Democratic Public Finance

Billy Saas and Scott Ferguson are joined by Will Beaman to discuss Money on the Leftโ€™s framework for what we call โ€œDemocratic Public Financeโ€ (DPF). According to this paradigm, money is public credit, a capacious tool for mobilizing everyoneโ€™s capacities to meet our needs and build a desirable future. DPF redefines politics as the process of coordinating our abundant human and material resources within ecological limits, rather than as an austere and exploitative competition for scarce funds. With this, Money on the Left not only opens fresh horizons for left politics, but also directly challenges the fiscal sabotage routinely carried out by liberals, conservatives and the authoritarian right. 

In conceptualizing DPF, Money on the Left builds on insights from Modern Monetary Theory (MMT); but we also push beyond MMTโ€™s delimitation of public money creation to the alleged sovereignty of the nation-state. Contrary to conventional accounts of MMT, we insist that money is a public, contested, and inexhaustible institution that must be politicized and redesigned across all levels of governance. 

During our discussion, our cohosts outline the approach to DPF presented in our recent long-form publication, โ€œDemocratic Public Finance: A Radical Vision for Mamdaniโ€™s New York City.โ€ Along the way, we tease out key insights from myriad other contemporary works, which variously leverage DPF to challenge the second Trump administrationโ€™s authoritarian radicalization of neoliberal economics. Such texts include co-authored pieces such as โ€œBlue Bonds: A Fiscal Strategy for Overcoming Trump 2.0,โ€ โ€œHow the Zetro Card can Save New York City (Really),โ€ and โ€œItโ€™s Time for Complimentary Currencies,โ€ as well as writings by Will Beaman like โ€œHow to New York Times Proof Mamdaniโ€™s Playbook,โ€ โ€œBlue Bonds: Duck or Rabbit?,โ€ and โ€œThe Case for Fiscal Insurgency.โ€ 

The conversation highlights the originality and urgency of Money on the Leftโ€™s core ideas for Democratic Public Finance. Since the discussion only scratches the surface of our writings, however, we encourage listeners to consult the linked publications above for a comprehensive engagement with DPF.

Visit our Patreon page here: https://www.patreon.com/MoLsuperstructure

Music by Nahneen Kula: www.nahneenkula.com

Transcript

This transcript has been edited for readability.

Scott Ferguson

Welcome everybody. I am Scott Ferguson and I am here with my co-host Billy Sass. Say hi, Billy.

Billy Saas

Hi, Billy.

Scott Ferguson

Nice. And our guest co-host today, Money on the Left’s own, Will Beaman.

Will Beaman

Hi, guys. How are you doing?

Scott Ferguson

As good as we can be, as good as we can be. So, we are convening today’s discussion primarily to update our listeners who maybe aren’t as online as the rest of us and maybe are not as aware of some of our publication work that we’ve been doing largely during the second Trump administration. We’ve been writing a lot. Will, in particular, has been writing a lot, and really pushing the boundaries of our paradigm and its stakes and its consequences.

We want to talk about some of these publications. I think, centrally, what we want to do โ€” and I think it’s important to begin with โ€” is discuss our rather lengthy new work that we published, titled โ€œDemocratic Public Finance A Radical Vision for Mamdaniโ€™s New York City.โ€ After unpacking and situating this text, or maybe along the way, we can take detours. We can talk about some of the other writings that have surrounded this work or preceded this work.

To get us going, I’ll start by saying that Money on the Left has been developing, what I would say is, a unique but dependent paradigm, a way of approaching political economy from the point of view of certain foundational premises that we, as many people know, borrow from Modern Monetary Theory, as well as certain legal theories of money that often go under the heading of a constitutional approach to money, which was spearheaded by Christine Desan, who we’ve interviewed on this podcast in the past. I think a lot of people think of us as the MMT podcast or an MMT podcast. I think there actually is a podcast called the MMT podcast.

Will Beaman

Yeah, we don’t want to get sued.

Scott Ferguson

Yeah, yeah. We’re not that one.

Billy Saas

Would they sue us?

Scott Ferguson

I don’t know. I think weโ€™re friends. Anyway, even though we draw on these other paradigms in many ways in solidarity with them, and we might consider ourselves as being part of them, we also have developed our own approach. It felt like there are certain kinds of assumptions and other limitations in these paradigms that we feel don’t go far enough. So, we come in peace. Weโ€™ve tried to expand, to speculate, to draw out further conclusions, to iron out certain contradictions in these other paradigms and essentially, we’ve been working on our own formulation. We all have been doing so separately and in collaboration in things like peer reviewed articles and blog posts and interviews and podcasts and all kinds of media.

But, I’d say that we don’t really have a user-friendly long form statement that just lays out the basic assumptions and our document that was published on October 10th of 2025, โ€œDemocratic Public Finance: A Radical Vision for Mamdaniโ€™s New York Cityโ€ does precisely that. On the one hand, it is a strategic document that’s aimed at this particular moment, at a threshold moment where we think and we hope that Zoran Mamdani becomes the mayor of New York City.

He is still a candidate, but we wrote this document in such a way that it would be addressed to Mamdaniโ€™s mayorship. So, we’re framing this in terms of a very exciting candidacy, a very exciting moment when a democratic socialist is hopefully and probably going to be elected to this office and thinking about what he can do to help fulfill his own promises that he’s making to the city, especially when it comes to fiscal policy. But it’s a double document because it also serves as a State of the Union address for us and just laying this paradigm that we’ve been working on for years and years and years. With that in mind, where do we want to start?

Will Beaman

Well, I think maybe one place to start would be a kind of a familiar distinction that MMTers are all too familiar with, which is between Modern Monetary Theory and the neoclassical paradigm. In this document, we mobilize and extend that distinction to problems and logics of governance.

There are two poles, or co-present impulses that animate and inform governance that we name, neoliberal public finance (NPF) and democratic public finance (DPF). Part of the strategy of this document is trying to not just tease out the limitations of neoliberal public finance and the possibilities of democratic public finance, but to expand both in such a way that they can speak to and be located in rhetorics that the Mamdani campaign has variously used. One thing that we talk about in this document a lot as  part of the frame is, no, Mamdani is not going out there saying โ€œmoney is a boundless public utility and the idea that we need to raise taxes in order to do things is bullshit.โ€ There are nevertheless surpluses of possibility and opportunity in a lot of the framings that he does. In a lot of ways, the DPF and NPF framing is a little bit of a code that we try to use to decode the present.

We could say some things about the nature of the kinds of recommendations that we make with this democratic public financing framework. Thereโ€™s no greater lesson in the past than realizing you’ve stumbled into fascism. This is not a new insight. It is a constantly expanding and accreting insight that neoliberalism got us here. But there are certain ways that the moves and the playbook of the Trump administration via the shakedowns of public institutions, the withholding of funds โ€”  whether that’s illegally impounding them or threatening to do so, which has a similar effect โ€” or it is stalling and slow walking government. 

As we record this the Trump administration is withholding Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program (SNAP) food provisioning as a means to try to pressure Democrats to stop the shutdown. All of these moves are part of a playbook of authoritarian consolidation, certainly. But the building blocks of this playbook are in some ways thoroughly neoliberal. We’ve been acculturated already into a kind of learned helplessness in the face of whatever comes down the pipe economically and so neoliberal governance or neoliberalism is already recast governance as the administration of difficult choices and austerity.

The acquisition of funds has been used for quite some time in order to manufacture crises of electability. We hear this happening in The New York Times with Mamdani. Things like, โ€œYou know, it’s good. But what if he can’t? What if he can’t convince Albany to tax the rich,โ€ and all these kinds of things that are staging the acquisition of funds as a train that’s coming towards us. But with Trump, the mask has slipped. What we’re seeing is that the Trump administration is hijacking and choreographing with the governing habits and conventional wisdom of neoliberal public finance as a paradigm. While it’s sort of an exhausted question of, โ€œare we still under neoliberalism or is this fascism?โ€ but part of what I think comes out of this is that there are neoliberal habits of thought that are being enlisted by fascism. Rather than  a vocal answer of whether this is fascism or whether this is neoliberalism, it’s the dynamic between them that matters. For that reason, we see all kinds of opportunities for other logics that this document tries to open up and explore.

Scott Ferguson

I think this is a great moment to kind of step back and talk about one of the fundamental premises and differences of, what I would call, our paradigm in relationship to, let’s say, the standard articulation of Modern Monetary Theory. We know that Modern Monetary Theory has opened up all kinds of possibilities in our thinking in the collective imagination. It’s been widely popularized, obviously. At the present moment, it is not ascendant because it has been largely blamed for the so-called inflation that we’ve been experiencing, which, of course, is a reading we would utterly reject. But despite these openings there are certain tensions and even contradictions within the original paradigm, which, I just want to say, the original paradigm of MMT is not even stable.

If you’re reading Warren Mosler’s version, it’s going to look different than Stephanie Kelton’s version, which is going to look different than Bill Mitchell’s version, and so on and so on. It’s not to say that there is one absolutely airtight MMT 101 paradigm, but nevertheless, part of that MMT 101 paradigm is a commitment to a notion of sovereignty and, what they call, monetary sovereignty. What this does is relegate the power of money creation to a singular entity, at least within a given political domain that is usually called the government or the state. I think it had more historical purchase when MMT was being developed and being popularized under the Obama administration, for example, when most of the fights were happening at the federal level, and there were questions of bailouts for the financial sector. โ€œWhat are we going to do with Main Street? Are we going to do the same for Main Street as we’re doing for Wall Street?โ€ The answer was no. 

The way that the monetary sovereignty framework was articulated made sense. The political climate at the time made it easy to ignore or to not see the limitations of that framework. I’m not saying that one couldn’t or shouldn’t have found the problems with the framework before, but I do think that the political situation has forced us into thinking further. The limitations of the framework are precisely its need to relegate monetary creation powers and the possibilities of democratizing money creation to only one entity, the state at the federal level or at the highest level.

What ends up happening in MMT 101 discourse is that everybody else, all other institutions are treated as money users. Money users have to just recycle the finite funds that the government has made available. Not only does this disempower a politics of monetary creation at all other levels, both sub federal and supra federal, like internationally, not only does it incapacitate monetary politics at all those other levels, but there’s also kind of a contradiction within MMT in order to maintain this notion of monetary sovereignty. 

I’ll just try to quickly spell it out for the Modern Monetary Theory 101 paradigm, which comes out of the post Keynesian school in part, is the assumption that money is endogenous, which means it is created in the form of credit and debt out of thin air, but not just by anybody, but by powerful institutions that proceed from the public sector.

These powers are delegated out to the private sector. So, banks create credit out of thin air because they’re empowered by the state to do so. The state does so because it holds the power to do so. So, there’s this commitment to the idea that all money is endogenous. It’s all created out of thin air by institutions with the power to do so.

Great. But then if that’s the assumption, if that’s the truth, then why suddenly turn around and say โ€œNo, no, no, no, no. It’s only the federal government that can do this,โ€ even though you, on the other page of your text, have told us that everybody does this, and you’ve certainly said this about private banks. I think what we’ve been up to is actually ironing out some of the contradictions in most articulations of MMT 101 and saying, โ€œno, let’s take endogenous money seriously.โ€ If it’s really endogenous all the time and it’s never finite value circulating, or it’s never an expression of the commodity form. If it’s always institutional endogenous money, then that means that money is not relegated to the function of sovereignty.

This is not to say that money isn’t a function of power. Of course it is. This is not to say that there aren’t degrees and qualities of monetary creation powers. Of course there are. But let’s stop disempowering all these other levels of governance, all these other institutions that not only could be creating money, but I would argue, they are. I would argue that states and municipalities in the United States, when they spend they are creating money. When they tax, they are taxing and buttressing the taxation power of the whole system of the dollar. They’re not mere recyclers of a finite thing. That doesn’t ever happen according to our point of view.

From that fundamental tweak and ironing out of this tension or contradiction in MMT 101, it opens up all of these possibilities for us, not just for monetary politics or monetary design in a kind of narrow sense of political economy, but also in terms of analysis of history, of political fights, of coalition building, of coalition breaking, of enduring questions and critical theory, whether that’s about aesthetics or any number of questions.

For us, we agree that money is publicly founded, it’s institutional and it’s endogenous. Letโ€™s take that seriously and stop constraining money under the sole authority of sovereignty. In doing so, suddenly we have this wide-open field of possibilities and a wide-open field of possibilities that we would argue are vital and critical for combating authoritarianism and fascism in the United States and around the world.

Will Beaman

That’s really well said. I would add, we’re certainly not denying the importance of grappling and contending with power and authority, but in a lot of ways, what we’re arguing for is to not take power at its word as to who participates in it and who doesn’t and where agency is located and where agency is not located. When you set up these really hard binaries between who has agency and who doesn’t under โ€œXYZโ€ objective conditions, and the idea of sovereignty is the epitome of this because it means exception. Exception from an overall lack of agency. The one who acts rather than the one who receives.Thatโ€™s going to come back in this discussion, I think, because one of our re-framings of MMT is taking seriously reception as a point of agency too and the typical MMT story of fiscal circuits of money being spent into existence and then taxed not as functions of sovereign power, but as choreographies of issuance and reception that unfold along a lot of different contested institutions.

But just to tie this back to this critique of neoliberal public finance and the way that it establishes or to use a more phallic sovereignty metaphor, erects certain nodes or choke points or key events at which the left or liberals or the left liberal coalition has an opportunity or a window to provision society. However, it turns on whether or not we get the taxpayer to say yes or, whether or not the economy as it’s construed as a sublime external force says yes. This is not unique to MMT either. On the Superstructure podcast years ago, we were critiquing debates that were happening in the early 2020s about which theory of change is correct, as if there’s a single answer. As if change doesn’t unfold through multiple theories. Likewise, I think that the MMTโ€™s insistence that we have this empowering mapping of where power is located and โ€œlook, at the places where it is located, it can take care of everyone.โ€

Nevertheless, we end up bringing back in this sort of logic of deferring possibility to the outcome of a rigged game, basically. It didn’t feel as much like a rigged game when it was 2021 and Biden seems to be a decent president compared to what I think many in the Sanders and Warren camps were expecting. But to your point, Scott, in this moment, deferral is really not an option. We also see political evidence all around us that there’s a massive appetite for politics that does not defer to some moment after the midterms or after 2028.

Billy Saas

Well, there’s something there to say about that. While it’s very exciting to consider this alongside the great success and momentum of the Mamdani campaign, there’s a certain extent of the deferral of possibility that we can also locate and attach to an electoral politics. Weโ€™re waiting for accommodation of these views by candidates and eventually people who hold office confronted, almost inevitably โ€”  and we hope not this time โ€”  by a kind of rhetoric of pragmatism and the inevitability of shedding possibility through the process of lawmaking and presiding and what democratic public finance also enables us to do is to look at those smaller scale avowedly non sovereign. There is no, or typically not, an army or an armed force behind the creation and circulation of complementary currencies within communities and so helping us at the same time as we encourage and continue to participate in a our own kind of realist way with electoral politics, we also look at and get excited about smaller scale interventions from the bottom up. 

That is, I think, ultimately what small โ€œdโ€ democrats, people who believe in democratic politics and governance, where we can almost immediately locate our agency and opportunities for participation. So, at the same time as there’s a kind of narrowing function of neoliberal public finance, everything leads to the decision of the sovereign. The sovereign is never going to accommodate, never really going to give grace, or maybe rarely and in limited form. Democratic public finance gives us a much broader path with many more forks and possibilities.

Scott Ferguson

That’s right, that’s right. I’m going to read a little bit of the intro. This isn’t the exact beginning of the text, but just to give a flavor of the text, and we will obviously provide links in the show notes for all of our listeners who haven’t been tracking our website, but largely interface with us through their ears. Here it goes:

โ€œThis document argues that building a just future requires shifting from the reigning ideology of Neoliberal Public Finance (NPF) to Democratic Public Finance (DPF). NPF constrains democratic possibilities by perpetuating the idea that money is always private, uncontrollable, and scarce. If money is scarce, so too are housing or jobs. NPF seems natural and almost unassailable, both as law and as a mode of framing collective life. It underwrites the neoliberal habit of acquiescence, which trains politicians and publics to treat fiscal sabotage as an impersonal event to be managed, not contested.

DPF, by contrast, asserts that money is an unlimited and disputable public good which can always be reorganized to serve people and the environment.โ€

And recall here that’s โ€œreorganize,โ€ not finding the money to spend for your big-ticket items.

โ€œFor DPF, money is an inexhaustible institution, involving an always ongoing and deeply public process through which societies mobilize their capacities and create their future. Imagine a city where public banks extend zero-interest credit to retrofit housing, or where a Job Guarantee program is financed through democratic credit issuance. This is the vision of DPF: not scarcity, but capacity; not limits, but collective potential.โ€

So that’s a nice and relatively coherent and powerful articulation of this contrast that we’re setting up. The document goes on to talk about the ways that we break up different aspects of democratic public finance as an alternative to neoliberal public finance and those four โ€”  what we call โ€”  strategic areas. Of course, they’re all connected. Just for the sake of writing, conceptualizing, and talking about politicizing, we name these four strategic areas. One more thing I’ll say is that each area is, at least from a conventional point of view, potentially more challenging than the next.

Now, ideological conditions could shift in what counts as the most challenging. But at the present moment, we conceive of these being ranked in order of the easiest to pursue to the hardest to pursue. So, number one is โ€œReframing Debt Issuance and Taxationโ€ according to the paradigm of democratic public finance. So, all that’s doing is pointing out that these tools that everybody knows about, nobody’s arguing about whether New York City or Minneapolis, or a small county in Nevada, taxes or issues debt. They all do it. It’s a question of what it means and what are the politics surrounding it and what really are questions of responsibility and risk around these instruments. Our argument would be: that needs to be rethought and reframed.

The second category is โ€œMobilizing People Differently: Public Sector Expansion, the Public School System, and the Multiplicity of Credits.โ€ This is where we talk about how monetary credits across scales of different degrees of receivability, capacity, and power are always being used in all kinds of ways to mobilize people. This is the case for airline miles. This is the case for Starbucks gift cards. This is the case for municipal fiscal policy. It’s happening all the time. But we’re suggesting that the public sector needs to get creative about the way that it actually designs systems of accreditation or of crediting that may not entirely be about high powered dollars, but nevertheless have strong, democratic, supportive, caring capacities that can work in tandem with fights over the spending, but more specifically, design and creation of high powered dollars.

Then we have category three: โ€œCreating Public Banking and Payments Infrastructure.โ€ We, at Money on the Left, clearly have investments in a major public banking initiative and legislation at the federal level, and also democratizing our payment system as well at the federal level. But you don’t have to just do it at the federal level. You can do it at the state level. You can also do it at the city level and at the municipal level. Weโ€™re moving into even more active, high-power dollar design, with category three. 

Category four is arguably the most challenging and that is actually: โ€œChallenging the Deep Structure of Neoliberal Finance in Municipal, State & Federal Law.โ€ This is us, in a way, taking our advance on MMT to the maximal level. So, I would say most of the time, MMT 101 discourse tends to take the design of the current system more or less for granted and sometimes this comes out in tropes that have been questioned within the MMT 101 movement. But there are framings like, โ€œoh, we’re just describing what exists. Weโ€™re not saying we need a new system. We’re just telling you how it works, and you can use this system if you know how it works, you can use it for other purposes and you can do nice things with it.โ€ Whereas we want to say, โ€œno, no, no, there are design trajectories and constraints that are built into the system that should not be there.โ€ 

The Constitution of the United States should not forbid sub-federal entities from creating money. That’s anti-democratic. It’s especially anti-democratic because the same federal legal structure allows for private institutions to create private credit all over these municipalities. Right? So, you’re licensing and enabling private creditors, you’re disabling public creditors. I would also say that that language in the Constitution is false, because I would say that public institutions at the federal level do actually circulate credit. They do that all the time in all kinds of different forms. So even though you might say, โ€œoh, well, it’s against the law for a state to issue credit or to create money,โ€ I would say they do it all the time. This is a controversial claim, but nevertheless, I think this is our position.

This fourth section is really about getting at those deep legal structures and saying those are social constructs. They were social constructs that were constructed out of struggles for power. If the left wants to really, really, really revolutionize the system and create conditions of possibility that are going to allow for genuine democracy and collective caretaking and contestation, you have to go after these deep legal structures. So, that’s the four areas. I don’t know if you all want to start with one and move toward four. Where do we want to go from here?

Billy Saas

Maybe we can move into discussion of each of them through reference to Willโ€™s prolific article and commentary. Maybe we could pivot to that.

Will Beaman

So, I will say that because everything that we do is a collective project. All of this that we’re talking about in this document has been showing up in what I’ve been writing and, to some extent, vice versa. Thatโ€™s just how collectivity works. But I would say that my madness at the beginning of the summer started with being, honestly, hypnotized by the rhetoric and communication and sophisticated aesthetic forms of the Mamdani campaign.

One of the first pieces that I wrote this summer about that, โ€œHow to New York Times-proof the Mamdani Campaign,โ€ was, in a lot of ways, taking up the theme in the first section: capacity being where we should focus our analysis rather than on the amount of dollars that are located here and there and need to be gathered. That, of course, is very MMT 101. If you have the real resources you can afford it and money is just a unit of account. But I think there are ways of describing capacity as a process of humanization that are less developed but present everywhere. This is something that I think the Mamdani campaign does really, really well.

In that particular piece, I talked about an ad that he did after he won the Democratic primary, where he sort of broke down all of the different demographic cultural, geographic, you name it, components of his victory. In doing so, he was able to not just โ€”  refute is not even the right word because it was so much more profound than that โ€”  reframe Beltway pundit conversation about the conventional horizons of possibility for this or that kind of politics with this or that group of voters or voters in general, but also getting away from that very macro and reductive caricature of what is politically possible and what is considered fringe to voters as a bloc.

This video that Mamdani did basically answered in a different way how he paid for it. How did he pay for the win? This opened up another theme that I was sort of thinking about and exploring this summer, which is that, a campaign sits in a sort of a liminal space that it often occupies in our own kind of mapping of things. It’s outside of politics. Right? It’s the stuff that happens before you’re in power, so it doesn’t really count. It also is largely volunteer work. It’s off the books. It’s not part of the economy either and yet it’s a massive logistical operation with a history and with capacities. A successful campaign does what successful fiscal authority does, which is creatively reread public capacities. I drew an analogy in that piece between the way that he was talking about and breaking down the various public capacities that paid for his win. What if this was extended to how he spoke about fiscal policy through governance? This is something that, to a certain extent, we can see traces of what both he and, frankly, lots of politicians are doing already.

