The Case for Fiscal Insurgency

by Will Beaman

A common refrain keeps surfacing among prominent journalists- and commentators-in-digital-exile on BlueSky. Commenting on the emergence of yet another shadowy centrist think tank, New York Times columnist Jamelle Bouie observes: โ€œTrumpโ€™s numbers are tanking and there is a palpable desire in the electorate for a real alternative and yet the only money in democratic politics is for doing Starmerism.โ€ Tim Carvell, a writer for Last Week Tonight with John Oliver, notes: โ€œa legacy publication or a deep-pocketed investor could hire an astonishing array of talent right now and make the best newspaper in America overnight.โ€ Ben Collins of The Onion puts it bluntly: โ€œIf youโ€™re rich and not a coward, this is what youโ€™d refer to as a โ€˜market opportunityโ€™โ€ฆ to be a pop of color in a sea of beige will be easier than ever. People will flock to it. You gotta be a little brave, though.โ€

In every case, the structure is the same: capacity is there, but private money says no. Talented organizers, journalists, and public servants are ready. Coalitional energy is real. Democratic desire is present. But political imagination stalls at the threshold of private investment. The assumption that only billionaires or suburban taxpayers can provision democracy has become so entrenched that it is easier to imagine acquiescing to authoritarianism than bypassing this veto.

Such resignation marks the disgrace of our present moment. We live in a democracy with boundless capacity, yet it is held hostageโ€”openly and in bad faithโ€”by private money and the austerity habits it demands. If democracy fails, it will not be because the publicโ€™s appetite was absent, but because we accepted private moneyโ€™s โ€œnoโ€ at face value. Even when the mask has long since slipped, and the idea that โ€œthe marketโ€ demands austerity is a bad joke.

The Neoliberal Habit of Acquiescence

This is the reflex Trump has hijacked. His sabotage of institutions works not only through brute force, but through the learned helplessness that neoliberal governance has drilled into liberals and even leftists for decades. For nearly half a century, Democrats have been told to treat fiscal sabotage as an impersonal eventโ€”something to adapt to, never contest. Capital flight, credit downgrades, and market volatility were cast not as acts of power but as external shocks demanding austerity management. Globalization was pitched in these terms: a sublime, external event beyond human governance, against which the only rational stance was flexibility and humility.

Trump exploits this governing reflex and turns it into spectacle. He models himself on the old specter of the โ€œbond vigilanteโ€: an actor so wealthy and unaccountable that he appears as a force of nature, bending governments to his will. Trump embodies that threat in human form, turning sabotage into a performance of independence. His violations of law and democratic norms are staged not as corruption, but as confirmation that he is beholden to no one.

When Democrats treat this as just another crisis to be managed, they recycle the very habit that neoliberalism instilled: the belief that adaptability in the face of sabotage is the essence of responsible governance. To accept private moneyโ€™s veto is to naturalize political sabotage. What was once presented as adaptation to markets has become collaboration with authoritarianism.

Starmerism & The Private Investment Trap

If neoliberal governance made sabotage appear natural, todayโ€™s Democratic politics takes the lesson even further: it treats Trumpโ€™s bullying as the new horizon of fiscal life. What once appeared as the sublime discipline of โ€œthe marketโ€ has been unmasked as the unbounded whims of an increasingly fascistic group of billionaires, with Trump as their avatar. Yet Democrats continue to orient themselves as if nothing essential has changedโ€”adapting to threats as though they were impersonal shocks, rather than deliberate acts of sabotage.

This is just Starmerism: a politics defined not by vision but by compliance, where electoral ambition shrinks to whatever billionaires, suburban taxpayers, or Trumpโ€™s manufactured crises will tolerate. The result is a politics of pre-emptive surrender: leaders advertising their moderation not in contrast to authoritarianism, but in deference to the veto power of money and the theater of sabotage. Meanwhile, the public appetite for immediacy is palpable. Each time a non-Trump timetable appears, the response is instantโ€”as when Zohran Mamdaniโ€™s protoโ€“public works scavenger hunt drew overwhelming participation. As I argued earlier in Money on the Left, people are not waiting for Trumpโ€™s next move; they are rehearsing a desire to be met.

Organizers and campaigns can mobilize small donors in unprecedented numbers, yet the infrastructure of long-term investmentโ€”media institutions, public communications, policy experimentationโ€”remains chained to elites who are either hostile or indifferent. The most talented journalists in the country are between jobs, the most creative campaigns run on fumes, and state and city governments are left to administer austerity with nothing but temporary patches. Meanwhile, the only steady stream of cash in politics flows to projects of retrenchment: centrist think tanks, corporate-friendly candidates, and the staging grounds of sabotage.

This is not fiscal realism. It is self-inflicted austerity, the result of imagining sabotage itself as an inescapable condition of democratic life. The paradox of Starmerism is that it presents itself as pragmatic but is in fact the most utopian position of all: it assumes that billionaires and their enforcers can be persuaded to underwrite democracy, against all evidence.

The task now is to break free from this trapโ€”not by waiting for private money to say yes, but by building circuits of democratic credit that bypass its veto altogether.

Even the migration to BlueSky, with its slower rhythms and sometimes too-earnest exchanges, is evidence to this point. Despite the notorious difficulties of platform migration in a socially embedded world, 39 million people have given BlueSky a shot. What this shows is a shockingly robust desire for a public sphere insulated from far right news cycles, where discourse as a public capacity is not dominated by reactionary slop. This is the same public desire that fiscal insurgency can meetโ€”and much better than BlueSky does. A democratic timetable not dictated by private moneyโ€™s veto or by authoritarian crackdowns, but by the courage to build and sustain public life directly.

That desire is not without precedent. At moments of democratic crisis in the past, Americans have built new circuits of credit and coordination to bypass elite vetoes.

Historical Precedents for Fiscal Insurgency

Insurgent credit has always been American democracyโ€™s lifeblood, emerging time and again when all else fails.

The most famous example is the Greenback. During the Civil War, when private banks could notโ€”or would notโ€”provision the Unionโ€™s survival, the government issued its own money directly. These notes were not backed by gold or private wealth but by the promise of democratic governance. They bypassed the Jacksonian gold standard and private banking alike, and proved that fiscal capacity could be mobilized without elite consent. For a generation afterward, Greenbackers carried that lesson forward, insisting that democratic credit could fund not only war but schools, infrastructure, and social flourishing.

A similar logic returned in World War II. Faced with the need to mobilize resources on a scale without precedent, the U.S. government issued war bonds that transformed ordinary households into participants in the nationโ€™s fiscal life. These bonds were not simply instruments of finance; they were instruments of mass coordination. Posters, rallies, and public campaigns framed bond-buying as an act of civic belonging, turning fiscal issuance into a cultural project. The war effort was provisioned not by waiting for private investment to return during the Great Depression, but by enrolling the public directly into circuits of democratic credit. 

