Zooming in on the Loop

By Tyler Suksawat & Scott Ferguson

In previous writings, we advanced an inventive new model for municipal finance: what we call the Seattle Loop. By establishing a city-owned public bank, we propose, Seattle can not only expand public investment through municipal lending and provide residents with low-cost financial services; it can also purchase its own bonds and “loop” the interest back to the city itself, rather than to Wall Street. Over time, the Loop promises to save Seattle (and any other municipality that adopts the Loop) hundreds of millions of dollars in interest payments annually. More important, it stands to turn the city’s public debt into a self-reinforcing system of public finance, capable of addressing community and environmental needs far more democratically and robustly than ever before in the city’s fiscal history.

Here, we take a more granular approach to some of the Loop’s key operations—capitalization and maintaining reserve balances—zooming in, as it were, to address logistical specificities that our broader model facilitates.

How precisely can a city like Seattle capitalize a public bank? That is, how will Seattle secure enough funds to, first, acquire a banking charter, and second, steadily marshal sufficient owner equity, or “capital,” to meet ongoing regulatory requirements? Concomitantly, how can a Seattle Municipal Bank attain and maintain adequate reserve balances, ensuring daily liquidity in managing interbank payments with the rest of the U.S. financial system?

In what follows, we explain both processes. Ultimately, we demonstrate that capitalization and reserves are not separate stumbling blocks to be surmounted, but deeply interrelated operations that—when designed in tandem—create a mutually reinforcing engine for public provision.

No Cap: A Closer Look at Capitalizing the Loop

Since we first introduced the Seattle Loop, several interlocutors have expressed concerns regarding the city’s capacity to sufficiently capitalize a new public bank. Frequently, these anxieties rest on the erroneous notion that much of Seattle’s current holdings are functionally off-limits, either because they are supposedly locked in high-yield investments or because tax revenues earmarked for future spending are deemed unavailable for democratic deployment.

In reality, all funds Seattle presently holds in private banks and investment portfolios are readily available to the city. This includes earmarked revenues, waiting to be spent according to legislative directives. No city, state, or federal laws prevent the city from mobilizing its assets toward the capitalization of a new public bank.

The scale of Seattle’s public wealth is immense, totaling over $8.1 billion in managed assets. This figure rests on two primary pillars: the city’s $3.8 billion Treasury Investment Pool, which handles daily operating cash and earmarked reserves, and the $4.3 billion managed by the Seattle City Employees’ Retirement System (SCERS).

The trouble is, under current municipal arrangements, this $8.1 billion foundation is sequestered in private financial institutions, reducing the city’s greatest strength into a passive subsidy for Wall Street. As a result, Seattle is forced into a perverse position: the city pays hundreds of millions of dollars in predatory fees and exposes retirement savings to volatile speculative markets, all while providing the very liquidity that private banks use to underwrite their own exploitative and destructive regime of lending.

Seattle possesses the capacity to liberate its public wealth from private capture, reallocating its massive holdings to capitalize a democratic municipal bank. While this transition demands adept financial management—including the careful disaggregation of funds and a move away from speculative vehicles—the challenges are solely logistical. Potential liquidity bottlenecks and termination fees from private vendors represent one-time and short-term transitional hurdles rather than systemic barriers. Any payment or dip in yields marks the final extraction by private intermediaries, a cost that will be swiftly recovered as the Seattle Loop commences in earnest.

After Seattle secures this initial capitalization and, with it, a banking charter, the city’s reclaimed equity then serves as its public bank’s regulatory foundation, providing the balance sheet capacity necessary to absorb municipal debt and extend credit at a scale far exceeding the initial investment. From here, Seattle can begin issuing bonds directly to—and, when necessary, receiving loans from—its own public bank. Henceforth, the city will systematically retire its legacy obligations to private investors. However, all future interest payments will remain within the public circuit. Consequently, Seattle recuperates wealth once lost to the rentier class, looping interest back into the general fund to support social provisioning. It also effectively democratizes debt issuance, wresting control from bond rating agencies and private intermediaries to empower local government and the voting public.

Throughout this process, it is essential to recognize a more fundamental point about the entire logic of capitalization. Capital requirements do not obey immutable natural laws; they are legal constructs subject to democratic redefinition

As California Assembly Bill 857 (2019), or Public Banking Act, demonstrates, it is entirely possible to legally codify what counts as capital in the first place. This landmark legislation reclassifies existing investment portfolios as suitable for bank capitalization, providing a clear regulatory roadmap for municipal entities. Recognizing that these definitions are flexible opens the door to creative capitalization strategies that were previously unimaginable. Indeed, Assembly Bill 857 utilizes the same powerful assumption to endow California public banks with depository functions. In addition to reclassifying what assets can be used to capitalize a bank, the legislation also legally redefines what counts as a public depository to explicitly include public banks. All this is to say that when we treat monetary terms and procedures as flexible tools of governance, the perceived limits of municipal finance reveal themselves to be legal constructs that can be rewritten for transformative action.

Of course, legal redefinition is nearly always a complex process. Bill 857, for example, explicitly reclassifies anticipated state tax revenue as credit that can be counted toward the capitalization of a public bank. Currently, however, federal law excludes projected tax revenues from Tier 1 bank capitalization requirements. What this means is that, while the State of California cannot use anticipated taxes as credit to capitalize its initial public bank, Bill 857 does give the state and its municipalities legal authority to leverage future taxes toward the capitalization of a second, third or fourth public bank. After the first public bank is founded, in other words, California may leverage future taxes as credit to create more public banks. The federal requirement for Tier 1 capital is met at each step, but the actual source is the anticipated taxes revenues. Hence, even though state and municipal legislation is never at total liberty to restructure monetary rules, it can effectively establish the strategic legal scaffolding necessary to expand the boundaries of public finance over the long term.

When it comes to maintaining capital requirements, meanwhile, the Seattle Loop departs from the reactive logic of private banking. Rather than viewing the bank as a mere vehicle for attracting private investors or balancing risk against maximized yields, we approach the Seattle Loop as an actively constructed system of public coordination. We can strengthen this system and insulate it from the volatility of private markets by requiring partner community lenders to open and maintain deposit accounts within Seattle’s public bank. This creates a symbiotic effect wherein the public bank serves as a stable foundation for the entire local financial ecosystem.

The partnership model allows the Seattle Municipal Bank to pursue projects that are currently beyond the reach of smaller, mission-driven lenders. Through participation lending, the bank can supplement loans for critical public works, such as low-income housing development. If a developer requires $50 million for a housing project but a local credit union only has the balance sheet capacity for $10 million, the municipal bank can purchase the remaining $40 million of the loan. This is not a theoretical novelty; it is a proven model of public coordination successfully utilized by the Bank of North Dakota—which is primarily a wholesale lender to other banks—for over a century to anchor regional development.

To safeguard the long-term vitality of the public bank, we can also augment its capital base by instituting a policy of retained earnings. In mandating that a small portion of the bank’s net interest income remain within the institution rather than being fully remitted to the general fund, we establish an autocatalytic growth curve for public credit. In technical terms, these retained profits build up the bank’s Tier 1 capital—the core, loss-absorbing equity that serves as a primary regulatory buffer.

Because banking operates on the logic of leverage, this public accumulation of capital has a disproportionate impact on the city’s provisioning power. Given that the minimum Tier 1 capital ratio is typically set at 6%, every dollar retained by the bank potentially unlocks over sixteen dollars in new lending capacity. Committing to this steady internal capitalization, the Seattle Municipal Bank does not only maintain its solvency, but also structurally expands the horizons of what the city can afford to build, fund, and sustain.

The bank further strengthens its capital base by integrating the city’s broader economic transactions into its circuit. For example, city contractors can be auto-enrolled to receive funds—from grants to large-scale construction payments—directly into Seattle Municipal Bank accounts. While contractors remain free to move their funds at any time, the Loop Bank can offer unique institutional benefits and seamless integration that incentivize them to remain within the public circuit.

The Seattle Municipal Bank can extend this invitation to the city’s most vital resource: its employees. If the city invites public sector workers to hold payroll accounts directly with the public bank or its partner banks, it can offer exclusive financial services and benefits tailored to the needs of public servants. This transforms payroll from a seemingly neutral administrative task into an active tool for expanding the fiscal reach of the public bank, ensuring that Seattle’s wealth continues to circulate in the interest of those who make the city run.

Finally, the Seattle Loop achieves a structural advantage regarding fiscal retention that private intermediaries simply cannot match: immunity from federal taxation. While private commercial banks are subject to federal corporate taxes—representing a steady loss in municipal wealth—public banks operate as tax-exempt governmental entities. Therefore, the Loop does more than shield the city from Wall Street’s extractive fees; it ensures that the surplus generated by public credit remains entirely within the local circuit. This effectively closes a major valve of fiscal siphoning, retaining every dollar of generated value to support the city’s own provisioning.

Settling In: Building Reserves & Internalizing the Clearing Process

To operate as a viable financial institution, the Seattle Municipal Bank must participate in the complex infrastructure of interbank settlement. This process is mediated by reserves—the specialized, high-powered money that banks use to clear and settle obligations with one another. Unlike the commercial bank deposits used by the public for daily transactions, reserves exist as digital entries on the balance sheet of the Federal Reserve, serving as the ultimate medium for the final settlement of payments.

Only the Fed has the authority to issue and destroy these reserves, whether through routine open-market operations and repurchase agreements or via emergency lending facilities and large-scale asset purchases during periods of systemic crisis. Critically, these reserves are not redeemable outside of the central bank circuit; they are a wholesale instrument for institutional settlement, not a retail medium for public commerce. One cannot use reserves to purchase a cup of coffee or a car. Instead, they function as the specialized money, which banks use to cancel out debts with one another as their customers transfer and transact between financial institutions.

In the current financial landscape, every time a check is cleared or a wire is sent between different institutions, a corresponding volume of reserves must move across the central bank’s ledger to satisfy the debt. For most municipal entities, the requirement to maintain and manage these balances has long been framed as an insurmountable barrier to entry into the specialized world of chartered banking and interbank settlement, often resulting in a costly and forced reliance on large private correspondent banks to handle the technical plumbing of settlement. With the design of the Seattle Municipal Bank, however, we build our own public system of liquidity, enabling the city to insulate itself from the extractive pressures of the settlement circuit, while also meeting ongoing reserve requirements.

One of the most common technical objections to our proposal is the problem of reserve acquisition. Critics ask how a new public bank can possibly compete in the interbank market without a pre-existing stock of Fed funds. Our answer is simple: reserves follow deposits. When the City of Seattle transfers its holdings out of private accounts and into its own municipal bank, the banking system mechanically expedites that move by transferring the corresponding reserves across the Fed’s ledger. In this light, the problem of reserve acquisition disappears. The city’s deposits furnish the very liquidity needed to settle the city’s payments.

While acquiring initial reserves is a mechanical byproduct of capitalization, maintaining them is a separate operational challenge. To see how this works, consider a simplified scenario: the City of Seattle receives a $10 million deposit from a private institution. In the interbank system, this deposit is accompanied by a transfer of $10 million in reserves. So far, the bank is flush. However, if the city then sells $10 million of its bonds to its own bank, it creates $10 million in new deposits. The moment the city attempts to spend that credit at vendors who bank in the private sector, the Seattle Municipal Bank must have enough reserves on hand to clear the payment. In this sense, reserves are the exit fee for transactions leaving the public circuit.

Still, a critical point remains: any payment clearing within the public-to-public system requires no reserves at all. When the city transfers funds between departments or pays an employee who also banks with the Seattle Municipal Bank, the transaction is settled via a simple ledger update—pure municipal bookkeeping. This allows for the creation of a relatively insulated, high-volume system of payment clearing, which lessens the demand for the Seattle Municipal Bank to keep up with settlements in the Fed funds market.  

That said, the Seattle Loop’s capacity for internal settlement reaches its full, transformative scale only through the project we have previously championed: a comprehensive digital public payment infrastructure. By establishing a municipal payment utility—akin to a “Public Venmo” or “Seattle Square”—the city will broker both free and surveillance-free transactions that circumvent exploitative credit card companies and tech oligarchies.

Imagine a digital municipal wallet that serves as the primary interface for civic life: your ORCA card, your library card, and your portal for utility payments and local event tickets, all integrated into a singular, public circuit. As payments circulate and clear within this internal system, the exit fee of private reserves effectively vanishes. This infrastructure is particularly vital for rewarding care work, as it allows the city to directly recognize and pay public service workers tending to our community. At its core, however, creating a digital public payment system expands the city’s internal clearing capacity, diminishing the burdens involved in attracting and maintaining reserves in the Fed funds system.

The Seattle Loop ensures that fiscal expansion is no longer tethered to the liquidity bottlenecks of the private market, but is instead limited only by our collective capacity to provision for the public good.

Conclusion: The Future is Fiscal Resilience

By zooming in on the technical foundations of the Seattle Loop, we see that capitalization and reserves are not mere obstacles to be overcome, but the very instruments of a new municipal financial architecture. Once this architecture is in place, the Seattle Loop functions as a vital automatic stabilizer for the regional economy.

Unlike private commercial banks, which are structurally compelled toward pro-cyclicality—lending aggressively during booms and retreating during busts—the Seattle Loop operates under a mandate of counter-cyclical investment. During economic downturns, when private credit freezes, the city can strategically expand its lending capacity, acting as a public credit guarantee that maintains the city’s future wellbeing when the present is uncertain or unstable.

As part of this mandate for counter-cyclical investment, the Seattle Loop can endow the city with a powerful tool for public refinancing. The public bank can systematically retire the city’s extractive legacies by purchasing older, high-interest loans currently held by private institutions. It can also extend refinancing options to non-profits and community organizations that have long been burdened by predatory private debt.

In the final analysis, what all such possibilities demonstrate is that the Seattle Loop is not merely technically feasible. It is an active and generative construction that supplies the city with maximal fiscal resilience. By re-engineering the city’s financial plumbing into a permanent infrastructure of social and environmental stewardship, the Loop guarantees that Seattle’s wealth is never again treated as a compliant subsidy for Wall Street, but is rather deployed as a powerful tool for a just and plentiful tomorrow.

The Feasibility Loop: When the Market Has No Idea

By Will Beaman

Proposals for public banking are typically met with a predictable set of feasibility concerns: whether sufficient capital can be assembled, whether deposits can be secured, and whether the institution can achieve the regulatory legitimacy required to begin operating. Once these terms are set, everything else follows. The public bank must prove itself to markets, satisfy prudential expectations modeled on private banking, and produce assets that investors can recognize as credible. Public purpose is filtered through these private and often counterproductive criteria.

Money on the Lefts Seattle Loop proposal proceeds from a very different starting point. By financing public investment through municipal bonds purchased and held within public institutions, it keeps interest payments circulating through public budgets instead of sending them outward as returns to private investors. Capitalization remains a necessary legal and institutional procedure in this arrangement, but it no longer serves as the first conceptual question or the primary political bottleneck.

What the Loop first makes visible is a circular structure in public finance itself. Rather than treating municipal borrowing as a one-way transfer from an external source of funds, it shows how public investment can be organized through circulations that remain within public institutions. That visible loop matters because it points to a deeper one that public banking debates often disavow. Neither the initial capitalization required to establish a public bank nor the ongoing capitalization that sustains it is best understood as coming from a single linear source of funds. Both are organized out of public “loops” that already exist: assets, revenues, obligations, deposits, and other financial commitments that are already in motion.

In that sense, the city’s ongoing fiscal and institutional life precedes and sustains any particular act of capitalization, even if capitalization is required to formalize a specific institutional arrangement. The relevant question is therefore not whether capitalization can be found in the abstract, as if outside this ongoing process, but how an already existing circulation can be formalized, redirected, and authorized within a public framework. With that structure in place, the Loop begins not from capitalization, but from capacity—from the projects a city already has the knowledge and resources to carry out. Finance, in this framing, is not treated as an externally scarce precondition that determines in advance whether action can begin. It is the means by which already legible capacities are coordinated, sequenced, and extended over time.

This shift is subtle, but it reorganizes the entire field. Once capitalization is treated as the starting point, public action must continually justify itself in terms set by external validators. Once capacity is treated as the starting point, finance becomes an internal instrument of coordination: a way of aligning labor, resources, and institutional commitments across time. It is no longer primarily about attracting deposits or reassuring markets. It is about making ongoing work legible and sustainable within public systems.

From here, a second shift follows. In most contemporary frameworks, sustainability is effectively defined by profitability—by whether a project can generate returns that investors recognize as adequate. This standard is treated as self-evident, but it actually substitutes one question for another. Rather than asking whether a project can be carried out and sustained over time, it asks whether profit-seeking actors can treat the project as a satisfactory asset.

The Loop displaces this proxy. Sustainability is no longer measured by investor recognition, but by whether a project can be carried forward institutionally without breakdown. Profit is unmasked as an incomplete and often misleading stand-in for the more specific and institutionally mediated conditions under which public action succeeds.

This changes the order of operations. Under prevailing assumptions, credibility must come first. Only once a project is validated—by markets, ratings, investor demand—can it proceed. The sequence runs from credibility to deposits to lending to eventual scale. The Loop allows a different sequence to emerge: projects are defined more clearly, financing is organized around the capacities required to carry them forward, and expansion can proceed iteratively. Feasibility is specified directly rather than inferred through market signals.

What looks, from the outside, like a more speculative approach is in fact a redistribution of risk. Conventional models concentrate risk in a narrow set of financial indicators—capital adequacy, balance sheet exposure, regulatory compliance, investor confidence—treated as decisive measures of prudence. They are also brittle, compressing a wide range of heterogeneous uncertainties into a single domain—market validation—over which public actors have limited control.

The Loop disperses that concentration, locating risk instead in the organization of capacity itself, including labor, materials, administration, and timing. These are not trivial concerns, but they are manageable within domains where knowledge already exists and adjustments can be made in real time. What appears “safe” in conventional terms often means accepting a framework that manufactures risk and demands conformity to it. What appears “risky” in the Loop’s terms is a willingness to relocate risk in forms that can be managed more directly.

This has implications for how criticism is handled. In many policy environments, objections accumulate as evidence that a proposal is too risky to pursue. Legal, inflationary, bond-market, and administrative concerns are often allowed to collapse into a single, generalized hesitation. The result is paralysis, or a retreat to what is already legible as acceptable.

The Loop opens the possibility of handling these concerns differently, refusing to let them stand in for the whole. Legal objections become questions about pathway and authority within existing institutions, including how a public bank can be chartered and capitalized using the city’s existing assets, revenues, and financial relationships. Price-stability concerns shift toward sectoral pressure, timing, and expansion. Bond-market objections have to become more specific about what those markets actually measure, and what they do not. Administrative doubts, meanwhile, turn into questions of staffing, coordination, and implementation design.

In this way, complications accumulate without becoming incapacitating. Rather than gathering at the level of the whole, where they would function as a veto, they are distributed across the institutions and forms of expertise capable of working through them. No single concern gets to stand in for the whole, and no one has to answer every concern at once.