We want to affirm that and highlight it and connect it to a project of giving that kind of rhetoric it’s due in fiscal terms. Something that I have not yet been able to write about, because I’m now fighting for my life and my doctoral program, is a lot of his videos since then. This is drawing on my past experiences in Scott’s Film and Media Studies MA program. I’ve been hypnotized in a very similar way by how he uses the close up in this series that he’s been doing, where he tells stories of famous New Yorkers and he tells them in close up, and they often are individuals who, in this or that way, are marginalized. But the close up, as we, in film studies, know from a long tradition of writing about the humanizing qualities of the close up and of photography, has this ability to cut through preconceived reductive notions that we have about people. The close up confers dignity as well as opacity and mystery and complexity on to individuals and onto people who we otherwise think of as individuals, or we think of them as part of a group or whatever.

In an interdependent world, there are so many things that we can say about ourselves and about others. There’s this tradition in our cinema of using the close up to open up complexity rather than close it. In light of this kind of conversation about real capacity, I thought, this visual language that he’s using is light years ahead of the kinds of rhetoric that we’re used to hearing and participating in about how many hard-working Americans there are in this country. The kind of nascent or underdeveloped ways of talking about economic capacity and, in this way also, I think, because we do come from a humanities tradition, there is a skepticism that we have about enlisting people as parts of a top-down notion of capacity. Itโ€™s something we have been in group therapy for several years. Saying, โ€œwell, you’re an economic asset,โ€ as if to reduce. 

In so much of Mamdani rhetoric, by focusing in the visual language of the eye contact and the close up and the storytelling and the way that he tells another person’s story, both you and that person, because the direct address in these close ups is ambiguous, he does so as the government or as a public representative. Talk about transcending the confessional mode. To me it has been opening up a world of thinking about all the different ways that we already humanize people in visual and aesthetic and rhetorical forms and how tragically disconnected that often is from the language that we use to talk about what we can do as a city. Or what we can do as a society and a culture in ways that interface directly with fiscal politics? Thatโ€™s one throughline that shows up also in this document that we all collectively worked on, which says basically, it’s the capacity that you need to pay attention to.

We already build the city every day. We don’t need a permission slip from somebody who sees themselves in mutually exclusive terms as the taxpayer, or the benevolent billionaire who will create jobs, but only if you’re not rude. We donโ€™t need to route our own self-understanding through those dehumanizing prisms and chokepoints.

A big part of the first section that’s really important to me is identifying within Mamdaniโ€™s own rhetoric both ways that he’s already talking about capacity that shift the conversation away intuitively from โ€œhow are you going to pay for it?โ€ because once you’ve done an entire campaign talking about all the ways that something is physically and materially and socially, culturally, etc. possible to do, then for โ€œhow you pay for it?โ€ to come in at the 11th hour reads as more transparently sabotage than it does in the kind of current neoliberal mode of politics where we take it for granted that โ€œhow you pay for it monetarilyโ€ is basically a proxy for how you pay for it materially, because all material things have to be paid for, therefore, paying for something monetarily is basically just another way of saying, โ€œcan we do this?โ€ And the answer then is always โ€œno,โ€ because Albany says no.

Scott Ferguson

Another part of what you’re talking about that I find to be so powerful, and it is something that is in Mamdaniโ€™s rhetoric and with even further amplification and connecting it to fiscal politics, can be just so vital, is really revaluing people. In this case, in New York City, people that are currently โ€”  under the neoliberal order and the fascist neoliberal order โ€”  seen as liabilities, as drains on the system as they drain away our tax dollars by using their SNAP benefits. Instead, seeing our community members who might be struggling with employment or who might be struggling with finding a secure home, revaluing them as assets that are not being utilized. Seeing them as qualitatively rich, interesting community members that we’re just abandoning and we’re failing to value.

To be honest, I would say that’s even latent in MMT 101 as well. I think the way that Mamdani is using his communication strategies, his rhetoric and his policy framings is pushing us more in that direction. Now, I want to leave to another related topic in which I would say, at least on the face of it, it’s less of an analogy to money, but it’s Mamdani getting closer and closer to money. Now, I don’t think any of us think that โ€œthere’s money in itself and then there’s other things that are not money.โ€ You know, we understand that sort of everything is money. Nevertheless, right over the summer and into the fall, Mamdani has been using certain proto or just straight up monetary designs in order to mobilize people. One of them is something called the Zetro card. Does somebody want to unpack the Zetro card and what he’s been doing with the Zetro card?

Will Beaman

Sure. We wrote another piece at some point in the past few weeks about that, which was sort of a tongue in cheek, a serious / not serious / but actually serious piece saying that the Zetro card could be scaled up and used to save New York City.

And what is the Zetro card? It began early in the campaign. It’s a very playful punch card that is obviously a pun on the Metro card, but with Z for Zoran, and this is a kind of an interesting detail of it. It emerged as a way for the campaign to sell merch beyond their legal allowance to do so. What this was was if you participate in canvasses and phone banks and whatever, the Zetro credits are issued and you can trade those in for posters and and merchandise, and it’s such a great example of what we’ve been calling a duck rabbit problem, named after the famous optical illusion from like 100 years ago. It is that image where you look and ask if it is a duck or is it a rabbit? It depends on which you see first, but after you see one, you probably are then going to see the other and then you can see both. It’s such a great figure for this paradigm, where, on the one hand, this is a punch card and this is just moving posters. Who cares? Itโ€™s playful and it’s fun. But on the other hand, it does have all the elements of the entire thing that we’re pitching already in miniature, right? Right down to the fact that it began as a creative workaround to legal limits.

Also, I think it exploits, in a good way, the category error that something being part of a campaign does for people, where you hear, โ€œWell, it’s not real though, so why would we even scrutinize this?โ€ That cuts both ways, right? Like, we had a lot of people saying like, โ€œdude, I’m pretty sure it’s just a punch card,โ€ and fair enough. It is just a punch card. And yet it also is not right. You see the punch card, rabbit or you see the endogenous money duck.

Scott Ferguson

And, dude, those fed notes are just like pieces of paper.

Will Beaman

Yeah. Itโ€™s all just bitcoin. What we actually have is a fiscal circuit. That is, credit being issued and redeemed in order to provision work and mobilize capacity. What we talked about in that piece is we sort of mocked up what it might look like to continue the Zetro card as a campaign practice after the campaign is over.

This draws on legibilities like the Bernie Sanders campaign, which talked about campaigning as something that you do year-round. AOC talks about this as well. One of the reasons that she always performs so well in her district despite being probably the most caricatured and villainized politician in the country, is they never let up on the infrastructure of communication and engagement with their constituents, including but also beyond, of course, all the ways that you would help your constituents during your day job when you’re a politician. But they also never stopped canvassing. They never stopped campaigning. I would argue there is precedent for that. But we thought through what some sort of micro steps could be that are still in the realm of being playful. To be clear, fiscal policy should be playful.

How can we be playful until we pull the wool out from over their eyes? I could very easily imagine a lot of the organizations that make up the Mamdani coalition accepting Zetro credits in exchange for part or full payments of membership dues, of ways to deepen participation in an organization to get opportunities for speaking time at meetings, to gain access to certain leadership positions.

All of these, of course, raise all kinds of ethical dilemmas to work through, but these are the same ethical dilemmas that already exist in organizations, which is โ€”  it’s sort of is the classic problem โ€”  when you say that there’s that there’s no hierarchy, you leave it up to all the implicit hierarchies in the world to decide who gets access to what.

Who you know and who you have good credit with becomes a way of controlling and gatekeeping one’s way of relating to opportunity within an organization. This is similar to employment. We thought initially of some first steps that the Zetro card could take in coalition with partnering institutions.

One could also imagine worker-owned co-ops and restaurants and DSA bars that are frequented and run by members accepting these on a particular day and then that turns into a full-time thing and so on. But what’s really kind of interesting in thinking about this is that it can scale and it can keep scaling in very kind of non-linear and cascading and unpredictable ways, because if this were to become a very popular thing, one could imagine co-ops and unions and organization chapters and other campaigns, even, accepting Zetro credits and maybe issuing their own credits, which then can be accepted by the same organizations that accept Zetro credits. Right. Then all of this can eventually interface with the kind of longer-term legal changes and transformations that weโ€™re trying to loosen the always loose and imperfect distinction between what is the official and the unofficial currency, because they’re predicated on a falsehood.

What does it mean to issue money versus just issue credit? What is a harmless gaming currency and what is shadow banking? All these things that are malleable, but that we’re used to thinking of their malleability as being a function of the fact that it’s the rich and the powerful who promote these things. The Zetro card is an ongoing campaign technology. I hope that it continues after the campaign ends, but it also is just an interesting kind of pedagogical thought experiment for thinking through and living and embodying this way of seeing fiscal policy.

It also is just so emblematic of Mamdaniโ€™s whole style, which is to introduce playfulness and games. We can talk about the famous scavenger hunt that he did in New York City as well. But these games that provision a campaign, they provision participation and nurture capacity and keep people limbered up and ready to get out to vote and ready to volunteer and keep those keep that muscle memory fresh.

Scott Ferguson

I think another thing that the Zetro card participates in and opens up is, what MMT discourse gets called, the hierarchy of money. The fact is that the campaign used higher power dollar credits, which they got through donations to pay vendors to make the merch. Then they’re redeeming the Zetro card credits by giving people this merch, but that merch wasn’t free. I think the lessons here are multiple. One is, for us, there’s no such thing as autonomous money. There’s no autonomy at the level of the so-called sovereign. There’s no autonomy at the level of a community currency or a Zetro card. It’s interdependence all the way up and down. So, get rid of the dream of autonomy, it doesn’t work. 

Two, its lower-level credit is always participating in higher level credit and vice versa. Higher level just means more receivability, more, what we call liquidity, wider receivability and with that comes power. With that comes capacitation. But still the lower forms of credit are not nothing. I think we want to get past this idea that, โ€œoh, well, at the end of the day, you know, what matters is real dollars, buy the merch and all this fuzzy, silly credit that’s being issued and redeemed to this Zetro card is a bunch of hot air, right?โ€ Or it’s not really real, when in fact, no, that’s actually how the dollar system works all the time. It plays out through this interdependent hierarchy and those so-called lower-level orders are qualitatively different. But I would say they are just as important. They’re just as important. I mean, this was really noticeable in the 18th and 19th century when you had different banks issuing their own liabilities.

Then you would have all of these complicated payment schedules and redeemability. There would be charts that tell that the Bank of Xโ€™s notes are only worth this much when you go into that state. It was a total mess. But you had a sense that without your local bank that creates the credits, you’re fucked, right? Like those lower-level credits that might not be quite as stable are still your lifeblood. Coming back to all the activity that the Zetro card mobilizes in one of the most important cities on the planet, it is tremendous. So that lower-level credit is deeply, deeply meaningful. It’s political. It can be democratized. You can be creative with it, but not in a way that pretends that it’s somehow autonomous or that you don’t have to deal with those higher-level credit issues at the same time.

Will Beaman

That’s fantastic. One other thing that I would add before we move on is, I think that whether it’s the Zetro card or the scavenger hunt that Zoran did over the summer, I think we make a mistake if we make the sovereignty mistake. If we attribute these just to the charisma of Mamdani, or just to how infectious his smile is and all of that. In order for a smile to be infectious, we have to want to smile. It demonstrates that there is a deep capacity that that I suspect has a history of in politics that, for fiscal politics, politics of participation and circuits of coordinated activity in the public interest that are not on the rhythm of taxpayer funding showdowns and the impoundments of funds and what did Donald Trump say and how are the markets going to react to it? All that kind of stuff. 

I think in a lot of ways, what Mamdani is recognizing is that there is an already existing desire for somebody to charismatically convene people to have fun. Something else that I’ve been writing about in the context of brat summer with the Kamala Harris campaign and Dark Brandon before that, the caricature of Biden, is that the coalition will come up with charisma for you even if you don’t have it. There are genres, and camp is a big one for moments when there’s a big gap between who the politician is and who you want them to be. There are genres that are rehearsed and practiced and that are activated again and again that signal and extend the charisma and the authority to convene people to politicians on the condition that they don’t suck. On the condition that they don’t betray the coalition. I think that this is what differentiates Mamdani, obviously, from Harris and Biden.

I think that Harris and Biden saw their star power as somehow a reflection on themselves, rather than as a long-cultivated expression and desire on the part of voters for a Dark Brandon or for a brat figure, or for any of these figures. So, I think that, were Mamdani to take this all for granted and pivot to the center, my hunch is that people would stop showing up for the scavenger hunts. I think that this provides an alternative framework in very rough, hand-wavy terms, to get at what I think sovereignty is always trying to get at, which is this authority as differentiation, as seeming ability to convene people. But if we misread that as power from outside society ordering society around, then we take for granted all the ongoing coordination and cooperation and fantasy and desire on the part of people that makes authority work. When we think in these terms, then we can see Trump’s fiscal politics as an extension of his whole persona, which is something that the far right has been rehearsing since Obama, or earlier than Obama. This desire for a sovereign for a Dirty Harry-type figure who’s going to be lawless and ruthless and hypocritical and all of that means, basically, that you’re going to be protected as a follower from being held accountable because you too are unaccountable.

Thatโ€™s a certain form of governance and of authority, or a currency, if you will. But it’s not the only one. It’s actually really important to be attentive to it as a genre rather than as the new political world that we’re living in where everybody needs to copy Trump, which is, I think, how Gavin Newsom, for example, has read this moment. When we see these moments of a star just seemingly emerging out of nowhere as something more like a franchise that has been rehearsed from the bottom up or maybe we would say from the middle out, to be granted with conditions, or without conditions in the case of Trump, although I bet if Trump started to respect other people, the franchise would shut him down. There are even still conditions there too, right?

Scott Ferguson

Right. We should say just outright, his unaccountability is a collective project. It’s not coming from an autonomous place of absolute power that everybody just bends the knee to. It’s that there is a whole infrastructure of people and organizations who carry out that unaccountability collectively, because that’s what they want to happen. Right? It’s the same structure, but it’s just used for evil.

Will Beaman

In the context of a little experiment, like the scavenger hunt or the Zetro card or looking at a campaign and turnout as being like a miniature fiscal event or a miniature employment event, we can maybe think, or we can rethink a lot of the sovereignty-derived insights of MMT, like the finance franchise being an extension of sovereign power to banks from the fiscal authority.

If we see the fiscal authority itself not as a sovereign in itself, but as a collective public project, then we are able to see genres and forms of franchise as collective public projects as well. I think that that’s just another bridge that sort of allows us to do an end run around this whole thing and connect these seemingly nonpolitical or superfluous or silly campaign techniques before so-called power has been taken to governance and authority.

Billy Saas

I wanted to add that I think what the Trump constituency that was ready to realize the franchise was responding to is that he’s willing to hang out with them for extended periods of time and just shoot the bull for hours and hours at these campaigns. Maybe we can round out the conversation by coming to two of the more recent Vertical pieces, one of which very helpfully categorizes or names within the realm of democratic public finance what the Mamdani campaign is up to and what other campaigns and what other constituencies can aspire to, which is fiscal insurgency. This is a phrase that I like quite a lot and that captures and describes what we’ve been talking about. So, I wonder if we can talk a little bit about fiscal insurgency as a kind of broad framework within a framework. Maybe we can close out with a more recent piece on โ€œThe Paradox of Political Thriftโ€ and maybe, not to game out Mamdaniโ€™s chances, but we can take stock of the scene and note all of the idiosyncrasies and exciting developments we can notice here in the end of October 2025.

Will Beaman

Yeah, absolutely. So that one is my term, but it expresses a lot of the same things that we are expressing in the DPF and NPF concepts in the โ€œMam-documentโ€ that we’ve been circulating. Listener, I want you to know that both of my co-hosts laughed, but they’re on mute.

Scott Ferguson

Iโ€™ve unmuted so I can guffaw audibly.

*laughs*

Will Beaman

Okay. Thank you. These [laughs] are my back pay. I’m playing with the idea of insurgency and occupation here. I mean, Iโ€™m not really playing with it. I’m obviously thinking about it for very reasonable reasons. Typically, we think of an insurgency as sort of a military term, and we often lose sight of what makes insurgent campaigns successful, whether they’re peaceful or not. To be absolutely clear, we are peaceful. We come in peace in all ways. It is a recognition that you have to be embedded in society, and you have to look to and lean upon infrastructures that already exist.

I think that what we have been articulating in the โ€œMam-documentโ€ and also in a lot of these other Vertical pieces and in this conversation, is that agency is actually all around us. If we take the neoliberals or the fascists at their word, that agency is over there, not over here โ€”  wherever โ€œhereโ€ may be โ€”  then we end up being duped by a rigged playbook. So, in a context where Trump is threatening to impound funds or when the state of New York and Albany was, in a liberal idiom, threatening to withhold funds for Mamdaniโ€™s plans, it changes the entire dynamic of that situation. One could model and conduct and enact fiscal agency without routing it through these rigged choke points. Fiscal insurgency is my name for that. Itโ€™s ultimately a historical phenomenon that we see in places where, for political or for economic reasons too, like in the Great Depression, if credit is not available to employ people to keep patterned payments that stabilize social obligations moving, in those contexts, if all that dries up, people still need that and the fact that credit is endogenous comes out in all kinds of ways. 

The Greenback, during the Civil War, was issued when private banks were unable and unwilling to finance the union’s survival and tax dollars were not enough, the Army was mobilized, and the war effort was mobilized with these things called Greenbacks. World War Two, we had a bond drive. In the Great Depression, we have all kinds of, so-called, low-level currencies that emerged as municipal notes. Before that, in the 19th century, banknotes were all over the place, some of them on a very crypto-style imaginary, being these entrepreneurial institutions on the literal frontier of American imperialism out West. There was a free banking movement. You also had lots of credit experiments and rhetorics of talking about money that were grappling with ethics and grappling with interdependence and grappling with real problems of liquidity being absent.

Fiscal insurgency is โ€“ and I’ll just I’ll quote from this from this piece here:

โ€œFiscal insurgency is not isolation. It is not about retreating into localism or walling off states from the national economy. It is about building protective circuits of credit that keep democratic life functioning even when sabotage is staged from above. Insulation means refusing to let billionaires or authoritarian actors dictate the terms of survival.โ€

I also think that this contrasts very sharply with Gavin Newsom. Heโ€™s a very mixed bag, and ultimately, a lot of the wavering on transphobia and on civil rights is disqualifying full stop, but Gavin Newsom has sort of become an early emblem of Democratic local electeds creatively resisting the Trump administration.

Pushing back on Trump’s redistricting is obviously good, but there is, I think, an overall vibe of countering Trump’s illegality with the same until he backs down. โ€œWeโ€™re going to fight fire with fire identically.โ€ A lot of the rhetoric that’s been coming out of Newsom’s office and among his boosters is throwing around ideas like โ€œif we stop funding the federal government in order to teach the red states a lesson,โ€ or proposing different versions of what they call a โ€œsoft secession.โ€ As an aside, it’s mind boggling to me that you can talk about soft secession and not make as many waves as when you talk about creating credit. I should say ruffles as many feathers. I wish you could create waves talking about creating credit.

I think that this framework of fiscal insurgency refuses zero sum logics and doesn’t try to counteract them by saying, โ€œwell, actually, it’s the Trump administration who represents the welfare queens of society, which is all of the places in Appalachia and Mississippi who are voting for Trump, but if it weren’t for the taxpayers in California, they wouldn’t have jobs or health care.โ€ The other thing that the idea of insurgency is sort of trying to answer is that โ€” and this goes back to the scavenger hunt โ€”  it is possible to claim continuity and stability as a form of resistance. I think that the left’s playbook often, especially owing to a lot of inheritances from the Marxist tradition and the labor movement and all of that, has a very mixed legacy of both. I want to differentiate between instances that I think are not always differentiated between. There’s strikes and striking and the withholding of labor.

To be clear, I love a strike and support a strike. But there are also instances where workers have staged takeovers of factories, and they’ve done various things to keep the world running rather than stop it. I would want to trouble this binary between keeping the world running and stopping it anyway. Right now, we’re in the middle of a government shutdown that’s absolutely necessary in order to put pressure on the incentive structure of the Republican Party and the political infrastructure that supports it. There’s all kinds of reasons why strikes are incredibly effective in doing that, but when you import that logic to money and you think about, โ€œwell, our only tool in the toolkit must be to stop paying taxes, which fund all spending and bring everything to a halt,โ€ you’re playing into the Trump playbook, which is showdowns. These are showdowns predicated on money being finite. I see opportunities and openings for a rhetoric of fiscal insurgency in the improvisations and coordinated efforts of blue state governors, but I also see neoliberal public finance present too.

That is my idea with the fiscal insurgency and maybe, Scott, if you want to tie that back to the Mamdani document before we go on to the other Vertical piece, I don’t want that to fall by the wayside.

Scott Ferguson

Yeah, I think that one of the things that this brings to mind is the multiple time horizons that we have in mind in structuring the โ€œMam-document,โ€ which I’m just going to constantly say for eternity.

Will Beaman

The term is going to be in the show notes.

Scott Ferguson

Yeah. So, on the one hand, we offer strategies for immediate needs. In terms of legibility, those are the lowest hanging fruit, which would start with just reframing the function of taxation. There’s a massive tax the rich campaign in New York City, right now, and we support it. Every billionaire is a policy failure that remains true. Tax the hell out of them. In the short term, that is going to, as we can put it in a technical sense, increase your dollar balances, New York City. You can spend those high-powered dollars to build municipal grocery stores and make fast, free, and easily accessible buses and more.

In terms of bond issuance, we have something we haven’t talked about yet. Early on in this year, we were trying to think of immediate, legible fiscal strategies for resisting the Trump administration and resisting what was at that point, largely illegal impoundments that were cutting federal financing for vital services and institutions that help people live and work and have homes and eat and have health care. So, we proposed a bond drive to save democracy, and we called it and still are calling it blue bonds. A blue bonds bond drive. Blue for democratically controlled states because we associate the Democratic Party with the color blue. So, we’re calling them blue bonds for that reason.