Money on the Leftโ€™s โ€œBlue Bondsโ€ proposal updates this history for our own authoritarian crisis. Blue Bonds are a way for states and cities to issue credit directly in the form of a national bond drive that insulates democratic institutions from hostile federal sabotage. Their structure is the famous duck-rabbit illusion: they can appear as conventional borrowing duck within a neoliberal framework, or as a credit instrument rabbit that unlocks public capacity in a democratic framework. Either way, the effect is the same: institutions provision themselves and democracy writ large, bypassing the veto of billionaires and the sabotage of Trump.

In the same spirit, complementary currencies offer a local and coalition-based approach: unions, campaigns, and municipalities can provision one another directly, rehearsing democratic solidarity through circuits of receivability rather than dependence on hostile elites.

These experiments matter not because they are perfect or permanent, but because they reveal a principle: democracy does not have to wait on private money. At key moments, Americans have already built and lived within systems of public credit that bypassed entrenched vetoes. Todayโ€™s challenge is to remember that history and mobilize itโ€”to see in Greenbacks, war bonds, Blue Bonds, and complementary currencies not oddities of fiscal history, but usable precedents for democratic survival.

Fiscal Insurgency as Public Endurance

Fiscal insurgency is not isolation. It is not about retreating into localism or walling off states from the national economy. It is about building protective circuits of credit that keep democratic life functioning even when sabotage is staged from above. Insulation means refusing to let billionaires or authoritarian actors dictate the terms of survival.

The Greenbacks insulated the Union from the constraints of the Jacksonian gold standard and private banking. World War II bonds insulated the war effort from failing private investment by activating public capacity directly. Blue Bonds extend this logic, creating coordinated fiscal capacity across states and cities that cannot be held hostage to federal obstruction. Complementary currencies, in turn, can provide insulation at the community levelโ€”allowing campaigns, unions, and municipalities to sustain each other when donor strikes or hostile legislatures attempt to cut them off.

What unites these experiments is their orientation toward endurance. They do not dissolve political conflict, though they do reveal markets to be corrupt betting institutions with often very little relation to our collective needs and capacities. Insulation means treating fiscal capacity as a public utility, not a private concession. It means provisioning schools, universities, media, and public works on terms that cannot be vetoed by billionaires or broken by Trumpโ€™s shakedowns.

To demand insulation, then, is not to run from political economy but to govern itโ€”to make sure that democratic credit flows even when elites attempt to dam it. In this sense, fiscal insurgency is not only possible but necessary: it is how democracy is renewed.

Democracy or Acquiescence

The stakes are not a simple fork between two univocal paths. What is at issue are competing habits of orientation that press on institutions, coalitions, and publics all at once. Acquiescence registers sabotage as shock and awe and then mistakes that registration for realityโ€”treating crises as external facts, measuring competence by austerity management, and advertising moderation in deference to oligarchs and dictators. These habits make collaborators out of people and institutions that imagine themselves merely adapting to circumstance.

Progressives are not exempt. Too often, they defer fiscal action to manufactured chokepoints: until national electoral victories return power to Democrats, until taxpayers can be persuaded to recycle their salaries into the state, until enlightened billionaires decide to bankroll media or infrastructure. Each deferral helps normalize acquiescence as realism, training institutions to accept sabotage as governance.

Yet when people crown an insurgent political campaign with star-power and charisma, participate in a playful scavenger hunt, or even migrate to slower platforms like BlueSky, they rehearse another orientation: one that insists capacity is abundant, desire is real, and democracy does not have to wait. These moments do not resolve into a single coherent path; they are plural rehearsals of another public life. Fiscal insurgency is how these scattered desires are enacted at a meaningful scaleโ€”how democratic improvisations become durable circuits of public credit.

The disgrace is not that Trump is strong, but that so many continue to bow before private moneyโ€™s veto even as it is unmasked as blackmail and collusion. The task is to cultivate and extend the democratic reflex wherever it appears, multiplying its legibility, and provisioning the health of our democracy rather than allowing sabotage to dictate the terms of survival.

Say Yes

Bouie, Carvell, and Collins are right: the talent, energy, and capacity are already here. The organizers are ready, the journalists are waiting, the public appetite is palpable. What blocks the way is not imagination, but private moneyโ€™s refusalโ€”backed by a political culture that treats that refusal as final.

Fiscal insurgency is the way to break that habit. It is how we turn capacity into action without waiting for billionaire patronage or taxpayer permission slips. It is how we refuse the manufactured chokepoints that fracture coalitions and empower Trump. It is how we insulate democracy from sabotage long enough to renew it. That is all that endogenous money really is: the courage to issue it, met by a public capacity that has already rehearsed its legitimacy.

The refrain of our momentโ€”capacity is there, but money says noโ€”should no longer be a lament. It must become a call. Private moneyโ€™s โ€œnoโ€ is not natural, it is not inevitable, and it is not the last word. We have the precedents, we have the tools, and we have the urgency. What remains is to build the circuits of public credit that can say yes to democracy when private power will not.

Why Credit’s Due: Reclaiming Pride in Boro

By Rob Hawkes and Robyn Ollett

The summer of 2025, like the summer of 2024 before it, has been one of heightened tensions surrounding the issues of race and immigration in the UK. This year, Union Flags and St Georgeโ€™s Crosses have adorned innumerable lamp posts, motorway bridges, roundabouts, and zebra crossings โ€“ ostensibly as expressions of national โ€œprideโ€ โ€“ following a series of anti-immigration protests outside the Bell Hotel in Epping, which had been housing asylum seekers. In late July and early August 2024, racist riots erupted in towns and cities in England and Northern Ireland, including in Middlesbrough (where we both work at Teesside University). The false narratives fuelling this combination of nationalistic fervour and xenophobic violence are that โ€œillegalโ€ immigrants to the UK are luxuriously treated at the expense of the โ€œindigenousโ€ population and that there is only ever an either/or choice between caring for โ€œour own peopleโ€ and providing basic support to those fleeing war, persecution, and/or starvation overseas. Underpinning these divisive myths is a pervasive logic of scarcity: there is not enough to go round.

This, inevitably, is also a logic of exclusion. If there is not enough for everyone, the only option is to leave some of us out. This, in turn, always means harming those who are already marginalised and perpetuating cycles of violence and disempowerment. Refugees and asylum seekers, disabled people, people of colour, LGBTQIA+ people, unemployed people and other benefits claimants all regularly face accusations of being a burden on or a threat to British society, or of failing to show sufficient gratitude or respect towards the supposed values and standards of the nation, or all of the above. Time and again, we are told that the costs of supporting the vulnerable must be met by โ€œthe taxpayerโ€ (and note that โ€œthe taxpayerโ€ is never themselves imagined to be among the vulnerable). Thus, the logic of scarcity and exclusion rests on a pernicious and demonstrably false understanding of the UKโ€™s money system. Meanwhile, misleading messages abound in the racist narratives that spread across social media, whipping up violence in our streets.  