What emerges is a reorganization of prudence rather than its rejection. Responsibility is no longer equated with deference to market signals or pre-emptive limitation. It lies instead in the ongoing capacity to specify, coordinate, and adjust—to carry projects forward over time without breakdown. That capacity is already present, unevenly but materially, in the practices of public institutions themselves.

The Seattle Loop makes this visible. What has often been treated as an external constraint—the need for capital, for validation, for confidence—appears instead as a particular way of organizing and interpreting public action. The Loop, in turn, opens the possibility that those terms can be reworked through the coordinated articulation of the capacities cities already possess. The feasibility loop is broken not when uncertainty disappears, but when uncertainty no longer has to be translated into market judgment before public action can proceed.

The Seattle Loop: Reclaiming the Public Interest

By Tyler Suksawat & Scott Ferguson

A palpable, but indecisive enthusiasm permeated a recent Seattle arts forum, revealing a city desperate for a future that no one quite knows how to build, let alone finance. Despite the proliferation of sticky notes with compelling schemes, as Amanda Manitach describes in The Stranger, the arts roundtable lacked a cohesive strategy for gathering its aspirational potpourri into an actionable mosaic. The obstacle, per usual, is price. How can Seattle even begin to envision a just, prosperous, and creative tomorrow when it can barely afford extant annual expenditures? 

A path forward exists. Yet it requires that we redesign Seattle’s current fiscal architecture.

The crux of the problem is that every year millions of Seattle’s tax dollars line the coffers of capitalists outside the city. When the city borrows money for bridges, schools, or transit, it pays massive interest fees to private banks on Wall Street. This “leak” is a primary cause of local austerity—the feeling that the city is always broke, even when there’s plenty of good ideas and idle resources to go around.

The time has come to plug that leak. By creating a city-owned public bank, Seattle can not only provide residents with low-cost financial services; it can also buy its own debt and pay interest to the city instead of private creditors. This simple shift transforms debt into a self-replenishing fund, giving us the financial hardware to build what our communities actually need—from social housing and municipal grocery stores to green jobs and a thriving arts scene. Manitach lists a public bank as one potential fix among many. But a municipal bank is not just one sticky note in the pile; it is the very foundation upon which every other progressive initiative depends. 

Such a plan transforms municipal finance from a leak into a loop. Instead of tax dollars leaving the city to pay private bank interest, a public bank creates a self-growing circuit. 

Here is how it works: (1) Seattle passes legislation, issuing debt to finance vital programs; (2) the municipal bank creates enough credit to purchase the city’s debt; (3) that money moves into the pockets of community members and local businesses; (4) the city next pays off the debt’s principal and interest to its own public bank; (5) the bank then transfers the interest and any additional banking revenue back into the city’s general fund; (6) the proceeds are finally re-invested into the next community project. With this, we stop the drain and grow the loop.  

The Seattle Loop is an engine for an entire ecosystem of loops. As Seattle’s public bank anchors the city’s finances, it can simultaneously empower myriad additional circuits of desperately needed public provisions. These smaller loops do not just draw from the city’s credit; they expand it. Weaving these connections together, we construct an adaptable web of public collaboration and value that becomes more powerful with every new participant who activates the city’s many circuits. 

How, then, to push the Seattle Loop from a visionary blueprint to a governing, democratic reality?

Feeling Loopy 

At its heart, the Seattle Loop is a generative mechanism of public credit that routes city finance through a new public bank, equipping us to provision our own city. This strategy internalizes Seattle’s public debt, utilizing a non-profit public bank to purchase the city’s municipal bonds. Capturing the interest payments that currently leak to private creditors and speculative markets, the Loop transmutes the city’s debt into a self-generating fund that increases Seattle’s capacity to secure public goods without the constraints of traditional austerity. 

To appreciate this plan’s innovativeness, we must correct a persistent myth: the idea that a bank’s ability to purchase bonds is constrained 1-to-1 by its existing deposits. As any modern banker knows, financial institutions do not lend out deposits. Rather, they routinely create credit anew from thin air. Loans create deposits, so to speak, not the other way around. Banks expand their balance sheets first and manage reserves afterward. Like it or not, that’s just how banking works. 

The constraints on bank lending are, in truth, regulatory capital ratios and liquidity coverage rules, not a finite quantity of available deposits. So, were Seattle to sell municipal debt to its own non-profit bank, the operation would generate fresh lines of credit (and associated interest) that would have never existed otherwise. Regularly overlooked, this inherently generative dimension of banking enables the Seattle Loop to dramatically enlarge the city’s fiscal ambit.

Rather than asking groups to adopt a single, rigid policy, our approach centers on the co-creation of specialized cross-city loops. We view the city’s central public bank as a foundational infrastructure that allows labor unions, housing advocates, and arts and culture coalitions to fashion their own distinct loops according to unique needs. Each time a new initiative launches—whether that’s a public payment system, municipal Job Guarantee or public entertainment venue—it does more than utilize existing credit; it expands the project’s collective reach. By bringing together these diverse loops, we turn municipal finance into enduring public cooperation and wealth. This growth doesn’t happen solely from the top down; it spreads through every new connection, ensuring that each project’s success bolsters the stability of the entire city. When you get in the loop, you are helping to engineer a flourishing ecosystem that thrives on mutual reinforcement.

Consider the potential of a city partnership with UFCW 3000, which represents a pivotal cross-section of grocery and agricultural workers. Through the Seattle Loop, we can maintain a municipal jobs program that establishes public grocery stores, ensuring both community food access and stable union employment. The Loop’s banking infrastructure can further provide essential financial services to the cannabis industry—a sector currently marginalized by federal banking restrictions and harassed by thieves—offering much-needed stability and security to both local businesses and their employees. At the same time, city-owned venues, a public payment system, and a complementary currency can work in tandem to wrest control over local arts and culture from corporate monopolies and manipulative ticket vendors. 

Loop Initiatives

The Seattle Loop provides the administrative and financial structure to implement a host of programs, transforming community hopes and dreams into a coordinated system. The following list, though hardly exhaustive, offers several concrete possibilities, beginning with the municipal bank. 

  • Public Bank: A central municipal financial institution that provides low-cost banking services to community members, local firms, and nonprofit organizations, while routing all city debt through this public channel. Internalized municipal borrowing ensures the vast majority of banking revenue—and the interest that would escape to Wall Street—stays in the city’s general fund. This recaptured wealth serves as a permanent, self-replenishing resource that dramatically widens the city’s fiscal capacity to provide for the public good.
  • Public Payment System: A fee-free municipal digital wallet that allows residents and businesses to bypass the extractive tolls of private credit card processors and ticket vendors.
  • Complementary Currency: A local digital money generated and managed by the city and its public bank. It is designed to extend the city’s fiscal reach, further stimulating commerce and keeping money within the community.
  • Municipal Job Guarantee: A permanent public employment program offering a living-wage job and benefits to any resident who wants one, focused on community care and infrastructure.
  • Public Arts & Culture: A public option for the arts, which secures the entire infrastructure of creative production—including venues, media platforms, and management—via a public payment system, complementary currency, and Job Guarantee that insulates local expression from corporate control and extraction. 
  • Youth Employment Program: A targeted initiative that integrates young people into the city’s productive life through paid mentorships and meaningful public service roles in cooperation with public schools.
  • Publicly Owned Housing: Socially managed residential developments that prioritize stable, well-furnished shelter as a human right rather than a speculative asset.
  • Municipal Groceries and Supply Chains: City-run food distribution networks that eliminate food deserts and secure affordable and reliable supply lines for essential goods. 
  • Vacancy Taxes on Property: A fiscal tool used to discourage property hoarding and incentivize the productive use of urban spaces for the public good.
  • Public Nonprofit Childcare: A model for repurposing underutilized school infrastructure into high-quality, universal childcare hubs as a proactive alternative to school closures.
  • Commercial Rent Controls: Protections that cap lease increases on commercial real estate to prevent the displacement of local small businesses and cultural venues.
  • RCV Competency: Educational workshops and pilots for Ranked Choice Voting to assist communities in navigating more democratic and representative election formats.
  • Public School Credit Access: A shift in K-12 financing that allows school districts to tap into municipal credit to fund facilities and enrichment without traditional debt dependency.
  • Public Worker Pensions: A strategy for reinvesting pension funds in the municipal bank to safeguard retirees’ wealth, while directly supporting local community stability.
  • Zero Waste and Right to Repair: A public program for circular economies that provides community repair clinics and municipal composting to end the era of planned obsolescence and food waste.

A Statewide Legal Framework

While the movement begins in Seattle, the vision and fight are inherently statewide, since at present inaugurating a municipal depository requires the authority of the Washington State Legislature. We are not looking to reinvent the wheel, but to accelerate a movement already in motion. We aim to revive and pass a refined version of the Washington State Public Bank Act (previously SB 5188), a framework championed by State Senator Bob Hasegawa that has already cleared the State Senate in past sessions.

Our immediate goal is to establish a legal architecture that follows the successful precedent of California’s Public Banking Act (AB 857), which in 2019 allowed local municipalities to charter their own public banks. Adapting these proven models to Washington, we can overcome the antiquated interpretations of our State Constitution that currently hem in municipal power. Our legislative strategy focuses on three pillars:

  • Codifying Public Authority: Building on the “Public Financial Cooperative” model from SB 5188, we will authorize cities and counties to establish public depository institutions, giving them the same financial agency recently won by cities like Los Angeles and San Francisco.
  • Modernizing Lending Protections: Washington’s Constitution (Article VIII, Sections 5 and 7) rightly forbids using public credit to aid private profit. We will clarify that a public bank, by definition, serves a fundamental government purpose—conducting public finance for public goods—and therefore acts as a shield against, rather than a vehicle for, private subsidies.
  • Enabling Inter-Municipal Cooperation: The final pillar authorizes cities and counties to pool their credit and deposits into an interdependent statewide system. Such cooperation allows a municipal pilot in Seattle to evolve into a resilient network, ensuring that smaller communities and rural counties can access the same low-cost credit as the state’s largest urban centers.

Reclaiming the Public Interest

The Seattle Loop represents more than a financial intervention; it is an open invitation to develop and share municipal wealth. 

In this movement, the call to reclaim the public interest acts as a double recovery. Literally, we recapture the enormous interest payments currently siphoned off by private debt service, routing those resources back into the city’s generative circuits. More deeply, however, we reclaim the very purpose of municipal governance, ensuring that the public interest—our collective well-being and democratic intent—once again directs our collective life.

This is our moment to build a city where the power of public credit is as resilient and expansive as the people who make it. 

Join us in the Seattle Loop.

* See here for a more granular approach to some of the Loop’s key operations, including capitalization and maintaining reserve balances.

How Cities Can Evaluate Public Investment Without Bond Markets

By Will Beaman

A series of recent articles from Money on the Left has argued that cities can sell municipal bonds to their own public banks, reclaiming public finance from private bond markets and expanding their fiscal capacity in the process. The Seattle Loop develops this approach in a more specific direction. It proposes that a city-owned bank purchase municipal debt and return interest payments to the public, generating new circuits of investment in housing, food access, green jobs, and other public goods.

A central premise of this approach is that cities should not have to organize public finance around the demand that private investors receive an additional monetary return on public investment. By routing municipal debt through a public bank, the Loop would keep interest payments circulating within the public sphere rather than sending them outward as a standing claim on city budgets. That shift changes not only where the money goes, but what counts as “return” in the first place.

Under the usual bond-market model, public investment is judged through the willingness of private investors to hold municipal debt at a given yield. The Loop points in a different direction. It organizes public finance around the qualitative return of the projects themselves: whether housing is built, whether food access expands, whether green jobs are created, whether public systems become more capacious and durable.

At present, the Loop exists as a proposal and an organizing project rather than a fully codified policy framework. But even in this early form, it opens a different set of questions about municipal finance.

Under conventional neoliberal framing, public investment is treated as responsible or sustainable to the extent that private investors are willing to hold municipal debt at an acceptable return. Bond markets are thus made to appear as if they provide objective information about what a city can afford.

The Loop unsettles that assumption. Once public finance is organized around the qualitative return of projects themselves rather than the quantitative return demanded by private investors, evaluation cannot simply be outsourced to investor judgment. It has to be articulated in other terms.

One way to begin doing so is to attach a structured public review to Loop-funded proposals—projects financed through municipal bonds held by a public bank. In this setting, evaluation would focus on how a proposal organizes public capacity: how it will be carried out, where pressure will emerge, how that pressure can be relieved, and how its qualitative effects will be distributed across the people and institutions that make up the city.

The Loop opens a distinct institutional setting for this kind of evaluation. When cities are reviewing projects financed and held within the public sphere, the question is no longer what private investors will tolerate, but how public capacity can be organized and expanded. The point is not simply to conjure capacity limits as a problem for the Loop to solve. It is to establish a framework that asks how things can be done well rather than whether they are possible in the first place.

This matters because capacity is not a fixed stock that public investment either respects or exceeds. It is provisioned over time. Apparent limits reflect earlier decisions about what to build, what to maintain, what to neglect, and whose needs to treat as secondary. In that sense, even localized pressure or shortage should not be read as a timeless law of political economy. These are patterned consequences of prior public and private ordering, and they can be reorganized in turn.

At a basic level, this means asking two kinds of questions.

First, there are capacity questions. If a proposal expands transit, childcare, housing, food access, or other public goods and services, what labor, facilities, supply chains, and administrative systems are needed to carry it out? Where is there room to expand smoothly, and where are the likely bottlenecks?

Second, there are distribution questions. Public investment does not transform every part of the city at once or in the same way. A proposal may expand capacity in one area while requiring complementary support elsewhere in order for that expansion to hold. A serious public review should make those uneven temporal and spatial patterns visible—not because public action must always impose hardship on someone, but because durable qualitative change depends on how expansion is paced, coordinated, and extended across different households, neighborhoods, and institutions.

The depth of this kind of review would vary with the size, novelty, and public significance of a proposal, but even a minimal version would make these considerations visible.

In practice, this kind of review would open up questions like:

Capacity considerations:

  • Which sectors will see increased demand, and at what scale
  • Where there is existing slack capacity, including underused facilities, underemployment, or service availability
  • What kinds of workers are needed, and how quickly they can be hired or trained
  • Which inputs and supply chains are likely to face pressure, and what complementary investments would widen capacity where needed
  • Whether production and service provision can expand locally or will rely on external sourcing
  • How spending is phased over time, and whether that phasing introduces or relieves pressure
  • Which agencies and institutions are responsible for implementation, and where administrative bottlenecks are likely to arise
  • Which sectors are likely to respond to new spending with higher prices, fees, or rents, and what complementary public action would be needed to prevent that

Distributional considerations:

  • Which households, neighborhoods, and institutions are positioned to see the earliest improvements from the proposal
  • In what form those improvements appear: expanded service access, reduced recurring costs, better working conditions, greater security, or new forms of public support
  • Where complementary investment may be needed so that initial improvements do not produce localized shortages or strain
  • How changes in household budgets and service access are likely to alter demand elsewhere in the city
  • How effects vary across existing patterns of income, wealth, geography, and institutional access
  • How benefits circulate locally through wages, purchases, and institutional uptake rather than leaking outward
  • How the proposal can be phased so that expanded provision becomes more durable and more evenly shared over time

We might call this a Capacity and Distribution Review. But the point is not merely to add one more layer of oversight to public investment. The review is one of the forms through which the Loop does its political and institutional work. By requiring proposals to be evaluated in terms of what capacities they draw on, where bottlenecks may emerge, how those bottlenecks can be addressed, and how qualitative improvements are likely to be patterned across the city, it shifts public judgment away from the usual neoliberal question of whether ambitious action is “feasible.” It asks instead what would be required to carry a project out well, how its demands can be coordinated over time, and how its benefits can be more broadly shared.

Rather than defer to whether a private bondholder class can profit from public investment, these questions ask how public investment will allocate labor and resources, structure service provision, and reshape everyday life across the city. They require a more specific account of the city: who does what, where pressure builds, how people live, and how different forms of labor and care are sustained.

Bond markets do not evaluate public investment in these terms. They collapse heterogeneous social activity into a single consideration: the willingness of private investors to accept a given return. That consideration is often treated as an objective measure of what a city can afford. But it does not tell us how a project will be carried out, where it will strain existing capacity, or how its effects will unfold across the city over time. All it really tells us is whether private investors can extract a monetary return from public projects.

A Capacity and Distribution Review, by contrast, makes those dimensions visible and contestable. It institutionalizes a different way of evaluating public action—one that centers coordination, provision, sequencing, and distribution rather than investor judgment. By requiring proposals to be described in terms of how they mobilize labor, expand provision, and affect different households and communities over time, this kind of review cultivates a different language of fiscal evaluation. It gives public officials a way to speak about spending that does not rely on the reductive categories and conventional wisdom of bond markets.

In doing so, it begins to render bond-market evaluation newly legible as what it is: not a neutral measure of public worth, but a perspective rooted in the interests of those who profit from public debt.

This matters politically because taxpayer rhetoric casts public life as the hard-earned substance of a deserving citizenry forever at risk of being siphoned away by others. In practice, that citizen is often imagined in racialized and classed terms, while the city’s diversity appears as a burden, a threat, or a drain on a fixed surplus. The Loop tells a different story. It treats the city’s differences across neighborhoods, institutions, and communities not as competing claims on a limited store of value, but as part of how public capacity is recognized, organized, expanded, and shared over time.

Rather than replacing one total system with another, municipal finance can become the occasion for a more honest evaluative framework that displaces neoliberal public-finance practices in the institutional space opened by the Seattle Loop.

In that sense, the Loop, the review, and the politics are of a piece. The Loop creates an institutional setting in which public investment no longer has to justify itself through private profit. The review gives that setting a public language and procedure. Together, they equip progressive policymakers with a vocabulary that does not undermine their own capacity to act and allows them to answer concerns about “responsibility” and “sustainability” in more detailed, heterogeneous, and above all dignifying terms.

Introducing: The Seattle Loop

We are thrilled to share a sneak peek at the Seattle Loop, a fiscal strategy for generating public money for urgent needs in and beyond the city of Seattle.

The Strategy: By establishing a municipal bank, Seattle can purchase its own debt and “loop” the interest back to the city instead of to private creditors. In addition to providing residents with low-cost banking and financial services, the Seattle Loop simultaneously empowers myriad additional circuits of desperately needed public provisions–from social housing and municipal grocery stores to green jobs and a thriving arts scene.

See here for a more extensive discussion of the Seattle Loop.

Join the Movement: A growing movement is arising across the city of Seattle to make the Loop a reality. To join up and stay informed, please send an email to theseattleloop@gmail.com.

Click or swipe below to explore the animated pamphlet.

To print this pamphlet, download the front + back pages.

Out of the Shadows: Public Banking for Municipal Finance

By Tyler Suksawat & Scott Ferguson

Editor’s Note: The following essay, originally published on March 3, 2026, offers a foundational theoretical framework for what has since been concretized as The Seattle Loop. The Seattle Loop is a fiscal strategy that utilizes municipal banking to purchase city debt, “looping” interest payments back into public provisions like social housing and green jobs. While this piece was written prior to our specific pivot toward the Seattle-based organizing effort, it articulates the core logic of public credit and municipal finance that underpins the current project.