Those are immediate strategies for getting high powered dollars into action to help people now. But we also have longer time horizons and more long-term strategies. One is challenging these fundamental laws, balanced budget amendments in state constitutions. When it comes to New York City, the so-called fiscal crisis of 1975, was one of the watersheds that ushers in the neoliberal era. It came along with a lot of new constrictive neoliberal fiscal laws about how much debt the city can issue in the future. All kinds of rules about budgeting to rein it in and keep it under control. Those rules were created by humans. They can be recreated by humans; they can be restructured by humans. But those are long term fights. They’re not going to be immediately legible to the public. But if you have a movement that is legible around, say, a Mamdani administration, then you imagine a way in which those long-term fights get introduced and become more and more exciting and more and more legible.

But there’s other long-term horizons that aren’t just about resistance but are about provisioning. This gets us back to area two, mobilizing people differently through creating credit at the sub federal level. We’ve been talking a lot about this at the level of the campaign, at the level of organizations. I love that you just passingly mentioned DSA bars that will create and redeem these credits, but we also have long term vital institutions in the city and everywhere else, quite frankly, that we can be reorganizing and thinking in terms of endogenous credit making. The big example that we give in the โ€œMam-documentโ€ is using the public school system.

So, the public school system is, in multiple senses, an accrediting institution. Students earn credits by going to school and by completing their schoolwork and by becoming educated. The schools themselves are a credit. They’re given credit to operate as schools by accrediting agencies that are themselves accredited by the government to be able to make those accrediting gestures in the first place.

There’s a whole hierarchy of crediting here, and you don’t need to build them from scratch. They’re already here. What happens if you start thinking more in terms of a public service economy and thinking about an end aim being something like a Green New Deal that has a public service component and a job guarantee at the heart of it.

So why not start in kindergarten? Why not start in first grade, second grade and start to do little baby steps here? Literally almost. Babies are almost literally baby steps toward public service. Itโ€™s not just a matter of providing institutional credit that isn’t dollars, but institutional credit for service labor. That’s going to benefit the school; benefit the society around the school, the neighborhoods around the school. It’s not just a matter of doing that, but it’s also a matter of being creative along the way. I love this, and this was not me. I didn’t come up with this. It was another member of our organization.

I love this example so much. So, the idea that we propose is this: you start a program where grade schoolers are helping to clean up their classrooms and their hallways. Right? And you know what? They already do this in Japan, and they probably do this in some places in the United States. But it’s not as routinized as it is in Japan. I’ve seen it with my own eyes. It’s incredible. Maybe the younger kids mostly take care of the immediate classroom and the hallways. But maybe the older kids are going off campus. They’re maintaining and beautifying the environment around their campus.

It doesn’t have to be just that. It can be any number of public service activities. I mean, it could be fun things. The sky’s the limit, right? But you’re providing various kinds of credit and that could be just your participation grade. It gets factored in your participation grade. Or it could be something more major, like, โ€œhere’s a certificate for a year’s worth of public service.โ€ It could be any number of ways of accrediting and this such a cool idea as a specific idea, but as a model, it’s to me amazing.

So, if you’re having kids doing, let’s say, what might count as janitorial work, right? Well, then what’s going on with the janitorial staff on campus? Well, the janitorial staff are the experts. They know what cleaning products work on which surfaces. You might think Windex is a good idea, but actually this other scrub is a good idea and use this kind of rag because this other kind of rag isn’t going to work. They have expertise. Why don’t we enlist the janitorial staff as pedagogues, as teachers who can teach, who can teach and help supervise and orchestrate this kind of work. The next part we do with a nod to the Mamdani campaign which is promising to reclassify preschool teachers as teachers that will give them the dignity of a certain status with certain kinds of benefits. I don’t know the ins and outs of it; I just know the basic move that they’re trying to make. What if, as part of this reorganization of crediting public service work, we change the designation and give a new kind of credit to janitorial staff? Now the janitorial staff are teachers and maybe the culinary staff, like the people who work in the cafeteria, maybe they get to be pedagogues, too and they’re teaching. They’re teaching cooking and place setting and cleaning up after everybody dines. What does that do? That can raise the pay, that can create certain kinds of tenure benefits for janitorial and cooking staff.

Suddenly you’re conferring new kinds of dignity, new kinds of credit in an institution that’s already enduring and powerful that a lot of people in society really, really value. They value the fact that they have these public schools, which are free, and they can trust to send their children to even though we’re in the midst of them being increasingly defunded, etc.

So, what would it mean to build up a scenario like that? To be transvaluing the people who participate along the way and essentially recreating the class structure that’s built into our public school system at the present. Then we can start thinking about, โ€œif we’re taxing, we’re issuing bonds, and what if we’re creating a public banking system and opening up our higher power dollar balances at the same time.โ€ If we’re working on that horizon at the same time, then we could start talking about a job guarantee at the level of the city.

So maybe that starts out of the school system, as there’s a teen unemployment crisis around the country right now, and there’s definitely one in New York City that they’re very aware of. What if you start a pilot job guarantee for whoever qualifies as the most vulnerable of teens in New York City? You start there.

You see how it goes. Maybe there’s a path to post-graduation employment. Maybe that path is subsidized. Maybe it’s in the public sector. Maybe it’s with nonprofits, with the public sector, supplementing the salaries for a certain amount of time or in perpetuity for these jobs. Then from there, maybe you expand it to all teens, whatever it is, 16- to 18-year-olds, or whatever we want to decide it’s going to be. 16- to 18-year-olds in New York City are guaranteed a public job.

Then from there you start piloting, opening it up to more and more people and then once you’re really rolling, it becomes a citywide job guarantee organized toward the goals of social justice, inclusion, community building and green sustainability. To me, and I’m saying this because I didn’t write this part of the document, that is such a powerful vision of not just what’s possible, like in a particular sector, but for what’s possible in general.

I think what we were talking about before with the Zetro card and coalition credits is equally a part of this project. But I do think that the education model might speak or might light up imaginations for certain people precisely because these feel like long existing stable institutions can support it, without having to build it from the ground up. Not that I’m opposed to building from the ground up either.

Will Beaman

I’m salivating listening to that. That’s amazing. It occurs to me that this also resonates in a really interesting way with a theme of this campaign and the very contested discourse which is another institutional logic of carcerality and the way that a lot of how Mamdani has framed his reforms to the police state is in terms of, โ€œwell, police fight violent crime, they’re not they shouldn’t be social workers. That’s not fair to expect of them.โ€ Of course, we should say that there’s tons of really important work and thinking and activism around creeping carceral logics that are present within the school system. So I don’t want to oppose them as institutions that are lived in, but the vision of schooling that you are referring to as one that views pedagogy in such a broad way that it enfolds a lot of work that people do as also being pedagogical work, sits alongside this other discourse that we’ve been having, which is how the solution to everything is to arrest people and put them in prisons. It’s interesting because I think this is another case where there’s sort of subtle discourse already happening about classification, which of course ties back to our earlier conversation about valuing assets and the dignity that attention to some of the pedagogy that everybody in a school setting is participating in, which is often subsumed or erased by this fraught and racialized imaginary of care work that is invisible, โ€œbut I don’t know who’s around my kidsโ€ and all of that kind of stuff. This is, to me, a different way of conceiving care as pedagogy, I love it. I’m all about it.

Scott Ferguson

We should probably also say something about, strategic area three of the document: โ€œCreating Public Alternatives to Commercial Banking and Payments.โ€ We are supporters of the public banking movement. Weโ€™ve been outspoken supporters at the federal level. Of The Public Banking Act. This kind of politics of public banking should be taken to the state or municipal level.

We’re not alone in this. There’s a whole public banking movement that also is interested in this as well. Connected to this is also developing a public payment system, what has been dubbed like a public Venmo. Weโ€™re really following a friend of the show, Robert Hockett, Cornell law professor who has worked with various politicians at the state level in New York and has written legislation that has not passed yet but has been proposed several times. So, we’re really piggybacking on Hackett’s work and all the supporters of Hackett’s work to create public banking and to create these public payment systems. In the research that we did, it seems like even though this was all proposed at the state level. By the way, Mamdani has, as an official, supported those. This is not news to Mamdani.

Will Beaman

The horizon of it might be news, the horizon that we want to do and how it leads to a complementary currency and all of that.

Scott Ferguson

Yeah, exactly. In our research, it seems like there’s a possibility in which you don’t have to get Albany fully on board for the full bill for establishing a New York state public banking system. You would only need Albany to add an amendment to a specific clause in state law, which essentially bars corporations from acting as banks and the amendment would just be, you know, โ€œexcept for New York City’s public bank.โ€ It would just exempt it. That still would be a fight. If you had the โ€œtax the richโ€ energy behind that fight, then that fight might be winnable. What happens when you have a public bank? 

Well suddenly you can bank all the unbanked people. You can push the private industries that are currently serving and exploiting those people, like the payday lending industry and the credit card industry, who are taking these vulnerable people who don’t have money and don’t have banking resources, and charging them through the nose with high interest rates that they cannot afford.

To have a public bank, you can immediately include people who have been excluded. You can also create a whole system of public investment that is predicated on low or no interest loans, and we’d have to look into the legality of all this. The major requirements for the loans are primarily to realize specific qualitative social and ecological goals. If you realize those goals, then you can continue to get low or no interest loans from the public bank. So you can democratize and socialize investment in that way while pushing out exploitative, private financial firms. Then the payments system side of this also has been developed as a legal framework by Robert Hockett, again at the state level.

If you’re pursuing a public bank at the level of New York City, you then will have the legal framework that opens up the possibility of creating a payment system as well. It can be digital. It can work through an app. Our colleague, Rowan Gray, is really interested in something that’s called e cash. This allows for digital payments to work with the kind of anonymity and privacy protection that traditional paper note and middle coin cash does. You can experiment in all kinds of different ways with this.

It doesn’t have to just look like a Venmo app. I mean, that could be one interface, but it could be any number of things. This puts pressure on credit card companies. I actually think โ€”  to speak slightly like a Marxist โ€”  I actually think that this would be extremely attractive to the petty bourgeoisie, you know, mom and pop bodega owner.

Will Beaman

I was just going to say, as we’re recording, there was a really fun, cool speech that he gave with an organization representing bodegas.

Scott Ferguson

People who run businesses in the city who are not major corporations. They are sacked with transaction fees left and right by Visa, Mastercard, etc., etc. and they hate it. My late father in law, he didn’t live in New York City, he lived in a small town in Iowa, but he had a small shop. He was a shoe repairman and sold clothing as well. He hated the credit card companies. No, he was no progressive or radical or anything, but I could totally see him going like, โ€œoh, wow. Yeah, I can just have an electronic payment system in my store, and I don’t have to pay more for it or charge customers more for it. Sign me up.โ€ This is just the tip of the iceberg. I mean, there’s so much that you can do and there’s so much that can be changed and so much collective fiscal capacity that could be unlocked if we pursue a citywide public banking and payment system.

Billy Saas

That’s excellent. I think it’s a good place to leave it.

Will Beaman

Thank you so much.

Billy Saas

Listeners, you can check out all of this stuff we’ve been talking about on Money on the Left dot org and also on Monthly Review Online.

* Thank you to Robert Rusch for the episode graphic, Nahneen Kula for the theme tune, and Thomas Chaplin for the transcript. 


Democratic Public Finance: A Radical Vision for Mamdaniโ€™s New York City

This document elaborates an emerging economic paradigm that is already latent in Zohran Mamdaniโ€™s plans and practices. The paradigm, which we call Democratic Public Finance (DPF), reframes money as an inexhaustible and malleable public institution. According to DPF, money is public credit, a capacious tool for mobilizing everyoneโ€™s capacities to meet our needs and build a desirable future. Contrary to economic orthodoxy, this paradigm redefines politics as the process of coordinating our abundant human and material resources within ecological limits, rather than exploitative competition for scarce funds. DPF is the process of making collective capacities visible, organizing them democratically, and enabling us to care for each other. Understood in this way, DPF discloses previously invisible possibilities for communal well-being and denaturalizes the impoverished suppositions that legitimize fiscal obstruction by establishment liberals, conservatives, and right-wing demagogues alike.

Mamdani has already displayed unparalleled political expertise in debunking myths about public spending. We build on this expertise, equipping the mayoralty with tools to openly and comprehensively challenge what we call Neoliberal Public Finance (NPF). NPF is an ideology and governance practice built on the false premise that money is a scarce private resource. NPF stages politics as a zero-sum game, assuming that communities can only deploy their capacities if they acquire money from taxpayers and bondholders. Undermining robust fiscal programs, NPF devalues extant collective capacities and obscures New York Cityโ€™s potentials. The result not only validates ongoing neoliberal austerity, but also enables the right-wing destruction of public services and the expulsion of vulnerable persons from the country and its institutions. Ultimately, NPF serves as a consistent excuse for inaction, leaving genuine democratic projects vulnerable to fiscal sabotage.

In what follows, we outline four strategies for the Mamdani mayoralty to consider. All four strategies are grounded in current proposals advanced by the Mamdani team. Each strategy is designed to advance inclusive democratic projects, while undermining the political legitimacy of manufactured crises perpetuated by establishment Democrats and the Trump administration:

1. Reframing Debt and Taxation: Reframes current taxation and debt limits as not only arbitrary, but also as irresponsible limits on what we can do for our communities. The aim is to publicly explain and contest current rules about municipal debt and taxation, highlighting how the rhetoric of money scarcity devalues workersโ€™ actual and potential contributions.

2. Mobilizing People Differently: Expands the public sector by using multiple forms of credit, particularly within the public school system, to create a culture of public service and a pipeline to a citywide Job Guarantee program.

3. Creating Public Banking and Payments Infrastructure: Establishes municipal-level public banking and a “Public Venmo” to democratize finance, serve the unbanked, and build a resilient local economy independent of Wall Street and insulated from federal political volatility.

4. Challenging Deep Legal Structures: Commences a long-term contestation of foundational laws at the municipal, state, and federal levels (e.g., balanced budget amendments), which legally enforce NPFโ€™s austerity logic.

The document concludes with a bibliography, which provides the theoretical and historical foundations for the principles of DPF outlined in this proposal.

* See here for a PDF version of this document.

Across the political spectrum, most people still believe that the U.S. economy is governed by immutable laws of supply and demand. On this logic, unemployment, rising rents, or scarcity of public goods are natural outcomes, not political choices. This market-centric worldview gives rise to misdiagnoses of social problems. Worse, it tends to validate pathological solutions that do far more harm than good. Take the oft-repeated notion that deporting migrants will โ€œfree upโ€ jobs and homes. Such ideas not only justify ongoing state violence; they also mask the real challenge at issue: overcoming our collective misunderstanding of public finance so that we can openly care for our communities and planet.

The present text argues that a robust response to the ills of market ideology requires cultivating shared knowledge about the political constitution of money. When communities grasp money as a contestable form of collective organization, large-scale public jobs and housing programs become eminently possible. Once this knowledge is widely shared, โ€œillegal migrationโ€ no longer appears as a problem. Responding to establishment handwringing and right-wing cruelty becomes an opportunity to build a democratic and inclusive future.

This document argues that building a just future requires shifting from the reigning ideology of Neoliberal Public Finance (NPF) to Democratic Public Finance (DPF). NPF constrains democratic possibilities by perpetuating the idea that money is always private, uncontrollable, and scarce. If money is scarce, so too are housing or jobs. NPF seems natural and almost unassailable, both as law and as a mode of framing collective life. It underwrites the neoliberal habit of acquiescence, which trains politicians and publics to treat fiscal sabotage as an impersonal event to be managed, not contested.

DPF, by contrast, asserts that money is an unlimited and disputable public good which can always be reorganized to serve people and the environment. For DPF, money is an inexhaustible institution, involving an always-ongoing and deeply public process through which societies mobilize their capacities and create their future. Imagine a city where public banks extend zero-interest credit to retrofit housing, or where a Job Guarantee program is financed through democratic credit issuance. This is the vision of DPF: not scarcity, but capacity; not limits, but collective potential.

A centuries-old tradition of legal and economic knowledge stands ready to support DPF: the credit theory of money. The credit theory of money demonstrates that when a governing institution issues or spends money, it credits the receiver, and records it as a debit in its books. Later, money can return to the issuer in payment of fines, dues, taxes, or other payments. When it does, the issuer credits itself and erases the debit. After its creation and before its return to the issuer and eventual erasure, money can mediate activities among money users. This is the crux of the credit theory: Money is the process of its creation, transmission, and final deletion. The credit theory of money could also be called the โ€œmonetary theory of creditโ€ because it emphasizes that money is credit and credit, money. Therefore, this document will use โ€œmoneyโ€ and โ€œcreditโ€ interchangeably.

If money is the ongoing process of issuing and deleting credits, it cannot be solely understood as an inert quantity that reflects past accomplishments. Money cannot be something we need to hoard to create a livable future. And it certainly cannot be scarce unless we make it so. Money is, instead, the world-making act of crediting those actors who construct the future.

As a crediting operation, money involves record keeping: the issuer notes credits on a ledger (analog or digital); it can also issue tokens such as coins or banknotes that have served as โ€œdistributed ledgersโ€ for millennia. The form money takes is secondary. No technological innovation can displace its essence, even as it constitutively shapes its operations and scope. All money is credit; all money, always, is an operation where crediting someoneโ€™s balance sheet means recording a debit on someone elseโ€™s. All money is orchestrated by a public entity situated at the center of a collectivity. In the United States and its predecessor polities, a wide range of actors, including colonies, states, and the federal government, but also municipalities and commercial entities such as banks, have operated ledgers, activating the capacities of millions of people. The economic situation in which we find ourselves currentlyโ€”defined by myriad atrocities as well as capabilitiesโ€”is the outcome of a long history of crediting operations.

These crediting operations never occur at random. All money, without exception, is a function of political design, as the legal scholar Christine Desan has pointed out. In everyday practice, some actors, but not others, are authorized to operate our crediting facilities, according to rules that govern for what purposes, and for whom, they can do so. How we answer the questions of monetary design is how the future takes shape. Thus DPF must name current rules, engage them, and propose avenues for democratic change. Just as exclusionary crediting patterns under the redlining scheme created a segregated housing sector, inclusive forms of money will make a just and inclusive world.

Readers of this document may recognize elements of DPF in Modern Monetary Theory (MMT), which has gained traction among progressive economists and challenged neoliberal assumptions about the federal budget. MMT rightly insists that the federal government, as a currency issuer, can never โ€œrun outโ€ of money, and that many forms of human sufferingโ€”unemployment, lack of housing, and other unmet needsโ€”result from artificial budget constraints. This document, however, presents Democratic Public Finance (DPF) as a broader political framework than MMT alone. Whereas MMT typically centers the federal governmentโ€™s capacity to issue currency, DPF reframes all levels of collective lifeโ€”federal, state, cityโ€”as potential sites of monetary transformation.

DPF builds on MMTโ€™s insights but pushes further: it sees money not just as a federal tool but as a design system embedded in law and governance at every level. It asks how public credit can be mobilized even within existing constraintsโ€”and how those constraints themselves can be named, politicized, and changed.

Contrary to conventional treatments of MMT, which often focus on technical truths about sovereign currency issuance, DPF is a form of democratic participation. It becomes a way of seeing, naming, and expanding what is possible, not only fiscally, but also politically. At the city level, this means exploring how to expand crediting capacity through public banking, rethinking debt rules, and transforming public service employment, all as part of a broader struggle over the meaning and purpose of money itself.

First, DPF reframes collective life as an open-ended crediting process that occurs at all levels, including the municipal. DPF refuses to accept the premise of money scarcity, and always looks for creative ways of crediting those who need it most.

Second, DPF is a mode of knowing the world differently: It is the process of learning about our capacities, possibilities, and needs.

Third, DPF is the process of naming the current rules of monetary design while rejecting the neoliberal premises that underlie it. With this, DPF challenges their status as a hard limit and static constraint. To this end, DPF advances and enhances multiple crediting institutions to mobilize people.

A DPF-informed challenge to NPFโ€™s money scarcity logic can deepen the transformative impact of Zohran Mamdaniโ€™s vision.

The Mamdani team already undermines NPF and has taken important steps toward DPF. When it denounces current debt rules as arbitrary, it challenges NPF. When it highlights the cityโ€™s vast and diverse resourcesโ€”from public sector assets to workersโ€™ capacitiesโ€”it undermines NPF. When it creates a sense of collective possibilities and responsibility, it undermines NPF. When it frames prices as a multifaceted political problem grounded in law, it undermines NPFโ€™s core tenet that prices can be an apolitical market outcome if the public sector does not โ€œinterfere.โ€ When Mamdani highlights the cityโ€™s vast unmet needs, from housing and childcare to food, and proposes feasible solutions for making life affordable, it makes economic life legible as a changeable provisioning system. These highly popular challenges to neoliberal orthodoxy have validated and strengthened forms of collective knowledge that are uniquely suited for advancing DPF.

At present, Mamdaniโ€™s agenda challenges some features of NPF, such as its extension of municipality bond issuance to fund public housing. Rhetorically, however, he has not fully broken with NPFโ€™s scarce money framing. This choice, of course, has a number of advantages. Above all, it enables Mamdani to focus on specific city projects and programs without introducing unfamiliar and potentially challenging ideas about public finance. That said, leaving NPF undisputed also has significant drawbacks. For such reasons, we urge the Mamdani mayoralty to go much further.

There are at least five reasons why leaving NPF largely intact damages Mamdaniโ€™s program for NYC. First, when we allow the appearance of money scarcity to persist, current human capacities and biophysical resources can appear secondary to moneyโ€™s availability, and potentially redundant. For instance, unemployed people can appear as a burden to the public purse and a cost to deserving taxpayers, not a tragic instance of exclusion and lost capacity that could be mobilized by credit creation.

Second, when money can continue to appear scarce, there is a tendency to see politics as the process of groups vying for scarce public outlays, rather than a future-oriented democratic coordination of capacities for the common good. Thereby, NPF plays down peopleโ€™s actual and potential contributions, creates fertile ground for exclusion, and distracts from a present that demands world-making.