In Middlesbrough, on October 18, 2025, we are hosting a free public screening of Maren Poitrasโ€™s documentary Finding the Money, which tells a very different story about money and taxation. This is the first in a series of events as part of Where Creditโ€™s Due: Making Money for Ecosocial Justice, a project supported by Teesside Universityโ€™s AHRC Impact Acceleration Account (IAA) and developed in dialogue with Boro Doughnut, Curious Arts, the Dorman Museum, and Money on the Left.

Debunking the famous lie โ€œThere is no such thing as public money; there is only taxpayersโ€™ money,โ€ Finding the Money demonstrates that the truth is the complete opposite. Following a group of economists who reject the conventional understanding of money, the documentary sets out the key ideas of the Modern Monetary Theory (or MMT) perspective. In the UK, as in the USA, taxes (and therefore โ€œthe taxpayerโ€) do not pay for public services. Currency-issuing governments create money whenever they spend. As counterintuitive as this may sound when weโ€™re so used to thinking of governments as budgeting just like households, there is such a thing as public money and public money belongs to everyone. Moreover, all money is credit, and credit is due to more people and more places than the present logic of scarcity and exclusion will ever allow. 

We care passionately about our town and the people who make up our communities, so we are dedicated to taking action and helping people understand that, despite what politicians and journalists might tell us, there is enough to go around. As Kate Raworth affirms in Doughnut Economics (2017) โ€œthe design of money โ€“ how it is created, the character it is given, and how it is to be usedโ€ has major implications for the way we live our collective lives. What we need now is the political will to imagine and design alternatives to the current orthodox monetary system, which is based on and encourages these false narratives and zero-sum trade offs.

Our project seeks to build an intersectional network of like-minded people by gathering existing groups and rallying others to the cause of imagining and striving for new ways of designing, issuing, and sustaining the credit that our communities desperately need and deserve. Raworthโ€™s book has inspired a global movement for ecosocial justice through the Doughnut Economics Action Lab (DEAL). The ideas are fairly simple: we indeed can meet everyoneโ€™s needs within our planetary boundaries if we reconfigure our perspective on infinite growth and design systems that work towards the goal of not just surviving but thriving within our ecological limits. Doughnut Economics, like MMT, fundamentally challenges the false choice created by the economic orthodoxy between prosperity and social inclusion. 

Recognising that Middlesbrough is a place where current credit flows regularly ignore or actively exclude those communities which are often the biggest contributors to local cultural and economic life โ€“ LGBTQIA+ groups, NGOs supporting refugee communities, and those supporting green initiatives โ€“ and we would like to explore what it would look like if public credit creation specifically sought to support spaces and initiatives that foster inclusion rather than division. Weโ€™ve seen riots scapegoating people suspected to have arrived on our shores by small boats. Weโ€™ve seen muslim friends and neighbours have their houses and businesses vandalised. Weโ€™ve seen children, families, and individuals scared to leave their homes or places of work or study. Then, in the aftermath of the riots, weโ€™ve seen the people of Middlesbrough represented as โ€œthugsโ€ or as โ€œhalf witsโ€ too stupid to recognise the โ€œidiocyโ€ of smashing up their own town: division only sows more division. Queer communities, on the other hand, have long shown that pride is a celebration of inclusion, not the opposite. Meanwhile, as we affirm at Money on the Left and as the MMT framework helps us to recognise, money has never been as straight or as exclusionary as conventional wisdom would have us believe.

It is essential that we think about the ways in which we credit and represent our community and our town, as the stories we tell about our communities and the people that build them are intimately bound up with the way we account for them in monetary terms. If we allow racist, ableist, and classist narratives to shout the loudest, that has a direct impact on the self-worth of everyone in our community. It might, therefore, be helpful to unpack the ways in which the people of Middlesbrough have been represented to better understand the interconnectedness of aspersions visited upon those who live here, those who participated in last summerโ€™s riots, and those who continue campaigns which feign nationalist pride while intimidating racial others. For instance, perhaps ironically, the term โ€œthug,โ€ which was repeatedly used to describe rioters, has racist origins: the Oxford English Dictionary explains that a โ€œthugโ€ once meant โ€œa member of a society or cult of robbers and murderers in India known for strangling their victims.โ€ Moreover, the OED notes that the term โ€œmay be considered offensive (esp. in U.S. use when used by a white person in reference to a black person […]).โ€ Meanwhile, words like โ€œimbecile,โ€ โ€œmoron,โ€ and โ€œidiot,โ€ which are regularly mobilised to mock rioters and racists, were once part of a system of organised ableist violence against people classified as mentally โ€œdefective.โ€

Reconfiguring recognition, taking pride in our community, and reclaiming our self-worth are central to our aims for this project and this connects our local efforts to the objectives and ethos of the Global Donut Days, a four-day, community-led festival, held online and in-person around the world in the days leading up to our first event in October. We hope to start a new conversation about monetary design and its implications in and for Middlesbrough, encouraging those who attend and participate in our events to imagine the possibilities for participation and inclusion that credit creation in, by, and for the people of Boro might open up. As the Money on the Left Editorial Collective recently proclaimed, โ€œItโ€™s Time For Complementary Currencies,โ€ forms of community credit which, as Raworth puts it, can help us โ€œbecome full participants in natureโ€™s cycles.โ€ By building an intersectional network of people to explore ideas around community currency and consider where creditโ€™s due, we join a worldwide effort to foster regenerative and inclusive economies. We hope you will join us in becoming part of this broader movement toward economic systems that recognise the full range of human identities, capacities, and contributions.

Zohranโ€™s #ZcavengerHunt was a Rehearsal

by Will Beaman

What yesterdayโ€™s New York City #ZcavengerHunt made visible is a coalition rehearsing public works before even winning the general election. It was not just people spending time together. With simple, posted invitations carried on cards, the campaign coordinated routes, rooms, roles, and care so that participation became possible and clear. That is a public task, not an extracurricular one. It was also a rehearsal for what a mobilized coalition needs to do next: move together for joy as well as safety, travel in groups while an administration tries to turn the city into a spectacle, and build turnout habits without waiting for a single big event. It is a model other cities can watch and adapt.

The right frame is not volunteerism, but insurgent fiscal policy. When Mamdani convened a citywide scavenger hunt for fun, he did not need Governor Kathy Hochul or Bill Ackmanโ€™s tax dollars; it ran on endogenous creditโ€”playful and quietly powerful. The cards created circuits of doing things together (meet here, staff this corner, escort this path, prep the kitchen window, check in); responsibilities were posted and settled. Grown-ups effectively parallel played: individual and group progress stayed private, while social media and campaign reports posted the size and pace of the crowd. The result was a massive public coordination of democratic lifeโ€”not an authoritarian mass, but a coalition limbered up and ready for the next project. For a concrete build path, see our proposal for how Zetro Cards could be scaled up for fiscal insurgency, from campaign swag to coalition-building to public works, which shows how this same pattern can move people through rooms, routes, trainings, and care on wider scales.