In a recent essay, we advanced a proposal for sub-federal governments to sell municipal bonds to their own public banks. We took the city as our primary point of departure, but the same lessons are applicable to U.S. counties and states. Establishing a public bank that regularly purchases municipal debt, we argued, would not only significantly expand a city’s fiscal capacity to support its communities and environs, but also reclaim regional public finance from a parasitical and punishing bond market. 

Since the publication of our essay, some commentators have criticized the proposal for involving city finance in so-called shadow banking, precisely because it places public credit creation outside traditional private capital markets. Such concerns are rooted in a legitimate wariness toward the unregulated and often fragile credit structures that trigger financial crises. However, this criticism fails to distinguish between speculative private ventures and institutionalized provisioning by the municipal public purse. Indeed, such a critique mistakes the absence of private middlemen for a lack of financial oversight and security. Our plan, by contrast, replaces the opaque and volatile shadows of private intermediation with a transparent, public-facing mechanism anchored in the enduring fiscal authority of the city government.

Today, municipal finance remains trapped in an exploitative and convoluted cycle. When a city issues debt, it is immediately subjected to a gauntlet of private intermediaries: banks underwrite the bonds, rating agencies perform a gatekeeping function via risk assessment, and institutional investors claim interest as a form of social rent. Crucially, these investors are often not traditional depository banks, but rather volatile non-bank entities such as money market mutual funds and hedge funds, which treat municipal bonds as liquid shadow money to be leveraged for short-term gain. As it stands, then, the public purse is already precariously entangled in shadow banking, with municipal debt serving as a primary asset for the volatile and uninsured money markets that dominate the status quo. Every stage of this process, meanwhile, is governed by a “fiscal discipline” that prioritizes private profit over public need. Thus, far from a stable, above-board process, the current municipal model represents an architecture of austerity that embeds the public interest within the murky, predatory, and destabilizing mechanisms of market-based finance.

Our proposal replaces the fragility of the shadow market with an architecture of public provisioning. Before we turn to the specific mechanisms of financial stability, we must first establish the basic institutional design. We propose a publicly owned institution with chartered banking powers–including direct access to the Federal Reserve’s discount window–that allows the city to bypass the private gauntlet and recapture its own credit. Under this arrangement, the interest generated by municipal debt is no longer captured as social rent; instead, it is credited back to the issuer’s general fund. While both the private market and our public model acknowledge that credit is fundamentally elastic, the divergence lies in who controls and benefits from that elasticity. By internalizing debt service and neutralizing the power of rating agencies, our proposal transforms the financial model from an extractive regime into a regenerative one.

This formalization—grounding municipal debt finance in a chartered public bank, regulated oversight, and direct access to central bank liquidity—moves our model firmly into the light of the regulated banking system. If critics wish to argue about the risks of aggressive credit expansion or the blurring of fiscal and monetary lines, those are legitimate debates over localized monetary and credit governance. But to label a chartered, transparently regulated public utility as “shadow banking” is a category error. Our plan does not evade regulation; it institutionalizes public purpose through it.

Regarding the safety of deposits, public ownership is no barrier to FDIC insurance. A state-chartered public bank meeting standard capital and supervisory requirements can qualify for federal backing. However, even in the absence of the FDIC, the Bank of North Dakota provides a proven roadmap: deposits can be backed by the full faith and credit of the municipal government itself. In this architecture, deposit safety is a design constraint managed through robust capital buffers and strict regulatory adherence, rather than an impossibility.

In this context, the risk of default on deposits is a feature of any bank lacking sufficient capital or insurance. Critics often raise the specter of “portfolio concentration,” but a public bank purchasing its own city’s bonds is simply internalizing fiscal risk. This shifts the concern from “depositor loss” to the broader question of municipal insolvency–a condition that, in our schema, is mitigated by the bank’s ability to coordinate with the city’s broader fiscal agenda. We address concentration not through the fickle discipline of the bond market, but through diversified asset management and the elimination of capitalist underwriting.

The most powerful engine of this model is its mandated retention and concerted utilization of public deposits, serving as a foundation for proactive public provisioning. By directing city payrolls, vendor payments, contractor accounts, and the collection of taxes, fines, fees, and even utility payments (as seen in Seattle) through the public bank, we create a massive, stable foundation of liquidity to be deployed for the common good. This capacity becomes particularly transformative when paired with a local Job Guarantee program. The bank provides the strong accounting infrastructure for such a program, ensuring that municipal payrolls for public works are settled within the public’s own credit circuit to build and sustain community wealth. Consequently, the interest payments that currently “leave” the city as social rent are instead retained, further expanding the city’s financial system and its capacity to support collective wellbeing with every cycle.

Finally, we must correct a persistent metallic-standard myth: the idea that a bank’s ability to purchase bonds is constrained 1:1 by its existing deposits. As any modern banker knows, loans create deposits. Banks expand their balance sheets first and manage reserves afterward. The true constraints on our model, then, are not “available deposits,” but rather regulatory capital ratios and liquidity coverage rules. We acknowledge these constraints and embrace them. Our goal is not to evade regulation, but to use the inherent elasticity of credit to activate municipal democracy and provision the public good.

Reclaiming the Public Interest: Cities Should Sell Municipal Bonds to Their Own Public Banks

By Tyler Suksawat & Scott Ferguson

Editor’s Note: The following essay, originally published on February 22, 2026, offers a foundational theoretical framework for what has since been concretized as The Seattle Loop. The Seattle Loop is a fiscal strategy that utilizes municipal banking to purchase city debt, “looping” interest payments back into public provisions like social housing and green jobs. While this piece was written prior to our specific pivot toward the Seattle-based organizing effort, it articulates the core logic of public credit and municipal finance that underpins the current project.

What chance do local governments have in fighting authoritarian austerity, especially when they are left to rely on feckless legislators at the state and federal levels who refuse to push back? Right now, we see austerity budgets appearing across every institution and major employer in the U.S. If the federal government continues to sabotage municipalities, and the state governments (even in liberal states) are proposing cuts-only budgets, then what hope do cities have? In truth, there are several meaningful alternatives to the present order, particularly if we follow the lead of what Money on the Left calls Democratic Public Finance. We only need to get creative about local monetary design. 

Extending money creation powers from the federal level directly to local governments remains an urgent political project. In the meantime, however, we propose that a powerful public option for municipal finance exists at the intersection between bond issuance and public banking. What if a city established a public bank and that public bank regularly purchased the city’s debt? Such a mechanism would liberate the city’s munis from private bond markets and punishing rating agencies, while expanding the city’s fiscal capacity beyond projected tax revenues. 

To understand why this works, we must discard a pervasive myth: banks do not lend deposits. They create credit “endogenously” through acts of authorization. Banks certainly have to meet liquidity and reserve requirements. However, meeting such requirements is a separate matter from crediting operations, which are legally enabled and protected by the Federal Reserve. A bank’s crediting operations do not recycle a limited pool of pre-existing investor funds. They actively expand the amount of total credit that is presently available. 

Therefore, when a public bank purchases its own city’s municipal debt, the result is not a closed loop in which a finite amount of money is passed back and forth. Because the public bank actively generates money to purchase the debt, the operation dramatically enlarges the city’s fiscal space. In such an arrangement, the municipal government acquires funds in the short term to meet community needs. The public bank grows its holdings by receiving interest payments from the city. The loops, then, are not redundant; they are kinetic. Far from an inert circuit, a public bank that purchases city debt is a dynamic design that defies the artificial gravity of austerity.

Most importantly, this arrangement halts the depletion of fiscal capacity by ensuring that debt service payments remain on the city’s own public ledger. Unlike with the private bond market, the public bank would be legally required to deposit earned interest into the city’s general fund. By cutting out the rentiers, the city thus transforms a parasitic financial drain into a regenerative cycle, guaranteeing that public interest is no longer just a yield for private financiers, but a shared benefit in the public interest.

We do not have to look far for a successful precedent. The Bank of North Dakota (BND) already acts as the depository for all state taxes, fines, and fees. While BND operates more conservatively than the model we propose—acting primarily as a registrar and facilitator rather than a direct purchaser of munis—it still remits its profits to the state’s general fund. In 2023 alone, the bank posted profits of $192.7 million. To put that in perspective, this figure greatly exceeds the $115 million in annual revenue projected for Washington State’s highly contested wealth tax proposal. For states like Washington, which rely heavily on regressive property tax levies to pay for almost everything, the BND model offers a wealth of untapped potential.

While the BND focuses primarily on state and municipal operations, if a new generation of public banks were chartered to provide consumer financial services alongside municipal finance, the benefits would be exponential. Private retail banks routinely generate massive profit margins of 15% to 30% through rapacious fees and predatory lending. Crucially, a public bank would not simply transfer this rentier model to the public sector. By functioning as a true public utility, it would offer high-quality, low-cost financial services instead. Public banks should provide an affordable, non-predatory alternative for working people. Even without exorbitant fees, however, it would still generate a robust and ethical source of revenue to be invested directly back into the community—funding the very policies, programs, and budgets voted on by the people the bank serves.

To realize this vision, establishing democratically accountable public banks—whether at the municipal or state level—must become a top political and legislative priority. Chartered as public utilities rather than profit-seeking enterprises, these institutions would be governed by public appointees and remain 100% accountable to city halls, county commissions, or state legislatures. By legally mandating that all net earnings (derived from interest and fees) be deposited back into the government’s general fund, municipalities can organically grow their revenues over time without continuously hiking taxes. As an added democratic benefit, their daily operations would be entirely transparent, with balance sheets published for the public.

The practical strength of this arrangement lies in the specific mechanics of the yield. With the federal funds rate currently sitting at a target range of 3.50% to 3.75%, a municipality could intentionally set its internal bond yields just above this floor. Because the public bank holds the debt, the spread guarantees a steady stream of revenue for the public ledger. Furthermore, by indexing the yield to the rate of inflation, the city constructs a resilient financial instrument in the face of unpredictable circumstances. Should an emergency or unforeseen project cost require rapid liquidity beyond the public bank’s immediate capacity, this competitive yield would generate intense demand from the private sector to hold the city’s munis—effectively subordinating private capital to the public interest.

Unlocking a municipality’s latent ability to sell bonds directly to its own public bank reveals a startling truth: the primary limits on local finance are not economic, but political. The constraints cities currently face are mostly self-imposed regulations—arbitrary debt ceilings or rules enforced by oversight boards captured by private banking interests. While every municipality will navigate different statutory limits on bond issuance, we can begin by maxing out current legal capacities and organizing to expand those horizons later. 

Consider the political implications for building local public capacity. Lately, wealth taxes have dominated local discussions around budget expansion. While taxing the rich remains a vital tool for combating economic inequality and checking the anti-democratic power of concentrated wealth, relying on taxation as the sole lifeline for municipal survival is politically precarious. A public bank shifts this paradigm. By carefully managing the yields and maturities on internally held municipal bonds, a city can steadily expand its general fund. Wealth taxes would no longer be a desperate necessity for basic funding, but rather one tool among many. 

Instead of begging for scraps from state legislatures or private bond markets, local governments can directly create the capacity to care for their communities. Once we are willing to get creative with Democratic Public Finance, we see that the blueprint is already here. We only need the political will to use it, guaranteeing that every local dollar created is an investment in the public interest. 

Beyond Loans: The Public Grant-Making Bank 

By the Money on the Left Editorial Collective

Public banking has been gaining traction for years, driven by a growing recognition that our current financial system often fails to serve the public good. The Bank of North Dakota has operated successfully for over a century, and states like New York have recently seen legislation proposed to establish their own state-level public banking systems. Success at the state level informs the effort for a nationwide Public Banking Act proposed in Congress, which offers a vital first step towards building a more equitable and sustainable economy by establishing a federal charter for local and state public banks and creating a systemic channel to direct public deposits toward community investment.

To fully realize public banking’s potential, however, we must recognize that loans alone are insufficient for addressing all public needs. The loan model makes urgent community investment dependent on the ability to generate a profit and repay, when, in fact, the entire reason these initiatives require public support is the absence of a prospect for private sector profit. 

For this reason, we need to expand the public’s financial toolkit beyond traditional loans to include grants. The operating paradigm for the next generation must empower public banks to issue grants, thereby giving communities the financial resources they need and freeing them from the constraints of expected repayment. In what follows, we explore the groundbreaking potential of a Public Grant-Making Bank, which promises to revolutionize the meaning of money as a mechanism of Democratic Public Finance.

The Public Banking Act, as previously proposed, makes significant strides. It seeks to establish a national framework, providing legal clarity for states and municipalities to create publicly owned banks. This structure would confer local control over investment, ensuring these banks are governed by public mandates that prioritize community needs over shareholder profits. The Public Banking Act would give public banks access to the Federal Reserve’s payment systems and liquidity facilities, integrating them into the broader financial architecture. The legislation allows them to fund local priorities like infrastructure, affordable housing, and renewable energy. Crucially, it mandates adherence to standards related to environmental justice and democratic governance, steering financial capacity toward the public good. 

The Public Banking Act’s proposed changes to the existing financial system are powerful; however, the legislation still operates within a capitalist paradigm of loan-based financing. By focusing primarily on loans, even at favorable rates, the model retains a core capitalist constraint: the expectation of financial repayment. This expectation means that any essential community investment must carry a calculable path to profit or guaranteed revenue sufficient to service the loan. When a project is defined by its social or ecological necessity rather than its ability to yield a private return, the loan structure fails. For instance, a loan for constructing protective sea walls, implementing watershed restoration, or funding universal local public transit will never meet a private profitability threshold. We cannot allow the constraints of private profit to obstruct the necessary path toward collective flourishing and stability. Such projects are essential, non-revenue-generating public goods that communities require for collective well-being.

To meet critical needs, we must expand the financial toolkit of public banking beyond traditional loans. We need a revised Public Banking Act that establishes a new class of financial institution: the Public Grant-Making Bank. A Public Grant-Making Bank actively tackles pressing social and ecological challenges where traditional, loan-based financing proves inadequate. 

The first pillar of this model involves restructuring finance as direct grants, rather than as loans. Instead of relying on future repayment, public banks would issue grants to projects based on their public mission. A Public Grant-Making Bank evaluates proposals by assessing their anticipated social and ecological effects. For example, funding the establishment of community-owned broadband networks would be evaluated on their contribution to equitable digital access and educational opportunity, not on a financial return model. If the qualitative assessment is strong, the grant is made. On this logic, a grant is still debt; only, it is a qualitative obligation to improve social and environmental conditions, rather than a quantitative obligation to repay a financial sum.

A core commitment to qualitative assessment requires a decisive legal shift. Local public banks, overseen by community-led boards, ought to be granted full discretion to issue finance based on community needs. Granting this authority requires major overhauls of banking laws, such as the Community Reinvestment Act, to legally authorize such non-financial metrics over traditional financial prudence. This authorization must be coupled with a legal liability shield for bank directors, protecting them from fiduciary duty claims when making mission-aligned grant decisions.

Any radical institutional change demands an equally radical monetary theory. Our financial regulatory system is typically conceived according to an erroneous, yet dominant “loanable funds” model, which posits that banks act as mere intermediaries, collecting pre-existing savings from lenders and then allocating those scarce funds to borrowers. Under this view, money is a finite resource, and any capital loss resulting from a grant poses an existential threat to the bank’s ability to maintain its pool of savings. However, we know from the credit theory of money that banks actually create money as credit when they extend financing. This means that when a bank issues a grant, it does not transfer pre-existing savings, but rather generates fresh financial assets in the community’s accounts.

The result inverts the traditional view of deficits. When a Public Grant-Making Bank issues a grant, it creates financial capacity for a community. In the process, the bank does not draw down its capital. It undergoes no depletion of pre-existing funds. Instead, the grant constitutes a creative act of democratic public provisioning in its own right. Modern Monetary Theory (MMT)’s sectoral balances approach is illuminating here. Just as, according to MMT, public sector deficits are private sector assets, we must recognize that the bank’s alleged deficit is actually the community’s financial surplus. The grants are not a loss; they are creative endowments that increase the net financial wealth of the public. For these institutions, therefore, we must reframe the reigning ideology of the balance sheet entirely.

While the credit theory explains the mechanics of how all banks create money, current law is designed to punish institutions that act on this reality for the public good; therefore, we must redesign the legal framework to make public grant-making possible. If the bank’s financial deficit is simply the community’s newly created financial asset, specific legal changes are required, such as amendments to the Federal Reserve Act and the Federal Deposit Insurance Act to establish what we could call a Systemically Essential Public Grant-Making Charter. Crucially, this charter and all associated exemptions would apply only to the bank’s non-repayable grants. The charter would exempt these banks from closure based on mission-related grants. We would mandate the creation of a Public Commitment Reserve—a dedicated and nominally inexhaustible fund explicitly backed by the full faith and credit of the United States that covers the necessary operational deficit, effectively making the federal government the implicit equity partner. This mechanism ensures the bank’s stability while validating its singular mission by giving the granting function a 100% Risk Weight Exemption from standard capital rules like those stemming from Basel III.

Meanwhile, the new regulatory framework must reflect a new collective purpose. Regulatory oversight would necessarily shift from strict capital ratios to a Public Mission Fulfillment Index (PMFI). Regulators should utilize something like a Public Mission Fulfillment Index (PMFI), a qualitative and quantitative assessment tool that measures the Public Grant-Making Bank’s effectiveness. Instead of narrowly auditing assets and liabilities, the PMFI would evaluate the bank’s adherence to its public mandate, its effectiveness in achieving social and ecological outcomes such as specific climate adaptation goals or public health milestones, and its transparent governance structure. Performance would be judged not by profit margins, but by documented progress toward communal problem-solving, making the mission, not a zero-sum balance sheet, the legal measure of success.

The Public Banking Act can incentivize the creation of new banking institutions across state and municipal levels, but we hardly need to start from scratch. The existing landscape is already rich with institutions that currently implement grants, demonstrating that non-loan-based provisioning is a deeply established practice. Consider the vast network of federal bodies that allocate grants based on qualitative criteria: organizations like the National Institutes of Health and the National Science Foundation fund research based on merit and public benefit, alongside cultural institutions such as the National Endowment for the Arts and the National Endowment for the Humanities. This federal effort is mirrored at the state level by agencies like the Departments of Labor, Health, and Energy; development-focused bodies such as the Appalachian Regional Commission; and, of course, our public university systems. Beyond government, the sector includes myriad non-profits and community foundations, including large institutions like the Robert Wood Johnson Foundation and the Ford Foundation, programmatic groups like Habitat for Humanity, and even small, local initiatives run by churches and food pantries. These well-established institutions prove that grant-based financing beyond profitability is already a central function of financial life in the United States. 

The Public Banking Act already contains language for empowering these organizations to become licensed public credit issuers. Like for-profit banks, such organizations draw on systemic knowledge of their recipients’ projects and the shifting contexts in which they operate. All that is needed is to equip them with financial capacities to expand and transform their current mandates in response to communal and ecological needs. Importantly, then, there is no one-size-fits-all model for Public Grant-Making Banks. We need diverse and nimble credit allocators for a heterogeneous and changing world.