Third, when money seems limited, taxpayers and bondholders can continue to present themselves as the center of political debate because we seem to depend on their money. It gives the voices of those who present themselves as taxpayers and bondholders special legitimacy as the alleged source of public financing, while of course disempowering everyone else. Instead of people who can presently claim certain assets, they are presented as the only geese that lay the golden eggs. They are those who ultimately pay. They are the pillars of the community on whose shoulders our collective welfare rests. Or, so we are told.

Fourth, leaving the assumption of money scarcity intact helps eclipse monetary design questions. Because money appears as a scarce quantity, not a political process of crediting and debiting, the rules that govern its issuance become less legible. This eclipsing shrinks the space of political possibilities because it becomes difficult to develop a widely shared language for public banking or a public payments system as a possibility within reach, just as urgent as freezing rents or expanding public childcare, and with potential effects that go beyond a single sector.

Fifth, when monetary capacity is regarded as a delimited resource, it induces political paralysis. Neoliberal ideology dictates that a democracy with tremendous organizational and productive capacity must nevertheless be held hostage by the veto power of private money holders. In countless scenarios, when talented organizers are ready, coalitional energy is real, and the democratic appetite for change is present, the dominant political imagination consistently stalls at the threshold of private investors. The assumption that only billionaires or suburban taxpayers can provision democracy has become so entrenched that it is easier to imagine acquiescing to authoritarianism than bypassing this veto.

In sum, NPF makes collective capacities less legible or appear redundant; it spells exclusion, enforces unjust hierarchies, and sabotages political action. NPF is an unjust pastโ€™s best bet to extend itself into the future, but DPF is here to say it has overstayed its welcome. If NPF says No, we canโ€™t!, DPF asks What do we wish to accomplish together? DPF involves collective decision-making about how we want to live and work in community based on an accurate understanding of money as a world-making public institution.

This document sketches four areas through which NYC can maximally expand crediting operations to its residents as it engages current rules, mobilizes peopleโ€™s capacities democratically, and builds empowering forms of economic knowledge. Each of these areas can stand on its own; together, they constitute a broad challenge to NPF. Individually, reframing each area can extend municipal crediting operations. If one of the areas for action falls short, then controversies about it nonetheless contribute to the overall goal of undermining NPF. DPF can still be advanced in the other areas. In addition, many of the anticipated gains are not easily reversed.

The core message is: Money is a malleable public institution we use so people can serve one another. This message must come through in practice, not as a doctrine but a reframing of politics that touches most areas of public lifeโ€”a constant challenge to NPF. NPF must be addressed, not as a static limit or a hard constraint but a series of politically created chokepoints that currently limit what we can do for each other.

The remainder of this document outlines four strategic domains where DPF principles can be operationalized in NYC. Each area demonstrates how rethinking monetary design can unlock democratic possibilities and challenge the assumptions of NPF.

The four strategic areas we cover include:

  1. Reframing Debt Issuance and Taxation
  2. Mobilizing People Differently: Public Sector Expansion, the Public School System, and the Multiplicity of Credits
  3. Creating Public Banking and Payments Infrastructure
  4. Challenging the deep structure of neoliberal finance in municipal, state & federal law

The premise of this section is simple but robust: To advance DPF and deepen its challenge to NPF, Mamdani can reframe current taxation and debt limits as both arbitrary and irresponsible constraints. Mamdani can explain the current rules about municipal taxation and debt and emphasize how illusions of money scarcity devalue workersโ€™ actual and potential contributions. Mamdani has much to gain, and little to lose, from connecting peopleโ€™s capacities to the monetary chokepoints that are currently obstacles to mobilizing them fully.

This is the message: The rules of NPF prevent the city from democratically mobilizing people to accomplish urgent tasks. NPF hurts people who need support and limits democratic decision-making about the cityโ€™s priorities. It limits what we can do for each other. We have the people.  We have the needs. Let us cooperate and build: fast and free buses, affordable childcare, and public grocery stores. Do not sabotage our ambitions through NPF. Donโ€™t be reckless.

This perspective also allows Mamdani to connect ICE (and other harmful public organizations) to the problem of collective provisioning. ICE takes away potentially useful people, who in turn become violence workers to deport people who are contributing in many ways and want to continue doing so. This is not only cruel; it also destroys important webs of social provisioning. Ours is the work of care against the work of violence. Ours is the work of creating future generations versus the work of destroying livelihoods, erasing contributions, and creating suffering. It is the call of the โ€œmanosphereโ€ versus the call of care. The NPF budgetary chokepoint and ICE are similar: both represent a reckless sabotage of production and a foolish, uncaring disruption. Countering sabotage and destruction could include creating good job options for people who might consider becoming ICE agents.

The messaging about taxation could be modified along these lines: We presently have to tax the rich to mobilize our labor, but that does not take away from the fact that we are doing the work ourselves. Taxing the rich is good for democracy and necessary for keeping the cityโ€™s dollar balances up under current rules, but it ought not limit what we can achieve together. Peopleโ€™s capacities and needs are at the center of the political universe, not taxpayerโ€™s bank accounts. When someone says, โ€œMamdani thinks there is a Santa,โ€ we should respond with: โ€œWe are our own Santa.โ€ When someone says, โ€œBy increasing taxes, you are chasing the goose that lays the gilded eggs,โ€ the answer is: โ€œWe lay our own eggs.โ€

Bond issuance practices and messaging can also be modified in this spirit. For instance, the city government could organize bond drives at advantageous rates. It is reasonable to believe there would be subscribers far beyond NYC because of the cityโ€™s central place in the global political imaginary and its potential to become a model for transformative change. Many people who donate to blue campaigns might buy such bonds. Instead of donating to campaigns, people would be investing in city infrastructure, and the line between donations and bonds could become blurred. The message could be: We need bond drives, and we are grateful to subscribers who help us minimize pressure on the budget. At the same time, it is us who do the work, and it is us who coordinate our efforts. Peopleโ€™s capacities, skills, and resources precede the dollar balances created by bond sales. This is similar in spirit to war bond drives, even if the context and purpose is distinct: While public discourse valued subscribers, no one doubted who was really going to war. Bond issuance coupled with political messaging has the further advantage of tying asset ownership to a political project. Unlike donations, owning a bond forges a longer-term connection.

There are also strategic advantages to deepening Mamdaniโ€™s challenge to NPF. First, a DPF reframing allows the city government to reject the unpopular role of austerity manager. Second, it allows the city to put pressure on those who could attempt to enforce NPF, while staying on message about New Yorkersโ€™ capacities, resources, and needs. Third, not engaging the assumptions of NPF while making โ€œhard choicesโ€ means re-anchoring the fictitious chokepoint at the center of collective life, which necessarily implies devaluing the potential contributions and collective resources that could be mobilized to meet urgent needs.

Unless NPF assumptions are challenged head-on, they are bound to shape how the cityโ€™s capacities, resources, and agency become legible. Unless NPF assumptions are rejected explicitly, capacities and democratic processes appear downstream from โ€œfinding the money.โ€ Even if it can never fully erase an awareness of actual possibilities on the ground, NPF makes peopleโ€™s capacities seem redundant and solutions appear utopian when they are at armโ€™s reach.

A DPF reframing of taxation and bond issuance marks a departure from typical progressive discourse, which does not challenge the NPF idea of a monetary chokehold, either taking it for granted or considering the legal forms NPF takes as unchallengeable. These are the typical reasons given for not challenging the money scarcity tenet: It sounds reasonable and plausible to politicians, economists, and other members of the public. Because neoliberal claims about money scarcity are ubiquitous, how to persuade the public is an open question. It might also appear pointless at the municipal level: Given how entrenched NPF as law and frame, why bother with ideas that seem out of reach? Finally, adding another contentious issue to an already bold political project could strain resources.

These objections should be weighed carefully. At the same time, it is important to note that the emphasis on actual capacities of workers is already at the core of Mamdaniโ€™s vision, that the shift to a DPF framing can be accomplished gradually and at first, almost imperceptibly. It does not rely on declaring โ€œWe are all municipal MMTers now.โ€ And it can leave a lasting impression with important implications for future politics: โ€œDo you remember the mayor who consistently said that our work can always be mobilized, that money is not the limit, that we should be able to mobilize our work democratically when we decide what we want to accomplish together?โ€

The central claim of Area 2 is: A municipality that seeks to maximally expand its crediting operations ought to broaden its definition of money and explore complementary crediting tools. To this end, this section introduces the hierarchy of money and discusses its possibilities and limits using the example of educational systems and their crediting operations.

Not all money/credit is the same: This is the hierarchy of money. At the top is โ€œhigh-powered moneyโ€โ€”commercial banksโ€™ balances with the central bank and federal fiscal appropriations. One step lower is the money in bank depositsโ€”banksโ€™ promise to exchange our balances for dollars at par on demand, or settle balances with other money users electronically. Commercial and governmental actors routinely combine such high-level dollars with lower-level credit systems: Airline miles, Starbucks gift cards, campus currencies, and gaming money are much farther down the hierarchy of money, yet they are immensely profitable and/or strategically useful for their issuersโ€”the entities that issue them, regulate their use, and accept them back in payment to themselves.

The money question becomes multidimensional when lower-level crediting operations come into view. Governmental institutions ceaselessly issue credit, or accredit other institutions to do so in their stead: When the government doesnโ€™t issue money, it charters banks to do so. When the public education sector does not issue credits or diplomas, DOE and other (DOE-accredited) accrediting agencies license private schools and universities that do the same. Governments also issue credits in the form of rebates for access to public facilities for certain groups (e.g. reduced entry fees for veterans). Finally, the public sector also maintains a broader legal system through which these public and commercial crediting systems can work. Collective life is a multifaceted crediting process, and politics is how we decide about the rules according to which this is done.

The Mamdani campaignโ€™s Zetro card program illustrates how money functions as a social tool of credit to mobilize community labor and resources. During the campaign, the Mamdani team issued Zetro cards to volunteers, crediting them for their canvassing and organizing hours. These cards could then be redeemed for campaign merchandise. The system creates an effective monetary circuit for coordinating collective capacities. It demonstrates in real-time that we do not need to wait for scarce dollars to organize our collective capacities; we can institute our own systems of credit to acknowledge labor, foster community, and work toward a shared goal. The Zetro card, then, is not merely a clever organizing tactic; it is a living example of how we can build a more just and responsive economy from the ground up by understanding money as inexhaustible public credit.

As part of this logic, municipal governments ought to fully exploit the multiplicity of crediting possibilities, and deploy it in tandem with high-level dollars. Lower-level crediting systems, such as those deployed in the education sector, are not subject to NPF chokepoints (even if curved grading echoes NPFโ€™s artificial scarcity). While they are distinct from dollars, at scale, they are a powerful means of mobilizing, valuing, rewarding and developing capacities and people and can be used to complement dollar expenses.

The logic of this section can be illustrated through the example of a decades-old summer camp in upstate New York, where returning campers, as they grow older and become more experienced, are gradually integrated into the supervising/instructional framework through several crediting systems. At first, campers earn badges for tasks accomplished (similar to scout ranks). At age 13, they can become Counselors-in-Training (CITs) who assist Counselors in some tasks. Now, they are already credited in the sense that their tuition is reduced and they can claim credit for their work on their CV. When they turn 16, CITs can apply to become Counselors, and become responsible for a group. This is a full summer job with dual crediting in dollars and work experience; they no longer pay tuition. Later, they can become specialized instructors, lifeguards, etc., with increasing dollar-denominated credit. At each step, they are credited in multiple ways and trained for the next step. While employment may not be guaranteed, there is a strong expectation that there is already a place for everyone who wants a job. This is a well-thought-out system that, at a small scale, captures the logic of a public education system that can expand into a larger public sector.

Outside of summer camps, the logic of dual crediting is ubiquitous in the process of โ€œCV buildingโ€: For instance, as interns, people receive a mix of credit for work done and a modest wage; as professionals, people get โ€œcreditโ€ for a job done (a line on the CV), and are credited in dollars. All educational systems, public and private, operate with multiple forms of credits and debits: For instance, higher education and research systems issue course credits, degrees, diplomas, awards and recognitions at all levels. They recognize โ€œas creditโ€ work experience, and at higher levels recognize and demand qualitative or quantitative evidence of merit, such as peer-reviewed publications. At the apex, the creditors themselves need to be credentialled (e.g., the higher education accreditation systems). In tandem with these multiple crediting systems, educational institutions rely on and administer a crediting/debiting system denominated in dollars that involves tuition, government funding, donations, fees and fines, and outlays of all kinds, e.g. as salaries for instructors or administrators. Educational systems manage the interaction of multiple crediting systems which situate them in broader social relations: Education functions because internal credits (e.g. diplomas) are recognized outside.

This section proposes expanding and formalizing the logic of multiple crediting systems, and making it part of a public sector expansion at the scale of the city. โ€œInternalโ€ credits can serve as an auxiliary engine to the dollar crediting system. Lower-level credit does not replace an engagement with NPF at the higher levels of money, but it makes the higher-level dollars more impactful and helps create a dynamic in which DPF can thrive and NPF becomes more implausible.

Imagine this sequence of crediting operations in which the summer camp serves as a model for combined โ€œinternalโ€ educational and โ€œexternalโ€ dollar credit: Elementary and middle school students can become used to the idea of public service early on, for instance by involving them in custodial tasks, food preparation, or gardening for one period per day. There is successful precedent for this in Japan, and there are similar, and popular, programs in many schools in the U.S. today, e.g. when older elementary school students help teachers with the youngest. Custodians and cooks, on the model of home economics teachers, could become part of the academic staff; that is, they would be recognized as teachers. In addition to performing tasks that are unsuitable for students, they would manage and supervise students in collaboration with school leadership and other teachers.

At this early stage, students would be credited with grades (e.g. conduct grades) and through a credit/rewards system such as ice cream credits from nearby stores (a practice that already exists). Using educational credits to mobilize students in this way would have many desirable effects: If the spirit of public service is already present in kindergarten, students think of themselves less as passive consumers of educational services and more as active participants in a public process. This could be the beginning of a generational experience of public service and collective responsibility.

It could also redefine custodians, kitchen staff, and their work: They are already doing pedagogical work when they instruct students about how to dispose of waste etc., but they are at a disadvantage as long as they are not formally defined as teachers. This redefinition of workers is similar to the proposed upgrading of childcare workers to teacher status, an (ac)crediting operation that involves a higher salary but is not limited to this form of credit. It is worth noting that school districts have experience onboarding workers from โ€œotherโ€ professions. It is also worth noting that, once this is accomplished, it is difficult to undo: If hundreds of custodians have been defined as teachers, they have contracts, union representation, etc.

In a context of a teen unemployment crisis, such internal crediting systems could be complemented by a plural credit system that includes dollars and subsidized public-purpose employment with high school credit. Initially, this could be a small-scale teen employment pilot project for the least enfranchised teens. If employers retain workers at the end of the period, their salaries could be subsidized. This program could be gradually expanded to include all teens. It is important to note that this would have to go hand in hand with a growing public sector in all areas of life (on the model of the proposed childcare expansion, and as part of the public sector expansion such as the Department of Community Safety, prevention first, Community Mental Health Navigators, EMT, violence interrupters). Similar to High School ROTC, but in the radically distinct context of local public service, youth could become familiar with possible future roles as they transition from high school credits and summer internships to public service employment. As it grows, its popular support base will also grow, and it would become more difficult to undo (similar to Social Security). Eventually, this logic can lead to a citywide Job Guarantee.

Note that this logic is radically distinct from a range of other options. (1) This is not a mere expansion of monetary benefits (e.g. the Uruguay of the Frente Amplio government after 2005) because it would tie crediting operations not to a diagnosed need (lack of money) and present high-powered money, by itself, as a remedy; instead, it would deploy multiple crediting systems to integrate people into a democratizing economic life that fulfills needs. (2) It is even more radically distinct from neoliberal โ€œHail Maryโ€ job market insertion programs that first train people and then abandon them. (3) Neither is it a New Deal-style temporary employment program: It goes hand in hand with a sustained and carefully planned public sector expansion. There are wins each step of the way, these wins are difficult to undo quickly or completely even if there is, say, an electoral defeat.

In sum, multiple crediting operations can drive a planned, gradual expansion of the public sector, a revaluation of different kinds of work, a mobilization of human capacities, and a pedagogical process that mimics, at the scale of New York City, the summer camp logic sketched above. This is the spirit of a Green New Deal at the scale of NYC and should be creatively extended across sectors.

In addition to reframing the budget process and developing already-existing lower-level crediting systems, a DPF strategy could challenge the corporate domination of banking and payments.

This is the premise of Area 3: If crediting operations create the future, democratizing such operations is at the core of a more inclusive and just politics. Today, banking and payments are dominated by commercial banks, credit card companies, and payday lenders.

Recent New York legislative history offers bold solutions that can advance DPF in this context: The New York Public Banking Act (NYPB) and the Inclusive Value Ledger Act (IVL). The NYPB would establish a regulatory framework allowing New York municipalities to create their own public banks. These banks would be chartered to serve the public interest, not Wall Street, and could provide essential services like low-cost loans for public infrastructure, small businesses, and affordable housing. They would also provide a free, safe and surveillance-free place for New York residents to manage their money, thereby banking the unbanked.

This legal and institutional foundation will open the doors for the IVL, which would establish a public, digital payments systemโ€”a โ€œPublic Venmoโ€โ€”for the entire state. The IVL would function as a public utility, offering every New Yorker a digital wallet connected to a state-controlled master account. This would enable no-cost, real-time payments between individuals and businesses, as well as with state entities for things like tax payments and benefits. This system would not only provide a no-fee alternative to commercial payment companies but could also be designed to recognize and reward public-purpose work, such as caregiving or community service, by delivering IVL credits directly into New Yorkersโ€™ digital wallets.

Crucially, implementing an IVL does not have to wait for the passage of a comprehensive state-level bill. New York City could create its own city-wide IVL with a targeted amendment to State Banking Law ยง 131, which currently prohibits corporations from receiving deposits. This small but powerful legal tweak would explicitly exempt a New York City-operated Inclusive Value Ledger from this prohibition, allowing the city to provide a public payments system to its residents and businesses. This tactical approach would deliver a key component of DPF immediately and serve as a powerful proof-of-concept for the broader statewide campaign, deepening the connections between progressive NYC politics and statewide efforts.

Mamdani is uniquely positioned to make the aims of the NYPB and the IVL legible to a broader public. His strength lies in his ability to listen to communities and propose solutions that meet their needs, a talent that can be leveraged to demonstrate how these acts would serve the very programs Mamdani is already championing, such as public grocery stores. By weaving these previously obscure initiatives into a narrative of community empowerment, Mamdani can show how a new banking and payments system would broaden access to financial services to the unbanked, sideline exploitative corporations, and expand the cityโ€™s fiscal capacity. This system can be integrated with other initiatives to organize a robust people-first economy where transactions support public goods rather than private profits. Most importantly, by creating these new monetary institutions, Mamdani can mobilize labor and resources in innovative ways that directly address community needs, a core tenet of democratic public finance.

Building out state-level banking and payments systems are especially critical forms of regional resilience and resistance to the current political moment defined by the second Trump presidency. The current administrationโ€™s approach to public finance can be described as a radicalized form of neoliberalism, where austerity is not merely a de facto policy framework but an authoritarian directive. This is epitomized by the assertion of a unitary executive theory of money, where the President claims the unilateral right to impoundโ€”or simply refuse to spendโ€”funds that Congress has appropriated. This unconstitutional power grab makes the federal fiscal process, but also previously โ€œunpoliticalโ€ institutions such as the Automated Clearing Houseโ€”vulnerable to a president who uses it to target political opponents and dismantle public programs. The aim is insulation from crisis bargaining: threats of shutdown, impoundment and legislative slow-walking lose their leverage when public payments continue uninterrupted. Pursuing state-level initiatives like public banking and payments systems offers a clear path to securing economic flourishing and self-determination for New Yorkers.

These bills cannot be revived and won overnight. But integrating the goals of these acts into a broader DPF narrative, Mamdani can make them not only socially meaningful, but also vital and exciting. The language and ideas we champion today shape what becomes imaginable tomorrow. Even if this struggle meets immediate resistance in Albany, it is crucial to shape the horizon in which the future will be contested. This proactive effort ensures that the conversation around public finance shifts from one of scarcity and austerity to one of collective capacity and possibility, laying the groundwork for a truly democratic financial system down the line.

To fully realize DPF, we must dismantle the foundational legal and ideological structures that uphold NPF. These deep-seated frameworks, often embedded in federal and state constitutions, represent the most formidable obstacles to transformative change. To leave them unchallenged in political discourse is to tacitly accept their premises of money scarcity and austerity, thereby limiting what is perceived as politically possible. While some of these deep structures were implemented during the neoliberal period, which began in the 1970s, others are rooted in the long history of the United States and owe to the anti-democratic impulses in the Enlightenment philosophy that informed the writing of the U.S. Constitution. Our goal is to expose these legal and ideological chokepoints not as unchangeable facts but as a political terrain to be contested, creating a pathway for long-term reform.

The core of NPF is a legal hierarchy that prioritizes private financial institutions over public bodies, especially at the state and municipal levels. The hierarchy consists of two basic, mutually reinforcing, structures. The first part of this structure is the legal framework that grants corporate banks the power to create credit, a privilege legal scholars Robert C. Hockett and Saule T. Omarova call the โ€œfinance franchise.โ€ The second part constrains sub-federal public entities with balanced budget rules and limited powers of taxation and debt issuance. This system fosters a negative feedback loop where public entities, starved of democratic financing tools, are forced into a politics of austerity, while private markets are prone to credit-fueled bubbles.

The effort to challenge these deep structures must focus on two key areas: (a) sub-federal constitutional and legal constraints, and (b) federal constitutional and appropriations law.

(a) Overcoming Sub-Federal Constraints: At the state and municipal level, NPF is largely enshrined in balanced budget requirements and other fiscal rules. Such rules, often embedded in state constitutions, make it difficult for cities like New York to respond to the needs of their residents without resorting to regressive taxes or market-dependent borrowing. Mamdani must frame these constraints not as a sign of fiscal prudence but as a form of social and ecological irresponsibility, preventing the city from mobilizing its vast human and material resources to address urgent needs. Balanced-budget rules function as pre-installed political levers that can be yanked to break progressive coalitions when livelihoods and essential services hang in the balance.