Just as Mamdani mobilized the human and cultural capacities of a city that hide in plain sight every day, he also mobilized gamification techniques the left usually consigns to neoliberal behaviorism. Stamps, punch cards, routes, and check-ins were not used to manipulate individuals; they were used to coordinate a publicโ€”rules posted, goals shared, privacy respected, and the โ€œprizeโ€ defined as more capacity to act together. As many pointed out on social media, he figured out how to make โ€œPokรฉmon Go to the Pollsโ€ actually work. It worked not as clicks or gimmicks, but rather as mapped routes, opened rooms, staffed corners, and kitchen windows that made movement legible and safe. In that register, play is not a nudge; play is public works. It turns dispersed willingness into organized time and space with tools people already understand.

Much will be written about the brilliance of Mamdani as a campaigner, and the charisma that eager establishment Democrats hope to replicate with a Pete Buttigieg or a Gavin Newsom. But the Mamdani coalition did not just rally behind a leaderโ€”it rehearsed the enfranchisement of one. Think of Mamdaniโ€™s charisma here as a kind of coalitional line of credit extended with conditions: people offer a line of trust and attention to a would-be convener, linked to responsibilities and democratic accountability. โ€œDark Brandonโ€ hinted at this nationallyโ€”a charisma on offer if the officeholder accepted a movement mantle (he did not). In New York, Mamdani is being chosen as a convener; the scavenger hunt and the Zetro credit circuit are tests of credit issuance, not โ€œbrandingโ€ in some narrow sense. He credits the public with usable roles, routes, and rooms; the public credits him with the authority to keep issuing. It is an analogical, public accreditationโ€”the two forms of crediting are not the same, but they are related and each is predicated on the other. If either side stops honoring the posted terms, the fiscal circuit weakens and the star power fades. In other words, leadership here is not intrinsic to the leader; it is a coordination with a very practiced and well-rehearsed public.

Seen this way, the coalition is the main character. It has repeatedly offered charisma on condition of genuine progressive politics. Biden and Harris were given that credit line and then lost their piece of the franchise by declining the democratic responsibilities that would have kept it open. Mamdani has retained his credit by meeting those responsibilities and using them to transform the municipal public sphere into a place of hope and rehearsals of full employment. The deeper story, however, is the coalition that dreamed him upโ€”and keeps provisioning public life whether or not a single figure is in the spotlight.

The wide open question for the Mamdani coalition is: what else this coalition event was rehearsing? We at Money on the Left are a bit biased: we want to see an insurgent fiscal politics defend cities and states from Trumpโ€™s authoritarianism, and we see opportunities for this everywhere. But the most important thing for democratic renewal after Trumpโ€”the step that comes before everythingโ€”is that members of a political coalition see themselves as participants in democratic design, not the neoliberal end-users of a technocratic solution or deals brokered with power on our behalf.

How the Zetro Card Can Save NYC (Really)

by the Money on the Left Editorial Collective

A domestic occupation is currently being staged in the United States. National guard units have been deployed to Washington, D.C., with similar moves signaled for Chicago and New York. The script pairs visible deployments with their fiscal equivalent: threats of impoundment, selective audits, procurement slow-walks, and last minute deals that convert liberal institutions into collaborators one by one. A military showdown is the point for Trump; it is the terrain the regime wants. Likewise in Albany, a fiscal showdown over tax increases is the terrain that liberal collaborationists prefer: a ritualized crisis designed to brand a Mamdani administration as a failure between rounds of austerity. The playbook is the same: manufacture a crisis, force a spectacle, and make the rest of the year about forcing victims to pick up the pieces.

When most people think of โ€œinsurgency,โ€ images of guerilla warfare come to mind. But even where historic insurgencies have included armed struggle (which we do not endorse in the United States), combat is not the most essential component. Successful insurgencies succeed by sustaining daily civilian life under occupation. Civil societies endure by keeping ordinary routines going: schools that still teach, kitchens that still serve, routes that still move people, meetings that still convene, mundane responsibilities that people still meet. That continuity erodes the occupierโ€™s legitimacy, stretches its capacity, and ensures it cannot outlast the people.

Military clashes and ritualized budget standoffs are already on the next page in Trumpโ€™s playbook. The durable answer to Trumpism is a fiscal insurgency: visible, practical, reproducible ways to keep the payments that sustain public life flowing so that recruitment and retention for deployments struggle, as residents continue to work, learn, care, and govern themselves. Rather than just play the showdown game, we keep the city on scheduleโ€”and build capacity as we go.

Fiscal insurgency

Fiscal insurgency creatively rereads what money already is in practice: credit issued, accepted, and retired through infrastructures that already operate. In addition to cash and bank accounts, we are all familiar with EBT, transit passes, tuition remissions, union stipends, city vouchers, and fee waiversโ€”all variously posted ways of paying for participation. 

Under pressure, the task is to keep payments aligned with capacity. Groceries, rides, childcare, rooms, translation, training, and pathways into responsibility must remain accessible even during a fiscal blackout. The practical goal is twofold: first, to route around staged fiscal choke points so that routine civic coordinations do not pause; second, to shrink the labor pool for occupation deployments by offering better work, learning, and debt relief at home.

This approach does not meet occupation with spectacle or force. It meets deployments where they actually live: recruitment and retention. When a city pays for participationโ€”public-works fellowships in libraries, parks, and transit; childcare and travel coverage for trainings and meetings; tuition offsets at community colleges; clear ladders into union roles and civic responsibilityโ€”the material case for enlistment weakens. Recruitment shortfalls and morale depletion follow, which is a fitting answer to a regime that wields austerity to get its way.

Why the Zetro Card, what it is now, and why it matters

There are countless everyday tools with public potential in plain sight. As a separate example of the appetite for this, the Mamdani campaign just launched a citywide โ€œScavenger Huntโ€โ€”distinct from the Zetro Cardโ€”that shows how eager New Yorkers are for playful, card-based participation; early events blew through the first batch of cards. The point in this article is not to crown one instrument, but to activate what is already familiar. The Mamdani campaignโ€™s โ€œZetro Cardโ€ is one such tool.

What the Zetro Card is today. The Zetro Card is a playful paper punch card in the Mamdani campaign. Supporters receive stamps at canvasses, phone banks, and pop-ups; after a set number of stamps, the card is redeemed for campaign merchandise. Because selling merch became constrained after certain fundraising thresholds, items are given away at volunteer events and DIY printing tablesโ€”so the punch card doubles as a tangible way to recognize participation and pick up posters, tees, and totes. It lives inside a high-energy field operation with frequent events and check-ins.

