Democratic Public Finance & the Future of Public Banking

By Scott Ferguson

The following text was composed as an address for the conference Public Banking for Public Prosperity: A Declaration of Financial Independence, held at the Friends Center in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, October 22โ€“24, 2026. Published here is the original, unabridged manuscript of the talk, which was subsequently condensed to meet the time constraints of live delivery.

We who gather here today agree: public banking is an indispensable instrument for reclaiming governing power and economic capacity from a rapacious financial sector and a feckless federal government. We have endured decades of anti-democratic austerity, compounding private wealth, and now, brazenly authoritarian fiscal sabotage. The time has come to break the duopoly of Wall Streetโ€™s private credit and a paralyzed federal purse by establishing a nationwide network of democratically accountable public banksโ€”an infrastructure that operates explicitly in the common interest and treats credit as an inalienable public resource, rather than a vehicle for private exploitation and profit.

My name is Scott Ferguson. I am an Associate Professor in the Department of Humanities, Arts, & Film at the University of South Florida and a co-founder of the Money on the Left Editorial Collective. Our mission at Money on the Left is straightforward, but formidable. Money, we insist, is an inexhaustible public utility and, faced with nearly insurmountable social and environmental crises, there is no more urgent task today than reconstructing the global monetary system. However captured or abused by private interests, we argue, money remains a thoroughly malleable public instrument for social and ecological care. For this reason, we place moneyโ€™s public design at the center of left thought and organizing, bridging political economy with law, culture, and aesthetics. Money, we contend, is neither a neutral medium of private exchange nor an irredeemable device of class domination that should be abolished. Whatever its historical entanglements with capitalist apologetics and political violence, money is the primary medium through which we organize our eco-social interdependenceโ€”and our most powerful tool for collective stewardship.

Following Modern Monetary Theory (or โ€œMMTโ€) and Christine Desanโ€™s โ€œconstitutionalโ€ legal theory, we understand money to be fundamentally public and endogenous. Monetary forms do not bubble up spontaneously from private barter or market exchange; they are active products of political governance and legal design that are rooted in the public sector. Money is an endogenous architecture of credit and debt, issuance and redemptionโ€”a dynamic legal institution that continuously brings monetary forms into existence and retires them through public authority. Money on the Left explicitly rejects dogmas that see money as exogenous: a scarce, privately hoarded value governed by immutable economic laws that no one supposedly controls. MMT correctly demonstrates that issuance always precedes redemption and that currency-issuing governments can always afford to mobilize idle resources and labor. Yet while standard versions of MMT restrict such capacity to what it defines as national โ€œmonetary sovereigns,โ€ Money on the Left extends this logic across the entire institutional landscape. We see fiscal and crediting capacity everywhereโ€”no matter how smothered by balanced-budget amendments, bond-market discipline, or ideological defeatism our public institutions appear to be.

My colleagues and I are honored to join this conference alongside such an extraordinary lineup of thinkers and organizers. If Money on the Left has a distinct contribution to offer this room, it lies not in technical banking mechanics or financial law, but in an overarching political-economic vision: what we call Democratic Public Finance, or DPF. DPF is designed to energize, guide, and protect our movement over the long haul. Public banking in the United States will necessarily be heterogeneous, modular, and adaptive, coordinating struggles across municipal, state, and federal scales. Yet as we embrace pragmatic strategies tailored to distinct political terrain, we must ensure that tactical flexibility does not degrade into technocratic compromise, complacency, or capitulation.

Replicating the Bank of North Dakota across all fifty states would be a monumental political triumph. It would claw back billions in public wealth from Wall Street and revitalize local economies. Still, such a triumph leaves the underlying logic of the commercial loan model more or less intact. This model casts cash-strapped institutions and organizations as perpetual debtors, forced to squeeze scarce revenues out of local communities to service principal and interest. A public bank that functions only as a benevolent lender, we warn, actually short-circuits moneyโ€™s true social power. This is where DPF proves indispensable: by refusing to accept zero-sum logics of scarcity as inherent to monetary design, Democratic Public Finance keeps our movementโ€™s horizon maximally open, experimental, and ambitious.


โ€œMoney is not a thing,โ€ wrote Karl Marx in The Poverty of Philosophy, โ€œit is a social relation.โ€ This familiar gesture aims to de-naturalize money, recasting political economy as a thoroughly social, and therefore contestable, domain of collective life. The trouble is that most modern political economyโ€”Marxism includedโ€”promptly betrays its own constructionism, reducing moneyโ€™s social functionality right back to a private, alienable, and ultimately exogenous thingliness. We know very well that money is not an inert fact of nature; yet we continue to envision its possibilities as if it were a freestanding token caught in a closed, quasi-physical system. Whether pinned to marginal utility, behavior, or abstract labor time, money is envisioned as a finite chit moving through real or virtual space, carrying a scarce substance from here to there via invisible market forces. Monetary value is always tethered to the past: either to yesterdayโ€™s accumulated revenues or to debts mortgaged against future earnings. In this prevailing credo, spendingโ€“and especially public spendingโ€“remains forever prisoner to moneyโ€™s supposed pastness. Shackled to tax receipts and bond yields, government is warned incessantly that ample fiscal investment will only โ€œcrowd outโ€ private capital or trigger runaway inflation.

Trapped in this worldview, collective life is forced to operate within perversely narrow and punitive limits. Care for the many is made dependent upon the taxable gains of the wealthy few. Framing public provision as mere โ€œredistributionโ€ pits interdependent communities against one another as antagonistic voting blocs. At the center of this theater stands the all-powerful figure of the โ€œtaxpayerโ€โ€”the mythic, hardworking, and tacitly white American around whom all legitimate public finance supposedly turns. Right and left polarize around mutually defining resentments. โ€˜Me firstโ€™ or โ€˜thee firstโ€™? โ€˜Taxation is theftโ€™ or โ€˜generosity toward the unfortunateโ€™? Inevitably, economic divides metastasize into cultural antagonisms: โ€˜High Tโ€™ versus โ€˜bleeding heart.โ€™ NASCAR or Broadway? Kid Rock or Chappell Roan? Raw milk or oat-milk?

In this warped reality, abandonment is baseline. Nurture is the rare exceptionโ€”born of impossible choices within a rigged game ruled by artificial scarcity. From this vantage, our most vulnerable communities count primarily as liabilities. Though replete with heterogeneous potentials and desires, they are entered into the ledger primarily as costs. Women of color, immigrants, the unhoused, disabled people, trans kids: in the eyes of orthodox finance, they are perpetual drains on the public purse, whether pitied, despised, or simply ignored. Assisting one community requires starving another. Pitched as zero-sum sacrifices, tenuous public investments in such areas rarely survive the next fiscal crisis. Last year, we funded disability services, so replenishing urban tree canopies had to wait. Next year, we will correct decades of library neglect, which means the light-rail line passed five years ago is indefinitely on hold. Want property tax relief for fixed-income seniors? That requires gutting budgets for public schools, who are then told to cross their fingers, protect their credit ratings, and beg Wall Street for bond financing.

Whereas the luminaries of Ancient Greece adopted a complex allegorical view of the gods, modern economic commentators across the political spectrum worship revenues as deadly literal deities, imagined to be the supreme fulcrum of all future finance. This is zero-sum metaphysics in extremis. According to todayโ€™s revenue fundamentalism, tomorrowโ€™s activities are intrinsically constrained by yesterdayโ€™s returns. We at Money on the Left are sympathetic to left critiques of the profit motive as, at best, inadequate and, at worst, poisonous for collective flourishing. What such criticisms regularly overlook, however, is the far more tenacious fantasy that revenue constitutes the sole chokepoint for future provisioning across public and private domains. The tragedy of the neoliberal โ€œbailout stateโ€ is not that it courts โ€œmoral hazard,โ€ violating the apparently sacred principle that all institutions and organizations should be self-funding without public assistance. Rather, bailouts are unjust simply because they mobilize public credit exclusively to rescue big capital, while abandoning the rest of us to austerity.

Consider defenses of the US Postal Service. Critics rightly point out how the 2006 mandate to pre-fund retiree benefits sabotaged a viable public agency. Yet notice the trap: defenders scramble to prove the Post Office can be profitable, the right screams for privatization, and the conventional left demands taxing the rich to plug the deficit. What remains unthinkable across the board is uncoupling public provisioning from revenue collection altogether. Through this twisted prism, collective care is forced to wait on private accumulation, rather than answering the urgent needs and democratic desires of the body politic.

Under neoliberalism, fiscal sabotage becomes a routine sacrifice: a ritual bloodletting designed to coax private revenues out of sluggish markets. Someday, we are promised, we will tax away private surpluses for the common good. In the meantime, belt-tightening remains our penance. Somehow, interminable austerity will conjure the resources upon which our collective survival depends.

Enter contemporary fascism. Todayโ€™s fascism is neither an unnatural perversion of market forces nor simply their authoritarian triumph. Instead, it takes neoliberalismโ€™s zero-sum callousness and strips away the polite fiction of economic neutralityโ€”touting austerity not as an unfortunate market necessity, but as an overt, cruel, and often vengeful political choice. Fighting corrupt oligarchs and authoritarian puppeteers is necessary, but in doing so we also need to repudiate the fatal premise that revenue is the primordial origin of human capacity. Never forget: because, at bottom, money is not a zero-sum game, redistribution collective life need not wait on private permission to thrive.

Herein lies the core revelation of Democratic Public Finance. If, according to DPF, money is a fundamentally public and endogenous infrastructure of credit and debt, then it arises not from the needleโ€™s eye of past returns, but rather as a function of ongoing politics and the wide berth of systemic legal design. Credit, in this view, represents the broad granting power at the heart of monetary issuance. It is not a micro-scale agreement between two parties, nor is it predicated upon scarcity. When a government, institution, or organization provides credit to recipients, it gives community members permission to carry out specified social activities. Though shaped by quantitative measures, the power of credit is thoroughly qualitative, malleable, and inexhaustible. Debt is equally plastic. Obligations can be structured in any number of ways. What is a grant but a form of credit that prioritizes qualitative commitments over quantitative returns? From this perspective, revenue is not a scarce token hoarded and spent; it is an operation of redemptionโ€”the settlement phase of the monetary circuit, not its restrictive wellspring. In our current system, revenue concentrates staggering purchasing power in private hands. Yet that distribution is not an immutable economic law; it is an active political design that must be radically contested. Revenue is neither the spontaneous outcome of market efficiency nor the indispensable precondition for future investment. To reduce left politics to revenue redistribution is to surrender our greatest instrument of collective coordination before the struggle even begins. Redistributionism, in other words, is inherently weak, like pointing a pocketknife at a firing squad.


Democratic Public Finance demands that we thoroughly re-engineer how the public sector variously grants and obliges. Stop trying to โ€œfind the moneyโ€ as if it were a finite hoard buried in the sand. Our task is to design monetary architectures that are public, capacious, and democratically accountable. At Money on the Left, we articulate this project across five strategic areas: First, we challenge the dominant fiscal rhetoric, exposing existing tax and debt limits as both arbitrary and politically irresponsible constraints. Balanced-budget amendments, statutory borrowing caps, and debt ceilings are not laws of nature; they are legal straitjackets designed to enforce artificial scarcity and devalue our collective labor. We have everything to gain by unmasking these rules and showing the public how these institutional bottlenecks are constructed to suppress human capacity and ecological renewal.

Second, DPF directly confronts and aims to dismantle the deep legal architectures that enforce neoliberal austerity and protect authoritarian power. These structures are etched into federal and state constitutions, designed precisely to preempt public power and discipline democratic ambition. To leave these legal boundaries unchallenged is to resign before political mobilization even startsโ€”conceding the myth of monetary scarcity and preemptively suffocating what our communities imagine to be possible.