While changing state constitutions is a long and arduous process, involving methods like legislatively referred amendments, citizen initiatives, or constitutional conventions, the conversation must begin now. By consistently highlighting how balanced budget amendments and other rules impede the cityโ€™s ability to serve its people, Mamdani can build public support for a future where these rules are challenged and ultimately transformed.

(b) Reforming the Federal Financial Architecture: The federal level presents its own set of constitutional chokepoints. Article I, Section 10, Clause 1 of the U.S. Constitution, which prohibits states from coining money or emitting bills of credit, is a primary legal barrier to sub-federal monetary power. Furthermore, the federal appropriations and payment authorization process itself contains anti-democratic bottlenecks that leave it vulnerable to executive overreach. A unitary executive can weaponize the governmentโ€™s centralized IT infrastructure to illegally impound funds, overriding Congressโ€™s constitutional power of the purse.

To address these issues, a transformative agenda would require:

A New Constitutional Amendment: The ultimate goal is to amend the U.S. Constitution to extend the finance franchise to states and municipalities. This would grant them the power of credit creation, moving them from being mere borrowers and taxers to being active participants in DPF. This is not a call for an unregulated free-for-all, but rather a new, regulated system where sub-federal entities are empowered to create money under strict rules to promote social inclusion, environmental sustainability, and affordable pricing. A new federal agency would be needed to coordinate this process and prevent destructive competition among states and cities.

Modernizing the Appropriations Process: Following the blueprint laid out in legal scholar Rohan Greyโ€™s paper โ€œDigitizing the Fisc,โ€ the federal appropriations process must be redesigned to be more democratic and resilient. Key proposals include:

A Congressional Fiscal Record: A digital database and ledger, managed by Congress, that records all public funds and spending directives.

A โ€œTreasury ATMโ€: A centralized, secure terminal for agencies to withdraw newly issued digital currency (โ€œeCoinsโ€) directly from Congressโ€™s authority, bypassing the traditional Treasury and Federal Reserve intermediaries and their associated political vulnerabilities.

Public Credit Cards: Congressionally-issued digital โ€œkeysโ€ that define the legal and operational limits of an agency’s spending authority, ensuring that funds are used in accordance with legislative intent.

A Federated Federal Ledger: A decentralized record-keeping system that synchronizes agency-level data with Congressโ€™s central ledger, increasing transparency and accountability while protecting against a unitary executive takeover.

By advocating for these changes, Mamdani would not only challenge NPF at its deepest legal and ideological roots but also lay the groundwork for a truly democratic financial system where money is a public utility used to mobilize people and resources for the common good. This approach redefines responsibility, shifting the focus from arbitrary budget rules to the well-being of people and the environment. It is worth noting that identifying problematic legal norms, including and the constitutional level, can in and of itself have important effects: For instance, the fact that the ERA has not been adopted remains a useful reminder of widespread opposition to womenโ€™s rights. Therefore, it has pedagogical effects that are important and make it a worthwhile cause regardless of when or whether it is adopted.

Without a doubt, Zohran Mamdaniโ€™s vision for New York City represents the most politically savvy and fiscally robust undertaking in decades. This document argues that Mamdaniโ€™s transformative vision can be further enhanced if it directly confronts the myth of money scarcity and frames our collective capacities as the source of shared prosperity. Democratic Public Finance at once delegitimizes and bypasses neoliberal sabotage from the center, as well as authoritarian subjugation and exclusion. Mamdani can move beyond a defensive debate over funding and offer a hopeful, coherent narrative that shapes what we can achieve together in new ways. It can also, potentially, help reshape the political landscape beyond New York City by modeling a different approach to fiscal policy and assisting other municipalities. Implementing the proposed strategiesโ€“reframing the budget, mobilizing people through lower-level forms of credit, creating public financial infrastructure, and challenging the deep legal structures of austerityโ€“is a long-term struggle. But even when immediate victory is uncertain, the very act of publicly contesting these rules is vital because it shapes what becomes politically legible and achievable for future generations. This fight will ground Mamdaniโ€™s ambitious platform in a shared sense of purpose, forging a stronger community and a powerful mandate to build a truly democratic and prosperous New York City.

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The Case for Fiscal Insurgency

by Will Beaman

A common refrain keeps surfacing among prominent journalists- and commentators-in-digital-exile on BlueSky. Commenting on the emergence of yet another shadowy centrist think tank, New York Times columnist Jamelle Bouie observes: โ€œTrumpโ€™s numbers are tanking and there is a palpable desire in the electorate for a real alternative and yet the only money in democratic politics is for doing Starmerism.โ€ Tim Carvell, a writer for Last Week Tonight with John Oliver, notes: โ€œa legacy publication or a deep-pocketed investor could hire an astonishing array of talent right now and make the best newspaper in America overnight.โ€ Ben Collins of The Onion puts it bluntly: โ€œIf youโ€™re rich and not a coward, this is what youโ€™d refer to as a โ€˜market opportunityโ€™โ€ฆ to be a pop of color in a sea of beige will be easier than ever. People will flock to it. You gotta be a little brave, though.โ€

In every case, the structure is the same: capacity is there, but private money says no. Talented organizers, journalists, and public servants are ready. Coalitional energy is real. Democratic desire is present. But political imagination stalls at the threshold of private investment. The assumption that only billionaires or suburban taxpayers can provision democracy has become so entrenched that it is easier to imagine acquiescing to authoritarianism than bypassing this veto.

Such resignation marks the disgrace of our present moment. We live in a democracy with boundless capacity, yet it is held hostageโ€”openly and in bad faithโ€”by private money and the austerity habits it demands. If democracy fails, it will not be because the publicโ€™s appetite was absent, but because we accepted private moneyโ€™s โ€œnoโ€ at face value. Even when the mask has long since slipped, and the idea that โ€œthe marketโ€ demands austerity is a bad joke.

The Neoliberal Habit of Acquiescence

This is the reflex Trump has hijacked. His sabotage of institutions works not only through brute force, but through the learned helplessness that neoliberal governance has drilled into liberals and even leftists for decades. For nearly half a century, Democrats have been told to treat fiscal sabotage as an impersonal eventโ€”something to adapt to, never contest. Capital flight, credit downgrades, and market volatility were cast not as acts of power but as external shocks demanding austerity management. Globalization was pitched in these terms: a sublime, external event beyond human governance, against which the only rational stance was flexibility and humility.

Trump exploits this governing reflex and turns it into spectacle. He models himself on the old specter of the โ€œbond vigilanteโ€: an actor so wealthy and unaccountable that he appears as a force of nature, bending governments to his will. Trump embodies that threat in human form, turning sabotage into a performance of independence. His violations of law and democratic norms are staged not as corruption, but as confirmation that he is beholden to no one.

When Democrats treat this as just another crisis to be managed, they recycle the very habit that neoliberalism instilled: the belief that adaptability in the face of sabotage is the essence of responsible governance. To accept private moneyโ€™s veto is to naturalize political sabotage. What was once presented as adaptation to markets has become collaboration with authoritarianism.

Starmerism & The Private Investment Trap

If neoliberal governance made sabotage appear natural, todayโ€™s Democratic politics takes the lesson even further: it treats Trumpโ€™s bullying as the new horizon of fiscal life. What once appeared as the sublime discipline of โ€œthe marketโ€ has been unmasked as the unbounded whims of an increasingly fascistic group of billionaires, with Trump as their avatar. Yet Democrats continue to orient themselves as if nothing essential has changedโ€”adapting to threats as though they were impersonal shocks, rather than deliberate acts of sabotage.

This is just Starmerism: a politics defined not by vision but by compliance, where electoral ambition shrinks to whatever billionaires, suburban taxpayers, or Trumpโ€™s manufactured crises will tolerate. The result is a politics of pre-emptive surrender: leaders advertising their moderation not in contrast to authoritarianism, but in deference to the veto power of money and the theater of sabotage. Meanwhile, the public appetite for immediacy is palpable. Each time a non-Trump timetable appears, the response is instantโ€”as when Zohran Mamdaniโ€™s protoโ€“public works scavenger hunt drew overwhelming participation. As I argued earlier in Money on the Left, people are not waiting for Trumpโ€™s next move; they are rehearsing a desire to be met.

Organizers and campaigns can mobilize small donors in unprecedented numbers, yet the infrastructure of long-term investmentโ€”media institutions, public communications, policy experimentationโ€”remains chained to elites who are either hostile or indifferent. The most talented journalists in the country are between jobs, the most creative campaigns run on fumes, and state and city governments are left to administer austerity with nothing but temporary patches. Meanwhile, the only steady stream of cash in politics flows to projects of retrenchment: centrist think tanks, corporate-friendly candidates, and the staging grounds of sabotage.

This is not fiscal realism. It is self-inflicted austerity, the result of imagining sabotage itself as an inescapable condition of democratic life. The paradox of Starmerism is that it presents itself as pragmatic but is in fact the most utopian position of all: it assumes that billionaires and their enforcers can be persuaded to underwrite democracy, against all evidence.

The task now is to break free from this trapโ€”not by waiting for private money to say yes, but by building circuits of democratic credit that bypass its veto altogether.

Even the migration to BlueSky, with its slower rhythms and sometimes too-earnest exchanges, is evidence to this point. Despite the notorious difficulties of platform migration in a socially embedded world, 39 million people have given BlueSky a shot. What this shows is a shockingly robust desire for a public sphere insulated from far right news cycles, where discourse as a public capacity is not dominated by reactionary slop. This is the same public desire that fiscal insurgency can meetโ€”and much better than BlueSky does. A democratic timetable not dictated by private moneyโ€™s veto or by authoritarian crackdowns, but by the courage to build and sustain public life directly.

That desire is not without precedent. At moments of democratic crisis in the past, Americans have built new circuits of credit and coordination to bypass elite vetoes.

Historical Precedents for Fiscal Insurgency

Insurgent credit has always been American democracyโ€™s lifeblood, emerging time and again when all else fails.

The most famous example is the Greenback. During the Civil War, when private banks could notโ€”or would notโ€”provision the Unionโ€™s survival, the government issued its own money directly. These notes were not backed by gold or private wealth but by the promise of democratic governance. They bypassed the Jacksonian gold standard and private banking alike, and proved that fiscal capacity could be mobilized without elite consent. For a generation afterward, Greenbackers carried that lesson forward, insisting that democratic credit could fund not only war but schools, infrastructure, and social flourishing.

A similar logic returned in World War II. Faced with the need to mobilize resources on a scale without precedent, the U.S. government issued war bonds that transformed ordinary households into participants in the nationโ€™s fiscal life. These bonds were not simply instruments of finance; they were instruments of mass coordination. Posters, rallies, and public campaigns framed bond-buying as an act of civic belonging, turning fiscal issuance into a cultural project. The war effort was provisioned not by waiting for private investment to return during the Great Depression, but by enrolling the public directly into circuits of democratic credit. 

Money on the Leftโ€™s โ€œBlue Bondsโ€ proposal updates this history for our own authoritarian crisis. Blue Bonds are a way for states and cities to issue credit directly in the form of a national bond drive that insulates democratic institutions from hostile federal sabotage. Their structure is the famous duck-rabbit illusion: they can appear as conventional borrowing duck within a neoliberal framework, or as a credit instrument rabbit that unlocks public capacity in a democratic framework. Either way, the effect is the same: institutions provision themselves and democracy writ large, bypassing the veto of billionaires and the sabotage of Trump.

In the same spirit, complementary currencies offer a local and coalition-based approach: unions, campaigns, and municipalities can provision one another directly, rehearsing democratic solidarity through circuits of receivability rather than dependence on hostile elites.

These experiments matter not because they are perfect or permanent, but because they reveal a principle: democracy does not have to wait on private money. At key moments, Americans have already built and lived within systems of public credit that bypassed entrenched vetoes. Todayโ€™s challenge is to remember that history and mobilize itโ€”to see in Greenbacks, war bonds, Blue Bonds, and complementary currencies not oddities of fiscal history, but usable precedents for democratic survival.

Fiscal Insurgency as Public Endurance

Fiscal insurgency is not isolation. It is not about retreating into localism or walling off states from the national economy. It is about building protective circuits of credit that keep democratic life functioning even when sabotage is staged from above. Insulation means refusing to let billionaires or authoritarian actors dictate the terms of survival.

The Greenbacks insulated the Union from the constraints of the Jacksonian gold standard and private banking. World War II bonds insulated the war effort from failing private investment by activating public capacity directly. Blue Bonds extend this logic, creating coordinated fiscal capacity across states and cities that cannot be held hostage to federal obstruction. Complementary currencies, in turn, can provide insulation at the community levelโ€”allowing campaigns, unions, and municipalities to sustain each other when donor strikes or hostile legislatures attempt to cut them off.

What unites these experiments is their orientation toward endurance. They do not dissolve political conflict, though they do reveal markets to be corrupt betting institutions with often very little relation to our collective needs and capacities. Insulation means treating fiscal capacity as a public utility, not a private concession. It means provisioning schools, universities, media, and public works on terms that cannot be vetoed by billionaires or broken by Trumpโ€™s shakedowns.

To demand insulation, then, is not to run from political economy but to govern itโ€”to make sure that democratic credit flows even when elites attempt to dam it. In this sense, fiscal insurgency is not only possible but necessary: it is how democracy is renewed.

Democracy or Acquiescence

The stakes are not a simple fork between two univocal paths. What is at issue are competing habits of orientation that press on institutions, coalitions, and publics all at once. Acquiescence registers sabotage as shock and awe and then mistakes that registration for realityโ€”treating crises as external facts, measuring competence by austerity management, and advertising moderation in deference to oligarchs and dictators. These habits make collaborators out of people and institutions that imagine themselves merely adapting to circumstance.

Progressives are not exempt. Too often, they defer fiscal action to manufactured chokepoints: until national electoral victories return power to Democrats, until taxpayers can be persuaded to recycle their salaries into the state, until enlightened billionaires decide to bankroll media or infrastructure. Each deferral helps normalize acquiescence as realism, training institutions to accept sabotage as governance.

Yet when people crown an insurgent political campaign with star-power and charisma, participate in a playful scavenger hunt, or even migrate to slower platforms like BlueSky, they rehearse another orientation: one that insists capacity is abundant, desire is real, and democracy does not have to wait. These moments do not resolve into a single coherent path; they are plural rehearsals of another public life. Fiscal insurgency is how these scattered desires are enacted at a meaningful scaleโ€”how democratic improvisations become durable circuits of public credit.

The disgrace is not that Trump is strong, but that so many continue to bow before private moneyโ€™s veto even as it is unmasked as blackmail and collusion. The task is to cultivate and extend the democratic reflex wherever it appears, multiplying its legibility, and provisioning the health of our democracy rather than allowing sabotage to dictate the terms of survival.

Say Yes

Bouie, Carvell, and Collins are right: the talent, energy, and capacity are already here. The organizers are ready, the journalists are waiting, the public appetite is palpable. What blocks the way is not imagination, but private moneyโ€™s refusalโ€”backed by a political culture that treats that refusal as final.

Fiscal insurgency is the way to break that habit. It is how we turn capacity into action without waiting for billionaire patronage or taxpayer permission slips. It is how we refuse the manufactured chokepoints that fracture coalitions and empower Trump. It is how we insulate democracy from sabotage long enough to renew it. That is all that endogenous money really is: the courage to issue it, met by a public capacity that has already rehearsed its legitimacy.

The refrain of our momentโ€”capacity is there, but money says noโ€”should no longer be a lament. It must become a call. Private moneyโ€™s โ€œnoโ€ is not natural, it is not inevitable, and it is not the last word. We have the precedents, we have the tools, and we have the urgency. What remains is to build the circuits of public credit that can say yes to democracy when private power will not.

Why Credit’s Due: Reclaiming Pride in Boro

By Rob Hawkes and Robyn Ollett

The summer of 2025, like the summer of 2024 before it, has been one of heightened tensions surrounding the issues of race and immigration in the UK. This year, Union Flags and St Georgeโ€™s Crosses have adorned innumerable lamp posts, motorway bridges, roundabouts, and zebra crossings โ€“ ostensibly as expressions of national โ€œprideโ€ โ€“ following a series of anti-immigration protests outside the Bell Hotel in Epping, which had been housing asylum seekers. In late July and early August 2024, racist riots erupted in towns and cities in England and Northern Ireland, including in Middlesbrough (where we both work at Teesside University). The false narratives fuelling this combination of nationalistic fervour and xenophobic violence are that โ€œillegalโ€ immigrants to the UK are luxuriously treated at the expense of the โ€œindigenousโ€ population and that there is only ever an either/or choice between caring for โ€œour own peopleโ€ and providing basic support to those fleeing war, persecution, and/or starvation overseas. Underpinning these divisive myths is a pervasive logic of scarcity: there is not enough to go round.

This, inevitably, is also a logic of exclusion. If there is not enough for everyone, the only option is to leave some of us out. This, in turn, always means harming those who are already marginalised and perpetuating cycles of violence and disempowerment. Refugees and asylum seekers, disabled people, people of colour, LGBTQIA+ people, unemployed people and other benefits claimants all regularly face accusations of being a burden on or a threat to British society, or of failing to show sufficient gratitude or respect towards the supposed values and standards of the nation, or all of the above. Time and again, we are told that the costs of supporting the vulnerable must be met by โ€œthe taxpayerโ€ (and note that โ€œthe taxpayerโ€ is never themselves imagined to be among the vulnerable). Thus, the logic of scarcity and exclusion rests on a pernicious and demonstrably false understanding of the UKโ€™s money system. Meanwhile, misleading messages abound in the racist narratives that spread across social media, whipping up violence in our streets.  

In Middlesbrough, on October 18, 2025, we are hosting a free public screening of Maren Poitrasโ€™s documentary Finding the Money, which tells a very different story about money and taxation. This is the first in a series of events as part of Where Creditโ€™s Due: Making Money for Ecosocial Justice, a project supported by Teesside Universityโ€™s AHRC Impact Acceleration Account (IAA) and developed in dialogue with Boro Doughnut, Curious Arts, the Dorman Museum, and Money on the Left.

Debunking the famous lie โ€œThere is no such thing as public money; there is only taxpayersโ€™ money,โ€ Finding the Money demonstrates that the truth is the complete opposite. Following a group of economists who reject the conventional understanding of money, the documentary sets out the key ideas of the Modern Monetary Theory (or MMT) perspective. In the UK, as in the USA, taxes (and therefore โ€œthe taxpayerโ€) do not pay for public services. Currency-issuing governments create money whenever they spend. As counterintuitive as this may sound when weโ€™re so used to thinking of governments as budgeting just like households, there is such a thing as public money and public money belongs to everyone. Moreover, all money is credit, and credit is due to more people and more places than the present logic of scarcity and exclusion will ever allow. 

We care passionately about our town and the people who make up our communities, so we are dedicated to taking action and helping people understand that, despite what politicians and journalists might tell us, there is enough to go around. As Kate Raworth affirms in Doughnut Economics (2017) โ€œthe design of money โ€“ how it is created, the character it is given, and how it is to be usedโ€ has major implications for the way we live our collective lives. What we need now is the political will to imagine and design alternatives to the current orthodox monetary system, which is based on and encourages these false narratives and zero-sum trade offs.

Our project seeks to build an intersectional network of like-minded people by gathering existing groups and rallying others to the cause of imagining and striving for new ways of designing, issuing, and sustaining the credit that our communities desperately need and deserve. Raworthโ€™s book has inspired a global movement for ecosocial justice through the Doughnut Economics Action Lab (DEAL). The ideas are fairly simple: we indeed can meet everyoneโ€™s needs within our planetary boundaries if we reconfigure our perspective on infinite growth and design systems that work towards the goal of not just surviving but thriving within our ecological limits. Doughnut Economics, like MMT, fundamentally challenges the false choice created by the economic orthodoxy between prosperity and social inclusion. 

Recognising that Middlesbrough is a place where current credit flows regularly ignore or actively exclude those communities which are often the biggest contributors to local cultural and economic life โ€“ LGBTQIA+ groups, NGOs supporting refugee communities, and those supporting green initiatives โ€“ and we would like to explore what it would look like if public credit creation specifically sought to support spaces and initiatives that foster inclusion rather than division. Weโ€™ve seen riots scapegoating people suspected to have arrived on our shores by small boats. Weโ€™ve seen muslim friends and neighbours have their houses and businesses vandalised. Weโ€™ve seen children, families, and individuals scared to leave their homes or places of work or study. Then, in the aftermath of the riots, weโ€™ve seen the people of Middlesbrough represented as โ€œthugsโ€ or as โ€œhalf witsโ€ too stupid to recognise the โ€œidiocyโ€ of smashing up their own town: division only sows more division. Queer communities, on the other hand, have long shown that pride is a celebration of inclusion, not the opposite. Meanwhile, as we affirm at Money on the Left and as the MMT framework helps us to recognise, money has never been as straight or as exclusionary as conventional wisdom would have us believe.

It is essential that we think about the ways in which we credit and represent our community and our town, as the stories we tell about our communities and the people that build them are intimately bound up with the way we account for them in monetary terms. If we allow racist, ableist, and classist narratives to shout the loudest, that has a direct impact on the self-worth of everyone in our community. It might, therefore, be helpful to unpack the ways in which the people of Middlesbrough have been represented to better understand the interconnectedness of aspersions visited upon those who live here, those who participated in last summerโ€™s riots, and those who continue campaigns which feign nationalist pride while intimidating racial others. For instance, perhaps ironically, the term โ€œthug,โ€ which was repeatedly used to describe rioters, has racist origins: the Oxford English Dictionary explains that a โ€œthugโ€ once meant โ€œa member of a society or cult of robbers and murderers in India known for strangling their victims.โ€ Moreover, the OED notes that the term โ€œmay be considered offensive (esp. in U.S. use when used by a white person in reference to a black person […]).โ€ Meanwhile, words like โ€œimbecile,โ€ โ€œmoron,โ€ and โ€œidiot,โ€ which are regularly mobilised to mock rioters and racists, were once part of a system of organised ableist violence against people classified as mentally โ€œdefective.โ€

Reconfiguring recognition, taking pride in our community, and reclaiming our self-worth are central to our aims for this project and this connects our local efforts to the objectives and ethos of the Global Donut Days, a four-day, community-led festival, held online and in-person around the world in the days leading up to our first event in October. We hope to start a new conversation about monetary design and its implications in and for Middlesbrough, encouraging those who attend and participate in our events to imagine the possibilities for participation and inclusion that credit creation in, by, and for the people of Boro might open up. As the Money on the Left Editorial Collective recently proclaimed, โ€œItโ€™s Time For Complementary Currencies,โ€ forms of community credit which, as Raworth puts it, can help us โ€œbecome full participants in natureโ€™s cycles.โ€ By building an intersectional network of people to explore ideas around community currency and consider where creditโ€™s due, we join a worldwide effort to foster regenerative and inclusive economies. We hope you will join us in becoming part of this broader movement toward economic systems that recognise the full range of human identities, capacities, and contributions.