How it scales without changing its feel. The same formโ€”stamp, QR, or SMSโ€”can carry credits that partners agree to honor for posted items tied to real capacity (for example: childcare blocks during meetings, off-peak community-room hours, produce bundles, modest travel support on action days, training seats, and even reserved speaking or facilitation time). Individual balances remain private; weekly program totals are public; a brief monthly check-in evens small differences with next-month service or modest dollars. In that expanded form, Zetro becomes a practical way to pay for participation without permission, while staying playful, legible and low-friction.

Zetro grows in three lanes at once:
1. Coalition Lane: Partners post menus of Zetro-receivable items
2. City Lane: Municipal agencies comp or cover what they already can in Zetro credits
3. Public Digital Payments Lane: A targeted amendment to State Banking Law ยง131, which currently prohibits corporations from receiving deposits, would be sufficient for Zetro to merge with a public digital payments system along the lines of what has already been proposed at state-level with the Inclusive Value Ledger Act. Same Zetro system, but even more doors and menu items open. 

The types of work credited on the card and the forms of participation those credits unlock can widen month by month and year by yearโ€”from campaign tables to coalition partners (DSA chapters, WFP affiliates, union training arms, worker co-ops, cultural venues) and then into public venues (library class seats, after-hours school auditoriums, parks fieldhouses, union halls, community-room hours, partial fares). Over time, credits can help residents purchase municipal groceries, arrange childcare and transit for organizing and training, and access professional on-ramps into union ladders and a renewed municipal care-and-organizing sector. Swap lines to other cities and allied campaigns can make the pattern replicable and coordinative nationwide.

What follows is a one-year plan in four quarters, a year-two continuation, and a horizon where Zetro Cards and other coalition credits grow together with โ€œBlue Bonds.โ€ Hereโ€™s how it could work:


Year One

Quarter 1โ€“2: Posted menus with offline-capability

  • Posted coverage sheets (โ€œwhat this card covers hereโ€). At initial partners (DSA chapters, WFP affiliates, supportive worker co-ops and public venues like libraries and community centers), list covered items with clear limits matched to actual capacity: bundled produce at a co-op table; modest transit support on canvass days; childcare blocks during meetings; off-peak community-room hours; small print runs; reserved speaking/facilitation time.
  • Privacy by default; public totals. Individual balances are private. Weekly program totals are public (dashboard-style).
  • Monthly check-in. Partners bring two numbersโ€”what they issued and what they honoredโ€”and even out any small differences with next-month service (extra room hours, print runs, childcare blocks) or modest dollars. A small rainy-day amount smooths one-off bumps and is refilled at the check-in.
  • Offline-first tools. Paper cards with serials, SMS codes for basic phones, QR badges for smartphones, and a simple web ledger where participants see only their own balance; stewards sync when connected.

Insurgency-specific provisioning (safety and movement)

  • Safe Walk & Ride corridors. Posted hours and mapped routes between meeting sites, libraries, schools after-hours, parks, fieldhouses, transit hubs.
    Menu items: escort hours, corner posts, route leads; modest travel support for route volunteers.
  • Buddy and check-in protocols; door marshals; de-escalation teams.
    Menu items: marshal shifts, de-escalation shifts, check-in desk.
  • Kitchen windows at evening meetings (community kitchen cadence) hosted in libraries/community centers.
    Menu items: prep/serve shifts; ingredient runs; take-home food bundles for late routes.
  • Dispatch table for ride pools (carpool grids).
    Menu items: dispatcher shifts; driver mileage allotments; maintenance credits.
  • Accompaniment pilot (court/clinic/ICE check-ins) with faith/legal partners.
    Menu items: escort hours; language access; staging-site stewards.

Quarter 3: Scale under known rules

  • Review coverage and limits against observed demand; keep balances private and totals public; maintain simple grievance and appeal routes.
  • One-page coverage sheets per site, reviewed quarterly, so people know exactly what the card covers where.
  • Mentored on-ramp for new issuers (co-issuance with small, posted starting limits and a graduation path once delivery is demonstrated).
  • Union-linked training access. Partners begin accepting Zetro for defined allotments of training seats in union programs (safety workshops, evening classes). Framed as an extension of existing education supports.

Insurgency-specific provisioning (citywide habits)

  • Route maps go citywide; relay rooms in libraries and community centers host hand-off windows.
    Menu items: relay room stewards; wayfinding/signage crews; neighborhood route coordinators.
  • Clinic and pharmacy relays for prescriptions and supplies (privacy rules posted).
    Menu items: intake desk; pharmacy runs; cold-chain handling.
  • Observer teams at sensitive sitesโ€”visible, trained, non-confrontational.
    Menu items: observer shifts; alerts desk.

Quarter 4: Public venues, groceries pilot, and formal accompaniment

  • Public venues with narrow, posted coverage. A set number of library class seats; off-peak community-room hours; partial fares for travel to trainings. Coverage lists, clear limits, privacy, and the monthly check-in remain standard.
    If the Public Digital Payments Lane opens, we can mirror these posted menus there; if not, the Coalition Lane and City Lane continue.
  • Municipal groceries pilot (petition window). The Mayorโ€™s Office opens a petition process for organizationsโ€”campaign-linked or notโ€”to request coverage for defined grocery bundles with posted maximums and periodic review.
  • Formal accompaniment lanes with faith and legal partners; posted procedures and privacy rules.

Year Two (selected extensions)

Quarter 5โ€“6: Union issuance and civic rebrand

  • Unions begin limited issuance of credits through strike support and childcare stipends, following a transparent, bounded framework aligned with coalition standards.
  • City rebrand. The administration rebrands Zetro under a civic name (for example, โ€œCity Cardโ€), signaling its shift from campaign experiment to city-backed fiscal infrastructure without changing privacy or monthly check-in rules.

Quarter 7โ€“8: Payable labor time and public venues

  • Union issuance expands to stipends for stewards, interpreters, and trainersโ€”more forms of labor time become payable.
  • Coalition credits recognized for a set number of seats at public venues (libraries, community centers, municipal groceries), knitting the system further into daily civic infrastructure.

Quarter 9โ€“12: Tuition offsets, debt relief pilots, swap lines

  • Tuition offsets and student-debt relief pilots for CUNY programs that support public work (ESL, EMT/first-aid, IT support for schools). Offsets are clearly defined, privacy-respecting, and guided by simple equity rules.
  • Demilitarization lanes. Offsets scale once receivability is wide enough to undercut debt-for-ICE recruitment offers directly.
  • Swap lines with other cities. Credits earned in New York can be honored in Chicago for defined uses, and vice versa, on posted terms and routine settlement schedules.