The design of the Public Grant-Making Bank yields a robust new approach for achieving economic stability. Rather than naturalize private market prices while fetishizing liberal budget-balancing, public granting banks allow us to challenge the political composition of investment and pricing in the first place. The work of economist Isabella Weber is instructive here, as her analysis highlights how public management of supply chains and targeted price control mechanisms for essential goods can be powerful tools for ensuring stability. Extending this logic to finance, the Public Grant-Making Bank establishes a powerful counterweight to capital markets, where the price of credit and the required rate of return are set by private risk and profit motives. A strong public sector that effectively sets the price of capital at zero shifts essential financial resources from speculative activity to necessary public provisioning. The current political volatility, including the rise of radically anti-democratic policies, behaviors, and sentiments, often stems from a deep-seated economic insecurity that financial systems designed purely for private profit have created. The Public Grant-Making Bank offers a design intervention that directly addresses this insecurity, ensuring new financial capacity is continuously deployed where it is needed most.

The stability provided by the Public Grant-Making Bank acts as a profound form of local political agency and resilience. Decades of unnecessary austerity, perpetuated by establishment Democrats, conservatives, and authoritarians, have destabilized communities by systematically robbing them of financial resources required to provide for basic needs. Will Beaman highlights this vulnerability in his argument for fiscal insurgency, noting that the political viability of progressive public projects is often threatened by legislative sabotage. At the same time, Beaman reminds us, the history of the United States is replete with inspiring examples of local and national credit creation that successfully resisted and overcame austerity. This in mind, the Public Grant-Making Bank represents a critical mechanism for fiscal insurgency. Because it operates on the principle of the legally protected creation of public credit for social ends, its budget is untethered from the state and municipal budgetary processes that constrain investment by recourse to poisonous neoliberal and authoritarian ideologies. This grants local administrators the authority to direct public investment, ensuring their decisions are democratically accountable while actively bypassing those financial constraints. Such enduring capacity acts as a vital institutional guarantor of political stability, ensuring communities can maintain essential provisioning even when political conflicts over the budget attempt to impose sudden cuts.

Thus a Public Grant-Making Bank is more than a policy fix; it is a profound political act that challenges the hegemonic conception of money as a fundamentally capitalist tool. Regrettably, progressives and leftists regularly equate money with capitalism, viewing currency as a mere expression of private competition and exploitation. This dominant view, however, not only fortifies capitalist interests, but also fails to see that money is a contestable and inexhaustible public system, a complex and interdependent hierarchy of obligations and benefits that can always be restructured to serve communal ends. Others on the left attempt to redeem money by embracing the promise of truly egalitarian “exchange.” Examples of this impulse include schemes advocating a return to allegedly pure, decentralized systems like direct barter, or proposals that champion digital currencies built on blockchain technology. Yet these approaches—rooted in the myth that money evolves from direct barter—typically accept the capitalist premise that money is merely a facilitator of micro transactions, thereby failing to embrace the hierarchy of money as a democratic design problem.

The Public Grant-Making Bank is a political project that importantly defamiliarizes what money is. By showing that financial capacity can be intentionally created and distributed based on social and environmental needs rather than the expectation of repayment, the bank clears the way for wide-ranging contests and creative building when it comes to democratic monetary design. Moreover, this approach reframes and reclaims the very idea of granting, not as the decree of a ruling authority, but as a shared commitment to the community and an affirmation of public trust. As a result, the Public Grant-Making Bank becomes an essential step toward achieving what we have elsewhere called Democratic Public Finance, a radical vision where our collective financial system is explicitly designed to serve society, not extract profit.

Passing the extended Public Banking Act and establishing the Public Grant-Making Bank requires a focused national political campaign, starting today. The immediate challenge is immense, given the second Trump administration’s active use of state power to defund social programs, attack democratically-controlled cities, and punish political enemies. Compounding this political sabotage, a nationwide affordability crisis continues to push prices higher across essential goods and services. Yet a clear political opening exists: the recent 2026 blue electoral sweep, a victory underscored by the election of democratic socialist Zohran Mamdani as New York City mayor, signals an urgent public demand for structural solutions to the affordability crisis. The Public Grant-Making Bank can be a vital ingredient in this effort. We can begin straightaway by forging powerful coalitions, bringing together progressive legislators with organizations like the Working Families Party, the Democratic Socialists of America, and the Debt Collective. Success is hardly certain, but the collective activity of imagining and organizing for this transformative financial architecture is itself a crucial political project that helps transform what counts as possible for public finance.

When we finally acknowledge money as public credit, we empower public banks to transition from mere lenders to catalysts of collective prosperity, underwriting the essential work of ecological restoration and community-making with direct grants. The initial Public Banking Act gives us the start. Our challenge now is to extend its vision and construct a system where financial design itself actively guarantees a just and ecologically stable world.

Democratic Public Finance

Billy Saas and Scott Ferguson are joined by Will Beaman to discuss Money on the Left’s framework for what we call “Democratic Public Finance” (DPF). According to this paradigm, money is public credit, a capacious tool for mobilizing everyone’s capacities to meet our needs and build a desirable future. DPF redefines politics as the process of coordinating our abundant human and material resources within ecological limits, rather than as an austere and exploitative competition for scarce funds. With this, Money on the Left not only opens fresh horizons for left politics, but also directly challenges the fiscal sabotage routinely carried out by liberals, conservatives and the authoritarian right. 

In conceptualizing DPF, Money on the Left builds on insights from Modern Monetary Theory (MMT); but we also push beyond MMT’s delimitation of public money creation to the alleged sovereignty of the nation-state. Contrary to conventional accounts of MMT, we insist that money is a public, contested, and inexhaustible institution that must be politicized and redesigned across all levels of governance. 

During our discussion, our cohosts outline the approach to DPF presented in our recent long-form publication, “Democratic Public Finance: A Radical Vision for Mamdani’s New York City.” Along the way, we tease out key insights from myriad other contemporary works, which variously leverage DPF to challenge the second Trump administration’s authoritarian radicalization of neoliberal economics. Such texts include co-authored pieces such as “Blue Bonds: A Fiscal Strategy for Overcoming Trump 2.0,” “How the Zetro Card can Save New York City (Really),” and “It’s Time for Complimentary Currencies,” as well as writings by Will Beaman like “How to New York Times Proof Mamdani’s Playbook,” “Blue Bonds: Duck or Rabbit?,” and “The Case for Fiscal Insurgency.” 

The conversation highlights the originality and urgency of Money on the Lefts core ideas for Democratic Public Finance. Since the discussion only scratches the surface of our writings, however, we encourage listeners to consult the linked publications above for a comprehensive engagement with DPF.

Visit our Patreon page here: https://www.patreon.com/MoLsuperstructure

Music by Nahneen Kula: www.nahneenkula.com

Transcript

This transcript has been edited for readability.

Scott Ferguson

Welcome everybody. I am Scott Ferguson and I am here with my co-host Billy Sass. Say hi, Billy.

Billy Saas

Hi, Billy.

Scott Ferguson

Nice. And our guest co-host today, Money on the Left’s own, Will Beaman.

Will Beaman

Hi, guys. How are you doing?

Scott Ferguson

As good as we can be, as good as we can be. So, we are convening today’s discussion primarily to update our listeners who maybe aren’t as online as the rest of us and maybe are not as aware of some of our publication work that we’ve been doing largely during the second Trump administration. We’ve been writing a lot. Will, in particular, has been writing a lot, and really pushing the boundaries of our paradigm and its stakes and its consequences.

We want to talk about some of these publications. I think, centrally, what we want to do — and I think it’s important to begin with — is discuss our rather lengthy new work that we published, titled “Democratic Public Finance A Radical Vision for Mamdani’s New York City.” After unpacking and situating this text, or maybe along the way, we can take detours. We can talk about some of the other writings that have surrounded this work or preceded this work.

To get us going, I’ll start by saying that Money on the Left has been developing, what I would say is, a unique but dependent paradigm, a way of approaching political economy from the point of view of certain foundational premises that we, as many people know, borrow from Modern Monetary Theory, as well as certain legal theories of money that often go under the heading of a constitutional approach to money, which was spearheaded by Christine Desan, who we’ve interviewed on this podcast in the past. I think a lot of people think of us as the MMT podcast or an MMT podcast. I think there actually is a podcast called the MMT podcast.

Will Beaman

Yeah, we don’t want to get sued.

Scott Ferguson

Yeah, yeah. We’re not that one.

Billy Saas

Would they sue us?

Scott Ferguson

I don’t know. I think we’re friends. Anyway, even though we draw on these other paradigms in many ways in solidarity with them, and we might consider ourselves as being part of them, we also have developed our own approach. It felt like there are certain kinds of assumptions and other limitations in these paradigms that we feel don’t go far enough. So, we come in peace. We’ve tried to expand, to speculate, to draw out further conclusions, to iron out certain contradictions in these other paradigms and essentially, we’ve been working on our own formulation. We all have been doing so separately and in collaboration in things like peer reviewed articles and blog posts and interviews and podcasts and all kinds of media.

But, I’d say that we don’t really have a user-friendly long form statement that just lays out the basic assumptions and our document that was published on October 10th of 2025, “Democratic Public Finance: A Radical Vision for Mamdani’s New York City” does precisely that. On the one hand, it is a strategic document that’s aimed at this particular moment, at a threshold moment where we think and we hope that Zoran Mamdani becomes the mayor of New York City.

He is still a candidate, but we wrote this document in such a way that it would be addressed to Mamdani’s mayorship. So, we’re framing this in terms of a very exciting candidacy, a very exciting moment when a democratic socialist is hopefully and probably going to be elected to this office and thinking about what he can do to help fulfill his own promises that he’s making to the city, especially when it comes to fiscal policy. But it’s a double document because it also serves as a State of the Union address for us and just laying this paradigm that we’ve been working on for years and years and years. With that in mind, where do we want to start?

Will Beaman

Well, I think maybe one place to start would be a kind of a familiar distinction that MMTers are all too familiar with, which is between Modern Monetary Theory and the neoclassical paradigm. In this document, we mobilize and extend that distinction to problems and logics of governance.

There are two poles, or co-present impulses that animate and inform governance that we name, neoliberal public finance (NPF) and democratic public finance (DPF). Part of the strategy of this document is trying to not just tease out the limitations of neoliberal public finance and the possibilities of democratic public finance, but to expand both in such a way that they can speak to and be located in rhetorics that the Mamdani campaign has variously used. One thing that we talk about in this document a lot as  part of the frame is, no, Mamdani is not going out there saying “money is a boundless public utility and the idea that we need to raise taxes in order to do things is bullshit.” There are nevertheless surpluses of possibility and opportunity in a lot of the framings that he does. In a lot of ways, the DPF and NPF framing is a little bit of a code that we try to use to decode the present.

We could say some things about the nature of the kinds of recommendations that we make with this democratic public financing framework. There’s no greater lesson in the past than realizing you’ve stumbled into fascism. This is not a new insight. It is a constantly expanding and accreting insight that neoliberalism got us here. But there are certain ways that the moves and the playbook of the Trump administration via the shakedowns of public institutions, the withholding of funds —  whether that’s illegally impounding them or threatening to do so, which has a similar effect — or it is stalling and slow walking government. 

As we record this the Trump administration is withholding Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program (SNAP) food provisioning as a means to try to pressure Democrats to stop the shutdown. All of these moves are part of a playbook of authoritarian consolidation, certainly. But the building blocks of this playbook are in some ways thoroughly neoliberal. We’ve been acculturated already into a kind of learned helplessness in the face of whatever comes down the pipe economically and so neoliberal governance or neoliberalism is already recast governance as the administration of difficult choices and austerity.

The acquisition of funds has been used for quite some time in order to manufacture crises of electability. We hear this happening in The New York Times with Mamdani. Things like, “You know, it’s good. But what if he can’t? What if he can’t convince Albany to tax the rich,” and all these kinds of things that are staging the acquisition of funds as a train that’s coming towards us. But with Trump, the mask has slipped. What we’re seeing is that the Trump administration is hijacking and choreographing with the governing habits and conventional wisdom of neoliberal public finance as a paradigm. While it’s sort of an exhausted question of, “are we still under neoliberalism or is this fascism?” but part of what I think comes out of this is that there are neoliberal habits of thought that are being enlisted by fascism. Rather than  a vocal answer of whether this is fascism or whether this is neoliberalism, it’s the dynamic between them that matters. For that reason, we see all kinds of opportunities for other logics that this document tries to open up and explore.

Scott Ferguson

I think this is a great moment to kind of step back and talk about one of the fundamental premises and differences of, what I would call, our paradigm in relationship to, let’s say, the standard articulation of Modern Monetary Theory. We know that Modern Monetary Theory has opened up all kinds of possibilities in our thinking in the collective imagination. It’s been widely popularized, obviously. At the present moment, it is not ascendant because it has been largely blamed for the so-called inflation that we’ve been experiencing, which, of course, is a reading we would utterly reject. But despite these openings there are certain tensions and even contradictions within the original paradigm, which, I just want to say, the original paradigm of MMT is not even stable.

If you’re reading Warren Mosler’s version, it’s going to look different than Stephanie Kelton’s version, which is going to look different than Bill Mitchell’s version, and so on and so on. It’s not to say that there is one absolutely airtight MMT 101 paradigm, but nevertheless, part of that MMT 101 paradigm is a commitment to a notion of sovereignty and, what they call, monetary sovereignty. What this does is relegate the power of money creation to a singular entity, at least within a given political domain that is usually called the government or the state. I think it had more historical purchase when MMT was being developed and being popularized under the Obama administration, for example, when most of the fights were happening at the federal level, and there were questions of bailouts for the financial sector. “What are we going to do with Main Street? Are we going to do the same for Main Street as we’re doing for Wall Street?” The answer was no. 

The way that the monetary sovereignty framework was articulated made sense. The political climate at the time made it easy to ignore or to not see the limitations of that framework. I’m not saying that one couldn’t or shouldn’t have found the problems with the framework before, but I do think that the political situation has forced us into thinking further. The limitations of the framework are precisely its need to relegate monetary creation powers and the possibilities of democratizing money creation to only one entity, the state at the federal level or at the highest level.

What ends up happening in MMT 101 discourse is that everybody else, all other institutions are treated as money users. Money users have to just recycle the finite funds that the government has made available. Not only does this disempower a politics of monetary creation at all other levels, both sub federal and supra federal, like internationally, not only does it incapacitate monetary politics at all those other levels, but there’s also kind of a contradiction within MMT in order to maintain this notion of monetary sovereignty. 

I’ll just try to quickly spell it out for the Modern Monetary Theory 101 paradigm, which comes out of the post Keynesian school in part, is the assumption that money is endogenous, which means it is created in the form of credit and debt out of thin air, but not just by anybody, but by powerful institutions that proceed from the public sector.

These powers are delegated out to the private sector. So, banks create credit out of thin air because they’re empowered by the state to do so. The state does so because it holds the power to do so. So, there’s this commitment to the idea that all money is endogenous. It’s all created out of thin air by institutions with the power to do so.

Great. But then if that’s the assumption, if that’s the truth, then why suddenly turn around and say “No, no, no, no, no. It’s only the federal government that can do this,” even though you, on the other page of your text, have told us that everybody does this, and you’ve certainly said this about private banks. I think what we’ve been up to is actually ironing out some of the contradictions in most articulations of MMT 101 and saying, “no, let’s take endogenous money seriously.” If it’s really endogenous all the time and it’s never finite value circulating, or it’s never an expression of the commodity form. If it’s always institutional endogenous money, then that means that money is not relegated to the function of sovereignty.

This is not to say that money isn’t a function of power. Of course it is. This is not to say that there aren’t degrees and qualities of monetary creation powers. Of course there are. But let’s stop disempowering all these other levels of governance, all these other institutions that not only could be creating money, but I would argue, they are. I would argue that states and municipalities in the United States, when they spend they are creating money. When they tax, they are taxing and buttressing the taxation power of the whole system of the dollar. They’re not mere recyclers of a finite thing. That doesn’t ever happen according to our point of view.

From that fundamental tweak and ironing out of this tension or contradiction in MMT 101, it opens up all of these possibilities for us, not just for monetary politics or monetary design in a kind of narrow sense of political economy, but also in terms of analysis of history, of political fights, of coalition building, of coalition breaking, of enduring questions and critical theory, whether that’s about aesthetics or any number of questions.

For us, we agree that money is publicly founded, it’s institutional and it’s endogenous. Let’s take that seriously and stop constraining money under the sole authority of sovereignty. In doing so, suddenly we have this wide-open field of possibilities and a wide-open field of possibilities that we would argue are vital and critical for combating authoritarianism and fascism in the United States and around the world.

Will Beaman

That’s really well said. I would add, we’re certainly not denying the importance of grappling and contending with power and authority, but in a lot of ways, what we’re arguing for is to not take power at its word as to who participates in it and who doesn’t and where agency is located and where agency is not located. When you set up these really hard binaries between who has agency and who doesn’t under “XYZ” objective conditions, and the idea of sovereignty is the epitome of this because it means exception. Exception from an overall lack of agency. The one who acts rather than the one who receives.That’s going to come back in this discussion, I think, because one of our re-framings of MMT is taking seriously reception as a point of agency too and the typical MMT story of fiscal circuits of money being spent into existence and then taxed not as functions of sovereign power, but as choreographies of issuance and reception that unfold along a lot of different contested institutions.

But just to tie this back to this critique of neoliberal public finance and the way that it establishes or to use a more phallic sovereignty metaphor, erects certain nodes or choke points or key events at which the left or liberals or the left liberal coalition has an opportunity or a window to provision society. However, it turns on whether or not we get the taxpayer to say yes or, whether or not the economy as it’s construed as a sublime external force says yes. This is not unique to MMT either. On the Superstructure podcast years ago, we were critiquing debates that were happening in the early 2020s about which theory of change is correct, as if there’s a single answer. As if change doesn’t unfold through multiple theories. Likewise, I think that the MMT’s insistence that we have this empowering mapping of where power is located and “look, at the places where it is located, it can take care of everyone.”

Nevertheless, we end up bringing back in this sort of logic of deferring possibility to the outcome of a rigged game, basically. It didn’t feel as much like a rigged game when it was 2021 and Biden seems to be a decent president compared to what I think many in the Sanders and Warren camps were expecting. But to your point, Scott, in this moment, deferral is really not an option. We also see political evidence all around us that there’s a massive appetite for politics that does not defer to some moment after the midterms or after 2028.

Billy Saas

Well, there’s something there to say about that. While it’s very exciting to consider this alongside the great success and momentum of the Mamdani campaign, there’s a certain extent of the deferral of possibility that we can also locate and attach to an electoral politics. We’re waiting for accommodation of these views by candidates and eventually people who hold office confronted, almost inevitably —  and we hope not this time —  by a kind of rhetoric of pragmatism and the inevitability of shedding possibility through the process of lawmaking and presiding and what democratic public finance also enables us to do is to look at those smaller scale avowedly non sovereign. There is no, or typically not, an army or an armed force behind the creation and circulation of complementary currencies within communities and so helping us at the same time as we encourage and continue to participate in a our own kind of realist way with electoral politics, we also look at and get excited about smaller scale interventions from the bottom up. 