Third, we seek to creatively multiply public crediting operations across the monetary hierarchy. In doing so, we redefine what counts as socially valuable by deploying complementary crediting tools across the public sector. By establishing diverse crediting channels, we can drive a planned, sustained expansion of public investment. We can revalue care and reproductive labor, mobilize neglected community capacities, and repair ecological harm. Though taxing billionaires out of existence remains a vital responsibility for any democratic movement, DPF ensures collective flourishing and participation without robbing Peter to pay Paul or deepening electoral divides over taxpayer money. Crucially, this proliferation also serves a profound pedagogical purpose: it demystifies finance in practice, proving that money is an alterable political technology open to democratic imagination and disputation.

Fourth, DPF politicizes and democratizes pricing. Supply, of course, matters. Demand is just as important. But pricing has little to do with the widely held fantasy that somehow together supply and demand naturally gravitate toward a market equilibrium that is fair, efficient, or  inevitable. Prices are, in truth, always administrated, playing a key part in moneyโ€™s ongoing design. The question is not if or when pricing is administered; it is how, by whom, and for what social purpose. Should we allow a corporate oligarchy and algorithmic software to raise prices in the name of maximizing private profit? Or, ought we to set a strong floor on pricing through robust public options, legal regulations, and community pricing boards?

Nowhere is the private administration of prices more aggressiveโ€”and more hiddenโ€”than in the logistical corridors of corporate e-commerce. When Amazon.com controls the marketplace, the warehouse, and the delivery network, pricing becomes a private tax on the whole world. This is why Christopher Armitage proposes a municipal alternative. โ€œ[Amazon] doesnโ€™t manufacture anything,โ€ writes Armitage. โ€œIt provides a website, a warehouse, and a van. In exchange, every transaction drains money out of the sellerโ€™s community.โ€ By contrast, a municipal alternative to Amazon can directly provide such services to the public: a web interface, public couriers and, when necessary, storage for locally-produced goods. โ€œA municipal platform has no incentive to manipulate search results, bury competitors, or launch private-label knockoffs of its own vendorsโ€™ best-selling products. The platform works for the community because the community owns it.โ€ Implied in Armitageโ€™s vision is that it puts pricing in the hands of the public sector, re-appropriating pricing from corporate gatekeepers and transforming it as an instrument of democratic governance.

Fifth and finally, DPF demands far-reaching experiments in public banking and digital payment systems. Today, banking and payments are dominated by commercial banks, private equity, shadow banking, credit card companies, Silicon Valley apps, and payday lenders. If crediting operations engender our collective future, then we must place democratizing such operations at the core of political organization and action. By chartering public banks, we wrest public funds from Wall Street, deploy stabilizing credit during downturns, channel investment into historically divested communities, and eradicate the banking deserts manufactured by financial consolidation. Alongside these banks, we need to establish free public digital payment rails. These systems will liberate small businesses and workers from predatory transaction tolls and expand public clearing. A robust public payment apparatus is what brings our municipal alternative to Amazon to lifeโ€”keeping prices low, eliminating middleman fees, and allocating wealth locally through transparent public ledgers rather than private conduits.


Democratic Public Finance enthusiastically champions every initiative to establish public banks. Yet it also challenges us to reach furtherโ€”to stretch far beyond the conventional boundaries that have historically hemmed in the movement. What, after all, is a public bank? What can public banking truly achieve? Rather than assuming a single, uniform templateโ€”or merely redirecting commercial loan protocols toward benevolent endsโ€”DPF treats public banking as an adaptable, modular project. Above all, it shatters the zero-sum fallacy that sees revenue as an absolute barrier to collective flourishing rather than as an adjustable coordinate of public policy.

A dazzling example of what DPF offers public banking is what we at Money on the Left term the Loop. First developed by our colleague Tyler Suksawat, the Loop resolves several systemic crises in a single stroke, while uncovering moneyโ€™s public endogeneity for all to see. The core problem is simple: every year, billions of public dollars exit our cities, counties, and states into the vaults of Wall Street. Whenever a state or municipality issues debt to build schools, fix transit, or repair water systems, it is forced to surrender massive interest payments to private underwriters and investors. This continuous financial depletion is a primary cause of regional austerity, cementing the manufactured illusion that the public is forever broke, even as our communities overflow with real capacity and urgent needs.

By establishing a government-owned public bank, we propose, a state or municipality can not only expand public investment through municipal lending; it can also purchase its own bonds and โ€œloopโ€ the interest back to the government itself, rather than to Wall Street. Over time, the Loop promises to reclaim the public interest in at least two senses. First, it quite literally saves states and municipalitiesโ€”not to mention school districts, universities, housing authorities, and any number of sub-federal public institutionsโ€”hundreds of millions, if not billions of dollars in interest payments annually. In doing so, it turns bond issuance into a self-reinforcing system of public finance, capable of addressing community and environmental suffering far more democratically and robustly than ever before in the history of the United States. Second, the Loop recuperates the public interest in the sense of collective concern and will, asserting democratic control over debt allocation from Wall Street gatekeepers, punishing rating agencies, and fickle investors. Ultimately, the Loop reveals what hegemonic forces conspire endlessly to conceal: namely, that money is a boundless and contestable public utility that can always be reorganized to serve community and environmental endeavors. We need only to cultivate enough knowledge, creativity, and grit to unlock moneyโ€™s repressed ecosocial potentials.


For the final movement of my talk, I wish to expand public bankingโ€™s horizon of possibility even further by considering what we at Money on the Left have taken to calling the Public Grant-Making Bank. As I suggested at the outset, establishing Bank of North Dakota-style institutions across every US state and territory would represent a monumental achievement. Yet such an effort nevertheless leaves the standard, loan-based approach to banking completely unquestioned. In this model, underfunded community organizations are turned into debtors, impelled to compete for scarce revenues in the marketplace simply to repay their loans

The problem is systemic, extending well beyond the world of public banking. The difficulty stems from two interlocking factors of monetary design. First, the United States has historically outsourced and privatized money creationโ€“a state fiscal functionโ€“to commercial finance. Rather than reducing private finance to mere competitive enterprise, that is, our analysis underscores the fiscal role of commercial banks in creating, disbursing, and redeeming the public dollar. Through this lens, the vast majority of funds emitted in the U.S. dollar system enter existence as private bank loans, placing private balance sheets at the center of the countryโ€™s fiscal architecture.

Second, because this fiscal architecture is structured primarily to maintain positive balance sheets, it harbors inherent tendencies toward austerity, default, and crisisโ€“both within and beyond the banking sector. To be sure, banks sustain investment by continuously creating new credit, paying interest on deposits, funding operations, and supporting public debt transactionsโ€“all of which, in turn, occasion further investments. At a structural level, however, and over the long term, banks subtract more from the economic system than they add precisely because they are legally mandated to conform to a politically constructed definition of solvency. However ideologically justified by those in power, the resulting fiscal system is debilitating by design. The good news, however, is that we can always construct more nuanced and democratically responsive definitions of โ€œsolvencyโ€ and inscribe them into law.

The conventional solution to this faulty structure is so-called โ€œcounter-cyclicalโ€ spending by the state. Such spending, however, only goes so far, as it remains beholden to shifting legislative priorities, rigid budget calendars, and political turnoverโ€“not to mention the twin myths of tax-payer redistribution and bond market โ€œborrowing.โ€ Public outlays, moreover, typically pale in comparison to the structural deficits induced by private financeโ€”which, as a systemic necessity, relentlessly collects more than it spends. In addition to robust state spending, then, what is needed is an ongoing, nimble, and locally sensitive fiscal infrastructure that can serve as an automatic stabilizer and answer community challenges in real time.

This is why Money on the Left proposes the creation of Public Grant-Making Banks, designed to counter and, in certain cases, even replace private bankingโ€™s regressive model of fiscal austerity. The primary pillar of this model involves restructuring finance as direct grants, rather than as loans. Instead of relying on future repayment, public banks would issue grants to projects based on their public mission. A Public Grant-Making Bank evaluates proposals by assessing their anticipated social and ecological effects. For example, funding the establishment of community-owned broadband networks would be evaluated on their contribution to equitable digital access and educational opportunity, not on a financial return model. If the qualitative assessment is strong, the grant is made. On this logic, a grant is still debt; only, it is a qualitative obligation to improve social and environmental conditions, rather than a quantitative obligation to repay a financial sum. The devil, of course, is always in the details. Yet it is essential to remember that public banking is however we design it to operateโ€“and there is no natural or necessary law that says banks must exclusively lend at interest.

Money on the Leftโ€™s own maximalist vision calls for revising and passing the Public Banking Act at the federal level, giving public banks full discretion to create and disburse grants based directly on community needs. Instituting this authority requires overhauling federal banking statutesโ€”from Prompt Corrective Action rules under the Federal Deposit Insurance Act to the Community Reinvestment Actโ€”legally substituting qualitative social metrics for conventional balance-sheet metrics. Such reform needs to be paired with a statutory liability shield for bank directors, protecting them from fiduciary duty claims when making mission-aligned grant decisions. Regulatory oversight would thus undergo a structural transformation: shifting away from punitive capital adequacy ratios toward what we envision as a Public Mission Fulfillment Index. Instead of narrowly auditing balance sheets for commercial solvency, such an Index would help evaluate a bankโ€™s adherence to its public mandateโ€”measuring substantive progress toward full employment, public health milestones,  carbon-emission benchmarks, and transparent governance. Performance is judged not by profit margins, but by documented strides toward communal problem-solving, making the social mission, not a zero-sum ledger, the legal measure of success.

The Public Banking Instituteโ€™s own Ellen Brown seems to support public grant banking at the federal level. In From Austerity to Prosperity: The Public Bank Solution, for instance, she affirms granting over loaning when comparing U.S. banking to the Chinese system. I quote her at length:

“Although the Chinese state-owned banks may have more [so-called] ‘non-performing’ loans than private Western banks, the Chinese economy itself is performing better than Western economies dominated by private sector banks; and this superior performance is supported by a public sector banking system that functions very well for its intended purposes. โ€ฆ [T]he Chinese government did not actually expect repayment of these funds. They were simply credits created on the banksโ€™ books for the purpose of paying for infrastructure and services. They were in the nature of โ€œcontingent grants.โ€ If they generated income, great. If not, they were written off as a cost of running an economy. They were government-issued money stimulating economic development. Western politicians call these unpaid loans โ€˜deficits,โ€™ โ€˜debtsโ€™ and โ€˜fiscal cliffs,โ€™ and they engage in endless debates over how to get rid of them. Meanwhile, China and its neighbors carry on building, growing and producing. They recognize that the governmentโ€™s debt is the peopleโ€™s credit and that a freely-flowing national credit is the key to a flourishing national economy.”

For us at Money on the Left, this very lesson must be extended to sub-federal finance, to say nothing of international finance.

Still, we do not need to wait for Washington: states and municipalities can commence experimenting with Public Grant-Making Banks right now, with or without federal support. Ideally, a revised federal Public Banking Act would obligate the Federal Reserve to provision corresponding reserves whenever a sub-federal public bank issues a grant. With this, grants allocated by state and municipal banks will achieve universal receivability throughout the U.S. economy without inducing destabilizing reserve drains within the sub-national public banking system. In a bottom-up approach, however, state and municipal banks can still be empowered to issue grants in addition to loans. Such institutions can begin establishing a designated Public Grant Reserve Account, the outgoing payments from which will be at first covered by assets in other areas. After meeting mandatory operating expenses, credit-loss reserves, and statutory capital preservation benchmarks, boards of directors can disburse a defined percentage of remaining net income as direct, public-purpose grants. What is more, those same public banks can deploy forgivable loans, recoverable advances, convertible public equity, zero-cost credit lines, and blended finance windows, proving that granting is not a single, narrow technique, but an expansive toolkit of bespoke financial architectures.