Zohranโ€™s #ZcavengerHunt was a Rehearsal

by Will Beaman

What yesterdayโ€™s New York City #ZcavengerHunt made visible is a coalition rehearsing public works before even winning the general election. It was not just people spending time together. With simple, posted invitations carried on cards, the campaign coordinated routes, rooms, roles, and care so that participation became possible and clear. That is a public task, not an extracurricular one. It was also a rehearsal for what a mobilized coalition needs to do next: move together for joy as well as safety, travel in groups while an administration tries to turn the city into a spectacle, and build turnout habits without waiting for a single big event. It is a model other cities can watch and adapt.

The right frame is not volunteerism, but insurgent fiscal policy. When Mamdani convened a citywide scavenger hunt for fun, he did not need Governor Kathy Hochul or Bill Ackmanโ€™s tax dollars; it ran on endogenous creditโ€”playful and quietly powerful. The cards created circuits of doing things together (meet here, staff this corner, escort this path, prep the kitchen window, check in); responsibilities were posted and settled. Grown-ups effectively parallel played: individual and group progress stayed private, while social media and campaign reports posted the size and pace of the crowd. The result was a massive public coordination of democratic lifeโ€”not an authoritarian mass, but a coalition limbered up and ready for the next project. For a concrete build path, see our proposal for how Zetro Cards could be scaled up for fiscal insurgency, from campaign swag to coalition-building to public works, which shows how this same pattern can move people through rooms, routes, trainings, and care on wider scales.

Just as Mamdani mobilized the human and cultural capacities of a city that hide in plain sight every day, he also mobilized gamification techniques the left usually consigns to neoliberal behaviorism. Stamps, punch cards, routes, and check-ins were not used to manipulate individuals; they were used to coordinate a publicโ€”rules posted, goals shared, privacy respected, and the โ€œprizeโ€ defined as more capacity to act together. As many pointed out on social media, he figured out how to make โ€œPokรฉmon Go to the Pollsโ€ actually work. It worked not as clicks or gimmicks, but rather as mapped routes, opened rooms, staffed corners, and kitchen windows that made movement legible and safe. In that register, play is not a nudge; play is public works. It turns dispersed willingness into organized time and space with tools people already understand.

Much will be written about the brilliance of Mamdani as a campaigner, and the charisma that eager establishment Democrats hope to replicate with a Pete Buttigieg or a Gavin Newsom. But the Mamdani coalition did not just rally behind a leaderโ€”it rehearsed the enfranchisement of one. Think of Mamdaniโ€™s charisma here as a kind of coalitional line of credit extended with conditions: people offer a line of trust and attention to a would-be convener, linked to responsibilities and democratic accountability. โ€œDark Brandonโ€ hinted at this nationallyโ€”a charisma on offer if the officeholder accepted a movement mantle (he did not). In New York, Mamdani is being chosen as a convener; the scavenger hunt and the Zetro credit circuit are tests of credit issuance, not โ€œbrandingโ€ in some narrow sense. He credits the public with usable roles, routes, and rooms; the public credits him with the authority to keep issuing. It is an analogical, public accreditationโ€”the two forms of crediting are not the same, but they are related and each is predicated on the other. If either side stops honoring the posted terms, the fiscal circuit weakens and the star power fades. In other words, leadership here is not intrinsic to the leader; it is a coordination with a very practiced and well-rehearsed public.

Seen this way, the coalition is the main character. It has repeatedly offered charisma on condition of genuine progressive politics. Biden and Harris were given that credit line and then lost their piece of the franchise by declining the democratic responsibilities that would have kept it open. Mamdani has retained his credit by meeting those responsibilities and using them to transform the municipal public sphere into a place of hope and rehearsals of full employment. The deeper story, however, is the coalition that dreamed him upโ€”and keeps provisioning public life whether or not a single figure is in the spotlight.

The wide open question for the Mamdani coalition is: what else this coalition event was rehearsing? We at Money on the Left are a bit biased: we want to see an insurgent fiscal politics defend cities and states from Trumpโ€™s authoritarianism, and we see opportunities for this everywhere. But the most important thing for democratic renewal after Trumpโ€”the step that comes before everythingโ€”is that members of a political coalition see themselves as participants in democratic design, not the neoliberal end-users of a technocratic solution or deals brokered with power on our behalf.

How the Zetro Card Can Save NYC (Really)

by the Money on the Left Editorial Collective

A domestic occupation is currently being staged in the United States. National guard units have been deployed to Washington, D.C., with similar moves signaled for Chicago and New York. The script pairs visible deployments with their fiscal equivalent: threats of impoundment, selective audits, procurement slow-walks, and last minute deals that convert liberal institutions into collaborators one by one. A military showdown is the point for Trump; it is the terrain the regime wants. Likewise in Albany, a fiscal showdown over tax increases is the terrain that liberal collaborationists prefer: a ritualized crisis designed to brand a Mamdani administration as a failure between rounds of austerity. The playbook is the same: manufacture a crisis, force a spectacle, and make the rest of the year about forcing victims to pick up the pieces.

When most people think of โ€œinsurgency,โ€ images of guerilla warfare come to mind. But even where historic insurgencies have included armed struggle (which we do not endorse in the United States), combat is not the most essential component. Successful insurgencies succeed by sustaining daily civilian life under occupation. Civil societies endure by keeping ordinary routines going: schools that still teach, kitchens that still serve, routes that still move people, meetings that still convene, mundane responsibilities that people still meet. That continuity erodes the occupierโ€™s legitimacy, stretches its capacity, and ensures it cannot outlast the people.

Military clashes and ritualized budget standoffs are already on the next page in Trumpโ€™s playbook. The durable answer to Trumpism is a fiscal insurgency: visible, practical, reproducible ways to keep the payments that sustain public life flowing so that recruitment and retention for deployments struggle, as residents continue to work, learn, care, and govern themselves. Rather than just play the showdown game, we keep the city on scheduleโ€”and build capacity as we go.

Fiscal insurgency

Fiscal insurgency creatively rereads what money already is in practice: credit issued, accepted, and retired through infrastructures that already operate. In addition to cash and bank accounts, we are all familiar with EBT, transit passes, tuition remissions, union stipends, city vouchers, and fee waiversโ€”all variously posted ways of paying for participation. 

Under pressure, the task is to keep payments aligned with capacity. Groceries, rides, childcare, rooms, translation, training, and pathways into responsibility must remain accessible even during a fiscal blackout. The practical goal is twofold: first, to route around staged fiscal choke points so that routine civic coordinations do not pause; second, to shrink the labor pool for occupation deployments by offering better work, learning, and debt relief at home.

This approach does not meet occupation with spectacle or force. It meets deployments where they actually live: recruitment and retention. When a city pays for participationโ€”public-works fellowships in libraries, parks, and transit; childcare and travel coverage for trainings and meetings; tuition offsets at community colleges; clear ladders into union roles and civic responsibilityโ€”the material case for enlistment weakens. Recruitment shortfalls and morale depletion follow, which is a fitting answer to a regime that wields austerity to get its way.

Why the Zetro Card, what it is now, and why it matters

There are countless everyday tools with public potential in plain sight. As a separate example of the appetite for this, the Mamdani campaign just launched a citywide โ€œScavenger Huntโ€โ€”distinct from the Zetro Cardโ€”that shows how eager New Yorkers are for playful, card-based participation; early events blew through the first batch of cards. The point in this article is not to crown one instrument, but to activate what is already familiar. The Mamdani campaignโ€™s โ€œZetro Cardโ€ is one such tool.

What the Zetro Card is today. The Zetro Card is a playful paper punch card in the Mamdani campaign. Supporters receive stamps at canvasses, phone banks, and pop-ups; after a set number of stamps, the card is redeemed for campaign merchandise. Because selling merch became constrained after certain fundraising thresholds, items are given away at volunteer events and DIY printing tablesโ€”so the punch card doubles as a tangible way to recognize participation and pick up posters, tees, and totes. It lives inside a high-energy field operation with frequent events and check-ins.

How it scales without changing its feel. The same formโ€”stamp, QR, or SMSโ€”can carry credits that partners agree to honor for posted items tied to real capacity (for example: childcare blocks during meetings, off-peak community-room hours, produce bundles, modest travel support on action days, training seats, and even reserved speaking or facilitation time). Individual balances remain private; weekly program totals are public; a brief monthly check-in evens small differences with next-month service or modest dollars. In that expanded form, Zetro becomes a practical way to pay for participation without permission, while staying playful, legible and low-friction.

Zetro grows in three lanes at once:
1. Coalition Lane: Partners post menus of Zetro-receivable items
2. City Lane: Municipal agencies comp or cover what they already can in Zetro credits
3. Public Digital Payments Lane: A targeted amendment to State Banking Law ยง131, which currently prohibits corporations from receiving deposits, would be sufficient for Zetro to merge with a public digital payments system along the lines of what has already been proposed at state-level with the Inclusive Value Ledger Act. Same Zetro system, but even more doors and menu items open. 

The types of work credited on the card and the forms of participation those credits unlock can widen month by month and year by yearโ€”from campaign tables to coalition partners (DSA chapters, WFP affiliates, union training arms, worker co-ops, cultural venues) and then into public venues (library class seats, after-hours school auditoriums, parks fieldhouses, union halls, community-room hours, partial fares). Over time, credits can help residents purchase municipal groceries, arrange childcare and transit for organizing and training, and access professional on-ramps into union ladders and a renewed municipal care-and-organizing sector. Swap lines to other cities and allied campaigns can make the pattern replicable and coordinative nationwide.

What follows is a one-year plan in four quarters, a year-two continuation, and a horizon where Zetro Cards and other coalition credits grow together with โ€œBlue Bonds.โ€ Hereโ€™s how it could work:


Year One

Quarter 1โ€“2: Posted menus with offline-capability

  • Posted coverage sheets (โ€œwhat this card covers hereโ€). At initial partners (DSA chapters, WFP affiliates, supportive worker co-ops and public venues like libraries and community centers), list covered items with clear limits matched to actual capacity: bundled produce at a co-op table; modest transit support on canvass days; childcare blocks during meetings; off-peak community-room hours; small print runs; reserved speaking/facilitation time.
  • Privacy by default; public totals. Individual balances are private. Weekly program totals are public (dashboard-style).
  • Monthly check-in. Partners bring two numbersโ€”what they issued and what they honoredโ€”and even out any small differences with next-month service (extra room hours, print runs, childcare blocks) or modest dollars. A small rainy-day amount smooths one-off bumps and is refilled at the check-in.
  • Offline-first tools. Paper cards with serials, SMS codes for basic phones, QR badges for smartphones, and a simple web ledger where participants see only their own balance; stewards sync when connected.

Insurgency-specific provisioning (safety and movement)

  • Safe Walk & Ride corridors. Posted hours and mapped routes between meeting sites, libraries, schools after-hours, parks, fieldhouses, transit hubs.
    Menu items: escort hours, corner posts, route leads; modest travel support for route volunteers.
  • Buddy and check-in protocols; door marshals; de-escalation teams.
    Menu items: marshal shifts, de-escalation shifts, check-in desk.
  • Kitchen windows at evening meetings (community kitchen cadence) hosted in libraries/community centers.
    Menu items: prep/serve shifts; ingredient runs; take-home food bundles for late routes.
  • Dispatch table for ride pools (carpool grids).
    Menu items: dispatcher shifts; driver mileage allotments; maintenance credits.
  • Accompaniment pilot (court/clinic/ICE check-ins) with faith/legal partners.
    Menu items: escort hours; language access; staging-site stewards.

Quarter 3: Scale under known rules

  • Review coverage and limits against observed demand; keep balances private and totals public; maintain simple grievance and appeal routes.
  • One-page coverage sheets per site, reviewed quarterly, so people know exactly what the card covers where.
  • Mentored on-ramp for new issuers (co-issuance with small, posted starting limits and a graduation path once delivery is demonstrated).
  • Union-linked training access. Partners begin accepting Zetro for defined allotments of training seats in union programs (safety workshops, evening classes). Framed as an extension of existing education supports.

Insurgency-specific provisioning (citywide habits)

  • Route maps go citywide; relay rooms in libraries and community centers host hand-off windows.
    Menu items: relay room stewards; wayfinding/signage crews; neighborhood route coordinators.
  • Clinic and pharmacy relays for prescriptions and supplies (privacy rules posted).
    Menu items: intake desk; pharmacy runs; cold-chain handling.
  • Observer teams at sensitive sitesโ€”visible, trained, non-confrontational.
    Menu items: observer shifts; alerts desk.

Quarter 4: Public venues, groceries pilot, and formal accompaniment

  • Public venues with narrow, posted coverage. A set number of library class seats; off-peak community-room hours; partial fares for travel to trainings. Coverage lists, clear limits, privacy, and the monthly check-in remain standard.
    If the Public Digital Payments Lane opens, we can mirror these posted menus there; if not, the Coalition Lane and City Lane continue.
  • Municipal groceries pilot (petition window). The Mayorโ€™s Office opens a petition process for organizationsโ€”campaign-linked or notโ€”to request coverage for defined grocery bundles with posted maximums and periodic review.
  • Formal accompaniment lanes with faith and legal partners; posted procedures and privacy rules.

Year Two (selected extensions)

Quarter 5โ€“6: Union issuance and civic rebrand

  • Unions begin limited issuance of credits through strike support and childcare stipends, following a transparent, bounded framework aligned with coalition standards.
  • City rebrand. The administration rebrands Zetro under a civic name (for example, โ€œCity Cardโ€), signaling its shift from campaign experiment to city-backed fiscal infrastructure without changing privacy or monthly check-in rules.

Quarter 7โ€“8: Payable labor time and public venues

  • Union issuance expands to stipends for stewards, interpreters, and trainersโ€”more forms of labor time become payable.
  • Coalition credits recognized for a set number of seats at public venues (libraries, community centers, municipal groceries), knitting the system further into daily civic infrastructure.

Quarter 9โ€“12: Tuition offsets, debt relief pilots, swap lines

  • Tuition offsets and student-debt relief pilots for CUNY programs that support public work (ESL, EMT/first-aid, IT support for schools). Offsets are clearly defined, privacy-respecting, and guided by simple equity rules.
  • Demilitarization lanes. Offsets scale once receivability is wide enough to undercut debt-for-ICE recruitment offers directly.
  • Swap lines with other cities. Credits earned in New York can be honored in Chicago for defined uses, and vice versa, on posted terms and routine settlement schedules.

The horizon: Blue Bonds + coalition credits (two tools to save our cities)

Blue Bondsโ€”a proposal of the Money on the Left Editorial Collectiveโ€”offer a way for city and state governments to finance an urban full-employment buildout that broadens receivability. They are ordinary dollar bonds, offered in small denominations to residents and anchored by public pensions and union funds (with solidarity subscriptions from other cities and states). Proceeds are tied to visible municipal options that coalition credits already move people through: grocery depots and cold-chain upgrades, childcare hubs and accessibility retrofits, community kitchens and repair cooperatives, library classrooms, transit access, and municipal broadband. Retirement is stated up front: as pressures recede and revenues normalize, the series winds down and the books close. Legislative changes in the Public Digital Payments Laneโ€”a no-fee, real-time public walletโ€”make this even easier, but Zetro + Blue Bonds work already in the Coalition and City lanes. 

Paired with Zetro/coalition credits, Blue Bonds and credits create political space for each other. Credits route around staged choke points so everyday provisioning continues; Blue Bonds draw in dollars on public terms to expand the very programs those credits already make usable. To cautious audiences, Blue Bonds read like familiar โ€œborrowing.โ€ To a coalition living with credits, they read as one denomination of credit among many: another way the city measures and coordinates provision, retired according to plan rather than by some supposed law of physics.

With capacity increased, receivability widens so credits can meet a substantial share of a householdโ€™s monthly essentials. Agencies and partners post coverage lists that expand steadily: groceries via municipal depots and co-ops; local travel through transit and bike programs; childcare and elder-care blocks; language access and legal aid; device repair and broadband; library and community-center programs; CUNY training and certifications; cultural access; tool-lending and community-kitchen time. Each item carries clear limits tied to real capacity; privacy is the default; weekly public totals keep everyone oriented; a brief monthly check-in keeps books even.

The employment premise is simple: there is always work to do and a way to step into it. Roles in facilitation, safety, translation, outreach, maintenance, logistics, kitchen prep, route escorting, and accompaniment are paired with training and mentoring. Credits earned here are immediately usable for listed needs, and tuition and student-debt offsets scale so the cityโ€™s offer competes directly with Trumpโ€™s enlistment promises; the better path is at home, in public life.

Beyond the city, swap lines make the pattern replicable and coordinative. Posted agreements allow defined items to be honored across jurisdictions and settled on a routine schedule. Credits earned here can be used for named needs there, and residents can subscribe to one anotherโ€™s Blue Bonds. The result is a durable fabric: credits keep patterned flows of provision steady; bonds fund expansion in plain view; together they cultivate a public that understands these instruments as democratic coordination, not deference to gatekeepers.

Appendix

A. Blackout readiness (why this matters)

One reason this infrastructure is urgent is simple: an administration hostile to cities will try to exert power over everyday payments as leverage. If a single processor, platform, or office can be squeezed, it will be. The response is to build many ways of paying that cannot be shut off by flipping a single switch switch.

That is why the plan mixes paper, SMS, and QR; has menus of โ€œwhat this card covers hereโ€ are important; has stewards learning to settle up together on a simple schedule even if systems are temporarily offline; and why ordinary municipal bonds held by residents, small dollar donors and public pensions can fund visible programs that credits already carry people through. No single vendor or account holds the keys; if one lane is squeezed, others stay open. Pursuing public banking and a Public Digital Payments Lane in parallel adds redundancy and cuts private choke points, but the Coalition and City lanes are enough to keep going in the meantime. Payment follows the work that people are doing, and the rules are posted in public so everyone can keep moving while the politics catch up.

B. How we will track and share progress (in plain language)

People should be able to see what is happening with Zetro Credits without surveilling their neighborsโ€™ transactions. Each week, it is essential to post totals by program and neighborhoodโ€”how many childcare hours, room hours, training seats, rides, grocery bundlesโ€”along with how quickly credits are being used. Once a month, partners can sit down for a short check-in to even out differences: if one site provided more than it issued, the group will agree on make-goods for next month (extra room hours, added training seats, more kitchen time) or a small cash adjustment. Every quarter, the city can publish a short summary of what was made possible, where pressure points were, and what will change on the coverage lists to keep pace with real demand.

C. Money on the Leftโ€™s seven principles for coalition credit (Our standard for support and endorsement)

  1. Coalitional responsibility, not sovereign enclosure
    Credits are commitments to a wider public supported in coalition. Issuance and acceptance are accountable to relationships across organizations and agencies, not only to a membershipโ€™s pre-defined ends.
  2. Responsibility to full participation (the full-employment principle)
    Every issuer has a duty to open real ways to earn creditsโ€”especially for undervalued labor (care, language access, accessibility, logistics)โ€”and to pair earning with pathways into responsibility (facilitation, training, strategy roles).
  3. Responsibility to recognize others (bounded cross-coalition receivability)
    Each issuer provides a clear pathway to receive credits from trusted partners that meet a published threshold of coalitional trust and solidarity. Recognition is bounded and menu-defined (what is accepted, where, and in what amounts) and is periodically reviewed in public.
  4. Structured paths to enfranchisement as an issuing authority
    There is a transparent route for new groups to become issuers: mentorship or co-issuance periods, capacity checks tied to real infrastructure, defined caps while ramping, and clear criteria for advancing to full issuer status.
  5. Duties and accountability that come with enfranchisement
    Issuers steward capacity (do not over-promise), publish aggregate issuance and redemption by program, participate in monthly clearing, honor grievance and appeal processes, and accept time-bound suspension or revocation if they violate standards.
  6. Privacy as public trust
    Individualsโ€™ balances and transactions remain private by default. Public oversight operates through aggregates and due-process audits for suspected misuse. Privacy is not a perk; it is how coalitions extend trust without control or surveillance.

Tied to real infrastructure and needs
Receivability menus must map to concrete capacitiesโ€”passes, rooms, classes, childcare, groceries, trainingsโ€”and be adjusted regularly to meet demonstrated needs, with special attention to reducing participation barriers.

Tax the Rich Campaigns Need Coalition Credits

By the Money on the Left Editorial Collective

As Zohran Mamdani and allied progressives turn a campaign victory into governing capacity, the primary weapons used against them will be fiscal. Centrist state legislatorsโ€”already hostile to progressive tax policyโ€”will be doubly pressured by a Trump White House threatening to impound funds and condition support for core institutions on political loyalty. In New York and other cities, Tax the Rich campaigns will likely escalate from letters and canvasses deliberately ignored by collaborationist lawmakers to protests and statehouse occupations met with brutal crackdowns. One trajectory is hopeful: the showdowns become a national, party-wide rally strong enough to keep Democrats from siding with governors like Kathy Hochul. Another outcomeโ€”one powerful actors are counting onโ€”is coordinated non-cooperation: institutional co-governance withheld from progressives with the same dogmatic vigor Tea Party Republicans showed President Obama. Where does the movement go from there?

This accelerationist showdown politics is a fascistic continuation of the neoliberal โ€œShock Doctrineโ€: engineer a crisis, paralyze the public response, fracture democratic movements with half-measures for some. The trick works by organizing the political conversation around middle-class and billionaire bank accountsโ€”and now routine threats of impoundmentโ€”instead of the existing capacities of everyday people. It tees up bottlenecks and headline spectacles meant to distract from a simple fact: the capacity to provision public life already exists in the workers, infrastructure, and institutionsโ€”the grassroots and member-driven organizations, unions, tenant groups, cultural partners, mutual-aid networks, and neighborhood branchesโ€”that made Mamdaniโ€™s win possible in the first place. When politics is reduced to pleading with mobile wealth, every concession looks like prudence and every defeat looks like inevitability.