That is, I think, ultimately what small “d” democrats, people who believe in democratic politics and governance, where we can almost immediately locate our agency and opportunities for participation. So, at the same time as there’s a kind of narrowing function of neoliberal public finance, everything leads to the decision of the sovereign. The sovereign is never going to accommodate, never really going to give grace, or maybe rarely and in limited form. Democratic public finance gives us a much broader path with many more forks and possibilities.

Scott Ferguson

That’s right, that’s right. I’m going to read a little bit of the intro. This isn’t the exact beginning of the text, but just to give a flavor of the text, and we will obviously provide links in the show notes for all of our listeners who haven’t been tracking our website, but largely interface with us through their ears. Here it goes:

“This document argues that building a just future requires shifting from the reigning ideology of Neoliberal Public Finance (NPF) to Democratic Public Finance (DPF). NPF constrains democratic possibilities by perpetuating the idea that money is always private, uncontrollable, and scarce. If money is scarce, so too are housing or jobs. NPF seems natural and almost unassailable, both as law and as a mode of framing collective life. It underwrites the neoliberal habit of acquiescence, which trains politicians and publics to treat fiscal sabotage as an impersonal event to be managed, not contested.

DPF, by contrast, asserts that money is an unlimited and disputable public good which can always be reorganized to serve people and the environment.”

And recall here that’s “reorganize,” not finding the money to spend for your big-ticket items.

“For DPF, money is an inexhaustible institution, involving an always ongoing and deeply public process through which societies mobilize their capacities and create their future. Imagine a city where public banks extend zero-interest credit to retrofit housing, or where a Job Guarantee program is financed through democratic credit issuance. This is the vision of DPF: not scarcity, but capacity; not limits, but collective potential.”

So that’s a nice and relatively coherent and powerful articulation of this contrast that we’re setting up. The document goes on to talk about the ways that we break up different aspects of democratic public finance as an alternative to neoliberal public finance and those four —  what we call —  strategic areas. Of course, they’re all connected. Just for the sake of writing, conceptualizing, and talking about politicizing, we name these four strategic areas. One more thing I’ll say is that each area is, at least from a conventional point of view, potentially more challenging than the next.

Now, ideological conditions could shift in what counts as the most challenging. But at the present moment, we conceive of these being ranked in order of the easiest to pursue to the hardest to pursue. So, number one is “Reframing Debt Issuance and Taxation” according to the paradigm of democratic public finance. So, all that’s doing is pointing out that these tools that everybody knows about, nobody’s arguing about whether New York City or Minneapolis, or a small county in Nevada, taxes or issues debt. They all do it. It’s a question of what it means and what are the politics surrounding it and what really are questions of responsibility and risk around these instruments. Our argument would be: that needs to be rethought and reframed.

The second category is “Mobilizing People Differently: Public Sector Expansion, the Public School System, and the Multiplicity of Credits.” This is where we talk about how monetary credits across scales of different degrees of receivability, capacity, and power are always being used in all kinds of ways to mobilize people. This is the case for airline miles. This is the case for Starbucks gift cards. This is the case for municipal fiscal policy. It’s happening all the time. But we’re suggesting that the public sector needs to get creative about the way that it actually designs systems of accreditation or of crediting that may not entirely be about high powered dollars, but nevertheless have strong, democratic, supportive, caring capacities that can work in tandem with fights over the spending, but more specifically, design and creation of high powered dollars.

Then we have category three: “Creating Public Banking and Payments Infrastructure.” We, at Money on the Left, clearly have investments in a major public banking initiative and legislation at the federal level, and also democratizing our payment system as well at the federal level. But you don’t have to just do it at the federal level. You can do it at the state level. You can also do it at the city level and at the municipal level. We’re moving into even more active, high-power dollar design, with category three. 

Category four is arguably the most challenging and that is actually: “Challenging the Deep Structure of Neoliberal Finance in Municipal, State & Federal Law.” This is us, in a way, taking our advance on MMT to the maximal level. So, I would say most of the time, MMT 101 discourse tends to take the design of the current system more or less for granted and sometimes this comes out in tropes that have been questioned within the MMT 101 movement. But there are framings like, “oh, we’re just describing what exists. We’re not saying we need a new system. We’re just telling you how it works, and you can use this system if you know how it works, you can use it for other purposes and you can do nice things with it.” Whereas we want to say, “no, no, no, there are design trajectories and constraints that are built into the system that should not be there.” 

The Constitution of the United States should not forbid sub-federal entities from creating money. That’s anti-democratic. It’s especially anti-democratic because the same federal legal structure allows for private institutions to create private credit all over these municipalities. Right? So, you’re licensing and enabling private creditors, you’re disabling public creditors. I would also say that that language in the Constitution is false, because I would say that public institutions at the federal level do actually circulate credit. They do that all the time in all kinds of different forms. So even though you might say, “oh, well, it’s against the law for a state to issue credit or to create money,” I would say they do it all the time. This is a controversial claim, but nevertheless, I think this is our position.

This fourth section is really about getting at those deep legal structures and saying those are social constructs. They were social constructs that were constructed out of struggles for power. If the left wants to really, really, really revolutionize the system and create conditions of possibility that are going to allow for genuine democracy and collective caretaking and contestation, you have to go after these deep legal structures. So, that’s the four areas. I don’t know if you all want to start with one and move toward four. Where do we want to go from here?

Billy Saas

Maybe we can move into discussion of each of them through reference to Will’s prolific article and commentary. Maybe we could pivot to that.

Will Beaman

So, I will say that because everything that we do is a collective project. All of this that we’re talking about in this document has been showing up in what I’ve been writing and, to some extent, vice versa. That’s just how collectivity works. But I would say that my madness at the beginning of the summer started with being, honestly, hypnotized by the rhetoric and communication and sophisticated aesthetic forms of the Mamdani campaign.

One of the first pieces that I wrote this summer about that, “How to New York Times-proof the Mamdani Campaign,” was, in a lot of ways, taking up the theme in the first section: capacity being where we should focus our analysis rather than on the amount of dollars that are located here and there and need to be gathered. That, of course, is very MMT 101. If you have the real resources you can afford it and money is just a unit of account. But I think there are ways of describing capacity as a process of humanization that are less developed but present everywhere. This is something that I think the Mamdani campaign does really, really well.

In that particular piece, I talked about an ad that he did after he won the Democratic primary, where he sort of broke down all of the different demographic cultural, geographic, you name it, components of his victory. In doing so, he was able to not just —  refute is not even the right word because it was so much more profound than that —  reframe Beltway pundit conversation about the conventional horizons of possibility for this or that kind of politics with this or that group of voters or voters in general, but also getting away from that very macro and reductive caricature of what is politically possible and what is considered fringe to voters as a bloc.

This video that Mamdani did basically answered in a different way how he paid for it. How did he pay for the win? This opened up another theme that I was sort of thinking about and exploring this summer, which is that, a campaign sits in a sort of a liminal space that it often occupies in our own kind of mapping of things. It’s outside of politics. Right? It’s the stuff that happens before you’re in power, so it doesn’t really count. It also is largely volunteer work. It’s off the books. It’s not part of the economy either and yet it’s a massive logistical operation with a history and with capacities. A successful campaign does what successful fiscal authority does, which is creatively reread public capacities. I drew an analogy in that piece between the way that he was talking about and breaking down the various public capacities that paid for his win. What if this was extended to how he spoke about fiscal policy through governance? This is something that, to a certain extent, we can see traces of what both he and, frankly, lots of politicians are doing already.

We want to affirm that and highlight it and connect it to a project of giving that kind of rhetoric it’s due in fiscal terms. Something that I have not yet been able to write about, because I’m now fighting for my life and my doctoral program, is a lot of his videos since then. This is drawing on my past experiences in Scott’s Film and Media Studies MA program. I’ve been hypnotized in a very similar way by how he uses the close up in this series that he’s been doing, where he tells stories of famous New Yorkers and he tells them in close up, and they often are individuals who, in this or that way, are marginalized. But the close up, as we, in film studies, know from a long tradition of writing about the humanizing qualities of the close up and of photography, has this ability to cut through preconceived reductive notions that we have about people. The close up confers dignity as well as opacity and mystery and complexity on to individuals and onto people who we otherwise think of as individuals, or we think of them as part of a group or whatever.

In an interdependent world, there are so many things that we can say about ourselves and about others. There’s this tradition in our cinema of using the close up to open up complexity rather than close it. In light of this kind of conversation about real capacity, I thought, this visual language that he’s using is light years ahead of the kinds of rhetoric that we’re used to hearing and participating in about how many hard-working Americans there are in this country. The kind of nascent or underdeveloped ways of talking about economic capacity and, in this way also, I think, because we do come from a humanities tradition, there is a skepticism that we have about enlisting people as parts of a top-down notion of capacity. It’s something we have been in group therapy for several years. Saying, “well, you’re an economic asset,” as if to reduce. 

In so much of Mamdani rhetoric, by focusing in the visual language of the eye contact and the close up and the storytelling and the way that he tells another person’s story, both you and that person, because the direct address in these close ups is ambiguous, he does so as the government or as a public representative. Talk about transcending the confessional mode. To me it has been opening up a world of thinking about all the different ways that we already humanize people in visual and aesthetic and rhetorical forms and how tragically disconnected that often is from the language that we use to talk about what we can do as a city. Or what we can do as a society and a culture in ways that interface directly with fiscal politics? That’s one throughline that shows up also in this document that we all collectively worked on, which says basically, it’s the capacity that you need to pay attention to.

We already build the city every day. We don’t need a permission slip from somebody who sees themselves in mutually exclusive terms as the taxpayer, or the benevolent billionaire who will create jobs, but only if you’re not rude. We don’t need to route our own self-understanding through those dehumanizing prisms and chokepoints.

A big part of the first section that’s really important to me is identifying within Mamdani’s own rhetoric both ways that he’s already talking about capacity that shift the conversation away intuitively from “how are you going to pay for it?” because once you’ve done an entire campaign talking about all the ways that something is physically and materially and socially, culturally, etc. possible to do, then for “how you pay for it?” to come in at the 11th hour reads as more transparently sabotage than it does in the kind of current neoliberal mode of politics where we take it for granted that “how you pay for it monetarily” is basically a proxy for how you pay for it materially, because all material things have to be paid for, therefore, paying for something monetarily is basically just another way of saying, “can we do this?” And the answer then is always “no,” because Albany says no.

Scott Ferguson

Another part of what you’re talking about that I find to be so powerful, and it is something that is in Mamdani’s rhetoric and with even further amplification and connecting it to fiscal politics, can be just so vital, is really revaluing people. In this case, in New York City, people that are currently —  under the neoliberal order and the fascist neoliberal order —  seen as liabilities, as drains on the system as they drain away our tax dollars by using their SNAP benefits. Instead, seeing our community members who might be struggling with employment or who might be struggling with finding a secure home, revaluing them as assets that are not being utilized. Seeing them as qualitatively rich, interesting community members that we’re just abandoning and we’re failing to value.

To be honest, I would say that’s even latent in MMT 101 as well. I think the way that Mamdani is using his communication strategies, his rhetoric and his policy framings is pushing us more in that direction. Now, I want to leave to another related topic in which I would say, at least on the face of it, it’s less of an analogy to money, but it’s Mamdani getting closer and closer to money. Now, I don’t think any of us think that “there’s money in itself and then there’s other things that are not money.” You know, we understand that sort of everything is money. Nevertheless, right over the summer and into the fall, Mamdani has been using certain proto or just straight up monetary designs in order to mobilize people. One of them is something called the Zetro card. Does somebody want to unpack the Zetro card and what he’s been doing with the Zetro card?

Will Beaman

Sure. We wrote another piece at some point in the past few weeks about that, which was sort of a tongue in cheek, a serious / not serious / but actually serious piece saying that the Zetro card could be scaled up and used to save New York City.

And what is the Zetro card? It began early in the campaign. It’s a very playful punch card that is obviously a pun on the Metro card, but with Z for Zoran, and this is a kind of an interesting detail of it. It emerged as a way for the campaign to sell merch beyond their legal allowance to do so. What this was was if you participate in canvasses and phone banks and whatever, the Zetro credits are issued and you can trade those in for posters and and merchandise, and it’s such a great example of what we’ve been calling a duck rabbit problem, named after the famous optical illusion from like 100 years ago. It is that image where you look and ask if it is a duck or is it a rabbit? It depends on which you see first, but after you see one, you probably are then going to see the other and then you can see both. It’s such a great figure for this paradigm, where, on the one hand, this is a punch card and this is just moving posters. Who cares? It’s playful and it’s fun. But on the other hand, it does have all the elements of the entire thing that we’re pitching already in miniature, right? Right down to the fact that it began as a creative workaround to legal limits.

Also, I think it exploits, in a good way, the category error that something being part of a campaign does for people, where you hear, “Well, it’s not real though, so why would we even scrutinize this?” That cuts both ways, right? Like, we had a lot of people saying like, “dude, I’m pretty sure it’s just a punch card,” and fair enough. It is just a punch card. And yet it also is not right. You see the punch card, rabbit or you see the endogenous money duck.

Scott Ferguson

And, dude, those fed notes are just like pieces of paper.

Will Beaman

Yeah. It’s all just bitcoin. What we actually have is a fiscal circuit. That is, credit being issued and redeemed in order to provision work and mobilize capacity. What we talked about in that piece is we sort of mocked up what it might look like to continue the Zetro card as a campaign practice after the campaign is over.

This draws on legibilities like the Bernie Sanders campaign, which talked about campaigning as something that you do year-round. AOC talks about this as well. One of the reasons that she always performs so well in her district despite being probably the most caricatured and villainized politician in the country, is they never let up on the infrastructure of communication and engagement with their constituents, including but also beyond, of course, all the ways that you would help your constituents during your day job when you’re a politician. But they also never stopped canvassing. They never stopped campaigning. I would argue there is precedent for that. But we thought through what some sort of micro steps could be that are still in the realm of being playful. To be clear, fiscal policy should be playful.

How can we be playful until we pull the wool out from over their eyes? I could very easily imagine a lot of the organizations that make up the Mamdani coalition accepting Zetro credits in exchange for part or full payments of membership dues, of ways to deepen participation in an organization to get opportunities for speaking time at meetings, to gain access to certain leadership positions.

All of these, of course, raise all kinds of ethical dilemmas to work through, but these are the same ethical dilemmas that already exist in organizations, which is —  it’s sort of is the classic problem —  when you say that there’s that there’s no hierarchy, you leave it up to all the implicit hierarchies in the world to decide who gets access to what.

Who you know and who you have good credit with becomes a way of controlling and gatekeeping one’s way of relating to opportunity within an organization. This is similar to employment. We thought initially of some first steps that the Zetro card could take in coalition with partnering institutions.

One could also imagine worker-owned co-ops and restaurants and DSA bars that are frequented and run by members accepting these on a particular day and then that turns into a full-time thing and so on. But what’s really kind of interesting in thinking about this is that it can scale and it can keep scaling in very kind of non-linear and cascading and unpredictable ways, because if this were to become a very popular thing, one could imagine co-ops and unions and organization chapters and other campaigns, even, accepting Zetro credits and maybe issuing their own credits, which then can be accepted by the same organizations that accept Zetro credits. Right. Then all of this can eventually interface with the kind of longer-term legal changes and transformations that we’re trying to loosen the always loose and imperfect distinction between what is the official and the unofficial currency, because they’re predicated on a falsehood.

What does it mean to issue money versus just issue credit? What is a harmless gaming currency and what is shadow banking? All these things that are malleable, but that we’re used to thinking of their malleability as being a function of the fact that it’s the rich and the powerful who promote these things. The Zetro card is an ongoing campaign technology. I hope that it continues after the campaign ends, but it also is just an interesting kind of pedagogical thought experiment for thinking through and living and embodying this way of seeing fiscal policy.

It also is just so emblematic of Mamdani’s whole style, which is to introduce playfulness and games. We can talk about the famous scavenger hunt that he did in New York City as well. But these games that provision a campaign, they provision participation and nurture capacity and keep people limbered up and ready to get out to vote and ready to volunteer and keep those keep that muscle memory fresh.

Scott Ferguson

I think another thing that the Zetro card participates in and opens up is, what MMT discourse gets called, the hierarchy of money. The fact is that the campaign used higher power dollar credits, which they got through donations to pay vendors to make the merch. Then they’re redeeming the Zetro card credits by giving people this merch, but that merch wasn’t free. I think the lessons here are multiple. One is, for us, there’s no such thing as autonomous money. There’s no autonomy at the level of the so-called sovereign. There’s no autonomy at the level of a community currency or a Zetro card. It’s interdependence all the way up and down. So, get rid of the dream of autonomy, it doesn’t work. 

Two, its lower-level credit is always participating in higher level credit and vice versa. Higher level just means more receivability, more, what we call liquidity, wider receivability and with that comes power. With that comes capacitation. But still the lower forms of credit are not nothing. I think we want to get past this idea that, “oh, well, at the end of the day, you know, what matters is real dollars, buy the merch and all this fuzzy, silly credit that’s being issued and redeemed to this Zetro card is a bunch of hot air, right?” Or it’s not really real, when in fact, no, that’s actually how the dollar system works all the time. It plays out through this interdependent hierarchy and those so-called lower-level orders are qualitatively different. But I would say they are just as important. They’re just as important. I mean, this was really noticeable in the 18th and 19th century when you had different banks issuing their own liabilities.

Then you would have all of these complicated payment schedules and redeemability. There would be charts that tell that the Bank of X’s notes are only worth this much when you go into that state. It was a total mess. But you had a sense that without your local bank that creates the credits, you’re fucked, right? Like those lower-level credits that might not be quite as stable are still your lifeblood. Coming back to all the activity that the Zetro card mobilizes in one of the most important cities on the planet, it is tremendous. So that lower-level credit is deeply, deeply meaningful. It’s political. It can be democratized. You can be creative with it, but not in a way that pretends that it’s somehow autonomous or that you don’t have to deal with those higher-level credit issues at the same time.

Will Beaman

That’s fantastic. One other thing that I would add before we move on is, I think that whether it’s the Zetro card or the scavenger hunt that Zoran did over the summer, I think we make a mistake if we make the sovereignty mistake. If we attribute these just to the charisma of Mamdani, or just to how infectious his smile is and all of that. In order for a smile to be infectious, we have to want to smile. It demonstrates that there is a deep capacity that that I suspect has a history of in politics that, for fiscal politics, politics of participation and circuits of coordinated activity in the public interest that are not on the rhythm of taxpayer funding showdowns and the impoundments of funds and what did Donald Trump say and how are the markets going to react to it? All that kind of stuff. 