Especially in large states like California, we can then move beyond the self-limiting horizon of earnings-covered grants into pure endogenous credit creation. In this case, the California Public Bank would simply credit the accounts of public entities, social housing developers, energy cooperatives, and ecological remediation projects, expanding the public equity of the commonwealth without imposing the discipline of commercial debt amortization or revenue raising. Operating at this scale without federal coordination immediately encounters the structural impediment of the payment system and, in particular, the loss of reserves. Overcoming this constraint requires pairing public grant-making banks with a dedicated state or inter-state public clearinghouseโ€”a companion network that maximizes internal settlement to minimize reserve flight, while pooling state public assets to interface cleanly with the Federal Reserve. Thus, far from a rigid, one-size-fits-all formula, there are myriad paths to launching Public Grant-Making Banks. The essential task, we contend, is to foreground grant-issuing as an aspirational horizonโ€“one that drives pragmatic local campaigns today while constantly reminding our movements of all that public banking can make possible.


Money on the Left does not claim to hold every answerโ€”political, legal, social, or aesthetic. Instead, our vision for Democratic Public Finance offers a guiding ethos for collective activism and structural transformation. We offer it to inspire the public banking movement to remain inventive, resilient, and undeluded by prevailing creeds of scarcity, ensuring that even when tactical compromises are necessary, we never mistake provisional constraints for the outer limits of what is possible. At last, we must reject myths of austerity and revenue redistribution that keep millions of our neighbors impoverished, unhealthy, and disempowered. Conceding to this canard today only tightens oligarchyโ€™s clamp on tomorrowโ€™s political imagination. Our communities and ecologies brim with unrecognized capacity, which the present order casts off as mere costs. If money is truly public, endogenous, and inexhaustible, then it is our shared democratic responsibility to ensure that all are cared for, all are sustained, and all are empowered to author a common future.

Thank you.

Featured Image: Augusta Savage, Lift Every Voice and Sing (The Harp), 1939. This photograph depicts a small contemporary bronze souvenir cast of Savageโ€™s monumental sixteen-foot plaster sculpture, originally commissioned for the 1939 New York Worldโ€™s Fair. Inspired by James Weldon Johnsonโ€™s Black national anthem, the sculpture depicted twelve singing Black children forming the strings of a harp, cradled by the arm of God. Savage had taken a leave of absence from her role as director of the Harlem Community Art Centerโ€”funded by the Works Progress Administrationโ€”to realize the commission, only for the masterpiece to be bulldozed after the fair when neither the fair corporation nor public authorities allocated the funds required to cast it in bronze or store it. The destruction of the work emblematizes the racialized and gendered austerity Democratic Public Finance aims to redress. For this feature, the original photograph has been cropped and recomposed against a solid monochromatic field using Adobe Express.

No, Public Banking is Not a Nicer Way to Lend Money

By Will Beaman

Public banking is often misdescribed as a nicer way of lending money. Instead of depositing public revenues in private banks, the sales pitch goes, governments can place their revenues in a public bank that will try its best to lend money in ways that support a progressive agenda. All while making a profit, of course.

This vision misses the political significance of endogenous money. An unfortunately technocratic-sounding term, endogenous money simply means that money is created through lending. It is not โ€œborrowedโ€ from the future, nor is it lent out from an existing stock of bank deposits. Instead, a private bank loan creates an asset and a liability from thin air at the same time in such a way that makes it look like the passive intermediation and recycling of private funds.

Seeing this is a lot like noticing the editing cuts in a film that create the appearance of continuous space-time through its oppositeโ€”discontinuous cuts that hide their own seams. We produce continuous cinematic space-time because thatโ€™s the genre convention*, not because itโ€™s necessary for the cinematic experience to be โ€œsoundโ€ or valid. With banking, hiding the plasticity and infinitude of money is a genre that limits the public demands we might make of the monetary medium. And thatโ€™s the whole point: investment banking joins together large-scale industrial policy driven by credit creation with asset-bubble dynamics designed to provision an oligarchy, while we debate fiscal policy through the hydraulic image of tax-dollars being recycled from suburban breadwinners.

All money is created before it is seemingly โ€œrecycledโ€ through this fiscal kayfabe. The reason this creative capacity is laundered through private banking is to shrink fiscal policy to the size of periodic showdowns with reactionary state legislatures and governors, while tech and other industries effectively grow and expand as much as they want. So, when public banking is conceived on the basis of widely debunked economic models of private banks lending and multiplying other peopleโ€™s deposits, it concedes basically everything to the profit motive. Sewer Socialism is dead on arrival.

*Not coincidentally, the historical emergence of self-effacing continuity techniques is associated with early racial melodramas that likewise laundered a reactionary moral worldview through a visual and narrative naturalism.

“Piggy Bank being Smashed with Hammer” by Images_of_Money is licensed under CC BY 2.0.
“IOU in a piggy bank” by Images_of_Money is licensed under CC BY 2.0.

Reclaiming Moneyโ€™s Public Powers for Imaginative Intersectional Politics

By Rob Hawkes

Alongside my Money on the Left colleagues Will Beaman and Tyler Suksawat, I recently joined Gus Dunn-Hindle of the Maine Peopleโ€™s Alliance to discuss public money and public banking on the Beacon Podcast. During the conversation, I cited our podcastโ€™s regular opening announcement that Money on the Left is โ€˜a monthly interdisciplinary podcast that reclaims moneyโ€™s public powers for imaginative intersectional politics.โ€™ The imaginative part of this is especially important โ€“ when we free up our imaginations to think about monetary design in new ways, we can begin to move beyond the austerity mindset that condemns millions to poverty, even in the wealthy societies of the global north, while treating extreme inequality and social exclusion as natural and inevitable facts of life.

Many of todayโ€™s most intractable challenges, from crumbling public services to the accelerating ecological crisis, look very different when we cease to view them through the orthodox prism of monetary scarcity, privation, and limitation. For the former Green Party leader Caroline Lucas, โ€˜the failure to rise to the challenge of the nature and climate emergenciesโ€™ is reflective of an โ€˜imagination deficitโ€™ and โ€˜a failure to imagine that a better world is possibleโ€™. Indeed, as Cory Doctorow points out, the โ€˜true meaningโ€™ of Margaret Thatcherโ€™s famous slogan โ€˜There is no alternativeโ€™ (TINA) โ€˜isnโ€™t โ€œNo alternative is possible,โ€ but rather, โ€œStop trying to think of an alternative.โ€โ€™ Speaking as a sci-fi writer, Doctorow likes to quip that โ€˜thinking of alternatives is literally my job.โ€™ In Doctorowโ€™s fiction, most notably in 2023โ€™s The Lost Cause, the envisioning of an alternative future engages directly with the emancipatory potential of democratic public finance, when a character recalls a moment in the past when โ€˜Towns and universities started minting their own currenciesโ€™ (a nod to Money on the Leftโ€™s Uni Currency Project). In the novel, this โ€˜wildcat moneyโ€™ becomes an engine of democratic possibility and change.

This is one of the many reasons why cultural analysis โ€“ from the MCU to literary modernism โ€“ has always been central to the Money on the Left project. As I wrote last month, โ€˜what connects my approach to the interpretation of cultural, monetary, and political forms to our groupโ€™s proposals for public banking, municipal bond issuance, and university financeโ€™ is the framework we at MotL call โ€˜the public money paradigmโ€™. And โ€˜when we understand that inequality and exclusionary violence are built into the logic of private money we can begin to imagine new possibilities for monetary design founded on democratic inclusion, collectivity, and care.โ€™

This is also why the intersectional part of โ€˜imaginative intersectional politicsโ€™ is vital. From the perspective of the private-money-based orthodoxy, the pursuit of justice appears as a series of either/or battles where the liberation of the marginalised can only ever come at anotherโ€™s expense. It is, perhaps, not a coincidence that this summerโ€™s hounding of Jason Arday, an autistic black professor, first out of British academia and then to his shocking and untimely death has taken place in the midst of an increasingly brutal financial crisis in the UKโ€™s higher education sector (which, as The Sunday Times recently revealed, saw universities collectively spending over ยฃ400 million excluding people from its workforce through redundancy schemes in 2024-25 alone). This is not to suggest that the austerity wrecking ball thatโ€™s currently trashing courses, departments, disciplines, and institutions across UKHE was responsible for Professor Ardayโ€™s death in any direct or uncomplicated sense. As Kieran Rose argues, the โ€˜ONLY reasonโ€™ Jason Ardayโ€™s story became a โ€˜storyโ€™ after he was publicly accused of plagiarism by a known eugenicist was โ€˜because of racismโ€™. Nevertheless, the fact that UKHE has been systematically starved of funds while simultaneously facing relentless attacks on its commitments to equality, diversity, and inclusion, has undoubtedly damaged the already precarious safety of marginalised groups and individuals such as Arday within our academic communities.

The vision of zero-sum exchange that defines the private money paradigm also corresponds closely with the rationale underpinning attempts to split the queer community by pitting LGB against TQIA2+ as well as the โ€˜overdiagnosisโ€™ panics that, in the UK, have coalesced around Dame Uta Frithโ€™s divisive and exclusionary views on autism and Channel 4โ€™s irresponsible documentary โ€˜The Great ADHD Myth?โ€™ Since March, when a piece appeared in the TES titled โ€˜why I no longer think autism is a spectrumโ€™, Frith, an autism researcher since the 1960s, has repeatedly been given a platform across new media (including podcasts), legacy media, and academic publications from which to take issue with the present interpretation of the diagnostic criteria for autism and especially to question the validity of late diagnosis. Meanwhile, โ€˜The Great ADHD Myth?โ€™ aired on 18 August and asked โ€˜whether ADHD is a genuine neurodevelopmental disorder, or a social constructโ€™. As Rose explains: โ€˜These arenโ€™t isolated stories, instead, they sit within a much wider journalistic ecology in which Autism and ADHD repeatedly appear alongside welfare expenditure, SEND budgets, NHS demand, school absence, social-care pressures and questions about who genuinely deserves support.โ€™

In each of these cases, then, those whose full participation in society is impeded by racism, transphobia, and/or ableism are regarded as competing for scarce resources in a world where there is never enough to go around. In a private money universe of barter-like trade-offs, care for the vulnerable must always come at the cost of someone elseโ€™s suffering. By contrast, reclaiming moneyโ€™s public powers for imaginative intersectional politics means recognising that monetary design choices shape and condition everything from our hierarchies of academic privilege to university funding crises, battles over trans rights, SEND provision in schools, and the wider recognition, accommodation, and support afforded to disabled people. Picturing another world is not the same thing as bringing one into being, of course, but freeing our imaginations from the austere limits of the private money paradigm is an important first step towards a better, more inclusive, and sustainable future.

Money Is Weird

by Rob Hawkes

Isnโ€™t it strange that social inclusion and climate justice appear unaffordable, but not the status quo?

In July, I presented at the Weird Modernisms conference at Loughborough University. My talk (which you can read here) argued that money is weird. This may sound like a rather bizarre claim; let me explain.

The word โ€˜weirdโ€™ suggests strangeness or oddness but, of course, also carries connotations of the magical and the supernatural (think of Macbethโ€™s โ€˜weird sistersโ€™). Indeed, evidence of moneyโ€™s uncanny ability to โ€˜emerge from thin airโ€™ is all around us, from government spending to bank lending, from complementary currencies to video game coins, and from high street store credit to crypto. And yet, our media and political debates remain dominated by the insistence that there is simply not enough money to fight economic injustice or to avert climate catastrophe. Stop trying to imagine a different, better world, they scream at us. Weโ€™d all like to see less poverty, properly funded/functioning public services, a liveable planet, etc., but what can you do if the markets arenโ€™t in favour? Sure, we can always pay for wars, but a socially inclusive and ecologically sustainable society is unaffordable. Weird, huh?