Capacity is already here

Our cities do not lack capacity; they lack control over public credit at the very spot opponents have staged as the lever. Schools, clinics, transit systems, housing expertise, organizers, volunteers, mutual-aid supply chainsโ€”these exist already. What austerity politics withholds is the means to recognize and sustain participation in public life while we use that capacity.

That is why recruitment offers into punitive state functions matter. High salaries and student-debt forgiveness for enforcement deployments do not merely โ€œfund jobs.โ€ They decide who has time, stability, and standingโ€”who belongsโ€”much as private wealth does. So when we say that we can build without billionaire tax dollars, we are not saying that we can build without money. Money and payment are the difference between austere rationing from a defensive movement posture and a durable public that keeps people housed, fed, mobile, and engaged.

This is the same pressure point that Tax the Rich campaigns confront. Coalition credit does not replace that fight; it keeps participation pay-able while the fight is underway, so staged fiscal blockades do not stall the very public we are building.

We already run payments systemsโ€”just without payments

Coalitional politics already coordinates large volumes of labor and resources across organizations. Every canvass shift, child-care rota, jail-support thread, translation queue, rides list, venue hookup, design favor, spreadsheet of phone-bank leads, and shared pantry run is coordinated through informal credits: reputation, vouching, IOUs, and remembered favors. Our sign-up sheets are routing instructions; our Signal threads are clearing and settlement; our spreadsheets are shadow ledgers. This is not small. It is the logistics layer that keeps thousands of hours of organizing moving in New York every month.

But you cannot buy groceries with your reputation. The difference between a heroic but austere movement and a durable public is receivabilityโ€”whether the credits people earn for real work can be used for the things that keep them in the fight: groceries, transit, childcare, dues, training, tools, and structured pathways into higher-stakes roles. That is what a payments system is, in essence: not suburban taxpayersโ€™ approval, but the concrete list of where your credit is accepted and for what.

Layered credits for layered publics

The constituent parts of Mamdaniโ€™s coalitionโ€”neighborhood branches, unions, tenant groups, mutual-aid networks, libraries, and cultural partnersโ€”are the right places to grow a politics of insurgent credit that sustains participation through staged fiscal showdowns without disruption. We do not need one grand new currency. We need many credits that already exist, and coordinating infrastructures to help them scale. This is an intentional extension of how coalitions already work: groups give endorsements, share lists, trade rooms and volunteers, align calendars, and memorialize it in MOUs. Credits simply make that coordination legible and usable to participants.

Credits already appear everywhere. Think of these as existing โ€œcredits,โ€ even when unnamed: ratios, patterns, and arrangements of obligation, responsibility, and inclusion.

  • Organizing โ€” credit-like arrangements of obligation and responsibility: canvassing, translation, running meetings, childcare, strike support.
  • Service and care โ€” credit-like patterns of mutual provision and inclusion: hours in mutual-aid kitchens, co-op groceries, cultural events, trainings.
  • Civic access โ€” credit-like arrangements of public inclusion: transit passes, library admissions, course slots, public fee waivers, utility discounts.

Read through a flat lens of โ€œvolunteerism,โ€ these credit forms are misdescribed as charity or good will and their politics is disavowed. In practice they are entangled from the start with the official infrastructures people need to surviveโ€”transit agencies, schools, libraries, utilitiesโ€”and with the circuits of paid work and the for-profit institutions that dominate food, housing, and care. In the dominant policy script, the boundary makes one sphere look like โ€œvolunteeringโ€ and the other like โ€œthe economy.โ€ When a mass movement elects a mayor to create municipal grocery stores, that boundary shows itself as a designed limiterโ€”meant to keep movements from going big until a mythic โ€œtomorrow.โ€ Naming these arrangements as credit, and making them receivable across partners and agencies now, refuses that delay. It turns the boundary from a horizon we wait on into a configuration we can reorganize together.

That simple act is solidarity and recognition. It says: your work, your time, your commitments count beyond your immediate circle. It is also how we recognize siloed efforts as part of a shared public infrastructure. And when we see our time, effort, and commitments as gestures that reach beyond the room, we can align them with what is happening elsewhere now. Work in one locale choreographs recognition and use in another. That readiness to meet one another is the seed of coalition: what you do here moves something there. Small actions scale up into shared capacity without asking anyone to abandon local priorities.

This is also how social causality works in practice, even when coalition is disavowed or treated as a fleeting event. The daycare shift that frees a canvasserโ€™s evening, the translation that unlocks a meeting, the room booking that anchors a trainingโ€”each is already shaping what becomes possible down the line and across town. They are remote from the startโ€”addressed to people you may never meet and to moments you will not occupy. These are already credit infrastructuresโ€”ratios and arrangements of obligation, responsibility, and acceptance. Credits do not invent them; they further name, steady, and make them receivable where life happens. Once that is acknowledged, the line between โ€œinsideโ€ and โ€œoutsideโ€ politics looks arbitrary. If a city library accepts campaign-issued credits for after-school programs, or a union local honors them for training sessions, then credits stop being a mutual-aid side hustle and become part of the public itself. Power maps shift because coordination is happening through channels that choke-point politics cannot fully control.

During a fiscal blackout or manufactured crisis, receivability lets organizers, caregivers, translators, and trainees keep moving through rooms, rides, childcare, and trainings now, with partners settling in kind or in dollars later. That is how the coalition holds its form instead of shrinking.

Public responsibility, not private money

Some will ask whether these credits are just another private money scheme. They are notโ€”because the premise is different. Both cryptocurrency culture and the Wall-Street-backed fiscal choke-point politics of the Democratic establishment share a deeper story: money as a pre-political emanation of a private worldโ€”white families, founders, and โ€œentrepreneursโ€โ€”that stands outside obligation and instructs public life from above. That settler-colonial fantasy treats credit as something private actors bestow, and government as a bookkeeper for their decisions.

We reject that. Money is a public responsibility. It names, coordinates, and sustains the capacities people already build together. Our approach is accountable where life is actually organizedโ€”schools, unions, libraries, clinics, transit, tenant groups, and campaignsโ€”and it is governed in public.

Framed this way, a coalition credit system is the coalitionโ€™s way to carry through when fiscal crises are staged as political discipline.

Call for Printing (CFP)

Turning from argument to practice, we invite every part of the New York coalition that made this victory possibleโ€”neighborhood branches, unions, tenant unions, mutual-aid networks, cultural partners, public programs, and campaignsโ€”to begin issuing and receiving their own coalition credits, coordinated where useful and federated where necessary. The aim is simple: make participation pay-able across the coalition now, so staged fiscal showdowns do not interrupt the public we are already building.

What Money on the Left can do

As an editorial collective, Money on the Left will direct our capacity to create reporting, toolkits, and convening power to projects that follow the ethical and political principles outlined below. We will profile pilots; publish template kits (receivability menus, credit designs, privacy policies, aggregate dashboards); host brief clinics with organizers and public partners; and help align shared measures so successes are visible and copyable.

Principles of coalitional responsibility (our coalition standard)

(This is our endorsement standard for complementary credits. It defines responsibility as coalitional, public, and open-endedโ€”rather than a closed, sovereign enclosure accountable only to itself.)

  1. Coalitional responsibility, not sovereign enclosure
    Credits are commitments to a wider public supported in coalition. Issuance and acceptance are accountable to relationships across organizations and agencies, not only to a membershipโ€™s pre-defined ends.
  2. Responsibility to full participation (the full-employment principle)
    Every issuer has a duty to open real ways to earn creditsโ€”especially for undervalued labor (care, language access, accessibility, logistics)โ€”and to pair earning with pathways into responsibility (facilitation, training, strategy roles).
  3. Responsibility to recognize others (bounded cross-coalition receivability)
    Each issuer provides a clear pathway to receive credits from trusted partners that meet a published threshold of coalitional trust and solidarity. Recognition is bounded and menu-defined (what is accepted, where, and in what amounts) and is periodically reviewed in public.
  4. Structured paths to enfranchisement as an issuing authority
    There is a transparent route for new groups to become issuers: mentorship or co-issuance periods, capacity checks tied to real infrastructure, defined caps while ramping, and clear criteria for advancing to full issuer status.
  5. Duties and accountability that come with enfranchisement
    Issuers steward capacity (do not over-promise), publish aggregate issuance and redemption by program, participate in monthly clearing, honor grievance and appeal processes, and accept time-bound suspension or revocation if they violate standards.
  6. Privacy as public trust
    Individualsโ€™ balances and transactions remain private by default. Public oversight operates through aggregates and due-process audits for suspected misuse. Privacy is not a perk; it is how coalitions extend trust without control or surveillance.
  7. Tied to real infrastructure and needs
    Receivability menus must map to concrete capacitiesโ€”passes, rooms, classes, childcare, groceries, trainingsโ€”and be adjusted regularly to meet demonstrated needs, with special attention to reducing participation barriers.

We are not making up a new world; we are taking responsibility for this one. Credits formalize the recognition already circulating in our movements and make it usable where people live, learn, travel, care, and govern.

Technology and design: many paths up the same mountain

Democracy has always involved design problemsโ€”ballots, mail-in envelopes, early vote windowsโ€”different tools serving the same civic function. Credit is the same way. There is no need to worship a platform; choose what is practical and accessible for your members and partners.

Tool options (examples, from low to higher tech):

  • Paper cards with serial numbers and short expiries
  • Stamp books or tear-off chits
  • SMS or voice codes for basic phones
  • QR badges on printable cards
  • Prepaid or closed-loop cards for specific partners
  • Simple web ledger (individuals see their own balances; the public sees only aggregates)

Designing according our Principles of Coalitional Responsibility

  • Keep balances private by default; publish simple public totals so scale is visible
  • Use posted receivability menus (limit by use and amount, not surveillance)
  • Ensure offline operation so tables and doorways work when the network does not
  • Make replacement easy when something is lost
  • Set a regular cadence to settle books across partners (compare ledgers and receipts; clear modest imbalances in kind or small dollars)

The point is not technology for its own sake; it is fit, access, and flexibility in service of the shared principles above. With that posture in mind, we turn to the case study.

Case study: โ€œA Million Doors to a Million Votesโ€ (what it proposes)

In โ€œA Million Doors to a Million Votes: NYC-DSAโ€™s Plan for a Mamdani Mandate,โ€ รlvaro Lรณpez lays out how NYC-DSA can convert a primary win into governing capacity. The piece frames the next phase as both a mass field operation and a neighborhood-level infrastructure that protects and implements a Mamdani administration. It aims to widen the coalition and electorate; keep a train-the-trainers field machine running past Election Day; turn neighborhood branches into โ€œLittle Local City Hallsโ€ for everyday access to services, rollouts, and mobilization; build standing co-governance tables for real, regular access to decision-making; pursue a broad public mandate in November; pair inside/outside tactics against coordinated opposition; and retrofit the organizationโ€™s finances and operations to match a governing coalition rather than a single campaign.

Lรณpezโ€™s plan already names the political infrastructures that must keep running if Albany withholds revenue or Washington impounds funds. Coalition credits give the coalition continuity under pressureโ€”these rooms stay open.

From a complementary-currency perspective, the planโ€™s constraint is that it ultimately totals DSAโ€™s capacity as dues + volunteer hours. Dues are the non-government analog to taxesโ€”important, but still organized around revenue permissionโ€”and volunteer labor, read through a flat lens of โ€œservice,โ€ remains bounded by peopleโ€™s unpaid time. That pairing undercounts the real logistics already moving through the coalition (care, translation, transit, rooms, training) and leaves participation exposed to the very bottlenecks opponents stage: when money is tight or burnout rises, capacity shrinks. In practice, this risks treating enthusiasm as the main fuel and dues as the only meter, rather than making participation pay-able across the rooms the memo builds.

Case study: translating the memo into coalition credit (โ€œRosesโ€ for NYC-DSA)

Within the NYC-DSA context, the coalition credit can take a name that fits the organizationโ€™s iconography and history: Rosesโ€”a nod to DSAโ€™s rose and to โ€œbread and roses.โ€ Here, the rose is not deferred as leisure after labor. It becomes participatory infrastructure, a way to provision the bread and invite people into responsibility at the same time. The name is specific to the DSA pilot; the principles are general.

Translating the memo into Roses (one possible sketch)
Turn โ€œLittle Local City Hallsโ€ into issuing and accepting locales with a short, public receivability menu (transit, childcare, rooms, trainings, and a modest grocery line via partners). Let the mass field earn-as-you-organize and advance-as-you-learn, with Roses opening pathways into responsibility (facilitation, spokesperson preparation, strategy rooms). Run co-governance as logisticsโ€”a simple monthly check-in that tallies aggregate issuance/redemption and settles leftover imbalances in kind or small dollars. Pair the mandate push with continuity planning so participation does not stall under pressure. Recast the dues drive as an inclusion drive, allowing Roses to cover a defined share of dues for undervalued labor while widening who can stay in the work.

Most importantly, a coalition-credit layer lets expenditure come before โ€œtaxation.โ€ Partners provide rooms, care, transit, and trainings first; credits are retired at use. What changes for dues is their function. Instead of serving mainly as a direct financing stream for a small slice of on-the-books activity, dues become a way to make organizational credits desirable and to retire them. If members can satisfy a defined share of dues in creditsโ€”and those credits are earned through undervalued labor and paired with pathways into responsibilityโ€”then dues policy helps distribute work more fairly and lowers barriers to participation for working-class members. Month to month, remaining imbalances are settled through reciprocal acceptance, in-kind capacity swaps, or small dollar transfers (dues/donations). This reverses the choke-point logic and lets the coalition go bigger when needed, while keeping issuance aligned with real capacity through simple public totals and regular check-ins. 

How it could work
Branches and partners issue Roses for defined uses they can already provision (rooms, childcare, transit support, trainings, groceries via co-ops). Members earn Roses for undervalued labor and use them where a posted menu says they are accepted. Most redemption is in kind at the point of use; a periodic check-in reconciles leftovers through reciprocal acceptance, capacity swaps, or small dollar transfers (dues/donations). Individual use stays private; only aggregate totals are published. That is enough for the coalition to keep its rhythm during a fiscal blackoutโ€”or when one is threatened.

Coalition credits during a fiscal blackout

If Albany triggers a fiscal blackout on Monday, field still runs because canvassers use credits for transit that night; parents attend trainings because childcare is payable in credits; translators keep meetings accessible; branches book rooms with partners who accept credits for a portion of fees. On Friday, the coalition tallies aggregates and schedules settlement in kind or dollars. The rhythm holds; the showdown does not become a shutdownโ€”and the coalitionโ€™s continuity demonstrates a model for city government to emulate and support.

Coalition credits here, Blue Bonds there

Coalition credits work in tandem with another fiscal strategy for city and state governments we have called Blue Bondsโ€”a Money on the Left proposal to politicize municipal debt issuance without inventing a new medium of payment. Blue Bonds are ordinary municipal or state bonds issued for dollars, but placed and held differently: small-denomination subscriptions for residents and workers, anchor orders from public-sector pensions and union funds, and distribution through public-facing portals and community finance partners. The goal is to reconstitute the investor base so funding for transit, housing, food, care, and education depends less on ratings agencies and Wall Street gatekeepers, especially under federal hostility.

Blue Bonds are deliberately national-politics friendly. To cautious audiences, they read as familiar โ€œborrowing.โ€ To a coalition already practicing public credit through organizing, they read as democratic control of the buy-sideโ€”who holds the bonds, on what terms, and to what public purpose. Figures like Mamdani can pursue a Blue Bonds drive now within existing law and disclosure rules, while narrating it as a community subscription to the cityโ€™s future.

Coalition credits shape the horizon for Blue Bonds in two ways. First, they surface concrete pipelinesโ€”rooms, routes, trainings, childcare, kitchens, and clinicsโ€”that make bond use legible and urgent to everyday subscribers. Second, they organize the constituency that will buy and hold the debt: union locals, tenant unions, co-ops, cultural institutions, and small savers who already coordinate through credits. In practice the two tracks can move in parallel: coalition credits keep participation pay-able during fiscal showdowns; a Blue Bonds drive democratizes the dollar side of public finance by anchoring ownership with residents, unions, public pensions, and mission-driven institutions. Together they reduce veto power over public investment and align financing with the people building the city.

Stakes for Tax the Rich

Right now, Tax the Rich campaigns that lack insurgent credit infrastructure are organized around a choke point constructed and enforced by the enemy: state-controlled revenue and the threat of impoundment. A coalitional strategy treats finance and credit not as a single fix or a strict sequence but as overlapping layers that operate together:

  • Coalition credits keep participation pay-able inside the movement and across partners during a fiscal blackout.
  • Agency receivability extends that continuity into public programs by accepting a defined share of credits for defined uses.
  • Blue Bonds do not act as a complementary currency; they democratize the dollar side of public finance by shifting ownership to residents, unions, and public pensionsโ€”including national small savers and cross-state pension solidarityโ€”reducing gatekeeper vetoes.

These layers can start in any order and reinforce one another. If a city moves first with Blue Bonds, coalition credits become lived on-ramps for community engagement and political backing. If coalition credits move first, they generate partners, practices, and evidence that strengthen a public bond constituency. Agencies can pilot both at once by posting narrow receivability menus while bond subscriptions gather. In every configuration, the campaign holds two fronts: it pushes the revenue demand and it operates a governable provisioning network that keeps rooms, rides, childcare, trainings, and pathways into responsibility open. If Albany concedes, additional resources flow into a system already working. If Albany stonewalls, the public sees that capital flight is an empty threat because the people, the infrastructure, and the organizing are hereโ€”and there is already a way to pay and a way to borrow without handing Wall Street a veto.

Call to organizations and campaigns

We invite neighborhood branches, WFP affiliates, unions, tenant unions, mutual-aid networks, cultural partners, and chapters to formalize the credits you already use informally and to connect them across partners and agencies. Begin with modest, concrete steps that fit local capacity:

  • Map the work that already earns trust (care shifts, translation, logistics, training) and publish a minimal receivability menu (transit, rooms, childcare, trainings, a small grocery line through partners).
  • Pair earning with pathways into responsibility so credits open access to facilitation, spokesperson preparation, and strategy roles.
  • Keep individual use private; publish simple public totals and regular check-ins; settle leftover imbalances through reciprocal acceptance, capacity swaps, or small dollars.
  • Invite one public partner to accept a defined share for a defined use; document what works; share the pattern so others can copy it.

Money on the Left stands ready to support this work. We can convene briefings and co-design sessions; help draft receivability menus, pilot MOUs, and privacy policies; publish case notes and templates; host clinics with organizers and public partners; and coordinate shared measures so successes are visible and portable. Projects that follow the principles of coalitional responsibility outlined above will be prioritized for reporting, toolkits, and ongoing advising.

By 2027, New York could have a base that already lives the alternative: public capacity organized as public credit, embedded in daily life, with municipal and state partners joining where they can and following where the coalition has shown the way. The aim is not to wait for capital to return or permission to be granted. It is to recognize that we are already building the world we needโ€”and to make that work payable.

Blue Bonds: Duck or Rabbit?

Chronicle of a Summer

by Will Beaman

We are living through a strange reversal of the monetary story many of us have spent the last decade telling. Modern Monetary Theory helped a broader public see that the federal governmentโ€”the so-called โ€œmonetary sovereignโ€โ€”does not fund itself like a household and should not be bullied by austerity myths. That framing made sense when we could imagine a democratic or progressive White House using those capacities for public purpose. But in a Trump 2.0 world, sovereignty thinking hits a wall: the very office that issues and coordinates the currency is run by an executive who can impound appropriations, starve local services, and force austerity by other means. The question shifts from what could a benevolent sovereign do to how do we keep democratic life funded while the โ€œsovereignโ€ is hostile?

The answer is not to throw out MMTโ€™s core insight, but to bring it closer to how people actually experience money. What matters is endogeneity: money is created inside our institutionsโ€”up and down the hierarchyโ€”through ordinary acts of issuing, accepting, and managing public claims. Banks and credit unions create deposits when they buy public paper; pensions rebalance portfolios; the Federal Reserve can support municipal markets if it chooses. And when it comes to the timing and terms for redeeming bonds and other public assets, that is a contested political outcomeโ€”not an act of nature. A municipal lending facility does not have to mimic a short-term loan; it can be set up for steady, long-term support. In a healthier political order, state and city bonds could be treated more like U.S. Treasuries held at the central bank: not โ€œborrowingโ€ in the household sense, but one among many tools for organizing public investment.

Money on the Left has been known in MMT circles for pushing back against โ€œmonetary sovereigntyโ€ framings, even the โ€œspectrum of sovereigntyโ€ version meant to address critiques that MMT only applies to the U.S. federal government. Those frames still tend to narrow the conversation to nodes of power for whom sovereignty is the natural goal. But much real-world monetary authority is improvised, contested, and backstopped at sites of issuance and receivability that we would rather see as responsible than sovereign. That is why ideas like the Uniโ€”a complementary credit issued for large university fiscal circuitsโ€”are not about making universities โ€œmore sovereign.โ€ They are about structuring public responsibility across the institutions that already knit democratic life together.

Now that traditional monetary sovereignty is, for practical purposes, off the table for progressives in U.S. national politics, this shift in emphasis feels less like a theoretical tangent and more like a necessity. Keep the endogeneity; drop the sovereignty reflex; and show how democratic institutions at many scales can provision the peace now, while building toward a political order where honoring public commitments is routine.

Two Tracks

When we began talking about what to propose in this moment, we quickly realized we were thinking on two tracks at once. On the one hand, we think it is important to promote experiments with complementary currenciesโ€”local scrip, university credits, and other tools that give communities fiscal space when dollars are scarce or deliberately withheld. On the other hand, when we imagined what someone like a Mayor Zohran Mamdani in New York or Illinois Governor J. B. Pritzker might plausibly get behind in the near term, the memory of war bondsโ€”and the image of a public bond driveโ€”already had wide cultural recognition. People know what it looks like to line up, to contribute to a shared fund, and to get a certificate in return.ย We called our proposal “Blue Bonds” in recognition that they would mostly be issued by Democratic -controlled “blue” states.

