets invited in? And who gets blamed when the system cracks?

These are not idle questions. As Carlson and Greene turn toward Christian nationalism, using the state to draw lines between insiders and outsiders, they are improvising on old themes: using money to grant absolution to some and withhold care from others. The MAGA movementโ€™s collapseโ€”exacerbated by scandals like Trumpโ€™s attempt to shut down the Epstein scandalโ€”has produced a frantic search for new conspiracies to stop the creeping sense of guilt and responsibility for Trumpโ€™s open cruelty. Monetary politics becomes one place to stage that search.

We have seen this play out before. In 1930s Germany, the Social Democrats rejected the WTB Plan for state-backed public credit, clinging to fiscal restraint. That created an opening the Nazis filled with their own vision of nationalist credit. Sound money did not save the Weimar Republic. It helped to end it.

If we want to avoid repeating those mistakes, we need to name whatโ€™s already happening. Public money is real. It is already shaping our lives. The only question is howโ€”and for whom. We need credit infrastructures that are open, democratic, and resilient. Not credit as a judgment, but credit as a commitment. Not a test of worthiness, but a project of shared responsibility.

Letter from Gus Reich to W. E. B. Du Bois, July 4, 1934

Dr. W.E.B. Dubois

Editor, The Crisis

Dear Sir:

Enclosed I send you[r] clipping from the Epworth-High road, giving me your address & that of your organ The Crisis; when you find my answer correct, I suggest that you print it in the Crisis for the advancement of colored people & the benefit of all to the glory & honor of our Lord Jesus.

In that article Color Caste in the U.S. the writer adds up all the rights of the white man, which the negro lacks, but he offers no practical solution how to cure the dilemma with benefit to both & harm to none. 

The white man in U.S., especially the Southern planter suffered loss indeed, when they gave up slave labor & the South feels its hardships yet to some degrees; however that was a blessing from the Lord which He gave to Abraham Lincoln & helped him put it through, for without it, our Declaration of Independence would have been a lie indeed & of no lasting power, but for the colored race, this blessing from the Lord brought upon them a new duty which means thankfulness & service; have they found Him today? 

It is a fact that today the white man all over the world is in far greater distress than the negroes were at the time when the civil war started & nobody has offered a solution yet, faithful & true; when my following statements are found correct, I beg to remember that the truth comes from the Lord, thank Him & use it in His name.

Todayโ€™s depression which spreads over all countries, is not caused by nature; there is enough to eat & commodities for sale; scarce is only the money in peopleโ€™s hands & the work with which they acquire it, & yet these people who lack this money today, are really the only ones who actually produce such value, with the work of their hands & the Lordโ€™s blessing, while the other fellow, who keeps it today, has to get it from them first, to get hold of it; has to take eager care of it, that he might not loose it again & has to carefully tend to it, that they may not slowly work it off again & deprive him of it. 

That is the character of our money-foundation, our banking & credit, our interest system; it is all selfish, devilishโ€”the only cure ? make it faithfully truth, brotherly-loving.

It is alltogether ridiculous to expect such a change however from men, who are accustomed to have prospered under the old system; the Lord wouldnโ€™t give truth to them; it has to come from men who know their Lord better, who are willing to serve Him & use Faith & Truth in all their work & give Him the glory & when I propose to the colored mrace today, to announce to the World repentence & reform, faithful & true, it is an opportunity given to them by the Lord to prove to their white brethren their equality & earn their thanks. 

It is impossible to make our finances true, if we are not willing to be true Christians ourselves first; our various denominations do not honor our Saviour but mostly other men; even Martin Luther, though he pronounced his faith in one Holy Christian Church โ€œwas done more harm than honor they made that church lutheran.โ€ To give glory to our Saviour, we must re-establish that Holy Christian Churchโ€ again, which the first Christians had & where they brought all they made & the church cared for them. 