Perhaps it is unsurprising that the inherent strangeness of money and the language we use to discuss it is ignored, overlooked, and repressed in mainstream discourse. Just as the economic orthodoxy functions to preserve existing social hierarchies โ€“ which are simultaneously patriarchal, white supremacist, imperialist, classist, ableist, hetero- and neuronormative โ€“ the way we routinely discuss public finance and the limitations we impose on monetary design are thoroughly normative and rest on the exclusion of the inexpressible weirdness of money and the humans who create it.

At the conclusion of my talk in Loughborough, I turned to the words of the neuroqueer theorist Nick Walker, who explains in Neuroqueer Heresies (2021) that: ‘Neuronormativity and heteronormativity, in essence, are systems of artificial restriction on human potential. By their very nature, they limit our possibilities. To neuroqueer is to refuse to be constrained by those limits.’ It is no coincidence that neurodivergent people have often been dismissed and/or vilified as weird (and, by extension, as magical, uncanny, supernatural, even monstrous), but as Walker also affirms, โ€˜anyone can liberate themselves from the strictures of normativity.โ€™ In asserting that money is weird, it is my hope that we can all โ€˜unzipโ€™ our โ€˜normal-person monetary imaginationsโ€™ and refuse to be constrained by the artificial restrictions the economic orthodoxy imposes on our understanding of moneyโ€™s limitless creative potential. The status quo relies on the exclusion of weirdness, strangeness, and otherness to maintain its illusion of affordability. To build an inclusive and sustainable future, weโ€™ll need to recognise and celebrate money as malleable, redesignable, and thus much weirder than weโ€™ve been taught to think.

Prototyping Democratic Public Finance With the Seattle Loop

By Will Beaman

Seattle is once again being told that a projected budget deficit requires difficult choices about which public commitments the city can continue to honor. Councilmember Robert Kettle recently used the cityโ€™s projected $175 million shortfall to call for a budget โ€œrealignmentโ€ around essential needs, explicitly opening the door to withdrawing from public work judged to benefit only particular groups. Money on the Leftโ€™s Seattle Loop model offers a way to enlarge the cityโ€™s financial capacity while reorganizing the relationships among public commitments, institutions, and constituencies.

The Seattle Loop is a proposal to establish a municipal bank that can purchase Seattleโ€™s bonds. When the city pays interest on those bonds, the money flows back from the bank into the city’s own general fund, where it can support further lending and public investment. This creates a continuing circuit between the cityโ€™s commitments and the financial capacity available to fulfill them. Rather than allowing municipal interest payments to leave the public realm as income for private creditors, the Loop keeps that income circulating through Seattleโ€™s own institutions.

The Loop also offers a prototype for a different way of governing. Progressive programs are usually introduced into a fiscal system that treats the public budget as a fixed quantity to be divided. Every commitment consequently appears to reduce the amount available for another commitment. Political constituencies enter the budget process as competing claims on scarce money, even when meeting their needs would strengthen the same social fabric.

This structure shapes how people understand one another. A new public commitment comes to appear as a cost imposed on everyone whose own needs remain unmet. The budget thus translates social interdependence into fiscal competition. People who depend on different institutions are encouraged to ask whose program must shrink and whose expectations must be deferred.

Even progressive governments can enlarge the funds available for public provision and distribute them more fairly while remaining caught in this antagonistic structure. So long as public needs must be assembled into a finite package, the pressure to rank them does not disappear. It shifts toward defining which commitments are sufficiently basic, universal, or broadly beneficial to deserve inclusion. Those categories can always be narrowed, and people whose needs are less easily represented as common can be cut away from the public they are supposed to share. Coalition then becomes an exercise in negotiating which differences the budget will recognize and which forms of life must be excluded or deferred.

Once we question the background assumption that money is inherently scarce, however, the social fabric comes into view as an additive ecology. A well-supported institution expands the capacities of the people and institutions around it. Its workers receive income and the communities it serves gain resources to participate in public life. These effects cascade throughout society, far beyond the line item where the initial spending appears.

Conventional public budgeting has difficulty representing this additive quality. It records the financial commitment at the point where money is spent, while the real capacities provisioned through that commitment are represented only where they generate profits. What appears in the budget as a collection of separate costs functions socially as a mutually reinforcing ecology.

The Seattle Loop gives this ecology a more honest financial expression. The cityโ€™s commitments become part of the asset base of a public bank, while the bankโ€™s activity generates income and financial capacity that can support further commitments. Budget priorities enter a circuit in which spending helps sustain the institutions that make additional spending possible.

All of this works because money itself is an expandable accounting instrument, even when the productive capacities it mobilizes cannot be expanded all at once. Those capacities can impose real limits on what a city can accomplish at any given moment. The Loop makes those limits questions of coordination and sequencing rather than reasons to treat every new commitment as a subtraction from a fixed fund. It asks what Seattle can produce now, where additional capacity must be developed, and how public investment can expand what becomes possible over time.

This changes the meaning of fiscal responsibility. Responsibility extends beyond keeping each commitment within its assigned budgetary container to designing relationships through which public institutions can support one another over time. The city can govern its financial system as part of the social ecology it is responsible for sustaining.

For progressives, this points toward an additive conception of coalition. Constituencies do not enter public life solely as claimants seeking their share of a common fund. Their flourishing can expand the capacities on which others depend. Public finance can organize these connections, making solidarity into a durable institutional relationship rather than an appeal for groups to accept sacrifices on one anotherโ€™s behalf.

The Seattle Loop is a local proposal, but its political implications extend beyond Seattle. It suggests that progressive governance can build institutions through which public commitments accumulate, reinforce one another, and generate new possibilities for collective action. A budget that forces constituencies to experience one another as costs will continually weaken the public it is supposed to serve. An additive financial architecture can help our democracy become more stable and resilient through the very act of providing for itself.

Measure for Measure: A Shakespearean Defense of the NYC Tenants’ Rights Movement

by Antonia Marreroย 

On July 16, 2026, Mayor Zohran Mamdani gathered at the historic Tenement Museum alongside housing advocates and organizers to release New York Cityโ€™s landmark Rental Ripoff Report. Shaped by testimony from thousands of working-class New Yorkers during the citywide Rental Ripoff Hearings, the report outlines a package of 23 policy reforms designed to hold negligent repeat-offender landlords accountable, enforce basic housing conditions, and legally recognize tenant unions.

Taking the stage to deliver a powerful address was Antonia Marrero, an organizer with the 196 & 214 Rockaway Parkway Tenant Union and a member of Housing Organizers for Peopleโ€™s Empowerment (HOPE). In a speech invoking Shakespeareโ€™s Measure for Measure, Marrero likened the moral hypocrisy of powerful elites in 17th-century Vienna to the systemic abuses of modern corporate landlords, issuing a ringing call for tenant power, union solidarity, and housing justice.

Following the event, right-wing media outlets troublingly singled out Marreroโ€™s address for mockery, attacking her characterization of evictions as a form of social violence and deriding the press conference as a “freak show.”

We at Money on the Left reject this sensationalized right-wing framing. To claim that displacement, homelessness, and the state-sanctioned removal of families from their homes are anything other than violent is an exercise in bad faith. Eviction is not a neutral transaction; it is a profound act of physical, emotional, and social violence visited upon working communities. Housing is a fundamental human right, tenantsโ€™ rights must be fiercely protected, and tenant organizing remains our strongest defense against predatory landlord harassment.

Below is the full transcript of Antonia Marreroโ€™s speech, published here with her blessing.

Good morning, everyone. My name is Antonia Marrero, and I am thrilled to be a member of HOPE Tenant Union: Housing Organizers for Peopleโ€™s Empowerment. HOPE facilitates tenant unity, HOPE offers civic education, and HOPE insists on the high road, the path of justice and housing for all. I was honored to participate in this yearโ€™s Rental Ripoff Hearings, and I want to thank Michael Tiger, General Counsel of the NYC Department of Consumer and Worker Protection, who listened to my testimony and welcomed my questions with kindness. Mayor Mamdaniโ€™s Rental Ripoff Hearings will echo for generations–the way the lessons of this museum have increasingly resonated for generations.

When I think about HOPE, I think about Shakespeare. In the comedy Measure for Measure–set in Vienna, a city famous for its social housing–the character Isabella talks about the political machine. She says: โ€œ[A]uthority, though it err like others, hath yet a kind of medicine in itself, that skins the vice oโ€™ the top.โ€ Isabella, the novice nun, says: “[K]ings, landlords, bishops, judges, and inspectors, all these powerful figures โ€ฆ are subject to mistakes; but because they have power, their mistakes have little consequences, at least, little consequences to them.”

But Sister Isabella also says: โ€œGo to your bosom; Knock there, and ask your heart what it doth know.โ€ What my heart knows is that we are living in an epic chapter of history. An epic is not a romance, itโ€™s not a melodrama. An epic is the story of a new order. Our city is turning the corner on Tenant Power. When we organize, we win results. The Mamdani Administration is emboldening us so that we no longer tolerate the violence of evictions as a matter of โ€œbusiness as usual.โ€

My landlord owns dozens of buildings, but he is not a steward of public trust. In fact, it is the opposite. Since 2005, I survived three faulty eviction cases. I have lost three friends to eviction, two of whom lived on my floor, and for the past year, our supportive housing neighbors have been dissuaded from joining our tenant union.

But todayโ€™s report shows there is a path forward.

I am grateful for Mayor Mamdaniโ€™s leadership, the commitment to improving our housing quality and holding โ€œlow roadโ€ landlords accountable, and the commitment to having tenant leaders — not just real estate leaders — at the decision-making table. Mayor Mamdaniโ€™s Rental Ripoff Hearings will be remembered in the Book of Lady Liberty, whose torch beacons the homeless, the tempest-tost, to our shores, so the greatest cosmopolis of interdependent neighborhoods that the world has ever known will set a new standard of what humanity can achieve when we prioritize collaboration over dominion, when we prioritize love over profit.

See a video of the full press conference here.

Euthanize the Rentier: Seven Steps to Democratic Renewal

By Will Beaman

John Maynard Keynes’s call for the “euthanasia of the rentier” has long occupied an uneasy place on the left. In the decades after World War II, as a domesticated “bastard Keynesianism” became part of Cold War economic governance, the phrase often came to symbolize an idealist hope that class antagonism could be managed away through lower interest rates and expert macroeconomic policy. Yet Keynes’s metaphor permits a more capacious program than interest-rate management alone. Read today, amid the renewed possibility of left governance after Trump, the “euthanasia of the rentier” can be taken up as a deeper provocation. Rather than asking how to protect democracy from finance, we must ask how to redesign finance so that democratic commitments become the highest-priority promises in the system.
ย 
Today, promises to private creditors are treated as inviolable while democratic commitmentsโ€”to employment, education, housing, public health, reparations, libraries, and ecological repairโ€”are treated as mere aspirations to be fulfilled only sometimes as discretionary expenditures.
ย 
Euthanizing the rentier begins with inverting this hierarchy. Private financial claims should remain enforceable only insofar as they do not undermine the standing promises a democracy makes to the people it governs. And that means giving democratic commitments institutional form.
ย 
Reparations should be recognized by central banking and public finance institutions as a permanent public obligation capable of capitalizing the institutions charged with carrying it out.
ย 
Libraries, schools, and guaranteed employment should be recognized as productive public assets rather than accounting costs. Public balance sheets should be organized around expanding democratic capacity instead of maximizing returns to creditors. What does this mean concretely and institutionally?
ย 
First, it means establishing a hierarchy of public promises. Employment, housing, health, education, climate obligations, reparations, and basic public services become primary public commitments. When private financial promises conflict with this, they’re restructured and/or written off completely.
ย 
Second, it means turning democratic obligations into financeable public assets. Law should authorize institutions to record the capacities that reparations, the right to a job, etc. create as durable public assets and to issue claims against the continuing public commitment to maintain them.
ย 
Third, changing central bank collateral rules. Central banks should accept bonds and obligations issued for democratically authorized purposes, purchase them directly or through public intermediaries, and provide permanent refinancing facilities. Private investors should have no role to play.
ย 
Fourth, it means building public balance sheet institutions wherever it’s possible. Public banks, reparations trusts, employment authorities, housing funds, and municipal finance facilities should be empowered to hold public assets, issue promises of their own and collateralize public commitments.
ย 
Fifth, cut out bond markets. There are other ways to tell if an investment is sustainable than if it makes money for a rich person. Charter public banks and have them purchase bonds and deposit interests in public coffers like Money on the Left‘s “Seattle Loop” plan.