Which Bonds?

That familiarity is why we first reached for bonds, but it did not stop there. While bond issuance is commonplace for US cities and states, the idea of a bond drive for democracy evokes the memory of World War II bonds. 

This raised a question for us to consider internally: what are the ideological implications of the wartime analogy?

Coretta Scott Kingโ€™s observation about the United States never confronting the idea of a peacetime economy became a kind of touchstone in our discussion. We asked ourselves: if we lean on the war bonds image too heavily, are we quietly reinforcing the idea that full employment and public belonging only make sense when there is an enemy to defeat? If so, that would be a dangerous starting point for democratic renewal. We do not want to bring people into public life only to leave them adrift when the โ€œthreatโ€ disappears.

Then another, more practical worry surfaced. While the idea of a โ€œnational debtโ€ owed to Chinese bond vigilantes sounds to many Americans like a cartoonish boogeyman, the public perception of bonds as debt feels more real at the state and local level. Here, concerns about bond ratings, refinancing terms, and investor confidence do not seem so far-fetchedโ€”they are the stuff of budget fights, service cuts, and โ€œtough medicineโ€ austerity campaigns. We have seen the same pattern play out internationally, where postcolonial governments are labeled โ€œirresponsibleโ€ and punished through capital flight and IMF conditionality.

One Personโ€™s Debt โ€ฆ

From our perspective, bonds are always endogenous. But the way they are experienced depends on the political and institutional surround. Sometimes they feel like a millstoneโ€”a debt plus interest hanging around the neck of some unfortunate city agency whose finances are under water. Other times, they feel more like a savings versus checking account: an interest-bearing claim in the broader circulation of public credit. The standard MMT framing would call this the difference between being the sovereign issuer of a currency and being a user. Yet it is just as accurate to say that the difference is designed into the political context. When, in the early days of COVID, the Federal Reserve created a facility to make municipal bonds receivable for dollars, it turned debt into cash almost overnight. โ€œTrade your debt for moneyโ€ sounds impossible until politics makes it happen.

That realization shifted our sense of what the war bonds analogy could do here. We are not trying to win a war (hopefully). The โ€œvictoryโ€ is a post-neoliberal government that can retire bonds or convert them to other kinds of assets without much fanfareโ€”because they have already done their job of keeping democracy funded and public employment steady.

The Duck-Rabbit Problem

And here is where what we call the duck-rabbit problem comes in, named after the famous optical illusion. The duck-rabbit illusion is an illustration that looks to some people at first glance like a rabbit, and to others like a duck. While the drawing is purposely ambiguous, it illustrates a universal premise in Gestalt psychology: our first impressions are โ€œwholesโ€ before we can perceive parts, new combinations and new assemblages. You see a duck or a rabbit first, and then with a bit of time you can see both images.

The duck-rabbit idea is central to how we move and learn in coalition. Members of a coalition see the same policy in their own terms, idioms and vernacularโ€”if not completely differently. By narrating these thoughts publicly, we hope to do coalitional communication more democratically. At Money on the Left, we will always say out loud that bonds are just another form of credit. Rather than borrowing funds that must be paid back at interest, bonds initiate new circuits of spending and receivability that can be structured in all kinds of ways. But whether the public understands them that way is not fixed in advanceโ€”it is something that the actual experience of Blue Bonds will shape. If they are used to provision a peacetime full-employment economy, and people see with their own eyes that this can be done whether or not Trump and his billionaires agree, then the idea that bonds must be โ€œpaid backโ€ in the punitive sense will look like the cruel joke that it is.


That, at least, is the horizon we are trying to open up: not just a fiscal tool to survive the present, but a lived demonstration that our capacity to provision the peace is real. Because that unfolds across many institutions and ledgers at once โ€” cities, states, unions, universities, and the central bank โ€” our strategies and designs should be multiple. Focusing here on Blue Bonds is not an attempt to subordinate other strategies and designs to this one. The opposite: complementary currencies and the public discourse they generate help set the long-term trajectory for Blue Bonds, making them more legible, inclusive, and durable. So when it comes to weighing our options, the more the merrier will deliver better, more democratic outcomes.

Coalition as Credit

Reading the Mamdani-Lander-Warren Coalition as a Credit Event

by Will Beaman

How do you keep governing when opponents try to stage a fiscal loss? In New York, that will be the fight: not just what to do, but how it will be underwritten as Albany and national actors slow-walk budgets until the calendar finishes them off. Our claim is simple: the technical โ€œhowโ€ is not a bolt-on. It is being rehearsed right now in coalition practice. Approach the Mamdaniโ€“Landerโ€“Warren moment as a crediting eventโ€”a scene where political credit and underwriting are made receivable across roomsโ€”and a near-term instrument, politicized bond issuance (Blue Bonds), stops looking like a leap and starts looking conceivable.

This is not the old, self-effacing triangulation that goes hunting for โ€œpolitical coverโ€ to appease moneyed interests and a โ€œsilent majorityโ€ of conservative voters. What we are seeing is public underwriting: recognitions offered in distinct idioms, in public, so claims are accepted where they would otherwise be blocked. โ€œCoverโ€ here is not borrowed; it is openly provisionedโ€”co-signed by diverse validators and accountable to diverse audiences.

Over the last months, old cues have misfired and new playbooks are being improvised. Coalition is shifting from ritual pledge to daily practiceโ€”who can speak for whom, in which rooms, without pretending to be the same. The Mamdani campaign crystallizes this shift: it may be the democratic-socialist leftโ€™s most consequential electoral win yetโ€”even including AOCโ€™s upset. Yet at the same time that it has sparked striking new instances of left-liberal solidarity, it has convened a soft collaborationist bloc linking Cuomo, national party figures, and The New York Times to Donald Trump himself.

We can interpret these gestures as a crediting event that contains multitudes, with implications across time. For the present political moment, such a reading re-credits the recent historical archive, stages usable contradiction in the present, and opens a near-future move: a democratic bond drive built from todayโ€™s coalition habits.

Past โ€” Reparative credit, loosening the archive

There is a kind of coalition work that begins by loosening the archive of political memory. It asks, generously, where should credit for movement victories go, and what have we discredited with too much finality? The Lander and Warren gestures toward Mamdani invite exactly that move. They do not pretend the Sandersโ€“Warren split never happened; they treat it as a record that can be re-read. What looked like incompatible strategies in 2020โ€”movement populism and structuralist reformโ€”can now be recast as twin rehearsals of a capacity we can use today. Warren praises Mamdani in her own idiom of affordability and household relief; Mamdani accepts the recognition without translating himself into technocratic prose. Lander, after his loss, extends his political credit to Mamdaniโ€™s project, not to equate the two of them, but as an acknowledgment that the organizing he did and the organizing Mamdani did could be recorded on the same page. This is a reparative politics of citation: restoring names and credit without forcing sameness.

Reparative citation matters because neoliberal politics rehearses competitive jockeying that narrows who can be seen. Liberal progressivism often tried to insulate technocratic expertise from the unruly work of experiential pedagogyโ€”treating spreadsheets, rulemaking, and fiduciary language as if they could do politics by themselves. On the other side, certain theories of mass organization cast groups like DSA as an autonomous subject accountable only to its own inside, tasked with building โ€œindependent powerโ€ that could then be imposed on coalition partners.

Each camp protected its strategyโ€™s dignity by discrediting the otherโ€™s. Technocrats dismissed movement language as naรฏve; Jacobin polemicists dismissed everything administrative as capture. Rituals of self effacement would accompany traversals between these two camps: left intellectuals discrediting their subject position as less โ€œorganicโ€ than an imagined working class audience; official policy spaces and legacy media gatekept from activists by rituals of genuflection to seriousness and moderation. The result was a historical archive that made it too easy to tell the story of 2020 as pure antagonism rather than divergent practice.

The Lander/Warren/Mamdani moment reanimates this archive with renewed depth and potential possibility. Landerโ€™s cross-endorsement recognizes that his organizing built capacities the coalition can now mobilize through Mamdani; Warrenโ€™s praise credits Mamdaniโ€™s coalition with strengthening the very affordability politics she champions in a different register. In both cases, political idioms are preserved and props are given both ways. That is what a swap line looks like in public: interoperability without assimilation. Read this way, the point is not metaphor, but practiceโ€”who can underwrite whom, in which roomsโ€”the same kind of practice a bond drive will require.

Seeing the past this way also clarifies why these credit analogies are not just rhetorical. Progressive campaigns really are provisioning authorities that mark up all kinds of creditโ€”small dollars, volunteer hours, public endorsements, private reputationsโ€”routinely narrated as commensurable forms of contribution. Money on the Left has argued that such ecosystems function like complementary-currency arrangements: unlike claims can be recognized together without collapsing into a single accounting identity, precisely because institutions learn to value one thing in terms of another. Treating cross-endorsements as crediting acts makes the practice legible. It is not sentiment; it is the political equivalent of marking accounts up and down to update how the coalition recognizes and underwrites political credit across its own differences.

What the reparative frame accomplishes, then, is simple: it dignifies both technocratic craft and movement pedagogy as distinct forms of credit worth carrying forward. It asks us to re-value strategies written off in the heat of a political split, and re-read losses as rehearsals. It keeps the archive open so prior work can be credited againโ€”nowโ€”to advance shared projects.

Present โ€” Staging contradictions as capacity

What is striking about the Mamdani moment is how plainly it was made possible by the cross-endorsement strategy with Brad Lander. The alliance was not a late truce; it created a channel where each camp could honor the other in its own language and have that recognition count in public. Lander used his standing to say, in effect, โ€œthis also belongs here,โ€ and people who trust Lander started acting like it does. That is the practical core: Mamdaniโ€™s credit in movement spaces and Landerโ€™s credit in institutional spaces were made to count across rooms without either campaign changing its voice.

The Israel/Palestine line makes this clear. Mamdani speaks with moral clarity about Zionism as an ethnonational project and steadfast about Palestinian rights. Lander, a liberal Zionist, did not pretend to agree. He gave a contradictory (but earnest) set of affirmations: โ€œIsrael has a right to exist,โ€ Mamdaniโ€™s critiques of Zionism are not antisemitic, and Lander can vouch for his moral seriousness. Mamdani did not translate himself to fit Landerโ€™s phrasing; he named the difference and kept moving. That is coalition as a working practice: two voices introducing each other across rooms and making each other receivable where they might otherwise be gated.

Landerโ€™s arrest outside immigration court deepened the point. He was detained and released, which is not how most detentions in that building go. Instead of treating that gap as something to hide, he said it out loud and used it to sharpen the gesture: I have credit with power that you donโ€™t, so Iโ€™m going to spend it on this. The asymmetry was not scrubbed for purity; it was mobilized. That is what solidarity looks like when it treats differences in proximity to power as a resource to be mobilized, not an embarrassment to be denied. And it builds a memory: if Lander runs for another office, the Mamdani field operation now has reasonโ€”and practiceโ€”to show up for him.

Elizabeth Warrenโ€™s partnership with Mamdani works the same way in another register. She does not adopt his cadence. She takes his affordability politics and says, in her idiom of consumer protection and competent administration, this belongs in the agenda I fight for. People who track Warrenโ€™s signalsโ€”career public servants, party operatives, legacy journalistsโ€”are more likely to give Mamdani a fair hearing. The long term effect is more coverage, more open doors, fewer knee-jerk vetoes.

Put simply: the present tense of this coalition is not unison; it is harmony. Lander vouches for Mamdani where his word reaches; Mamdani honors Lander without pretending they share every premise; Warren stamps the ticket in yet another venue. Each move keeps the differences intact and makes them usable together. That is why it feels durable rather than transactional. And because these introductions hold across rooms, they also prepare the validators and venues that a democratic bond drive would rely on when the budget is made to stall. 

Before we go further, a brief note on scope. These two sections have been descriptive: how political credit is being extended across rooms. What follows is more prescriptive. It asks how that same practice might be carried into administration if obstruction is engineeredโ€”so that the coalitionโ€™s habits remain usable when the setting changes.

Future โ€” Extending todayโ€™s coalition to tomorrowโ€™s Blue Bonds

Across unions, community groups, city agencies, and neighboring jurisdictions, similar gestures happen all the time: people with standing in one room are co-signing work from another, and audiences are learning to treat that co-sign as valid.

For political campaigns, these gestures are not atmosphericsโ€”they are capacity.

They answer, concretely, how someone like Mamdani was able to win as a democratic socialist: by having validators introduce his commitments across rooms where their word travels, so the campaignโ€™s promises begin to count in more places. And they are practice for recognizing political and economic capacity writ large when Trump tells everyone from opponents to junior partners that he holds all the cards.

This last section is therefore less descriptive and more invitational. It proposes one way to carry todayโ€™s coalition habits into governance if the play is to stall and demoralizeโ€”say, by slow-walking โ€œTax the Richโ€ until the calendar delivers the final blow. Taxing the rich is worth fighting for. But when it is treated as the only pathโ€”as if money were a finite substance to be recycled before anything else can happenโ€”it becomes a Hail Mary acceleration that invites the right to run out the clock. The alternative we propose is not to abandon that fight, but to pair it with a financing route that is increasingly legible in the coalitionโ€™s own practice.

Call that route politicized bond issuance. Neoliberal common sense has trained us to hear โ€œbondsโ€ as the city equivalent of household borrowing that must be paid back before any other thought is possible. The neoliberal story about bonds can make it seem more realistic to seek the consent of Trump-aligned donors and reactionary statehouse leaders for tax increases than to mobilize ordinary bond issuance at a political scale.

But the coalitional practices weโ€™ve been tracing make it possible to tell a different story. If coalitional gestures are carried forward, then the board will already be set up for a bond drive for democracy: radical democratic sentiments, urgent public works projects, trusted validators speaking in their own idioms, and a wide base that treats small sums and steady participation as meaningful. If agencies say in advance what the bonds will fund; if unions and civic institutions publicly invest in them, and if neighboring jurisdictions open reciprocal pathways, then bonds are a safe and stable feature of public life. In other words, we can politicize bonds to say that their viability is defended and expanded through the same cross-room vouching that is already underway in coalitional politics. 

Once politicized bond issuance is on the table, it changes the politics of taxation before any showdown. โ€œTax the Richโ€ stops being a plea to gatekeepers and becomes a negotiation in which the coalition already has a working alternative to fiscal suffocation. The message is simple: we will finance transit, clinics, housing stabilization, wages, and care on timelines set by public need. You can meet us there with durable revenue, or we will proceed while continuing to organize for that revenue. Either way, the work continues.

There is presently a massive desire for public gestures of solidarity between governing bodies. For someone like Illinois Governor J.B. Pritzker to have the backs of Texas Democrats who have the back of our entire democracy. And for ordinary people to be able to invest small dollars in fighting the oligarchy. A national Blue Bonds campaign between states and allied cities makes both desires actionable. It would create channels for residents to subscribe across jurisdictions and for issuers to coordinate acceptance and timing so that solidarity can spread in policy. In short, Blue Bonds could underwrite the emergence of a cross-state, urban front capable of sustaining public life against impoundment politics.

None of this requires the movement to know every technical step in advance. It requires that the legibility we are building nowโ€”about who vouches for whom, how unlike contributions add up, and why differences do not have to be flattenedโ€”be carried into administration and policy. A small Blue Bond holding then reads as another channel in a familiar architecture: small dollars, small labor, endorsements, and now a publicly named savings instrument tied to visible projects and campaigns. The more intelligible this becomes in the present, the less it will feel like a leap when it becomes a necessity. The coalition will be extending a practice it already recognizes, not inventing one from scratch.

Credit Events

If neoliberal governance taught a reflex, it was the Hail Mary face-off: stage a crisis, wait for things to deteriorate, come in with a bad solution or none at all. We propose a different ending. When coalition is treated as structure rather than exception, then crisis is no longer the only game. A democratic bond driveโ€”organized issuance, tax receivability, union and civic subscription, cross-jurisdiction supportโ€”becomes thinkable now because the recognitions that would sustain it are already public.

We should consign the Hail Mary to the dustbin with the rest of our neoliberal relics. Keep organizing to Tax the Rich, but pair it with instruments that todayโ€™s coalition already renders receivable. Waiting for the next showdown is not a strategy; treating the face-off as fate hands initiative to opponents who script defeat through delay and procedural choke points. The stall is built, and it can be countered by arranging capacities the politics has already brought into being.

Credit events are not events in the neoliberal senseโ€”not economic or political crises. They are scenes of public underwriting that re-credit the archive, make claims receivable across rooms in the present, and name near-term administrative capacities that follow without a leap. Blue Bonds are the near-term test of this stance: coordinate issuance with acceptance for taxes and fees, union and civic subscription, and reciprocity across jurisdictions so public work continues while longer-run revenue struggles proceed. No brinkmanshipโ€”keep recognitions public and portable, and build the instruments that enact democratic values.

The Unofficial Lives of Public Money

by Will Beaman

Recent Money on the Left proposals for endogenous credit campaignsโ€”like Unis or Blue Bondsโ€”often run headlong into an unspoken but deeply rooted distinction between โ€œofficialโ€ and โ€œunofficialโ€ money. This distinction can make such projects seem peripheral, even when they are designed to work alongside and strengthen existing public infrastructures. Clarifying how this distinction works, and how it might be reframed, is essential to building a narrative in which these proposals make intuitive sense as part of a broader democratic vision.

Perhaps a more helpful axis for thinking about currency is not official versus unofficial, but democratic and publicly responsible monetary practices versus rogue and publicly irresponsible ones. This framing helps us see how the dollar itself contains multiple layers of issuance and coordination that are neither fully centralized nor always democratically accountable. It also allows us to recognize that some soโ€‘called โ€œunofficialโ€ currencies may, in fact, make their connections to public infrastructure more visible and accountable than many โ€œofficialโ€ practices do.

We have inherited contradictory public imaginaries that reinforce the official/unofficial binary. The legacy of federalism and constitutional demarcations of โ€œsovereignโ€ public authority over issuing moneyโ€”the gold standard fantasy that implies a natural, finite supply of currency, and tacit ideological assumptions about what kinds of work count as legitimateโ€”all feed the belief that there is a โ€œrealโ€ quantity of money to which everything else must conform. Each of these imaginaries narrows our sense of what money is and what it can do.

The dollarโ€™s apparent seamlessness emerges from an ongoing choreography in which multiple institutionsโ€”from Congress to municipal courtsโ€”issue and reissue credit, coordinate payments, and manage its acceptance. This takes many everyday forms: congressional appropriations, loanโ€‘originated bank deposits, markedโ€‘up reserve balances and Treasuries, and municipal bonds. It also happens through public rituals and discoursesโ€”such as the oftโ€‘repeated claim that government must tax before it can spend, or moments when state governments refuse to draw on appropriated funds, as though hoarding balances were a mark of fiscal virtue. These narratives and practices naturalize the idea of the dollar as finite, preโ€‘existing, and selfโ€‘contained, when in fact its continuity depends on countless points of issuance and coordination. The question is not whether these points exist, but whether their issuance and functions are democratically accountable.

Sovereignty and its Doppelgรคnger 

When we reframe the landscape in terms of democratic and publicly responsible versus rogue and publicly irresponsible monetary practices, sovereignty becomes a revealing figure. In one register, it names the institutional intransigence that locks fiscal authority inside gatekept procedures and narrow definitions of โ€œlegitimateโ€ spendingโ€”congressional supermajorities, balancedโ€‘budget amendments, debt ceilings, and appropriations that never reach the people they were passed for. This is sovereignty as a state of affairs: insulated, resistant to public challenge, and wielded to forestall democratic fiscal contestation.

In another register, sovereignty animates a frontier fantasy. Here it becomes the outlaw dream of escaping any collective obligationโ€”a dream with deep roots in the settlerโ€‘colonial โ€œfree bankingโ€ movements of the Jacksonian West. In the nineteenth century, โ€œfree banksโ€ were celebrated in some quarters as engines of independence, issuing notes supposedly backed by local initiative and unshackled from federal oversight. In reality, they operated inside a broader federal and state monetary order, often failing spectacularly and leaving communities to absorb the losses. This history has been reโ€‘stylized in the twentyโ€‘first century as Silicon Valleyโ€™s crypto imaginary: Manifest Destiny reborn in code and venture capital, promising a โ€œsovereignโ€ infrastructure of value beyond the reach of government.

Both registers disavow their entanglements with the wider monetary system. The first enshrines continuity ritualsโ€”like taxing before spendingโ€”as natural limits, masking the many points where the dollar is already issued and reโ€‘issued. The second glorifies breakaway issuance, pretending it can float free of public infrastructure while quietly relying on it for convertibility, legal enforceability, and market credibility. In different ways, both treat accountability as a threat rather than a foundation.

By holding these two faces of sovereignty together, we can see how rogue and publicly irresponsible currencies cut across the official/unofficial divide. The dollar itself can be made to act like a rogue instrument when its points of issuance are hidden behind sovereigntyโ€™s gatekeeping. And many โ€œunofficialโ€ projects, from speculative crypto tokens to Trump Coins, rehearse the same fantasy of unaccountable freedom that drove the free banking frontierโ€”right down to their selective nostalgia for collapse and reset.

What this framing makes possible is a different horizon: one where new currencies, like Unis or Blue Bonds, work precisely by making their embeddedness in public infrastructure visible and contestableโ€”expanding the field of fiscal coordination rather than evading it.

Postscript: On Naming and Silencing

Jakob Feinigโ€™s concept of monetary silencingโ€”the process by which institutions and experts render money apolitical, finite, and beyond democratic contestationโ€”offers a powerful complement to the framing here. His historical work shows how silencing deepens when coalitional struggles over public money recede. Though he most often applies the term to mainstream institutions, Feinig has also noted how crypto imaginaries obscure their reliance on legal and infrastructural scaffolding.

My own framing begins from the other end: the outlaw, herrenvolk ethos of cryptocurrencies and the free banking movements before them. But we converge in showing that these are two sides of the same coinโ€”each eroding democratic governance when left unexamined. That convergence highlights a deeper point: naming is not just rhetorical. If monetary silencing thrives in the absence of coalitional imagination, then how we describe monetary practices helps form the context in which public futures can be seen.