The horizon: Blue Bonds + coalition credits (two tools to save our cities)

Blue Bondsโ€”a proposal of the Money on the Left Editorial Collectiveโ€”offer a way for city and state governments to finance an urban full-employment buildout that broadens receivability. They are ordinary dollar bonds, offered in small denominations to residents and anchored by public pensions and union funds (with solidarity subscriptions from other cities and states). Proceeds are tied to visible municipal options that coalition credits already move people through: grocery depots and cold-chain upgrades, childcare hubs and accessibility retrofits, community kitchens and repair cooperatives, library classrooms, transit access, and municipal broadband. Retirement is stated up front: as pressures recede and revenues normalize, the series winds down and the books close. Legislative changes in the Public Digital Payments Laneโ€”a no-fee, real-time public walletโ€”make this even easier, but Zetro + Blue Bonds work already in the Coalition and City lanes. 

Paired with Zetro/coalition credits, Blue Bonds and credits create political space for each other. Credits route around staged choke points so everyday provisioning continues; Blue Bonds draw in dollars on public terms to expand the very programs those credits already make usable. To cautious audiences, Blue Bonds read like familiar โ€œborrowing.โ€ To a coalition living with credits, they read as one denomination of credit among many: another way the city measures and coordinates provision, retired according to plan rather than by some supposed law of physics.

With capacity increased, receivability widens so credits can meet a substantial share of a householdโ€™s monthly essentials. Agencies and partners post coverage lists that expand steadily: groceries via municipal depots and co-ops; local travel through transit and bike programs; childcare and elder-care blocks; language access and legal aid; device repair and broadband; library and community-center programs; CUNY training and certifications; cultural access; tool-lending and community-kitchen time. Each item carries clear limits tied to real capacity; privacy is the default; weekly public totals keep everyone oriented; a brief monthly check-in keeps books even.

The employment premise is simple: there is always work to do and a way to step into it. Roles in facilitation, safety, translation, outreach, maintenance, logistics, kitchen prep, route escorting, and accompaniment are paired with training and mentoring. Credits earned here are immediately usable for listed needs, and tuition and student-debt offsets scale so the cityโ€™s offer competes directly with Trumpโ€™s enlistment promises; the better path is at home, in public life.

Beyond the city, swap lines make the pattern replicable and coordinative. Posted agreements allow defined items to be honored across jurisdictions and settled on a routine schedule. Credits earned here can be used for named needs there, and residents can subscribe to one anotherโ€™s Blue Bonds. The result is a durable fabric: credits keep patterned flows of provision steady; bonds fund expansion in plain view; together they cultivate a public that understands these instruments as democratic coordination, not deference to gatekeepers.

Appendix

A. Blackout readiness (why this matters)

One reason this infrastructure is urgent is simple: an administration hostile to cities will try to exert power over everyday payments as leverage. If a single processor, platform, or office can be squeezed, it will be. The response is to build many ways of paying that cannot be shut off by flipping a single switch switch.

That is why the plan mixes paper, SMS, and QR; has menus of โ€œwhat this card covers hereโ€ are important; has stewards learning to settle up together on a simple schedule even if systems are temporarily offline; and why ordinary municipal bonds held by residents, small dollar donors and public pensions can fund visible programs that credits already carry people through. No single vendor or account holds the keys; if one lane is squeezed, others stay open. Pursuing public banking and a Public Digital Payments Lane in parallel adds redundancy and cuts private choke points, but the Coalition and City lanes are enough to keep going in the meantime. Payment follows the work that people are doing, and the rules are posted in public so everyone can keep moving while the politics catch up.

B. How we will track and share progress (in plain language)

People should be able to see what is happening with Zetro Credits without surveilling their neighborsโ€™ transactions. Each week, it is essential to post totals by program and neighborhoodโ€”how many childcare hours, room hours, training seats, rides, grocery bundlesโ€”along with how quickly credits are being used. Once a month, partners can sit down for a short check-in to even out differences: if one site provided more than it issued, the group will agree on make-goods for next month (extra room hours, added training seats, more kitchen time) or a small cash adjustment. Every quarter, the city can publish a short summary of what was made possible, where pressure points were, and what will change on the coverage lists to keep pace with real demand.

C. Money on the Leftโ€™s seven principles for coalition credit (Our standard for support and endorsement)

  1. Coalitional responsibility, not sovereign enclosure
    Credits are commitments to a wider public supported in coalition. Issuance and acceptance are accountable to relationships across organizations and agencies, not only to a membershipโ€™s pre-defined ends.
  2. Responsibility to full participation (the full-employment principle)
    Every issuer has a duty to open real ways to earn creditsโ€”especially for undervalued labor (care, language access, accessibility, logistics)โ€”and to pair earning with pathways into responsibility (facilitation, training, strategy roles).
  3. Responsibility to recognize others (bounded cross-coalition receivability)
    Each issuer provides a clear pathway to receive credits from trusted partners that meet a published threshold of coalitional trust and solidarity. Recognition is bounded and menu-defined (what is accepted, where, and in what amounts) and is periodically reviewed in public.
  4. Structured paths to enfranchisement as an issuing authority
    There is a transparent route for new groups to become issuers: mentorship or co-issuance periods, capacity checks tied to real infrastructure, defined caps while ramping, and clear criteria for advancing to full issuer status.
  5. Duties and accountability that come with enfranchisement
    Issuers steward capacity (do not over-promise), publish aggregate issuance and redemption by program, participate in monthly clearing, honor grievance and appeal processes, and accept time-bound suspension or revocation if they violate standards.
  6. Privacy as public trust
    Individualsโ€™ balances and transactions remain private by default. Public oversight operates through aggregates and due-process audits for suspected misuse. Privacy is not a perk; it is how coalitions extend trust without control or surveillance.

Tied to real infrastructure and needs
Receivability menus must map to concrete capacitiesโ€”passes, rooms, classes, childcare, groceries, trainingsโ€”and be adjusted regularly to meet demonstrated needs, with special attention to reducing participation barriers.

Tax the Rich Campaigns Need Coalition Credits

By the Money on the Left Editorial Collective

As Zohran Mamdani and allied progressives turn a campaign victory into governing capacity, the primary weapons used against them will be fiscal. Centrist state legislatorsโ€”already hostile to progressive tax policyโ€”will be doubly pressured by a Trump White House threatening to impound funds and condition support for core institutions on political loyalty. In New York and other cities, Tax the Rich campaigns will likely escalate from letters and canvasses deliberately ignored by collaborationist lawmakers to protests and statehouse occupations met with brutal crackdowns. One trajectory is hopeful: the showdowns become a national, party-wide rally strong enough to keep Democrats from siding with governors like Kathy Hochul. Another outcomeโ€”one powerful actors are counting onโ€”is coordinated non-cooperation: institutional co-governance withheld from progressives with the same dogmatic vigor Tea Party Republicans showed President Obama. Where does the movement go from there?