Sixth, formalize the breaking of creditor power by making creditor claims revisable by design rather than only during emergencies.

Lastly (seventhly), reform public accounting. Fiscal rules should measure whether spending creates and sustains real capacities, rather than treating all public outlays as costs. Record jobs, functioning institutions, public knowledge, and social stability as assets and capacities, not as costs.

In summary, euthanizing the rentier should prompt a constitutional reordering of public finance: Democratic commitments must be formalized as durable claims on the state, institutions must be created to carry and refinance those claims, and private creditors must lose the power to decide whether those promises are affordable.

Weird Epistemologies of Money and Trust in Fitzgerald, Ford, and Larsen; or, Isnโ€™t Money Weird?

By Rob Hawkes

What follows is a slightly expanded version of a talk I gave at the โ€˜Weird Modernismsโ€™ conference at Loughborough University, UK (1-4 July 2026), a collaboration between the UK-based British Association for Modernist Studies (BAMS) and the US-based Modernist Studies Association (MSA). โ€˜Weird Modernismsโ€™ brought over 400 delegates together in the midst of an escalating crisis in the UKโ€™s higher education sector (UKHE), which has seen multiple course closures, departmental restructures, and over 30,000 job losses in the last 3 years. Around the world, many academics face similar threats and much worse, and yet, at a time of rising authoritarianism and ecological breakdown, the critical capacity to think beyond the status quo that universities exist to foster and expand could not be more vital. My acute frustration with the โ€˜shrinkingโ€™ of UKHE[1] is that it is driven by a disastrous funding model designed according to the logic of what I describe in my recent writing as the โ€˜private money paradigmโ€™.[2] As Scott Ferguson and I wrote last year, the private money paradigm:

upholds the backwards idea not only that fiscal outlays merely recycle private pounds, but also that the public good is somehow a burdensome drain on scarce public resources. The result pits communities against one another in a struggle over limited finances and frequently does so along conspicuously classed, gendered, and racialised lines.[3]

As I hope to demonstrate in this essay, however, money is much weirder and more capacious than the austere and exclusionary monetary politics thatโ€™s now threatening the future of our universities (and much more besides) will ever allow.

At โ€˜Weird Modernismsโ€™, I shared these thoughts during a panel on โ€˜Weird Epistemologiesโ€™, chaired by Ruth Clemens and also featuring brilliant presentations by Anna Dijkstra and Graham Borland. My essay considers three modernist writers whose works are centrally concerned with sexual, racial, and classed forms of passing. In F. Scott Fitzgeraldโ€™s The Great Gatsby (1925), we learn of the transformation of โ€˜Mr Nobody from Nowhereโ€™ Jimmy Gatz into Jay Gatsby, a transgression of class boundaries that takes place in a novel where several characters, including the narrator, may also be straight-passing queer people.[4] In Nella Larsenโ€™s Passing (1929), Clare Kendry, a light-skinned African American woman, passes so successfully for a white person that even her racist husband is unaware of her background, and, in Ford Madox Fordโ€™s The Rash Act (1933), Henry Martin Aluin Smith, an American who has been bankrupted by the Wall Street Crash, and Henry Monckton Allard Smith, a British millionaire, switch places after both plan to commit suicide on the same day. Thus, all of these texts feature characters who assume, perform, or inhabit identities that may be regarded as deceptive, fraudulent, or fake. Nevertheless, each novel also complicates the epistemological basis on which these performed selves might be understood to be straightforwardly โ€˜falseโ€™ (or indeed โ€˜trueโ€™). Building on the claim recently advanced by the Money on the Left editorial collective that โ€˜money is queerโ€™, this essay adds the analogous observation that money is weird.[5] Here, I argue that Fitzgeraldโ€™s, Fordโ€™s, and Larsenโ€™s characters encapsulate and express moneyโ€™s epistemological weirdness, due in part to the way their performances both problematise and depend upon trust. Thus, while financial circumstances appear both to drive and facilitate the deceptive acts of Jay Gatsby, Clare Kendry, and Henry Martin Aluin Smith, they also point towards what I describe elsewhere as the โ€˜(un)conditional opennessโ€™ without which neither monetary tokens nor experimental novels could do the weird things they do in and to our worlds.[6]

Before I say more about the three novels already mentioned, I want to go back to the book Iโ€™ve probably thought more about than any other in the last quarter of a century. As it happens, I gave my first ever academic conference paper almost twenty years ago, in September 2006, at the University of Birmingham. At that conference, I considered Ford Madox Fordโ€™s The Good Soldier, beginning with this passage:

For who in this world can give anyone a character? Who in this world knows anything of any other heartโ€”or of his own? I don’t mean to say that one cannot form an average estimate of the way a person will behave. But one cannot be certain of the way any man will behave in every caseโ€”and until one can do that a โ€œcharacterโ€ is of no use to anyone.[7]

Two decades later, I continue to find this an endlessly fascinating moment in John Dowellโ€™s narrative and I think the reason for this is its epistemological weirdness. Famously, The Good Soldier is obsessed with the problem of knowing: can we really know other people? Did Dowell ever truly know the real Edward Ashburnham (the supposed โ€˜good soldierโ€™ of the novelโ€™s title)? In Fordโ€™s hands these questions also attain a metatextual dimension: what is the point of writing novels if we cannot know the characters that inhabit them?[8] Indeed, this points towards two ideas that are in productive tension throughout modernist fiction: a profound sense of the textuality of the self, its construction in discourse and its shifting unknowability, alongside the modernist commitment to descending deeper into the self than ever before, as exemplified by the development of the stream-of-consciousness technique.

It is with this tension in mind that I turn to Fordโ€™s 1933 novel The Rash Act. Prior to its publication, Ford described The Rash Act as: โ€˜the beginning of a trilogy that is meant to do for the post-war world and the Crisis what the Tietjens tetralogy [better known as Paradeโ€™s End] did for the warโ€™.[9] So, for Ford at least, The Rash Act was up there with one of his very best works and it was also very specifically about โ€˜the Crisisโ€™ (in other words, the Wall Street Crash of 1929 and the Great Depression that followed). Like Paradeโ€™s End, The Rash Act is a time-shifted, impressionist, and fragmented narrative which makes extensive use of free-indirect style. In another sense, however, The Rash Act is a quite simple prince-and-pauper fairy-tale in which Henry Martin, a โ€˜down-and-outโ€™ American, and the British millionaire Henry Monckton exchange identities after both attempt the rash act of suicide.[10] While Hugh succeeds in killing himself, Henry fails, but sustains a blow to his face which (along with the fact that the two look very similar) enables him to assume the otherโ€™s identity. This is from the moment just after Henry Martinโ€™s failed suicide attempt:

A voice said:
โ€˜This is Monsieur Monckton Smeez. . . .โ€™
Another:
โ€˜Vous ne le dites pas! . . . You donโ€™t say! I wish I had his money. But not at the moment his face.โ€™ […]
If he wasnโ€™t at the bottom of the Mediterranean he was at the side of a road under some plane trees and he had changed his identity.[11]

So, immediately upon being mistaken for Hugh Monkton, Henry is thinking in terms of changing his identity and money is already part of the equation.

Henry Martin writhed. […] He tried to say:
โ€˜You must not say that.โ€™ But they were binding his jaw over his head with a lint bandage. . . . After all he had wished to be Hugh Monckton. Now he was.[12]

This refers the reader back to a scene earlier in the book, when the two men meet for the first time in a Provenรงal nightclub and Henry experiences an intense desire to switch places with Hugh. However, beyond the fantasy of trading places that the novel appears to offer, it also asks typically weird modernist questions about identity and the self: two important markers of Hugh Moncktonโ€™s identity here are his money and a facial scar that he acquired during the First World War. During the course of his failed suicide attempt, Henry sustains a similar injury and is thus mistaken for Hugh. If he gets his money and also gets his scar, does this transform Henry into Hugh?

Nella Larsenโ€™s Passing, like The Rash Act, is a fragmented modernist narrative containing hermeneutic gaps, time-shifts, multiple ambiguities, and epistemological uncertainties. Ittells the story of two African American women, Clare Kendry and Irene Redfield, both of whom are light-skinned enough to pass for white. While Irene only passes occasionally, Clare is married to a wealthy white supremacist who does not know and would not take kindly to knowing that she has, in the novelโ€™s own terms, quote-unquote โ€˜Negro bloodโ€™.[13] Importantly, Clare, we learn, started passing in the first place to escape from poverty as well as from racism and so, like The Rash Act, Passing centres on a character who is motivated by money to take on or create a new identity. This is from the second chapter of Passing, as Irene and Clare discuss the topic of โ€˜passingโ€™ for white:

โ€œTell me, honestly, havenโ€™t you ever thought of โ€˜passingโ€™?โ€
Irene answered promptly: โ€œNo. Why should I?โ€ And […] hastened to add: โ€œYou see, Clare, Iโ€™ve everything I want. Except, perhaps, a little more money.โ€
At that Clare laughed […]. โ€œOf course,โ€ she declared, โ€œthatโ€™s what everybody wants, just a little more money, even the people who have it. And I must say I donโ€™t blame them. Moneyโ€™s awfully nice to have. In fact, all things considered, I think, โ€™Rene, that itโ€™s even worth the price.โ€[14]

Here, Larsen makes a very direct link between passing and money. The act of passing has apparently enabled Clare to get all that she wants in life (โ€˜what everybody wantsโ€™) but it also entails a cost: โ€˜all things considered […] itโ€™s even worth the priceโ€™. But, once again, there is also a sense that passing destabilises the categories and the hierarchies that both race and money have hitherto functioned to hold in place. Both novels, therefore, explore identities as discursively constructed, performed, and open to negotiation, contestation, and creative reimagining, while also placing money at the centre of their narratives of passing.

This essay is titled โ€˜Weird Epistemologies of Money and Trustโ€™ and there is, perhaps, an obvious sense in which the novels discussed so far raise questions to do with trust and/or trickery, given their concentration on characters who โ€˜pretendโ€™ to be people other than their โ€˜trueโ€™ selves. However, I would argue that, where questions of money and trust are concerned, these stories are about more than fraudulent and deceptive central characters. As I mentioned earlier, my recent work has made a distinction between the โ€˜private money paradigmโ€™ of mainstream discourse and the โ€˜public money paradigmโ€™, which my fellow members of the Money on the Left Editorial Collective and I advance in our writing and our activism. The private money paradigm dominates orthodox economic thought, teaching, and rhetoric as well as framing our political debates (see for example, the idea that a new Prime Minister needs the permission of โ€˜the marketsโ€™ to act in the public interest).[15] It insists that money originates in private exchange, that it is finite, scarce, and that โ€˜difficult decisionsโ€™ about who to exclude and marginalise must always be made according to the rules of โ€˜budget responsibilityโ€™.