I think in a lot of ways, what Mamdani is recognizing is that there is an already existing desire for somebody to charismatically convene people to have fun. Something else that I’ve been writing about in the context of brat summer with the Kamala Harris campaign and Dark Brandon before that, the caricature of Biden, is that the coalition will come up with charisma for you even if you don’t have it. There are genres, and camp is a big one for moments when there’s a big gap between who the politician is and who you want them to be. There are genres that are rehearsed and practiced and that are activated again and again that signal and extend the charisma and the authority to convene people to politicians on the condition that they don’t suck. On the condition that they don’t betray the coalition. I think that this is what differentiates Mamdani, obviously, from Harris and Biden.

I think that Harris and Biden saw their star power as somehow a reflection on themselves, rather than as a long-cultivated expression and desire on the part of voters for a Dark Brandon or for a brat figure, or for any of these figures. So, I think that, were Mamdani to take this all for granted and pivot to the center, my hunch is that people would stop showing up for the scavenger hunts. I think that this provides an alternative framework in very rough, hand-wavy terms, to get at what I think sovereignty is always trying to get at, which is this authority as differentiation, as seeming ability to convene people. But if we misread that as power from outside society ordering society around, then we take for granted all the ongoing coordination and cooperation and fantasy and desire on the part of people that makes authority work. When we think in these terms, then we can see Trump’s fiscal politics as an extension of his whole persona, which is something that the far right has been rehearsing since Obama, or earlier than Obama. This desire for a sovereign for a Dirty Harry-type figure who’s going to be lawless and ruthless and hypocritical and all of that means, basically, that you’re going to be protected as a follower from being held accountable because you too are unaccountable.

That’s a certain form of governance and of authority, or a currency, if you will. But it’s not the only one. It’s actually really important to be attentive to it as a genre rather than as the new political world that we’re living in where everybody needs to copy Trump, which is, I think, how Gavin Newsom, for example, has read this moment. When we see these moments of a star just seemingly emerging out of nowhere as something more like a franchise that has been rehearsed from the bottom up or maybe we would say from the middle out, to be granted with conditions, or without conditions in the case of Trump, although I bet if Trump started to respect other people, the franchise would shut him down. There are even still conditions there too, right?

Scott Ferguson

Right. We should say just outright, his unaccountability is a collective project. It’s not coming from an autonomous place of absolute power that everybody just bends the knee to. It’s that there is a whole infrastructure of people and organizations who carry out that unaccountability collectively, because that’s what they want to happen. Right? It’s the same structure, but it’s just used for evil.

Will Beaman

In the context of a little experiment, like the scavenger hunt or the Zetro card or looking at a campaign and turnout as being like a miniature fiscal event or a miniature employment event, we can maybe think, or we can rethink a lot of the sovereignty-derived insights of MMT, like the finance franchise being an extension of sovereign power to banks from the fiscal authority.

If we see the fiscal authority itself not as a sovereign in itself, but as a collective public project, then we are able to see genres and forms of franchise as collective public projects as well. I think that that’s just another bridge that sort of allows us to do an end run around this whole thing and connect these seemingly nonpolitical or superfluous or silly campaign techniques before so-called power has been taken to governance and authority.

Billy Saas

I wanted to add that I think what the Trump constituency that was ready to realize the franchise was responding to is that he’s willing to hang out with them for extended periods of time and just shoot the bull for hours and hours at these campaigns. Maybe we can round out the conversation by coming to two of the more recent Vertical pieces, one of which very helpfully categorizes or names within the realm of democratic public finance what the Mamdani campaign is up to and what other campaigns and what other constituencies can aspire to, which is fiscal insurgency. This is a phrase that I like quite a lot and that captures and describes what we’ve been talking about. So, I wonder if we can talk a little bit about fiscal insurgency as a kind of broad framework within a framework. Maybe we can close out with a more recent piece on “The Paradox of Political Thrift” and maybe, not to game out Mamdani’s chances, but we can take stock of the scene and note all of the idiosyncrasies and exciting developments we can notice here in the end of October 2025.

Will Beaman

Yeah, absolutely. So that one is my term, but it expresses a lot of the same things that we are expressing in the DPF and NPF concepts in the “Mam-document” that we’ve been circulating. Listener, I want you to know that both of my co-hosts laughed, but they’re on mute.

Scott Ferguson

I’ve unmuted so I can guffaw audibly.

*laughs*

Will Beaman

Okay. Thank you. These [laughs] are my back pay. I’m playing with the idea of insurgency and occupation here. I mean, I’m not really playing with it. I’m obviously thinking about it for very reasonable reasons. Typically, we think of an insurgency as sort of a military term, and we often lose sight of what makes insurgent campaigns successful, whether they’re peaceful or not. To be absolutely clear, we are peaceful. We come in peace in all ways. It is a recognition that you have to be embedded in society, and you have to look to and lean upon infrastructures that already exist.

I think that what we have been articulating in the “Mam-document” and also in a lot of these other Vertical pieces and in this conversation, is that agency is actually all around us. If we take the neoliberals or the fascists at their word, that agency is over there, not over here —  wherever “here” may be —  then we end up being duped by a rigged playbook. So, in a context where Trump is threatening to impound funds or when the state of New York and Albany was, in a liberal idiom, threatening to withhold funds for Mamdani’s plans, it changes the entire dynamic of that situation. One could model and conduct and enact fiscal agency without routing it through these rigged choke points. Fiscal insurgency is my name for that. It’s ultimately a historical phenomenon that we see in places where, for political or for economic reasons too, like in the Great Depression, if credit is not available to employ people to keep patterned payments that stabilize social obligations moving, in those contexts, if all that dries up, people still need that and the fact that credit is endogenous comes out in all kinds of ways. 

The Greenback, during the Civil War, was issued when private banks were unable and unwilling to finance the union’s survival and tax dollars were not enough, the Army was mobilized, and the war effort was mobilized with these things called Greenbacks. World War Two, we had a bond drive. In the Great Depression, we have all kinds of, so-called, low-level currencies that emerged as municipal notes. Before that, in the 19th century, banknotes were all over the place, some of them on a very crypto-style imaginary, being these entrepreneurial institutions on the literal frontier of American imperialism out West. There was a free banking movement. You also had lots of credit experiments and rhetorics of talking about money that were grappling with ethics and grappling with interdependence and grappling with real problems of liquidity being absent.

Fiscal insurgency is – and I’ll just I’ll quote from this from this piece here:

“Fiscal insurgency is not isolation. It is not about retreating into localism or walling off states from the national economy. It is about building protective circuits of credit that keep democratic life functioning even when sabotage is staged from above. Insulation means refusing to let billionaires or authoritarian actors dictate the terms of survival.”

I also think that this contrasts very sharply with Gavin Newsom. He’s a very mixed bag, and ultimately, a lot of the wavering on transphobia and on civil rights is disqualifying full stop, but Gavin Newsom has sort of become an early emblem of Democratic local electeds creatively resisting the Trump administration.

Pushing back on Trump’s redistricting is obviously good, but there is, I think, an overall vibe of countering Trump’s illegality with the same until he backs down. “We’re going to fight fire with fire identically.” A lot of the rhetoric that’s been coming out of Newsom’s office and among his boosters is throwing around ideas like “if we stop funding the federal government in order to teach the red states a lesson,” or proposing different versions of what they call a “soft secession.” As an aside, it’s mind boggling to me that you can talk about soft secession and not make as many waves as when you talk about creating credit. I should say ruffles as many feathers. I wish you could create waves talking about creating credit.

I think that this framework of fiscal insurgency refuses zero sum logics and doesn’t try to counteract them by saying, “well, actually, it’s the Trump administration who represents the welfare queens of society, which is all of the places in Appalachia and Mississippi who are voting for Trump, but if it weren’t for the taxpayers in California, they wouldn’t have jobs or health care.” The other thing that the idea of insurgency is sort of trying to answer is that — and this goes back to the scavenger hunt —  it is possible to claim continuity and stability as a form of resistance. I think that the left’s playbook often, especially owing to a lot of inheritances from the Marxist tradition and the labor movement and all of that, has a very mixed legacy of both. I want to differentiate between instances that I think are not always differentiated between. There’s strikes and striking and the withholding of labor.

To be clear, I love a strike and support a strike. But there are also instances where workers have staged takeovers of factories, and they’ve done various things to keep the world running rather than stop it. I would want to trouble this binary between keeping the world running and stopping it anyway. Right now, we’re in the middle of a government shutdown that’s absolutely necessary in order to put pressure on the incentive structure of the Republican Party and the political infrastructure that supports it. There’s all kinds of reasons why strikes are incredibly effective in doing that, but when you import that logic to money and you think about, “well, our only tool in the toolkit must be to stop paying taxes, which fund all spending and bring everything to a halt,” you’re playing into the Trump playbook, which is showdowns. These are showdowns predicated on money being finite. I see opportunities and openings for a rhetoric of fiscal insurgency in the improvisations and coordinated efforts of blue state governors, but I also see neoliberal public finance present too.

That is my idea with the fiscal insurgency and maybe, Scott, if you want to tie that back to the Mamdani document before we go on to the other Vertical piece, I don’t want that to fall by the wayside.

Scott Ferguson

Yeah, I think that one of the things that this brings to mind is the multiple time horizons that we have in mind in structuring the “Mam-document,” which I’m just going to constantly say for eternity.

Will Beaman

The term is going to be in the show notes.

Scott Ferguson

Yeah. So, on the one hand, we offer strategies for immediate needs. In terms of legibility, those are the lowest hanging fruit, which would start with just reframing the function of taxation. There’s a massive tax the rich campaign in New York City, right now, and we support it. Every billionaire is a policy failure that remains true. Tax the hell out of them. In the short term, that is going to, as we can put it in a technical sense, increase your dollar balances, New York City. You can spend those high-powered dollars to build municipal grocery stores and make fast, free, and easily accessible buses and more.

In terms of bond issuance, we have something we haven’t talked about yet. Early on in this year, we were trying to think of immediate, legible fiscal strategies for resisting the Trump administration and resisting what was at that point, largely illegal impoundments that were cutting federal financing for vital services and institutions that help people live and work and have homes and eat and have health care. So, we proposed a bond drive to save democracy, and we called it and still are calling it blue bonds. A blue bonds bond drive. Blue for democratically controlled states because we associate the Democratic Party with the color blue. So, we’re calling them blue bonds for that reason.

Those are immediate strategies for getting high powered dollars into action to help people now. But we also have longer time horizons and more long-term strategies. One is challenging these fundamental laws, balanced budget amendments in state constitutions. When it comes to New York City, the so-called fiscal crisis of 1975, was one of the watersheds that ushers in the neoliberal era. It came along with a lot of new constrictive neoliberal fiscal laws about how much debt the city can issue in the future. All kinds of rules about budgeting to rein it in and keep it under control. Those rules were created by humans. They can be recreated by humans; they can be restructured by humans. But those are long term fights. They’re not going to be immediately legible to the public. But if you have a movement that is legible around, say, a Mamdani administration, then you imagine a way in which those long-term fights get introduced and become more and more exciting and more and more legible.

But there’s other long-term horizons that aren’t just about resistance but are about provisioning. This gets us back to area two, mobilizing people differently through creating credit at the sub federal level. We’ve been talking a lot about this at the level of the campaign, at the level of organizations. I love that you just passingly mentioned DSA bars that will create and redeem these credits, but we also have long term vital institutions in the city and everywhere else, quite frankly, that we can be reorganizing and thinking in terms of endogenous credit making. The big example that we give in the “Mam-document” is using the public school system.

So, the public school system is, in multiple senses, an accrediting institution. Students earn credits by going to school and by completing their schoolwork and by becoming educated. The schools themselves are a credit. They’re given credit to operate as schools by accrediting agencies that are themselves accredited by the government to be able to make those accrediting gestures in the first place.

There’s a whole hierarchy of crediting here, and you don’t need to build them from scratch. They’re already here. What happens if you start thinking more in terms of a public service economy and thinking about an end aim being something like a Green New Deal that has a public service component and a job guarantee at the heart of it.

So why not start in kindergarten? Why not start in first grade, second grade and start to do little baby steps here? Literally almost. Babies are almost literally baby steps toward public service. It’s not just a matter of providing institutional credit that isn’t dollars, but institutional credit for service labor. That’s going to benefit the school; benefit the society around the school, the neighborhoods around the school. It’s not just a matter of doing that, but it’s also a matter of being creative along the way. I love this, and this was not me. I didn’t come up with this. It was another member of our organization.

I love this example so much. So, the idea that we propose is this: you start a program where grade schoolers are helping to clean up their classrooms and their hallways. Right? And you know what? They already do this in Japan, and they probably do this in some places in the United States. But it’s not as routinized as it is in Japan. I’ve seen it with my own eyes. It’s incredible. Maybe the younger kids mostly take care of the immediate classroom and the hallways. But maybe the older kids are going off campus. They’re maintaining and beautifying the environment around their campus.

It doesn’t have to be just that. It can be any number of public service activities. I mean, it could be fun things. The sky’s the limit, right? But you’re providing various kinds of credit and that could be just your participation grade. It gets factored in your participation grade. Or it could be something more major, like, “here’s a certificate for a year’s worth of public service.” It could be any number of ways of accrediting and this such a cool idea as a specific idea, but as a model, it’s to me amazing.

So, if you’re having kids doing, let’s say, what might count as janitorial work, right? Well, then what’s going on with the janitorial staff on campus? Well, the janitorial staff are the experts. They know what cleaning products work on which surfaces. You might think Windex is a good idea, but actually this other scrub is a good idea and use this kind of rag because this other kind of rag isn’t going to work. They have expertise. Why don’t we enlist the janitorial staff as pedagogues, as teachers who can teach, who can teach and help supervise and orchestrate this kind of work. The next part we do with a nod to the Mamdani campaign which is promising to reclassify preschool teachers as teachers that will give them the dignity of a certain status with certain kinds of benefits. I don’t know the ins and outs of it; I just know the basic move that they’re trying to make. What if, as part of this reorganization of crediting public service work, we change the designation and give a new kind of credit to janitorial staff? Now the janitorial staff are teachers and maybe the culinary staff, like the people who work in the cafeteria, maybe they get to be pedagogues, too and they’re teaching. They’re teaching cooking and place setting and cleaning up after everybody dines. What does that do? That can raise the pay, that can create certain kinds of tenure benefits for janitorial and cooking staff.

Suddenly you’re conferring new kinds of dignity, new kinds of credit in an institution that’s already enduring and powerful that a lot of people in society really, really value. They value the fact that they have these public schools, which are free, and they can trust to send their children to even though we’re in the midst of them being increasingly defunded, etc.

So, what would it mean to build up a scenario like that? To be transvaluing the people who participate along the way and essentially recreating the class structure that’s built into our public school system at the present. Then we can start thinking about, “if we’re taxing, we’re issuing bonds, and what if we’re creating a public banking system and opening up our higher power dollar balances at the same time.” If we’re working on that horizon at the same time, then we could start talking about a job guarantee at the level of the city.

So maybe that starts out of the school system, as there’s a teen unemployment crisis around the country right now, and there’s definitely one in New York City that they’re very aware of. What if you start a pilot job guarantee for whoever qualifies as the most vulnerable of teens in New York City? You start there.

You see how it goes. Maybe there’s a path to post-graduation employment. Maybe that path is subsidized. Maybe it’s in the public sector. Maybe it’s with nonprofits, with the public sector, supplementing the salaries for a certain amount of time or in perpetuity for these jobs. Then from there, maybe you expand it to all teens, whatever it is, 16- to 18-year-olds, or whatever we want to decide it’s going to be. 16- to 18-year-olds in New York City are guaranteed a public job.

Then from there you start piloting, opening it up to more and more people and then once you’re really rolling, it becomes a citywide job guarantee organized toward the goals of social justice, inclusion, community building and green sustainability. To me, and I’m saying this because I didn’t write this part of the document, that is such a powerful vision of not just what’s possible, like in a particular sector, but for what’s possible in general.

I think what we were talking about before with the Zetro card and coalition credits is equally a part of this project. But I do think that the education model might speak or might light up imaginations for certain people precisely because these feel like long existing stable institutions can support it, without having to build it from the ground up. Not that I’m opposed to building from the ground up either.

Will Beaman

I’m salivating listening to that. That’s amazing. It occurs to me that this also resonates in a really interesting way with a theme of this campaign and the very contested discourse which is another institutional logic of carcerality and the way that a lot of how Mamdani has framed his reforms to the police state is in terms of, “well, police fight violent crime, they’re not they shouldn’t be social workers. That’s not fair to expect of them.” Of course, we should say that there’s tons of really important work and thinking and activism around creeping carceral logics that are present within the school system. So I don’t want to oppose them as institutions that are lived in, but the vision of schooling that you are referring to as one that views pedagogy in such a broad way that it enfolds a lot of work that people do as also being pedagogical work, sits alongside this other discourse that we’ve been having, which is how the solution to everything is to arrest people and put them in prisons. It’s interesting because I think this is another case where there’s sort of subtle discourse already happening about classification, which of course ties back to our earlier conversation about valuing assets and the dignity that attention to some of the pedagogy that everybody in a school setting is participating in, which is often subsumed or erased by this fraught and racialized imaginary of care work that is invisible, “but I don’t know who’s around my kids” and all of that kind of stuff. This is, to me, a different way of conceiving care as pedagogy, I love it. I’m all about it.

Scott Ferguson

We should probably also say something about, strategic area three of the document: “Creating Public Alternatives to Commercial Banking and Payments.” We are supporters of the public banking movement. We’ve been outspoken supporters at the federal level. Of The Public Banking Act. This kind of politics of public banking should be taken to the state or municipal level.

We’re not alone in this. There’s a whole public banking movement that also is interested in this as well. Connected to this is also developing a public payment system, what has been dubbed like a public Venmo. We’re really following a friend of the show, Robert Hockett, Cornell law professor who has worked with various politicians at the state level in New York and has written legislation that has not passed yet but has been proposed several times. So, we’re really piggybacking on Hackett’s work and all the supporters of Hackett’s work to create public banking and to create these public payment systems. In the research that we did, it seems like even though this was all proposed at the state level. By the way, Mamdani has, as an official, supported those. This is not news to Mamdani.

Will Beaman

The horizon of it might be news, the horizon that we want to do and how it leads to a complementary currency and all of that.

Scott Ferguson

Yeah, exactly. In our research, it seems like there’s a possibility in which you don’t have to get Albany fully on board for the full bill for establishing a New York state public banking system. You would only need Albany to add an amendment to a specific clause in state law, which essentially bars corporations from acting as banks and the amendment would just be, you know, “except for New York City’s public bank.” It would just exempt it. That still would be a fight. If you had the “tax the rich” energy behind that fight, then that fight might be winnable. What happens when you have a public bank? 

Well suddenly you can bank all the unbanked people. You can push the private industries that are currently serving and exploiting those people, like the payday lending industry and the credit card industry, who are taking these vulnerable people who don’t have money and don’t have banking resources, and charging them through the nose with high interest rates that they cannot afford.