This accelerationist showdown politics is a fascistic continuation of the neoliberal โ€œShock Doctrineโ€: engineer a crisis, paralyze the public response, fracture democratic movements with half-measures for some. The trick works by organizing the political conversation around middle-class and billionaire bank accountsโ€”and now routine threats of impoundmentโ€”instead of the existing capacities of everyday people. It tees up bottlenecks and headline spectacles meant to distract from a simple fact: the capacity to provision public life already exists in the workers, infrastructure, and institutionsโ€”the grassroots and member-driven organizations, unions, tenant groups, cultural partners, mutual-aid networks, and neighborhood branchesโ€”that made Mamdaniโ€™s win possible in the first place. When politics is reduced to pleading with mobile wealth, every concession looks like prudence and every defeat looks like inevitability.

Capacity is already here

Our cities do not lack capacity; they lack control over public credit at the very spot opponents have staged as the lever. Schools, clinics, transit systems, housing expertise, organizers, volunteers, mutual-aid supply chainsโ€”these exist already. What austerity politics withholds is the means to recognize and sustain participation in public life while we use that capacity.

That is why recruitment offers into punitive state functions matter. High salaries and student-debt forgiveness for enforcement deployments do not merely โ€œfund jobs.โ€ They decide who has time, stability, and standingโ€”who belongsโ€”much as private wealth does. So when we say that we can build without billionaire tax dollars, we are not saying that we can build without money. Money and payment are the difference between austere rationing from a defensive movement posture and a durable public that keeps people housed, fed, mobile, and engaged.

This is the same pressure point that Tax the Rich campaigns confront. Coalition credit does not replace that fight; it keeps participation pay-able while the fight is underway, so staged fiscal blockades do not stall the very public we are building.

We already run payments systemsโ€”just without payments

Coalitional politics already coordinates large volumes of labor and resources across organizations. Every canvass shift, child-care rota, jail-support thread, translation queue, rides list, venue hookup, design favor, spreadsheet of phone-bank leads, and shared pantry run is coordinated through informal credits: reputation, vouching, IOUs, and remembered favors. Our sign-up sheets are routing instructions; our Signal threads are clearing and settlement; our spreadsheets are shadow ledgers. This is not small. It is the logistics layer that keeps thousands of hours of organizing moving in New York every month.

But you cannot buy groceries with your reputation. The difference between a heroic but austere movement and a durable public is receivabilityโ€”whether the credits people earn for real work can be used for the things that keep them in the fight: groceries, transit, childcare, dues, training, tools, and structured pathways into higher-stakes roles. That is what a payments system is, in essence: not suburban taxpayersโ€™ approval, but the concrete list of where your credit is accepted and for what.

Layered credits for layered publics

The constituent parts of Mamdaniโ€™s coalitionโ€”neighborhood branches, unions, tenant groups, mutual-aid networks, libraries, and cultural partnersโ€”are the right places to grow a politics of insurgent credit that sustains participation through staged fiscal showdowns without disruption. We do not need one grand new currency. We need many credits that already exist, and coordinating infrastructures to help them scale. This is an intentional extension of how coalitions already work: groups give endorsements, share lists, trade rooms and volunteers, align calendars, and memorialize it in MOUs. Credits simply make that coordination legible and usable to participants.

Credits already appear everywhere. Think of these as existing โ€œcredits,โ€ even when unnamed: ratios, patterns, and arrangements of obligation, responsibility, and inclusion.

  • Organizing โ€” credit-like arrangements of obligation and responsibility: canvassing, translation, running meetings, childcare, strike support.
  • Service and care โ€” credit-like patterns of mutual provision and inclusion: hours in mutual-aid kitchens, co-op groceries, cultural events, trainings.
  • Civic access โ€” credit-like arrangements of public inclusion: transit passes, library admissions, course slots, public fee waivers, utility discounts.

Read through a flat lens of โ€œvolunteerism,โ€ these credit forms are misdescribed as charity or good will and their politics is disavowed. In practice they are entangled from the start with the official infrastructures people need to surviveโ€”transit agencies, schools, libraries, utilitiesโ€”and with the circuits of paid work and the for-profit institutions that dominate food, housing, and care. In the dominant policy script, the boundary makes one sphere look like โ€œvolunteeringโ€ and the other like โ€œthe economy.โ€ When a mass movement elects a mayor to create municipal grocery stores, that boundary shows itself as a designed limiterโ€”meant to keep movements from going big until a mythic โ€œtomorrow.โ€ Naming these arrangements as credit, and making them receivable across partners and agencies now, refuses that delay. It turns the boundary from a horizon we wait on into a configuration we can reorganize together.

That simple act is solidarity and recognition. It says: your work, your time, your commitments count beyond your immediate circle. It is also how we recognize siloed efforts as part of a shared public infrastructure. And when we see our time, effort, and commitments as gestures that reach beyond the room, we can align them with what is happening elsewhere now. Work in one locale choreographs recognition and use in another. That readiness to meet one another is the seed of coalition: what you do here moves something there. Small actions scale up into shared capacity without asking anyone to abandon local priorities.

This is also how social causality works in practice, even when coalition is disavowed or treated as a fleeting event. The daycare shift that frees a canvasserโ€™s evening, the translation that unlocks a meeting, the room booking that anchors a trainingโ€”each is already shaping what becomes possible down the line and across town. They are remote from the startโ€”addressed to people you may never meet and to moments you will not occupy. These are already credit infrastructuresโ€”ratios and arrangements of obligation, responsibility, and acceptance. Credits do not invent them; they further name, steady, and make them receivable where life happens. Once that is acknowledged, the line between โ€œinsideโ€ and โ€œoutsideโ€ politics looks arbitrary. If a city library accepts campaign-issued credits for after-school programs, or a union local honors them for training sessions, then credits stop being a mutual-aid side hustle and become part of the public itself. Power maps shift because coordination is happening through channels that choke-point politics cannot fully control.

During a fiscal blackout or manufactured crisis, receivability lets organizers, caregivers, translators, and trainees keep moving through rooms, rides, childcare, and trainings now, with partners settling in kind or in dollars later. That is how the coalition holds its form instead of shrinking.

Public responsibility, not private money

Some will ask whether these credits are just another private money scheme. They are notโ€”because the premise is different. Both cryptocurrency culture and the Wall-Street-backed fiscal choke-point politics of the Democratic establishment share a deeper story: money as a pre-political emanation of a private worldโ€”white families, founders, and โ€œentrepreneursโ€โ€”that stands outside obligation and instructs public life from above. That settler-colonial fantasy treats credit as something private actors bestow, and government as a bookkeeper for their decisions.