This narrative of privation, limitation, and zero-sum binary choices is embedded in the transactional logic of exchange that we can trace back at least as far as Adam Smithโ€™s infamous claim that there is โ€˜a certain propensity in human nature […] to truck, barter, and exchange one thing for anotherโ€™.[16] And, indeed, despite there being no historical or anthropological evidence to support this view, most economics textbooks continue to explain that money is a โ€˜medium of exchangeโ€™ that emerged as a solution to the โ€˜double-coincidence-of-wants problemโ€™ of barter.[17] This, for example, is from Case, Fair, and Osterโ€™s widely-used Principles of Economics:

A barter system requires a double coincidence of wants for trade to take place. […] Some agreed-to medium of exchange […] neatly eliminates the double-coincidence-of-wants problem. […] Money is a lubricant in the functioning of a market economy.[18]

We can only speculate as to why the language of lubrication is so pervasive in economic writing, but it is echoed in Robert Putnamโ€™s influential Bowling Alone: The Collapse and Revival of American Community, where it is also associated with the concept of trust:

A society that relies on generalized reciprocity is more efficient than a distrustful society, for the same reason that money is more efficient than barter. Honesty and trust lubricate the inevitable frictions of social life.[19]

This is just one instance of a pervasive trend in the scholarly discourse on trust, which Iโ€™ve been tracing across a number of disciplines for quite some years now, and which frequently frames trusting in transactional terms as, if you like, a kind of barter system: Iโ€™ll trust you if you trust me back; Iโ€™ll trust you if I can be certain you wonโ€™t double cross me.[20] Here is another, even more recent, example from Philippa Ryanโ€™s Trust and Distrust in Digital Economies (2019): โ€˜Trust has proven to be integral to economic development and human security, because trust is central to exchangeโ€™.[21] My contention in all of this is that strategic, transactional, or, indeed, โ€˜calculative trustโ€™ is not trust at all;[22] and that a much better way to understand the concept is to think of it in terms of the openness to the other that Derek Attridge describes as essential to โ€˜responsible readingโ€™.[23] Indeed, as Iโ€™ve previously put it, the โ€˜openness to newness, strangeness, and othernessโ€™ (a list to which we might also add weirdness) that is โ€˜fostered and demanded by experimental fictionโ€™ (and, indeed, other works of art) is much closer than we usually think to the trust inherent in the acts of using and creating money, which entail both performative promises to pay and collective acknowledgements of interdependence: IOU or, rather, we owe one another.[24]

For the purposes of this essay, what I want to highlight is that, while there is a way of reading both The Rash Act and Passing as stories in which identities are exchanged in barter-like transactions โ€“ Henry for Hugh (which, incidentally, is the title of the 1934 sequel to The Rash Act),[25] and African American for white โ€“ and while this reading might also foreground the idea of trust โ€“ other characters must trust that Henry is Hugh or that Clare is white to enable them to pass โ€“ such interpretations would miss important aspects of these texts. Indeed, from our perspective at Money on the Left, the weird epistemologies and malleabilities that we find in modernist texts, when it comes to questions of identity and selfhood, are neither separate nor separable from public moneyโ€™s always-already ungraspable, capacious, and open-ended weirdness. So, however tempting it may be to conclude that, although Passing and The Rash Act complicate fixed ideas about identities โ€“ presenting them as shifting, ambiguous, and discursively constructed โ€“ they perpetuate an orthodox understanding of money as a realm of transactional zero-sum exchange, my colleagues at Money on the Left and I would say โ€˜whoa, hold on!โ€™

As I mentioned at the beginning, at MotL we have been affirming for some time now that โ€˜money is queerโ€™. As Scott Ferguson explains in his 2025 article โ€˜Analog Critique; or, Isnโ€™t Money Queer?โ€™:

By this, we mean not only that public money should be mobilized to serve LGBTQ2+ communities, but more profoundly that money as a social medium is never as straight or alienating as it feigns to be. Like language, moneyโ€™s many words, sights, sounds, smells and feels never communicate exactly what they intend.[26]

Even more recently, Lea Steininger has added, in an article published just a couple of months ago (and which I heartily recommend):

Just as sexual/gender identities are not fixed but constructed through discourse and power, so too are economic goods and services not stable, preexisting entities. [… M]oney itself is queer in the sense that it embodies polyvalent and contestable public structures and performances, which cannot be reduced to the narrow definitions offered by dominant economic ideologies.[27]

My contention here is that the weird epistemologies that we find in modernist fiction can help us to โ€˜think queerlyโ€™ about money in a number of important ways. Moreover, if it is better understood as (un)conditional openness, and not as calculative exchange, then the trust involved both in reading modernist novels and in creating money is much weirder than we may hitherto have recognised. The recent celebration of weird modernisms in Loughborough, then, demands to be recognised not just as an expression of the weird obsessions of weird scholars, but as academia fulfilling what Stefan Collini has called its โ€˜governing purposeโ€™, that of โ€˜extending human understanding through open-ended enquiryโ€™.[28] As โ€˜choreographers of creditโ€™, trust, and openness to newness, strangeness, and otherness, universities foster the very weirdness that the private money paradigm consistently fails to recognise, comprehend, or value.[29]

At the 2024 BAMS conference in Leeds, Scott Ferguson and I presented a paper on The Great Gatsby which we have since developed into a book chapter that came out in April this year in a volume titled Inflationary Modernities, edited by Wayne Stables and Kieran Brown.[30] In that chapter, we discuss this moment, when Nick meets Gatsby for the first time:

He smiled understandingly […]. It was one of those rare smiles […] that you may come across four or five times in life. […] It understood you just so far as you wanted to be understood, believed in you as you would like to believe in yourself, and assured you that it had precisely the impression of you that, at your best, you hoped to convey. Precisely at that point it vanished โ€“ and I was looking at an elegant young roughneck, a year or two over thirty, whose elaborate formality of speech just missed being absurd.[31]

Returning to this passage in preparation for โ€˜Weird Modernismsโ€™, I was struck once again by the way it exemplifies what Scott and I have described as Fitzgeraldโ€™s method of โ€˜impressionist accountingโ€™.[32] Nickโ€™s idea of Gatsby here wavers and blurs before his eyes so that, again, this is not simply a matter of โ€˜elegant young roughneckโ€™ Jimmy Gatz pretending to be the extravagant party host Jay Gatsby. Instead, Gatsby complicates and queers (or perhaps I should say weirds) orthodox understandings of gendered, raced, classed, and sexual identity while also offering glimpses beyond the private money paradigmโ€™s austere logic of exclusionary violence.

The image at the top of this essay is the โ€˜Weird Prideโ€™ flag, co-created in 2021 by autistic writers, advocates, and community organisers Fergus Murray andย  Quinn Dexter for the first Weird Pride Day (March 4th), โ€˜a day for people to embrace their weirdness, and reject the stigma associated with being weirdโ€™.[33]ย In Murrayโ€™s words: โ€˜Creativity is driven by divergent perspectives, and squashed by demands for conformity.โ€™[34] To conclude, then, I want to turn to the words of the neuroqueer theorist Nick Walker and to affirm that, by embracing what Walker calls โ€˜beautiful weirdnessโ€™, we can open up new possibilities not only for rejecting normative attitudes to identity but also for jettisoning the economic orthodoxies embedded in the private money paradigm. I suspect that every delegate at the โ€˜Weird Modernismsโ€™ conference was there because at some point in the past theyโ€™d been willing to approach the beautiful weirdness of modernist art with an attitude of openness and trust. As Walker explains:

[A]nyone can liberate themselves from the strictures of normativity. The already neurodivergent can reconnect with, and cultivate previously suppressed or undeveloped capacities, in order to more fully manifest their potentials for beautiful weirdness, and those whom we call neurotypicals are just potential neuroqueer mutant comrades who havenโ€™t yet woken up and figured out how to unzip their normal-person suits.[35]

My hope is that by embracing weird modernisms and by affirming, not only that money is queer but also that money is weirder than the austerity mindset thatโ€™s currently doing its utmost to destroy our universities, and indeed our planet, will ever be able to appreciate or contain, we can build a postnormal, inclusive and sustainable world and unzip our โ€˜normal-person suitsโ€™ (along with our normal-person monetary imaginations) together.


[1] I refer here to QMUCUโ€™s indispensable โ€˜UK HE Shrinkingโ€™ webpage: https://qmucu.org/qmul-transformation/uk-he-shrinking/

[2] See, for example, Rob Hawkes and Scott Ferguson, โ€˜Green-Lighting Gatsby: Austere Modernisms, Exuberant Avant-Gardes, and their Orgastic Futuresโ€™, in Inflationary Modernities: Literature, Culture, and Economy, ed. Wayne Stables and Kieran Brown (Palgrave Macmillan, 2026), 21-47; and Rob Hawkes, โ€˜โ€œToo paranoid for you?โ€: Suspicion, Trust and (Post/Meta?)Modern Money in Thomas Pynchonโ€™s Bleeding Edgeโ€™, in Dis/Trusting the Digital World in Imaginative Literature, ed. Adam Kelly and Katerina Pavlidi (Edinburgh University Press, 2026), 185-204.

[3] Rob Hawkes and Scott Ferguson, โ€˜UK Universities in Crisis? Time to Transform Higher Ed Financeโ€™, Money on the Left, 16 January 2025: https://moneyontheleft.org/2025/01/16/uk-universities-in-crisis-time-to-transform-higher-ed-finance/

[4] F. Scott Fitzgerald, The Great Gatsby [1925] (Penguin,1990), 123.

[5] Scott Ferguson, โ€˜Analog Critique; or, Isnโ€™t Money Queer?โ€™, Public Culture 37.1 (2025), 86.

[6] Rob Hawkes, โ€˜(Un)conditional Openness: Towards a Neochartalist Theory of Money and Trustโ€™, Money on the Left: History, Theory, Practice 1.1 (2025), 1-42. See also Rob Hawkes, Scott Ferguson, and Will Beaman, โ€˜(Un)conditional Openness: Towards a Neochartalist Theory of Money and Trustโ€™, Money on the Left, 4 July 2025: https://moneyontheleft.org/2025/07/04/unconditional-openness-towards-a-neochartalist-theory-of-money-and-trust-2/

[7] Ford Madox Ford, The Good Soldier, ed. Martin Stannard (Norton, 2012), 105-8.

[8] My first academic conference paper subsequently developed into my first academic publication, which was on this very topic. See Rob Hawkes, โ€˜Personalities of Paper: Characterisation in A Call and The Good Soldier โ€™, in Ford Madox Ford: Literary Networks and Cultural Transformations, ed. Andrzej Gasiorek and Daniel Moore (Rodopi, 2008), 43-60.

[9] Ford Madox Ford, letter to Ray Long, 2 July 1932, Letters of Ford Madox Ford, ed. Richard M. Ludwig (Princeton University Press, 1965), 208.

[10] Ford Madox Ford, The Rash Act [1933] (Carcanet, 1982), 74. For further discussion of this fascinating novel, see Rob Hawkes, โ€˜Trusting in Provence: Financial Crisis in The Rash Act and Henry for Hughโ€™, in Ford Madox Ford, France and Provence, ed. Dominique Lemarchal and Claire Davison-Pรฉgon (Rodopi, 2011), 229-42; and โ€˜Bogus Modernism: Impersonation, Deception and Trust in Ford Madox Ford and Evelyn Waughโ€™, in Reconnecting Aestheticism and Modernism: Continuities, Revisions, Speculations, ed. Bรฉnรฉdicte Coste, Catherine Delyfer, and Christine Reynier (Routledge, 2017), 175-86.

[11] Ford, The Rash Act, 212.

[12] Ford, The Rash Act, 211-12.

[13] Nella Larsen, Passing [1929], in Quicksand and Passing (Serpentโ€™s Tail, 2014), 158.

[14] Larsen, Passing, 160.

[15] โ€˜Andy Burnham would enter Downing Street already โ€œboxed inโ€ by financial marketsโ€™ according to a recent piece in the Guardian by Alex Daniel: โ€˜โ€œWalking a tightropeโ€: Burnhamโ€™s borrowing plans clash with fiscal realitiesโ€™, Guardian, 24 June 2026: https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2026/jun/24/walking-a-tightrope-andy-burnham-borrowing-clash-fiscal-realities

[16] Adam Smith, The Wealth of Nations [1776] (Penguin, 1999), 116.