To have a public bank, you can immediately include people who have been excluded. You can also create a whole system of public investment that is predicated on low or no interest loans, and we’d have to look into the legality of all this. The major requirements for the loans are primarily to realize specific qualitative social and ecological goals. If you realize those goals, then you can continue to get low or no interest loans from the public bank. So you can democratize and socialize investment in that way while pushing out exploitative, private financial firms. Then the payments system side of this also has been developed as a legal framework by Robert Hockett, again at the state level.

If you’re pursuing a public bank at the level of New York City, you then will have the legal framework that opens up the possibility of creating a payment system as well. It can be digital. It can work through an app. Our colleague, Rowan Gray, is really interested in something that’s called e cash. This allows for digital payments to work with the kind of anonymity and privacy protection that traditional paper note and middle coin cash does. You can experiment in all kinds of different ways with this.

It doesn’t have to just look like a Venmo app. I mean, that could be one interface, but it could be any number of things. This puts pressure on credit card companies. I actually think —  to speak slightly like a Marxist —  I actually think that this would be extremely attractive to the petty bourgeoisie, you know, mom and pop bodega owner.

Will Beaman

I was just going to say, as we’re recording, there was a really fun, cool speech that he gave with an organization representing bodegas.

Scott Ferguson

People who run businesses in the city who are not major corporations. They are sacked with transaction fees left and right by Visa, Mastercard, etc., etc. and they hate it. My late father in law, he didn’t live in New York City, he lived in a small town in Iowa, but he had a small shop. He was a shoe repairman and sold clothing as well. He hated the credit card companies. No, he was no progressive or radical or anything, but I could totally see him going like, “oh, wow. Yeah, I can just have an electronic payment system in my store, and I don’t have to pay more for it or charge customers more for it. Sign me up.” This is just the tip of the iceberg. I mean, there’s so much that you can do and there’s so much that can be changed and so much collective fiscal capacity that could be unlocked if we pursue a citywide public banking and payment system.

Billy Saas

That’s excellent. I think it’s a good place to leave it.

Will Beaman

Thank you so much.

Billy Saas

Listeners, you can check out all of this stuff we’ve been talking about on Money on the Left dot org and also on Monthly Review Online.

* Thank you to Robert Rusch for the episode graphic, Nahneen Kula for the theme tune, and Thomas Chaplin for the transcript. 


Democratic Public Finance: A Radical Vision for Mamdani’s New York City

This document elaborates an emerging economic paradigm that is already latent in Zohran Mamdani’s plans and practices. The paradigm, which we call Democratic Public Finance (DPF), reframes money as an inexhaustible and malleable public institution. According to DPF, money is public credit, a capacious tool for mobilizing everyone’s capacities to meet our needs and build a desirable future. Contrary to economic orthodoxy, this paradigm redefines politics as the process of coordinating our abundant human and material resources within ecological limits, rather than exploitative competition for scarce funds. DPF is the process of making collective capacities visible, organizing them democratically, and enabling us to care for each other. Understood in this way, DPF discloses previously invisible possibilities for communal well-being and denaturalizes the impoverished suppositions that legitimize fiscal obstruction by establishment liberals, conservatives, and right-wing demagogues alike.

Mamdani has already displayed unparalleled political expertise in debunking myths about public spending. We build on this expertise, equipping the mayoralty with tools to openly and comprehensively challenge what we call Neoliberal Public Finance (NPF). NPF is an ideology and governance practice built on the false premise that money is a scarce private resource. NPF stages politics as a zero-sum game, assuming that communities can only deploy their capacities if they acquire money from taxpayers and bondholders. Undermining robust fiscal programs, NPF devalues extant collective capacities and obscures New York City’s potentials. The result not only validates ongoing neoliberal austerity, but also enables the right-wing destruction of public services and the expulsion of vulnerable persons from the country and its institutions. Ultimately, NPF serves as a consistent excuse for inaction, leaving genuine democratic projects vulnerable to fiscal sabotage.

In what follows, we outline four strategies for the Mamdani mayoralty to consider. All four strategies are grounded in current proposals advanced by the Mamdani team. Each strategy is designed to advance inclusive democratic projects, while undermining the political legitimacy of manufactured crises perpetuated by establishment Democrats and the Trump administration:

1. Reframing Debt and Taxation: Reframes current taxation and debt limits as not only arbitrary, but also as irresponsible limits on what we can do for our communities. The aim is to publicly explain and contest current rules about municipal debt and taxation, highlighting how the rhetoric of money scarcity devalues workers’ actual and potential contributions.

2. Mobilizing People Differently: Expands the public sector by using multiple forms of credit, particularly within the public school system, to create a culture of public service and a pipeline to a citywide Job Guarantee program.

3. Creating Public Banking and Payments Infrastructure: Establishes municipal-level public banking and a “Public Venmo” to democratize finance, serve the unbanked, and build a resilient local economy independent of Wall Street and insulated from federal political volatility.

4. Challenging Deep Legal Structures: Commences a long-term contestation of foundational laws at the municipal, state, and federal levels (e.g., balanced budget amendments), which legally enforce NPF’s austerity logic.

The document concludes with a bibliography, which provides the theoretical and historical foundations for the principles of DPF outlined in this proposal.

* See here for a PDF version of this document.

Across the political spectrum, most people still believe that the U.S. economy is governed by immutable laws of supply and demand. On this logic, unemployment, rising rents, or scarcity of public goods are natural outcomes, not political choices. This market-centric worldview gives rise to misdiagnoses of social problems. Worse, it tends to validate pathological solutions that do far more harm than good. Take the oft-repeated notion that deporting migrants will “free up” jobs and homes. Such ideas not only justify ongoing state violence; they also mask the real challenge at issue: overcoming our collective misunderstanding of public finance so that we can openly care for our communities and planet.

The present text argues that a robust response to the ills of market ideology requires cultivating shared knowledge about the political constitution of money. When communities grasp money as a contestable form of collective organization, large-scale public jobs and housing programs become eminently possible. Once this knowledge is widely shared, “illegal migration” no longer appears as a problem. Responding to establishment handwringing and right-wing cruelty becomes an opportunity to build a democratic and inclusive future.

This document argues that building a just future requires shifting from the reigning ideology of Neoliberal Public Finance (NPF) to Democratic Public Finance (DPF). NPF constrains democratic possibilities by perpetuating the idea that money is always private, uncontrollable, and scarce. If money is scarce, so too are housing or jobs. NPF seems natural and almost unassailable, both as law and as a mode of framing collective life. It underwrites the neoliberal habit of acquiescence, which trains politicians and publics to treat fiscal sabotage as an impersonal event to be managed, not contested.

DPF, by contrast, asserts that money is an unlimited and disputable public good which can always be reorganized to serve people and the environment. For DPF, money is an inexhaustible institution, involving an always-ongoing and deeply public process through which societies mobilize their capacities and create their future. Imagine a city where public banks extend zero-interest credit to retrofit housing, or where a Job Guarantee program is financed through democratic credit issuance. This is the vision of DPF: not scarcity, but capacity; not limits, but collective potential.

A centuries-old tradition of legal and economic knowledge stands ready to support DPF: the credit theory of money. The credit theory of money demonstrates that when a governing institution issues or spends money, it credits the receiver, and records it as a debit in its books. Later, money can return to the issuer in payment of fines, dues, taxes, or other payments. When it does, the issuer credits itself and erases the debit. After its creation and before its return to the issuer and eventual erasure, money can mediate activities among money users. This is the crux of the credit theory: Money is the process of its creation, transmission, and final deletion. The credit theory of money could also be called the “monetary theory of credit” because it emphasizes that money is credit and credit, money. Therefore, this document will use “money” and “credit” interchangeably.

If money is the ongoing process of issuing and deleting credits, it cannot be solely understood as an inert quantity that reflects past accomplishments. Money cannot be something we need to hoard to create a livable future. And it certainly cannot be scarce unless we make it so. Money is, instead, the world-making act of crediting those actors who construct the future.

As a crediting operation, money involves record keeping: the issuer notes credits on a ledger (analog or digital); it can also issue tokens such as coins or banknotes that have served as “distributed ledgers” for millennia. The form money takes is secondary. No technological innovation can displace its essence, even as it constitutively shapes its operations and scope. All money is credit; all money, always, is an operation where crediting someone’s balance sheet means recording a debit on someone else’s. All money is orchestrated by a public entity situated at the center of a collectivity. In the United States and its predecessor polities, a wide range of actors, including colonies, states, and the federal government, but also municipalities and commercial entities such as banks, have operated ledgers, activating the capacities of millions of people. The economic situation in which we find ourselves currently—defined by myriad atrocities as well as capabilities—is the outcome of a long history of crediting operations.

These crediting operations never occur at random. All money, without exception, is a function of political design, as the legal scholar Christine Desan has pointed out. In everyday practice, some actors, but not others, are authorized to operate our crediting facilities, according to rules that govern for what purposes, and for whom, they can do so. How we answer the questions of monetary design is how the future takes shape. Thus DPF must name current rules, engage them, and propose avenues for democratic change. Just as exclusionary crediting patterns under the redlining scheme created a segregated housing sector, inclusive forms of money will make a just and inclusive world.

Readers of this document may recognize elements of DPF in Modern Monetary Theory (MMT), which has gained traction among progressive economists and challenged neoliberal assumptions about the federal budget. MMT rightly insists that the federal government, as a currency issuer, can never “run out” of money, and that many forms of human suffering—unemployment, lack of housing, and other unmet needs—result from artificial budget constraints. This document, however, presents Democratic Public Finance (DPF) as a broader political framework than MMT alone. Whereas MMT typically centers the federal government’s capacity to issue currency, DPF reframes all levels of collective life—federal, state, city—as potential sites of monetary transformation.

DPF builds on MMT’s insights but pushes further: it sees money not just as a federal tool but as a design system embedded in law and governance at every level. It asks how public credit can be mobilized even within existing constraints—and how those constraints themselves can be named, politicized, and changed.

Contrary to conventional treatments of MMT, which often focus on technical truths about sovereign currency issuance, DPF is a form of democratic participation. It becomes a way of seeing, naming, and expanding what is possible, not only fiscally, but also politically. At the city level, this means exploring how to expand crediting capacity through public banking, rethinking debt rules, and transforming public service employment, all as part of a broader struggle over the meaning and purpose of money itself.

First, DPF reframes collective life as an open-ended crediting process that occurs at all levels, including the municipal. DPF refuses to accept the premise of money scarcity, and always looks for creative ways of crediting those who need it most.

Second, DPF is a mode of knowing the world differently: It is the process of learning about our capacities, possibilities, and needs.

Third, DPF is the process of naming the current rules of monetary design while rejecting the neoliberal premises that underlie it. With this, DPF challenges their status as a hard limit and static constraint. To this end, DPF advances and enhances multiple crediting institutions to mobilize people.

A DPF-informed challenge to NPF’s money scarcity logic can deepen the transformative impact of Zohran Mamdani’s vision.

The Mamdani team already undermines NPF and has taken important steps toward DPF. When it denounces current debt rules as arbitrary, it challenges NPF. When it highlights the city’s vast and diverse resources—from public sector assets to workers’ capacities—it undermines NPF. When it creates a sense of collective possibilities and responsibility, it undermines NPF. When it frames prices as a multifaceted political problem grounded in law, it undermines NPF’s core tenet that prices can be an apolitical market outcome if the public sector does not “interfere.” When Mamdani highlights the city’s vast unmet needs, from housing and childcare to food, and proposes feasible solutions for making life affordable, it makes economic life legible as a changeable provisioning system. These highly popular challenges to neoliberal orthodoxy have validated and strengthened forms of collective knowledge that are uniquely suited for advancing DPF.

At present, Mamdani’s agenda challenges some features of NPF, such as its extension of municipality bond issuance to fund public housing. Rhetorically, however, he has not fully broken with NPF’s scarce money framing. This choice, of course, has a number of advantages. Above all, it enables Mamdani to focus on specific city projects and programs without introducing unfamiliar and potentially challenging ideas about public finance. That said, leaving NPF undisputed also has significant drawbacks. For such reasons, we urge the Mamdani mayoralty to go much further.

There are at least five reasons why leaving NPF largely intact damages Mamdani’s program for NYC. First, when we allow the appearance of money scarcity to persist, current human capacities and biophysical resources can appear secondary to money’s availability, and potentially redundant. For instance, unemployed people can appear as a burden to the public purse and a cost to deserving taxpayers, not a tragic instance of exclusion and lost capacity that could be mobilized by credit creation.

Second, when money can continue to appear scarce, there is a tendency to see politics as the process of groups vying for scarce public outlays, rather than a future-oriented democratic coordination of capacities for the common good. Thereby, NPF plays down people’s actual and potential contributions, creates fertile ground for exclusion, and distracts from a present that demands world-making.

Third, when money seems limited, taxpayers and bondholders can continue to present themselves as the center of political debate because we seem to depend on their money. It gives the voices of those who present themselves as taxpayers and bondholders special legitimacy as the alleged source of public financing, while of course disempowering everyone else. Instead of people who can presently claim certain assets, they are presented as the only geese that lay the golden eggs. They are those who ultimately pay. They are the pillars of the community on whose shoulders our collective welfare rests. Or, so we are told.

Fourth, leaving the assumption of money scarcity intact helps eclipse monetary design questions. Because money appears as a scarce quantity, not a political process of crediting and debiting, the rules that govern its issuance become less legible. This eclipsing shrinks the space of political possibilities because it becomes difficult to develop a widely shared language for public banking or a public payments system as a possibility within reach, just as urgent as freezing rents or expanding public childcare, and with potential effects that go beyond a single sector.

Fifth, when monetary capacity is regarded as a delimited resource, it induces political paralysis. Neoliberal ideology dictates that a democracy with tremendous organizational and productive capacity must nevertheless be held hostage by the veto power of private money holders. In countless scenarios, when talented organizers are ready, coalitional energy is real, and the democratic appetite for change is present, the dominant political imagination consistently stalls at the threshold of private investors. The assumption that only billionaires or suburban taxpayers can provision democracy has become so entrenched that it is easier to imagine acquiescing to authoritarianism than bypassing this veto.

In sum, NPF makes collective capacities less legible or appear redundant; it spells exclusion, enforces unjust hierarchies, and sabotages political action. NPF is an unjust past’s best bet to extend itself into the future, but DPF is here to say it has overstayed its welcome. If NPF says No, we can’t!, DPF asks What do we wish to accomplish together? DPF involves collective decision-making about how we want to live and work in community based on an accurate understanding of money as a world-making public institution.

This document sketches four areas through which NYC can maximally expand crediting operations to its residents as it engages current rules, mobilizes people’s capacities democratically, and builds empowering forms of economic knowledge. Each of these areas can stand on its own; together, they constitute a broad challenge to NPF. Individually, reframing each area can extend municipal crediting operations. If one of the areas for action falls short, then controversies about it nonetheless contribute to the overall goal of undermining NPF. DPF can still be advanced in the other areas. In addition, many of the anticipated gains are not easily reversed.

The core message is: Money is a malleable public institution we use so people can serve one another. This message must come through in practice, not as a doctrine but a reframing of politics that touches most areas of public life—a constant challenge to NPF. NPF must be addressed, not as a static limit or a hard constraint but a series of politically created chokepoints that currently limit what we can do for each other.

The remainder of this document outlines four strategic domains where DPF principles can be operationalized in NYC. Each area demonstrates how rethinking monetary design can unlock democratic possibilities and challenge the assumptions of NPF.

The four strategic areas we cover include:

  1. Reframing Debt Issuance and Taxation
  2. Mobilizing People Differently: Public Sector Expansion, the Public School System, and the Multiplicity of Credits
  3. Creating Public Banking and Payments Infrastructure
  4. Challenging the deep structure of neoliberal finance in municipal, state & federal law

The premise of this section is simple but robust: To advance DPF and deepen its challenge to NPF, Mamdani can reframe current taxation and debt limits as both arbitrary and irresponsible constraints. Mamdani can explain the current rules about municipal taxation and debt and emphasize how illusions of money scarcity devalue workers’ actual and potential contributions. Mamdani has much to gain, and little to lose, from connecting people’s capacities to the monetary chokepoints that are currently obstacles to mobilizing them fully.

This is the message: The rules of NPF prevent the city from democratically mobilizing people to accomplish urgent tasks. NPF hurts people who need support and limits democratic decision-making about the city’s priorities. It limits what we can do for each other. We have the people.  We have the needs. Let us cooperate and build: fast and free buses, affordable childcare, and public grocery stores. Do not sabotage our ambitions through NPF. Don’t be reckless.

This perspective also allows Mamdani to connect ICE (and other harmful public organizations) to the problem of collective provisioning. ICE takes away potentially useful people, who in turn become violence workers to deport people who are contributing in many ways and want to continue doing so. This is not only cruel; it also destroys important webs of social provisioning. Ours is the work of care against the work of violence. Ours is the work of creating future generations versus the work of destroying livelihoods, erasing contributions, and creating suffering. It is the call of the “manosphere” versus the call of care. The NPF budgetary chokepoint and ICE are similar: both represent a reckless sabotage of production and a foolish, uncaring disruption. Countering sabotage and destruction could include creating good job options for people who might consider becoming ICE agents.

The messaging about taxation could be modified along these lines: We presently have to tax the rich to mobilize our labor, but that does not take away from the fact that we are doing the work ourselves. Taxing the rich is good for democracy and necessary for keeping the city’s dollar balances up under current rules, but it ought not limit what we can achieve together. People’s capacities and needs are at the center of the political universe, not taxpayer’s bank accounts. When someone says, “Mamdani thinks there is a Santa,” we should respond with: “We are our own Santa.” When someone says, “By increasing taxes, you are chasing the goose that lays the gilded eggs,” the answer is: “We lay our own eggs.”

Bond issuance practices and messaging can also be modified in this spirit. For instance, the city government could organize bond drives at advantageous rates. It is reasonable to believe there would be subscribers far beyond NYC because of the city’s central place in the global political imaginary and its potential to become a model for transformative change. Many people who donate to blue campaigns might buy such bonds. Instead of donating to campaigns, people would be investing in city infrastructure, and the line between donations and bonds could become blurred. The message could be: We need bond drives, and we are grateful to subscribers who help us minimize pressure on the budget. At the same time, it is us who do the work, and it is us who coordinate our efforts. People’s capacities, skills, and resources precede the dollar balances created by bond sales. This is similar in spirit to war bond drives, even if the context and purpose is distinct: While public discourse valued subscribers, no one doubted who was really going to war. Bond issuance coupled with political messaging has the further advantage of tying asset ownership to a political project. Unlike donations, owning a bond forges a longer-term connection.

There are also strategic advantages to deepening Mamdani’s challenge to NPF. First, a DPF reframing allows the city government to reject the unpopular role of austerity manager. Second, it allows the city to put pressure on those who could attempt to enforce NPF, while staying on message about New Yorkers’ capacities, resources, and needs. Third, not engaging the assumptions of NPF while making “hard choices” means re-anchoring the fictitious chokepoint at the center of collective life, which necessarily implies devaluing the potential contributions and collective resources that could be mobilized to meet urgent needs.