That is another item our church lacks today & doesnโ€™t exercise control over our banks, to make them work straight-true, but that does not prevent, that we have to suffer today from the consequences of our neglect & that is the cause of our depression; the real cure, the only one,  is to create a perfectly christian banking system, abandon all of the old one, it is devilish from A to Z & if the president & senate refuses, make it privately, it will be even more profitable & it is exceedingly simply, just use bank-cheques instead of gold & silver, accounts for currency; it will give everybody all the money he needs, make abnormal riches a burden instead of a privilege & will make crime & wars unnecessary & undesirable. Being given to me by the Lord, it will receive His blessings also & if put into action by the colored race, will certainly win them the admiration of their white brethren. President Roosevelt has asked already for criticism & suggestions, practically admitting his failure; only the Truth will last eternally & putting it into finances will change our whole life. 

Settling the war-debt question, we should give up our demands for them; wouldnโ€™t need them anymore, but demand from our allies that they in turn give up their colonies & make the world free. We gave up slaves, they must do the same, it is either Christ or the devil!

Further details & information gladly furnished when wanted. 

Yours truly

Gus Reich

Letter from W. E. B. Du Bois to Gus Reich, July 10, 1934

Mr. Gustus Reich,
c/o Heywood Avenue, S.E.,
Atlanta, Georgia.

My dear Sir:

I thank you for your letter of July 4. I regret to say that I am no longer editor of The Crisis and therefore cannot publish your views. If I did, however, I would point out the process of curing ills by printed money has been tried many times but never worked.

Very sincerely yours

Itโ€™s Time for Complementary Currencies

By the Money on the Left Editorial Collective

Introduction

Zohran Mamdaniโ€™s landslide win was not just a local upsetโ€”it was a turning point. It proved that member-led, volunteer-powered campaigns can defeat political dynasties even under conditions of national authoritarian drift. And now, others are lining up behind him. MN state Sen. Omar Fatehโ€”another Democratic Socialistโ€”won the local Democratic Partyโ€™s endorsement for Mayor of Minneapolis against three-term Democratic Mayor Jacob Frey. Kat Abughazaleh, a progressive digital commentator formerly affiliated with Media Matters, is winning major party endorsements for her congressional campaign in Illinoisโ€™s 9th District. More campaigns are getting ready.ย 

But the window is narrow, and the threat is clear. Donald Trump is terrified of an insurgent movement rising out of the cities he cannot control. His plan is to withhold federal funds, punish sanctuary cities, and weaponize austerity against local governments that refuse to comply. He wants mayors and city councils too scared to fund anything beyond police. And the Democratic establishment will go along with nearly all of it. The economic establishment will cheer it on in the name of fiscal moderation and pragmatism.

To meet this moment, we need new tactical registersโ€“new tools for organizing local capacities and coordinating them at scale.

What follows is not a singular proposal. It is a framework for coordinating, scaling and financing the work that so many organizers do for free. A shared practice of issuing and receiving credit in solidarityโ€”between campaigns, between cities, between institutions willing to govern together. We do not need to wait for reactionary statehouses or federal financing to tell us whatโ€™s possible. We can build systems of solidarity and accountability that scale without sovereignty.

Mamdaniโ€™s campaign did not simply winโ€”it ran a logistical operation, coordinated policy development, and cared for people. Fifty thousand volunteers who didnโ€™t beg for permission got organized.

To understand how we can scale up that infrastructure, we need to first understand the tool: complementary currencies.

What Are Complementary Currencies?

Complementary currencies are locally issued forms of credit that supplement and expand the currencies we think of as โ€œofficialโ€. When imagined alongside the dollar rather than in opposition to it, complementary currencies do not merely reveal new possibilities. They help us see the dollar differently, too.

Imagine this: a canvasser in Brooklyn earns credits for a weekend of turnout work. Those credits are then accepted by another chapter to help fund a print run. A local labor union recognizes those credits as dues. A food co-op accepts them for groceries. A pilot municipal grocery store, created by a city council aligned with the movement, honors the credits for fresh produce. A sanctuary city program uses them for transit access. Under pressure from organizers, the local government agrees to accept those credits for partial tax payments, fines, or fees. This isnโ€™t โ€œexchangeโ€; itโ€™s organizing. 