[17] Karl E. Case, Ray C. Fair, and Sharon M. Oster, Principles of Economics, 10th edn. (Prentice Hall, 2012), 502.

[18] Case et al., Principles of Economics, 502.

[19] Robert D. Putnam, Bowling Alone: The Collapse and Revival of American Community (Simon and Schuster, 2000), 135.

[20] See Hawkes, โ€˜(Un)conditional Opennessโ€™; and Hawkes, โ€˜โ€œToo paranoid for you?โ€โ€™ for detailed discussions of these issues.

[21] Philippa Ryan, Trust and Distrust in Digital Economies (Routledge, 2019), 3.

[22] According to Laura Poppo, Kevin Zheng Zhou and Julie J. Li, calculative trust โ€˜informs expectations by deliberately and rationally assessing forward-looking conditionsโ€™ and โ€˜hinges on the relative values of cheating […] and cooperationโ€™. Poppo et al., โ€˜When Can You Trust โ€œTrustโ€? Calculative Trust, Relational Trust, and Supplier Performanceโ€™, Strategic Management Journal 37.4 (2016): 725, 724.

[23] See Derek Attridge, The Singularity of Literature (Routledge, 2004).

[24] Rob Hawkes, โ€˜How can novels help us think about money… and maybe even save the planet?โ€™, Money on the Left, 26 February 2024: https://moneyontheleft.org/2024/02/26/how-can-novels-help-us-think-about-money-and-maybe-even-save-the-planetguest-lecture/

[25] Ford Madox Ford, Henry for Hugh (J.B. Lippincott, 1934).

[26] Ferguson, โ€˜Analog Critiqueโ€™, 86.

[27] L. E. Steininger, โ€˜Against inflation: queer-feminist monetary (and price) theoryโ€™, Review of International Political Economy (2026), 18.

[28] Stefan Collini, What Are Universities For? (Penguin, 2012), 91.

[29] Scott Ferguson, Benjamin Wilson, William Saas, and Maxximilian Seijo, โ€˜Overcoming COVID-19 Requires Rethinking University Finance,โ€™ b2o (2020): https://www.boundary2.org/2020/07/scott-ferguson-benjamin-wilson-william-saas-maxximilian-seijo-overcoming-covid-19-requires-rethinking-university-finance/

[30] Hawkes and Ferguson, โ€˜Green-Lighting Gatsbyโ€™, 21-47.

[31] Fitzgerald, The Great Gatsby, 49.

[32] Hawkes and Ferguson, โ€˜Green-Lighting Gatsbyโ€™, 33-6.

[33] Weird Pride Day (n.d): https://weirdpride.day/

[34] Stimpunks Foundation, โ€˜Weirdโ€™ (n.d.): https://stimpunks.org/glossary/weird/

[35] Nick Walker, Neuroqueer Heresies: Notes on the Neurodiversity Paradigm, Autistic Empowerment, and Postnormal Possibilities (Autonomous Press, 2021), 190.

(Itโ€™s Not) All About Olivia: A Study in Citations, Retroactive & Otherwise

by Jonathan Haynes

A different girl now, but thereโ€™s nothing new

โ€” Olivia Rodrigo, โ€œdรฉjร  vuโ€ (written by Olivia Rodrigo, Daniel Nigro, Taylor Swift, Jack Antonoff & St. Vincent, and everybodyโ€™s team)

The Taylor Swiftโ€“Olivia Rodrigo โ€œfeudโ€ is bullshit. It makes me angry โ€” and, Iโ€™ll admit, it breaks my heart โ€” to watch the Livies and the Swifties snipe at each other online. And it frustrates me that every Olivia profiler has to circle back to it, when somehow Swift never gets asked the same question, yet lives by its terms to the degree that her last album often plays like a hymn to a certain celebrity football playerโ€™s[1] phallus.[2] I know parasocial investment can be real and even nourishing. But this particular mystery is doing harm. Itโ€™s not how art works. It is, depressingly, how oligarchic neoliberalism works.

The story the culture wants to tell about Olivia Rodrigo and Taylor Swift is All About Eve (Joseph L. Mankiewicz, 1950): the adoring ingรฉnue who studies the star, learns her moves, and then slips the knife in. And the aging star, watching it happen, curdling into vindictiveness as the protรฉgรฉe takes what was hers. Itโ€™s an irresistible script because it gives everyone a villain to choose. Either Rodrigo, a self-proclaimed Swifty from early childhood on, is Eve Harrington โ€” the thief, borrowing too much and calling it homage, who echoed Swiftโ€™s โ€œCruel Summerโ€ on โ€œdรฉjร  vuโ€ closely enough that Swiftโ€™s camp landed a retroactive writing credit to the tune of millions of dollars โ€” or Swift is Margo Channing at her most petty, the elder star so threatened by her younger (self) that she has to litigate a credit. And itโ€™s a stupid bind, because the script only offers those two roles, jealous predator or past-her-prime grudge-holder. The more honest story โ€” the one the All About Eve, Taylor vs. Olivia mythology obscures from us โ€” is lineage.[3]

Call it the Catfight Economy[4], and grant right away that the diagnosis isnโ€™t mine โ€” critics have been describing this for years, and the manufactured rivalry has a whole literature behind it (and about it; among many other works, Brian De Palmaโ€™s 2012 film Passion also tells the All About Eve story, via Persona [Ingmar Bergman 1966] and Mulholland Drive [Lynch 2000]). To summarize: two successful women cannot share a professional space without one of them being a threat to the other. The press supplies the frame, the fans supply the labor, the platforms supply the distribution, and that leaves two artists narrated into a fight neither one started, so far as any human who doesnโ€™t actually know them personally knows. And surely their friends donโ€™t even know, really, whether or not Swift and Rodrigo are โ€œfrostyโ€ in real life.

What interests me is less the mechanism than its ideology: the things the Catfight Economy quietly trains us to believe. It teaches that influence is theft, that admiration is weakness, that producing art is powerful and receiving art is debt (I fully intend the sexual resonances there). That there is only ever one musical chair and the other woman is already sitting in it. It is a scarcity story dressed as gossip.

The machine is not exclusively aimed at women. Pop has always run on manufactured antagonism, Beatles versus Stones, Beach Boys versus Beatles, Blur versus Oasis, Biggie versus Pac. But the menโ€™s versions tend to read as competition between equals, a sport with two champions, even a spur to better work. Consider the Kendrickโ€“Drake cage match of 2024, which also managed to steal the spotlight from the quiet revolution surfacing at that yearโ€™s Grammys, where six of the eight Album of the Year nominees were women, including Rodrigo and Swift (the eventual winner โ€“ Iโ€™m still throwing beers at the screen that told me Midnights beat GUTS), a changing of the guard that held the stage about as long as it took two megalomaniacal, multi-millionaire assholes to start calling each other domestic abusers and pedophiles in public (I love much of the work of both of them). America crowned Kendrick Lamar the winner of the Drake battle-to-the-death the following year, when a hundred million people, both in the bleachers and at home, sang along as he hurled a blistering insult at his former collaborator at the Super Bowl.[5]

A metaphor for America in general in 2024, I guess.

When turned on women, the same machine sours[6]: the rivalry curdles into a catfight, and only one of them is allowed to survive it. A field with room for only one is a field that never has to take womenโ€™s art seriously as a tradition.

Consider the blows Swift absorbed to clear the commercial ground Rodrigo now shares with her. She came up through the Nashville songwriting machine as a teenage girl who had to have the best idea in the room just to be heard by professionals twice her age.[7] She spent years as a target of an online abuse campaign that ran through Kanye West and the people around him. And in 2019 she watched the masters to her first six albums get sold out from under her when Big Machine was acquired by Scooter Braun โ€” who had managed West for years โ€” an event that crystallized, in public and at her expense, exactly how little her little girl selfโ€™s signature on a contract was worth. Each of these events is also a Catfight Economy event in its way: each got covered as drama, as personality, as Taylor-being-Taylor, when each was actually structural โ€” a girl up against an industry built to extract from her.

Rodrigoโ€™s generation negotiated in the shadow of that lesson. Where Swift had to re-record her own catalogue to reclaim it โ€” Taylorโ€™s Version โ€” Rodrigo and peers like Chappell Roan entered an industry where creative control had become a thing a young woman could think to ask for, because they had all just watched the cost of not asking. There will never need to be a GUTS (Oliviaโ€™s Version). That absence is Swiftโ€™s bequest. This is the inheritance the rivalry frame canโ€™t see: the older artistโ€™s losses became the younger artistโ€™s terms.

Which is what makes the recently announced Daisy Chain Fields concert so important. The festival Rodrigo founded is something more than a festival and more than a tribute to the Lilith Fair; it is the Catfight Economyโ€™s exact inverse, built on purpose. Where the Catfight Economy profits by pitting women against each other, Daisy Chain Fields is dedicated โ€” in Rodrigoโ€™s own words[8] โ€” to the belief that โ€œjoy, community, and creativity can inspire meaningful change,โ€ celebrating the voices, artistry, and contributions of women in music. Where the Catfight Economy extracts value from women and routes it to platforms and press, Daisy Chain Fields routes its net proceeds outward, to nonprofits advancing and advocating for women and girls. Where the Catfight Economy insists inspiration and curiosity must harden into competition, the mission statement insists on โ€œknowledge, strength, and action.โ€ It closes on an image that is Oliviaโ€™s whole argument in one line โ€” daisies are โ€œwild and beautiful,โ€ and โ€œas a chain they are strong and unbreakable.โ€

Seen this way, Rodrigoโ€™s so-called evasiveness about Swift in interviews[9] stops looking like coldness and starts looking like intellectual consistency. She has been on the record about hating the manufactured-feud framing, and her refusal to feed it is the same gesture as the festival: a person who has built an explicit stand against the Catfight Economy is not going to step into its oldest set piece on cue.

So the mythology gets it backward. All About Eve is a story about a theater with one dressing room and one star, where the only way up is to displace the woman already standing in the spotlight. Eve doesnโ€™t want to make her own work, she wants Margoโ€™s part, Margoโ€™s audience, Margoโ€™s life. That is the only plot the Catfight Economy knows how to run, and it is the plot it keeps trying to cast Rodrigo into. Swift, more than anyone, knows it, and she has spent a career writing it (among millions of other things) down. โ€œClara Bow,โ€ the closing song on The Tortured Poets Department (2024), is the It-girl assembly line set to music: the industryโ€™s eye slides from Clara Bow to Stevie Nicks to, in the final verse, Taylor Swift herself, each new arrival told sheโ€™s the real thing, dazzling, the new god worth worshipping โ€” until the eye moves on to the next one, who has an edge the last one never did. It is Margo Channingโ€™s nightmare written by Margo, the star narrating her own replacement on the same conveyor that carried her in. And believe me, there is a ton of fan and critical speculation that this is one of many Swift songs about Rodrigo, which is so much more than missing the point. Itโ€™s a cruel[10] irony.

Swift is the great chronicler of the trap. But the interesting relationship between these two artists isnโ€™t antagonism, itโ€™s transmission: the elder who took the structural punishment, and the younger who studied the wreckage and wrote her way around it. Rodrigo is rejecting the whole theater and building a field of daisies. Swift sings the cage with unmatched clarity, and thus, somewhat like the Jane Austen of D.A. Millerโ€™s monograph[11], transcends it; Rodrigo, standing on the ground Swift cleared, gets to start dismantling it.


[1] Travis Kelceโ€™s.

[2] Taylor Swift, โ€œWood,โ€ The Life of a Showgirl, Republic Records, 2025.