Unless NPF assumptions are challenged head-on, they are bound to shape how the city’s capacities, resources, and agency become legible. Unless NPF assumptions are rejected explicitly, capacities and democratic processes appear downstream from “finding the money.” Even if it can never fully erase an awareness of actual possibilities on the ground, NPF makes people’s capacities seem redundant and solutions appear utopian when they are at arm’s reach.

A DPF reframing of taxation and bond issuance marks a departure from typical progressive discourse, which does not challenge the NPF idea of a monetary chokehold, either taking it for granted or considering the legal forms NPF takes as unchallengeable. These are the typical reasons given for not challenging the money scarcity tenet: It sounds reasonable and plausible to politicians, economists, and other members of the public. Because neoliberal claims about money scarcity are ubiquitous, how to persuade the public is an open question. It might also appear pointless at the municipal level: Given how entrenched NPF as law and frame, why bother with ideas that seem out of reach? Finally, adding another contentious issue to an already bold political project could strain resources.

These objections should be weighed carefully. At the same time, it is important to note that the emphasis on actual capacities of workers is already at the core of Mamdani’s vision, that the shift to a DPF framing can be accomplished gradually and at first, almost imperceptibly. It does not rely on declaring “We are all municipal MMTers now.” And it can leave a lasting impression with important implications for future politics: “Do you remember the mayor who consistently said that our work can always be mobilized, that money is not the limit, that we should be able to mobilize our work democratically when we decide what we want to accomplish together?”

The central claim of Area 2 is: A municipality that seeks to maximally expand its crediting operations ought to broaden its definition of money and explore complementary crediting tools. To this end, this section introduces the hierarchy of money and discusses its possibilities and limits using the example of educational systems and their crediting operations.

Not all money/credit is the same: This is the hierarchy of money. At the top is “high-powered money”—commercial banks’ balances with the central bank and federal fiscal appropriations. One step lower is the money in bank deposits—banks’ promise to exchange our balances for dollars at par on demand, or settle balances with other money users electronically. Commercial and governmental actors routinely combine such high-level dollars with lower-level credit systems: Airline miles, Starbucks gift cards, campus currencies, and gaming money are much farther down the hierarchy of money, yet they are immensely profitable and/or strategically useful for their issuers—the entities that issue them, regulate their use, and accept them back in payment to themselves.

The money question becomes multidimensional when lower-level crediting operations come into view. Governmental institutions ceaselessly issue credit, or accredit other institutions to do so in their stead: When the government doesn’t issue money, it charters banks to do so. When the public education sector does not issue credits or diplomas, DOE and other (DOE-accredited) accrediting agencies license private schools and universities that do the same. Governments also issue credits in the form of rebates for access to public facilities for certain groups (e.g. reduced entry fees for veterans). Finally, the public sector also maintains a broader legal system through which these public and commercial crediting systems can work. Collective life is a multifaceted crediting process, and politics is how we decide about the rules according to which this is done.

The Mamdani campaign’s Zetro card program illustrates how money functions as a social tool of credit to mobilize community labor and resources. During the campaign, the Mamdani team issued Zetro cards to volunteers, crediting them for their canvassing and organizing hours. These cards could then be redeemed for campaign merchandise. The system creates an effective monetary circuit for coordinating collective capacities. It demonstrates in real-time that we do not need to wait for scarce dollars to organize our collective capacities; we can institute our own systems of credit to acknowledge labor, foster community, and work toward a shared goal. The Zetro card, then, is not merely a clever organizing tactic; it is a living example of how we can build a more just and responsive economy from the ground up by understanding money as inexhaustible public credit.

As part of this logic, municipal governments ought to fully exploit the multiplicity of crediting possibilities, and deploy it in tandem with high-level dollars. Lower-level crediting systems, such as those deployed in the education sector, are not subject to NPF chokepoints (even if curved grading echoes NPF’s artificial scarcity). While they are distinct from dollars, at scale, they are a powerful means of mobilizing, valuing, rewarding and developing capacities and people and can be used to complement dollar expenses.

The logic of this section can be illustrated through the example of a decades-old summer camp in upstate New York, where returning campers, as they grow older and become more experienced, are gradually integrated into the supervising/instructional framework through several crediting systems. At first, campers earn badges for tasks accomplished (similar to scout ranks). At age 13, they can become Counselors-in-Training (CITs) who assist Counselors in some tasks. Now, they are already credited in the sense that their tuition is reduced and they can claim credit for their work on their CV. When they turn 16, CITs can apply to become Counselors, and become responsible for a group. This is a full summer job with dual crediting in dollars and work experience; they no longer pay tuition. Later, they can become specialized instructors, lifeguards, etc., with increasing dollar-denominated credit. At each step, they are credited in multiple ways and trained for the next step. While employment may not be guaranteed, there is a strong expectation that there is already a place for everyone who wants a job. This is a well-thought-out system that, at a small scale, captures the logic of a public education system that can expand into a larger public sector.

Outside of summer camps, the logic of dual crediting is ubiquitous in the process of “CV building”: For instance, as interns, people receive a mix of credit for work done and a modest wage; as professionals, people get “credit” for a job done (a line on the CV), and are credited in dollars. All educational systems, public and private, operate with multiple forms of credits and debits: For instance, higher education and research systems issue course credits, degrees, diplomas, awards and recognitions at all levels. They recognize “as credit” work experience, and at higher levels recognize and demand qualitative or quantitative evidence of merit, such as peer-reviewed publications. At the apex, the creditors themselves need to be credentialled (e.g., the higher education accreditation systems). In tandem with these multiple crediting systems, educational institutions rely on and administer a crediting/debiting system denominated in dollars that involves tuition, government funding, donations, fees and fines, and outlays of all kinds, e.g. as salaries for instructors or administrators. Educational systems manage the interaction of multiple crediting systems which situate them in broader social relations: Education functions because internal credits (e.g. diplomas) are recognized outside.

This section proposes expanding and formalizing the logic of multiple crediting systems, and making it part of a public sector expansion at the scale of the city. “Internal” credits can serve as an auxiliary engine to the dollar crediting system. Lower-level credit does not replace an engagement with NPF at the higher levels of money, but it makes the higher-level dollars more impactful and helps create a dynamic in which DPF can thrive and NPF becomes more implausible.

Imagine this sequence of crediting operations in which the summer camp serves as a model for combined “internal” educational and “external” dollar credit: Elementary and middle school students can become used to the idea of public service early on, for instance by involving them in custodial tasks, food preparation, or gardening for one period per day. There is successful precedent for this in Japan, and there are similar, and popular, programs in many schools in the U.S. today, e.g. when older elementary school students help teachers with the youngest. Custodians and cooks, on the model of home economics teachers, could become part of the academic staff; that is, they would be recognized as teachers. In addition to performing tasks that are unsuitable for students, they would manage and supervise students in collaboration with school leadership and other teachers.

At this early stage, students would be credited with grades (e.g. conduct grades) and through a credit/rewards system such as ice cream credits from nearby stores (a practice that already exists). Using educational credits to mobilize students in this way would have many desirable effects: If the spirit of public service is already present in kindergarten, students think of themselves less as passive consumers of educational services and more as active participants in a public process. This could be the beginning of a generational experience of public service and collective responsibility.

It could also redefine custodians, kitchen staff, and their work: They are already doing pedagogical work when they instruct students about how to dispose of waste etc., but they are at a disadvantage as long as they are not formally defined as teachers. This redefinition of workers is similar to the proposed upgrading of childcare workers to teacher status, an (ac)crediting operation that involves a higher salary but is not limited to this form of credit. It is worth noting that school districts have experience onboarding workers from “other” professions. It is also worth noting that, once this is accomplished, it is difficult to undo: If hundreds of custodians have been defined as teachers, they have contracts, union representation, etc.

In a context of a teen unemployment crisis, such internal crediting systems could be complemented by a plural credit system that includes dollars and subsidized public-purpose employment with high school credit. Initially, this could be a small-scale teen employment pilot project for the least enfranchised teens. If employers retain workers at the end of the period, their salaries could be subsidized. This program could be gradually expanded to include all teens. It is important to note that this would have to go hand in hand with a growing public sector in all areas of life (on the model of the proposed childcare expansion, and as part of the public sector expansion such as the Department of Community Safety, prevention first, Community Mental Health Navigators, EMT, violence interrupters). Similar to High School ROTC, but in the radically distinct context of local public service, youth could become familiar with possible future roles as they transition from high school credits and summer internships to public service employment. As it grows, its popular support base will also grow, and it would become more difficult to undo (similar to Social Security). Eventually, this logic can lead to a citywide Job Guarantee.

Note that this logic is radically distinct from a range of other options. (1) This is not a mere expansion of monetary benefits (e.g. the Uruguay of the Frente Amplio government after 2005) because it would tie crediting operations not to a diagnosed need (lack of money) and present high-powered money, by itself, as a remedy; instead, it would deploy multiple crediting systems to integrate people into a democratizing economic life that fulfills needs. (2) It is even more radically distinct from neoliberal “Hail Mary” job market insertion programs that first train people and then abandon them. (3) Neither is it a New Deal-style temporary employment program: It goes hand in hand with a sustained and carefully planned public sector expansion. There are wins each step of the way, these wins are difficult to undo quickly or completely even if there is, say, an electoral defeat.

In sum, multiple crediting operations can drive a planned, gradual expansion of the public sector, a revaluation of different kinds of work, a mobilization of human capacities, and a pedagogical process that mimics, at the scale of New York City, the summer camp logic sketched above. This is the spirit of a Green New Deal at the scale of NYC and should be creatively extended across sectors.

In addition to reframing the budget process and developing already-existing lower-level crediting systems, a DPF strategy could challenge the corporate domination of banking and payments.

This is the premise of Area 3: If crediting operations create the future, democratizing such operations is at the core of a more inclusive and just politics. Today, banking and payments are dominated by commercial banks, credit card companies, and payday lenders.

Recent New York legislative history offers bold solutions that can advance DPF in this context: The New York Public Banking Act (NYPB) and the Inclusive Value Ledger Act (IVL). The NYPB would establish a regulatory framework allowing New York municipalities to create their own public banks. These banks would be chartered to serve the public interest, not Wall Street, and could provide essential services like low-cost loans for public infrastructure, small businesses, and affordable housing. They would also provide a free, safe and surveillance-free place for New York residents to manage their money, thereby banking the unbanked.

This legal and institutional foundation will open the doors for the IVL, which would establish a public, digital payments system—a “Public Venmo”—for the entire state. The IVL would function as a public utility, offering every New Yorker a digital wallet connected to a state-controlled master account. This would enable no-cost, real-time payments between individuals and businesses, as well as with state entities for things like tax payments and benefits. This system would not only provide a no-fee alternative to commercial payment companies but could also be designed to recognize and reward public-purpose work, such as caregiving or community service, by delivering IVL credits directly into New Yorkers’ digital wallets.

Crucially, implementing an IVL does not have to wait for the passage of a comprehensive state-level bill. New York City could create its own city-wide IVL with a targeted amendment to State Banking Law § 131, which currently prohibits corporations from receiving deposits. This small but powerful legal tweak would explicitly exempt a New York City-operated Inclusive Value Ledger from this prohibition, allowing the city to provide a public payments system to its residents and businesses. This tactical approach would deliver a key component of DPF immediately and serve as a powerful proof-of-concept for the broader statewide campaign, deepening the connections between progressive NYC politics and statewide efforts.

Mamdani is uniquely positioned to make the aims of the NYPB and the IVL legible to a broader public. His strength lies in his ability to listen to communities and propose solutions that meet their needs, a talent that can be leveraged to demonstrate how these acts would serve the very programs Mamdani is already championing, such as public grocery stores. By weaving these previously obscure initiatives into a narrative of community empowerment, Mamdani can show how a new banking and payments system would broaden access to financial services to the unbanked, sideline exploitative corporations, and expand the city’s fiscal capacity. This system can be integrated with other initiatives to organize a robust people-first economy where transactions support public goods rather than private profits. Most importantly, by creating these new monetary institutions, Mamdani can mobilize labor and resources in innovative ways that directly address community needs, a core tenet of democratic public finance.

Building out state-level banking and payments systems are especially critical forms of regional resilience and resistance to the current political moment defined by the second Trump presidency. The current administration’s approach to public finance can be described as a radicalized form of neoliberalism, where austerity is not merely a de facto policy framework but an authoritarian directive. This is epitomized by the assertion of a unitary executive theory of money, where the President claims the unilateral right to impound—or simply refuse to spend—funds that Congress has appropriated. This unconstitutional power grab makes the federal fiscal process, but also previously “unpolitical” institutions such as the Automated Clearing House—vulnerable to a president who uses it to target political opponents and dismantle public programs. The aim is insulation from crisis bargaining: threats of shutdown, impoundment and legislative slow-walking lose their leverage when public payments continue uninterrupted. Pursuing state-level initiatives like public banking and payments systems offers a clear path to securing economic flourishing and self-determination for New Yorkers.

These bills cannot be revived and won overnight. But integrating the goals of these acts into a broader DPF narrative, Mamdani can make them not only socially meaningful, but also vital and exciting. The language and ideas we champion today shape what becomes imaginable tomorrow. Even if this struggle meets immediate resistance in Albany, it is crucial to shape the horizon in which the future will be contested. This proactive effort ensures that the conversation around public finance shifts from one of scarcity and austerity to one of collective capacity and possibility, laying the groundwork for a truly democratic financial system down the line.

To fully realize DPF, we must dismantle the foundational legal and ideological structures that uphold NPF. These deep-seated frameworks, often embedded in federal and state constitutions, represent the most formidable obstacles to transformative change. To leave them unchallenged in political discourse is to tacitly accept their premises of money scarcity and austerity, thereby limiting what is perceived as politically possible. While some of these deep structures were implemented during the neoliberal period, which began in the 1970s, others are rooted in the long history of the United States and owe to the anti-democratic impulses in the Enlightenment philosophy that informed the writing of the U.S. Constitution. Our goal is to expose these legal and ideological chokepoints not as unchangeable facts but as a political terrain to be contested, creating a pathway for long-term reform.

The core of NPF is a legal hierarchy that prioritizes private financial institutions over public bodies, especially at the state and municipal levels. The hierarchy consists of two basic, mutually reinforcing, structures. The first part of this structure is the legal framework that grants corporate banks the power to create credit, a privilege legal scholars Robert C. Hockett and Saule T. Omarova call the “finance franchise.” The second part constrains sub-federal public entities with balanced budget rules and limited powers of taxation and debt issuance. This system fosters a negative feedback loop where public entities, starved of democratic financing tools, are forced into a politics of austerity, while private markets are prone to credit-fueled bubbles.

The effort to challenge these deep structures must focus on two key areas: (a) sub-federal constitutional and legal constraints, and (b) federal constitutional and appropriations law.

(a) Overcoming Sub-Federal Constraints: At the state and municipal level, NPF is largely enshrined in balanced budget requirements and other fiscal rules. Such rules, often embedded in state constitutions, make it difficult for cities like New York to respond to the needs of their residents without resorting to regressive taxes or market-dependent borrowing. Mamdani must frame these constraints not as a sign of fiscal prudence but as a form of social and ecological irresponsibility, preventing the city from mobilizing its vast human and material resources to address urgent needs. Balanced-budget rules function as pre-installed political levers that can be yanked to break progressive coalitions when livelihoods and essential services hang in the balance.

While changing state constitutions is a long and arduous process, involving methods like legislatively referred amendments, citizen initiatives, or constitutional conventions, the conversation must begin now. By consistently highlighting how balanced budget amendments and other rules impede the city’s ability to serve its people, Mamdani can build public support for a future where these rules are challenged and ultimately transformed.

(b) Reforming the Federal Financial Architecture: The federal level presents its own set of constitutional chokepoints. Article I, Section 10, Clause 1 of the U.S. Constitution, which prohibits states from coining money or emitting bills of credit, is a primary legal barrier to sub-federal monetary power. Furthermore, the federal appropriations and payment authorization process itself contains anti-democratic bottlenecks that leave it vulnerable to executive overreach. A unitary executive can weaponize the government’s centralized IT infrastructure to illegally impound funds, overriding Congress’s constitutional power of the purse.

To address these issues, a transformative agenda would require:

A New Constitutional Amendment: The ultimate goal is to amend the U.S. Constitution to extend the finance franchise to states and municipalities. This would grant them the power of credit creation, moving them from being mere borrowers and taxers to being active participants in DPF. This is not a call for an unregulated free-for-all, but rather a new, regulated system where sub-federal entities are empowered to create money under strict rules to promote social inclusion, environmental sustainability, and affordable pricing. A new federal agency would be needed to coordinate this process and prevent destructive competition among states and cities.

Modernizing the Appropriations Process: Following the blueprint laid out in legal scholar Rohan Grey’s paper “Digitizing the Fisc,” the federal appropriations process must be redesigned to be more democratic and resilient. Key proposals include:

A Congressional Fiscal Record: A digital database and ledger, managed by Congress, that records all public funds and spending directives.

A “Treasury ATM”: A centralized, secure terminal for agencies to withdraw newly issued digital currency (“eCoins”) directly from Congress’s authority, bypassing the traditional Treasury and Federal Reserve intermediaries and their associated political vulnerabilities.

Public Credit Cards: Congressionally-issued digital “keys” that define the legal and operational limits of an agency’s spending authority, ensuring that funds are used in accordance with legislative intent.

A Federated Federal Ledger: A decentralized record-keeping system that synchronizes agency-level data with Congress’s central ledger, increasing transparency and accountability while protecting against a unitary executive takeover.

By advocating for these changes, Mamdani would not only challenge NPF at its deepest legal and ideological roots but also lay the groundwork for a truly democratic financial system where money is a public utility used to mobilize people and resources for the common good. This approach redefines responsibility, shifting the focus from arbitrary budget rules to the well-being of people and the environment. It is worth noting that identifying problematic legal norms, including and the constitutional level, can in and of itself have important effects: For instance, the fact that the ERA has not been adopted remains a useful reminder of widespread opposition to women’s rights. Therefore, it has pedagogical effects that are important and make it a worthwhile cause regardless of when or whether it is adopted.

Without a doubt, Zohran Mamdani’s vision for New York City represents the most politically savvy and fiscally robust undertaking in decades. This document argues that Mamdani’s transformative vision can be further enhanced if it directly confronts the myth of money scarcity and frames our collective capacities as the source of shared prosperity. Democratic Public Finance at once delegitimizes and bypasses neoliberal sabotage from the center, as well as authoritarian subjugation and exclusion. Mamdani can move beyond a defensive debate over funding and offer a hopeful, coherent narrative that shapes what we can achieve together in new ways. It can also, potentially, help reshape the political landscape beyond New York City by modeling a different approach to fiscal policy and assisting other municipalities. Implementing the proposed strategies–reframing the budget, mobilizing people through lower-level forms of credit, creating public financial infrastructure, and challenging the deep legal structures of austerity–is a long-term struggle. But even when immediate victory is uncertain, the very act of publicly contesting these rules is vital because it shapes what becomes politically legible and achievable for future generations. This fight will ground Mamdani’s ambitious platform in a shared sense of purpose, forging a stronger community and a powerful mandate to build a truly democratic and prosperous New York City.

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