Instead of treating money as a scarce resource to be unlocked from the top down, complementary currencies reveal money to be a flexible and inscribable record of solidarity and coordination. They allow communities and coalitions to express their own priorities, provision their own infrastructures, and deliberate what kinds of labor and care should be receivable across shared space. 

There are many historical precedents for complementary currencies in U.S. historyโ€”from colonial-era land bank notes and settler-issued paper money to Depression-era scrip, mutual aid societies, time banks, and local exchange trading systemsโ€”each reflecting periods when ordinary people experimented with monetary design in the absence of sufficient national currency or in response to systemic exclusion from formal credit systems. Even Lincolnโ€™s greenbacks and FDRโ€™s war bonds grounded new money issuance in real economic capacities rather than abstract pools of tax dollars. Money on the Left proposals like Blue Bonds and the Uni draw on these traditions to reimagine democratic finance as a practice of coordination, not austerity.

From Command to Coordination

We do not need a movement that controls everything. We need movements that can coordinate across what is already happening, provisioning at scale without turning participation into tactical bottlenecks and zero-sum debates over which โ€œtheory of changeโ€ is correct. That is already the lesson of the campaigns and organizations that are winning: field ops that trust volunteers to become leaders; member-led organizations that practice deliberative democracy; housing and mutual aid coalitions that prototype new forms of care without waiting for policy permission.

These campaigns are not spontaneous. They are deeply organized. But they are also strategically diverse. What links them is not control or disciplineโ€”it is solidarity. We need forms of coordination that let us hold many strategic priorities as valid without collapsing them into a single strategic hierarchy. That is what complementary credit experiments can offer: not a command center or vanguard, but flexible infrastructures of coordination and provision. Built from below, from diverse middles, and even daring city halls that refuse to wait for Albanyโ€™s approval.

Money as Credit, Not Scarcity

We are used to thinking of money as something we need to getโ€”from donors, from state budgets, from foundations that never quite agree with our politics. At the heart of a complementary currency strategy is a different understanding of what money is. Money is not a scarce thing to be hoarded or unlocked. Nor is it a capitalist medium of exchange. Money is a flexible infrastructure of recognition, designed through politics. 

Because the truth is, we already can do the things that we supposedly need billionaires and middle class taxpayers to fund. Indeed, we already do extend care, time, labor, risk, translation, food, design, coordination, and protection across every campaign, community org, and institution that we build.

Complementary currencies do not introduce a new kind of value. They enlarge the democratic value systems that already existโ€”and allow wider scales of recognition and inclusion in the infrastructures we need to live.

In an insurgent democratic politics, no single node of issuance or receivability calls all the shotsโ€”but each one takes responsibility to extend trust and good faith as part of a shared infrastructure of democratic provisioning.

Swap Lines as Democratic Pedagogy

The left does not need central discipline from a vanguard of strategists or an idealized mass organization imagined as external to the broader public. We need infrastructures that enact the same solidarity and flexibility we already extend to each other, honoring diverse valuations of what work is important, and agreeing to receive what others provisionโ€”even when it comes in unfamiliar forms.

That is the logic of a swap line.

In high finance, a swap line is a mutual agreement to recognize credit across systems without collapsing them into one. Central banks use them to stabilize currencies, but the principle of connecting different currencies to facilitate economic coordination shows up everywhere. It is how bank deposits, paper money, coins, reserveโ€”all forms of money with different institutional historiesโ€”come together to make the US dollar feel singular and continuous. What appears as the dollar or imagined as a gold standard has always been an invisible choreography between institutions.

But that invisibility is part of the problem. As Jakob Feinig argues, monetary systems are kept deliberately opaque, a process he calls monetary silencing. The more our systems rely on coordination, the more that coordination is hidden, treated as technical or natural rather than political and participatory.

Complementary currencies make the logic of the swap line public. They give us ways to politicize the agreements we already depend on, to deliberate openly about what kinds of work and care weโ€™re willing to receiveโ€”and from whom. They turn financial interoperability into a practice of democratic solidarity.