[3]A caveat, because it would be ultra-shitty to let it pass without saying so: getting a retroactive co-write on a song you didnโ€™t write is a graceless thing to accept, and Swift accepted it. But the music business is litigious to its bones, and a young artist is so incentivized to hand over the co-credit and the royalty points rather than prolong the online nastiness that โ€” five years later โ€” it is somehow still a story that Elvis Costello did not sue Olivia Rodrigo. None of which is to claim Swift invented the position she occupies. She has predecessors, obviously, and similar All About Eve stories have been told about Madonna and Mariah Carey many times over. But the lineage Iโ€™m tracing isnโ€™t stylistic, itโ€™s structural โ€” the terms of creative control a young woman can now think to ask for. And the asymmetry of admiration matters: Rodrigo arrived a self-proclaimed Swifty, modeling herself on a songwriter-auteur with total command of her own persona and catalogue. Swift arrived a girl gushing about LeAnn Rimes โ€” herself a teenage phenom, but the inheritance there was a way of singing, by way of Patsy Cline, not a way of owning your work. The bequest I mean is the one Swiftโ€™s own losses created, not the longer history of women in pop, which runs back well beyond her.

[4]I am thinking here of Gloria Steinemโ€™s โ€œCatfight Theory of History,โ€ from an editorial she co-wrote with Eleanor Smeal, president of the Feminist Majority Foundation. The occasion was the release on streaming of Mrs. America, an historical film (TV show? Content thing?) that she believed portrayed the fight for the ERA as a catfight between her and Phyllis Schlafly instead of โ€œa battle between the ERA and economic interests.โ€ (LA Times, โ€œWhy โ€˜Mrs. Americaโ€™ is bad for American women,โ€ July 30, Covid year zero).

[5]โ€œA Minorโ€ is funny and clever. Lamar is also a genius who won a well-deserved Pulitzer Prize. Nonetheless, if I were scoring that Superbowl scene, it would be to โ€œAll the lonely people,โ€ and โ€œEleanor Rigbyโ€ (The Beatles, Revolver, Capital Records, 1966) is in E minor.

[6]Olivia Rodrigo, Sour, Interscope Records, 2021.

[7] See Taylor Swiftโ€™s interview for the NYT project, The 30 Greatest Living Songwriters (2026). Come to think of it, why isnโ€™t Billy Joel on that list? I havenโ€™t checked, but I bet Swift had him on her ballot. And Olivia โ€“ who might have made the list herself had the new one come out before the list dropped โ€“ David Byrne nominated her on his own (citation forthcoming, I know I read that somewhere) โ€“ well, we already know from โ€œdรฉjร  vuโ€ that she was โ€œthe one who taught you Billy Joel.โ€

[8]It could have been her โ€œteam.โ€ What is an author?

[9]See (hear?) the NYT Popcast interview with Rodrigo, in which Joe Coscarelli and Jon Caramanica ask her intelligently designed questions about the โ€œfrostinessโ€ between her and Swift, so that she can redirect without sounding like sheโ€™s hiding something. Good journalism still happens there!

[10]Taylor Swift, โ€œCruel Summer,โ€ Lover, Republic Records, 2019.

[11]Miller, D.A., Jane Austen, or The Secret of Style, Princeton University Press: 2005.

Invisible Republic (With Apologies to Greil Marcus)

By Jonathan Haynes

Given the miserable state of American life generally, here’s a thing that astonishes me. Two of the best homegrown popular artworks I can think of came out recently, within months of each other, are enormously popular, and are political (I beg you to please stay with me here): Olivia Rodrigo’s You Seem Pretty Sad for a Girl So in Love and Paul Thomas Anderson’s One Battle After Another. You could read each as a defiant argument for the humanities. Of course it’s unclear whether the artists know they’re making that argument, or would say so if they knew.

Listen to how they explain how their new works came to be. Anderson (Esquire): โ€œVineland was always going to be too hard to adapt, so I stole the parts that spoke to me and just started running like a thief.โ€ Rodrigo (NYT Popcast): โ€œI was really inspired by this book Simple Passion by Annie Ernaux. She’s having this affair with this person and she’s not quite happy, she’s kind of going insaneโ€ฆ I was really inspired by all of the ways in which love makes you insane and miserable.โ€

Wait. Back up. You guys are reading Ernaux and Pynchon? Like it’s nothing. Like it’s just something that you do. Meanwhile I’m sitting here listening to Pod Save America with a gun in my mouth.

After all, these are quintessential LA artists โ€” Anderson out of the San Fernando Valley, Rodrigo originally out of Temecula โ€” who actually get to make art in an industry town that has lost its industry, as devastatingly and, hopefully not but seemingly permanently, as any coal or steel town lost its in the seventies. Brilliant people with decades of experience at every tier of the entertainment business can’t get jobs at CVS or Target in 2026. (I have a friend like this, a superior researcher and writer with excellent pedagogical skills and a stunning depth of knowledge of movie history and culture. If you’re hiring, DM me and I’ll connect you.). But I’m not making the easy point that PTA and OR are privileged to make the art they want. Sure, they have one-percent lifestyles that buy them room to concentrate, instead of lives frantically lived between DoorDash and Lyft shifts. Nor am I saying I’m just glad they’re using that privilege well, though I obviously do think that. I’m not even really talking about them. I’m talking about the astonishing, vertiginous fact that there exists a massive popular audience for their work โ€” an Invisible Republic, if you will โ€” that consumes it not just avidly but ecstatically.

I’ve never actually cried to an Olivia Rodrigo song. I loved โ€œdrivers licenseโ€ in 2021 because of its stylistic mastery; my initial reaction was exhilaration at the rare aesthetic achievement, and I started thinking about the implied connection to the canon of American rock and roll โ€œcar songs,โ€ including the previous year’s โ€œMurder Most Foul,โ€ Bob Dylan’s masterpiece about the Kennedy assassination. Great bad trip car songs bracketed the pandemic. Dylan’s arrived in the first month of quarantine, when auto-mobility became a deadly thing. Her song came ten months later, amid the first vaccine roll-out, when it felt safer, but still low-key miserable, to drive your car places.

(Here, my ingenious sister-in-law, the novelist Megan Moores, would interrupt: there is plenty of textual evidence You Seem Pretty Sad for a Girl So in Love is about a romance with a guy with just such an emotional deficit who knows all the words to โ€œJust Like Heaven.โ€)

Historically, crying to Olivia Rodrigo songs is the primary mode of engagement with her. There is a TikTok genre dedicated to getting deep in your feelings while listening to her songs. My favorite of those that I’ve seen is the guy with red eyes and dribbling snot blurting out the titles of the songs on the new album that turned him into a sniveling wreck: โ€œFuck you, โ€˜begged.โ€™ Fuck you, โ€˜honeybee.โ€™ Fuck you, โ€˜less.โ€™ Fuck you, โ€˜cigarette smoke.โ€™โ€ Kathleen Hanna of Bikini Kill is on record as having bawled her eyes out hearing โ€œdrivers licenseโ€ for the first time. Right after the song dropped, there was an SNL sketch about gruff guys wearing flannel shirts getting into their feelings in a pool hall. The whole world was gutted by that song, allegedly. I loved it but experienced itโ€ฆdifferently (Dylan, etc.).

But with โ€œhoneybee,โ€ Olivia Rodrigo wrecked me too. She did it out of the blue with a couplet on a song that has gotten some flack for being out of the sonic universe of most of the album. It sounds like a Disney tune, a fair description meant as a criticism, to which I retort, one of the most celebrated American directors of all time just released (on the same day as Olivia’s new album) a blockbuster movie that โ€œdisclosesโ€ that his entire psychic universe โ€” and the universe’s โ€” is organized around โ€œWhen You Wish Upon a Star.โ€ John Lennon closed the turbulent White Album with a song that was explicitly based on Disney music. St. Vincent did a whole album based on that sound and called it Actor. Olivia Rodrigo, now occasional St. Vincent collaborator, began her professional life as a child actor in Disney shows (do your own research).

The couplet:

I hope I never see what your face looks like going

A face I swear that I could spend my whole life knowing

The purity of these lines is astonishing and lifts the album lyrically (whatever you think of Disney songs) into very rarified company. I think Lorenz Hart, at least the one played by Ethan Hawke in the new Linklater film, would have been proud to have written them. At the exact second I was admiring the craft, the eleven-year-old who sobbed at ET knocked me on my ass.

I hope I never see what your face looks like going

A face I swear that I could spend my whole life knowing

I am seeing a lot of faces going these days: my parents’ faces, the childish face of my now-teenage son, my own face.

The mortal irony of this lyric is that if she got her wish, she’d spend her whole life watching this person’s face going.

Fuck you, โ€œhoneybee.โ€

There is another TikTok from a listening party where Rodrigo plays the new album for fans hearing it cold, a live mic resting on her knee. As the chorus of โ€œstupid songโ€ climbs higher than you expect it to go, the room starts leaking into the audio โ€” a gasp, โ€œoh my god,โ€ and then the screaming. Those people weren’t screaming before. The music made them do it. The screams are the flip side of the sobs, and sometimes done simultaneously. And it’s like Dylan โ€” those verses in โ€œMr. Tambourine Manโ€ and โ€œA Hard Rain’s a-Gonna Fallโ€ in which the words just keep piling up and you never know when or where they’re going to land. Allen Ginsberg said everything in Dylan was โ€œcollected into that one column of air coming out of him and the vibration of the sound,โ€ and that fits Olivia Rodrigo even better. And it also fits the climactic One Battle After Another car chase that Scott Ferguson and I worked through on the Money on the Left podcast, Superstructure.

Switched on Pop names the mechanism better than I can: spiraling. On their recent podcast dedicated to You Seem Pretty Sad for a Girl So in Love, the musicologist Nate Sloan hears Rodrigo’s choruses as those coin funnels in children’s museums: you set a penny on its edge and it circles the bowl, faster and tighter as it falls, until it loses its orbit and drops through the hole at the center. The Rodrigo chorus does the same โ€” the line winds and accelerates, as she spins out more and more words and lifts ever higher into her vocal register, until it lands on the title phrase and drops out of motion. โ€œKiss me and I might drop dead.โ€ โ€œI love you more than any stupid song could ever say.โ€ The orbit, then the hole. And it is the same shape Anderson cuts in One Battle After Another: a VistaVision camera with a telephoto lens strapped to the nose of a Dodge Charger, the car running the undulating California hills, the pursuit going on and on over those swells until Chase Infiniti slams on the brakes. Two funnels, two dead stops. And in both cases, a mixed-race girl behind the wheel. Make of that coincidence what you will. I’ll leave that question open, as I imagine that Greil Marcus would.

But the invisible republic that I borrow Marcus’s title to identify is built precisely out of rhymes like that one โ€” uncanny correspondences the culture throws up without being asked, which it falls to criticism only to notice, and to refuse to explain away.

It brings into unwitting communion beleaguered English teachers grading endless piles of AP exams, college students with gender studies degrees graduating into an American void, rock critic Substackers traveling hundreds of miles in The Paranoid Style band tee shirts to see Hamell on Trial in a beloved local music venue that is closing soon (where will we go?), movie-scene-deconstructing 35-year-old YouTubers who can’t get over the color timing in One Battle and issue their manifestos from their parents’ living rooms, lonely denizens of livvieshq on Instagram with โ€œmaggots for brains,โ€ and work from home tech guys with moldy Ph.D.s who spend their days busily feeding their careers into AI tools.

This essay is already piled high with allusions, but I must add one more โ€” George Miller’s masterpiece, Babe: Pig in the City. I’m thinking of the scene – it always makes me sob – when Babe saves the Bull Terrier from drowning and the Bull Terrier says โ€œWhatever the pig says, goesโ€ to all the other animals. And so all of these different species โ€” who are, in some cases, even biologically, instinctively, constitutively driven to hate and fear each other, and in others, to blithely ignore each other โ€” must share the jelly beans. Or everyone starves.

And then they become an army.


UPDATE: 24 hours after the present essay was published, this announcement went out to subscribers from the official Olivia Rodrigo mailing list.

* Note that alphabetical order, asked to do nothing but sort names, quietly places Bikini Kill above some of the biggest stars in the world โ€” including the promoter herself.