Monetary Silencing and the Battle for Legibility

This political moment isnโ€™t emerging in a vacuum. For decades, our fiscal and monetary institutions have rehearsed a worldview in which credit is something earnedโ€”a borrowing right extended only to the deserving. But โ€œdeservingโ€ has never been neutral. Creditworthiness has long stood in for segregation, racism, and exclusionโ€”baked into zoning laws, lending practices, public education funding, and municipal bond markets. Home loans, student debt, and city budgets were more than neutral financial instruments. They rehearsed the ideologies of American racism: who belongs, who can be trusted, who is safe to invest in, and who must be controlled or abandoned?

That regime fractured in 2008. Some responses moved in a hopeful direction: mutual aid networks, debt resistance campaigns, diverse anti-carceral movements from Black Lives Matter to the mainstreaming of abolition and defund, and resurgent interest in public banking and economic democracy. But the collapse also made room for something else. If the 20th century home loan once staged middle-class exceptionalism, Trumpism offered a permission structure for outlaw cruelty. A way to break rules without consequence, to treat othersโ€™ suffering as proof of oneโ€™s own sovereignty.

But that is not the only story. Mutual aid networks, abolitionist coalitions, and movements like Mamdaniโ€™s have rehearsed alternative credit infrastructuresโ€”ones grounded not in discipline, but in coordination, care, and lived solidarity. These movements did not necessarily name their practices as monetary, but they began to build the legibilities we need to overcome monetary silence. They have not been able to fully elaborate these unconscious participatory impulses. Still, they have created the conditions to make such impulses visibleโ€“and to politicize them.

Complementary credit systems offer a trajectory for elaboration. They do not moralize worthiness. They do not reward obedience. They do not ask who deserves a loan. They rewrite the script, treating credit not as exception, but as infrastructure: a shared capacity to issue and receive trust without hierarchy or purity tests. 

The issue is not whether labor is paid or unpaidโ€”credited or uncredited. Nominally โ€œvolunteerโ€ labor builds good faith and trust within a community, but that kind of credit is not usable at a grocery store. What is relevant is where credit is receivable. Today, as campaigns like Mamdaniโ€™s promote pilots of municipal grocery stores and other public institutions, we have the opportunity to publicly deliberate receivability itself. We no longer need to maintain the fiction that political labor and public provisioning belong to separate spheres. We can develop new forms of creditโ€”and new institutions that receive themโ€”to bridge the false binary between activism and public works, and to reveal that distinction as something far more messy, lived-in, and democratic than weโ€™ve been taught.

Insurgent campaigns like Mamdaniโ€™s are not pausing for Albanyโ€™s blessing. They are already rehearsing a creative, coalitional politicsโ€”one that provisions capacity across communities, builds trust across organizations, and coordinates across difference. Complementary credit systems do not replace that work. They extend it.

Conclusion: Coordinating What We Already Know How to Do

There is no shortage of capacity on the left. We have organizers, campaigns, coalitions, and institutions already doing the work of governance: feeding people, housing people, translating policy into action, building coalitions across lines of difference. What we lack is the infrastructure to recognize that work as connected.

Complementary credit systems can help us coordinate what we already know how to do. Not by replacing the dollar or disavowing the state, but by recognizing that public trust is not something we must win permission to issue. It is something we are already extending to each other, every time we organize a shift, open our homes, cook a meal, or build a spreadsheet.

This is not a project of exit. Itโ€™s a project of refusing to defer. We need not delay unlocking capacity for a future administration. We can name what we are already provisioningโ€”and build systems that make that provisioning visible, receivable, and durable across space and time.

What weโ€™re describing is not a singular plan. Itโ€™s a tactical registerโ€”one that can help insurgent movements reimagine good government not as control, but as coordination. This is not bureaucracy; it is collective trust. In the face of austerity threats and coercive attacks, we need cities and campaigns willing to issue and receive public credit in solidarity. Not someday, but now.

An insurgent movement of good government connected by local currencies can spread courage and coordination faster than Trumpโ€™s tenuous coalition of the fearful and battered ever could.