We reject that. Money is a public responsibility. It names, coordinates, and sustains the capacities people already build together. Our approach is accountable where life is actually organizedโ€”schools, unions, libraries, clinics, transit, tenant groups, and campaignsโ€”and it is governed in public.

Framed this way, a coalition credit system is the coalitionโ€™s way to carry through when fiscal crises are staged as political discipline.

Call for Printing (CFP)

Turning from argument to practice, we invite every part of the New York coalition that made this victory possibleโ€”neighborhood branches, unions, tenant unions, mutual-aid networks, cultural partners, public programs, and campaignsโ€”to begin issuing and receiving their own coalition credits, coordinated where useful and federated where necessary. The aim is simple: make participation pay-able across the coalition now, so staged fiscal showdowns do not interrupt the public we are already building.

What Money on the Left can do

As an editorial collective, Money on the Left will direct our capacity to create reporting, toolkits, and convening power to projects that follow the ethical and political principles outlined below. We will profile pilots; publish template kits (receivability menus, credit designs, privacy policies, aggregate dashboards); host brief clinics with organizers and public partners; and help align shared measures so successes are visible and copyable.

Principles of coalitional responsibility (our coalition standard)

(This is our endorsement standard for complementary credits. It defines responsibility as coalitional, public, and open-endedโ€”rather than a closed, sovereign enclosure accountable only to itself.)

  1. Coalitional responsibility, not sovereign enclosure
    Credits are commitments to a wider public supported in coalition. Issuance and acceptance are accountable to relationships across organizations and agencies, not only to a membershipโ€™s pre-defined ends.
  2. Responsibility to full participation (the full-employment principle)
    Every issuer has a duty to open real ways to earn creditsโ€”especially for undervalued labor (care, language access, accessibility, logistics)โ€”and to pair earning with pathways into responsibility (facilitation, training, strategy roles).
  3. Responsibility to recognize others (bounded cross-coalition receivability)
    Each issuer provides a clear pathway to receive credits from trusted partners that meet a published threshold of coalitional trust and solidarity. Recognition is bounded and menu-defined (what is accepted, where, and in what amounts) and is periodically reviewed in public.
  4. Structured paths to enfranchisement as an issuing authority
    There is a transparent route for new groups to become issuers: mentorship or co-issuance periods, capacity checks tied to real infrastructure, defined caps while ramping, and clear criteria for advancing to full issuer status.
  5. Duties and accountability that come with enfranchisement
    Issuers steward capacity (do not over-promise), publish aggregate issuance and redemption by program, participate in monthly clearing, honor grievance and appeal processes, and accept time-bound suspension or revocation if they violate standards.
  6. Privacy as public trust
    Individualsโ€™ balances and transactions remain private by default. Public oversight operates through aggregates and due-process audits for suspected misuse. Privacy is not a perk; it is how coalitions extend trust without control or surveillance.
  7. Tied to real infrastructure and needs
    Receivability menus must map to concrete capacitiesโ€”passes, rooms, classes, childcare, groceries, trainingsโ€”and be adjusted regularly to meet demonstrated needs, with special attention to reducing participation barriers.

We are not making up a new world; we are taking responsibility for this one. Credits formalize the recognition already circulating in our movements and make it usable where people live, learn, travel, care, and govern.

Technology and design: many paths up the same mountain

Democracy has always involved design problemsโ€”ballots, mail-in envelopes, early vote windowsโ€”different tools serving the same civic function. Credit is the same way. There is no need to worship a platform; choose what is practical and accessible for your members and partners.

Tool options (examples, from low to higher tech):

  • Paper cards with serial numbers and short expiries
  • Stamp books or tear-off chits
  • SMS or voice codes for basic phones
  • QR badges on printable cards
  • Prepaid or closed-loop cards for specific partners
  • Simple web ledger (individuals see their own balances; the public sees only aggregates)

Designing according our Principles of Coalitional Responsibility

  • Keep balances private by default; publish simple public totals so scale is visible
  • Use posted receivability menus (limit by use and amount, not surveillance)
  • Ensure offline operation so tables and doorways work when the network does not
  • Make replacement easy when something is lost
  • Set a regular cadence to settle books across partners (compare ledgers and receipts; clear modest imbalances in kind or small dollars)

The point is not technology for its own sake; it is fit, access, and flexibility in service of the shared principles above. With that posture in mind, we turn to the case study.

Case study: โ€œA Million Doors to a Million Votesโ€ (what it proposes)

In โ€œA Million Doors to a Million Votes: NYC-DSAโ€™s Plan for a Mamdani Mandate,โ€ รlvaro Lรณpez lays out how NYC-DSA can convert a primary win into governing capacity. The piece frames the next phase as both a mass field operation and a neighborhood-level infrastructure that protects and implements a Mamdani administration. It aims to widen the coalition and electorate; keep a train-the-trainers field machine running past Election Day; turn neighborhood branches into โ€œLittle Local City Hallsโ€ for everyday access to services, rollouts, and mobilization; build standing co-governance tables for real, regular access to decision-making; pursue a broad public mandate in November; pair inside/outside tactics against coordinated opposition; and retrofit the organizationโ€™s finances and operations to match a governing coalition rather than a single campaign.

Lรณpezโ€™s plan already names the political infrastructures that must keep running if Albany withholds revenue or Washington impounds funds. Coalition credits give the coalition continuity under pressureโ€”these rooms stay open.

From a complementary-currency perspective, the planโ€™s constraint is that it ultimately totals DSAโ€™s capacity as dues + volunteer hours. Dues are the non-government analog to taxesโ€”important, but still organized around revenue permissionโ€”and volunteer labor, read through a flat lens of โ€œservice,โ€ remains bounded by peopleโ€™s unpaid time. That pairing undercounts the real logistics already moving through the coalition (care, translation, transit, rooms, training) and leaves participation exposed to the very bottlenecks opponents stage: when money is tight or burnout rises, capacity shrinks. In practice, this risks treating enthusiasm as the main fuel and dues as the only meter, rather than making participation pay-able across the rooms the memo builds.

Case study: translating the memo into coalition credit (โ€œRosesโ€ for NYC-DSA)

Within the NYC-DSA context, the coalition credit can take a name that fits the organizationโ€™s iconography and history: Rosesโ€”a nod to DSAโ€™s rose and to โ€œbread and roses.โ€ Here, the rose is not deferred as leisure after labor. It becomes participatory infrastructure, a way to provision the bread and invite people into responsibility at the same time. The name is specific to the DSA pilot; the principles are general.

Translating the memo into Roses (one possible sketch)
Turn โ€œLittle Local City Hallsโ€ into issuing and accepting locales with a short, public receivability menu (transit, childcare, rooms, trainings, and a modest grocery line via partners). Let the mass field earn-as-you-organize and advance-as-you-learn, with Roses opening pathways into responsibility (facilitation, spokesperson preparation, strategy rooms). Run co-governance as logisticsโ€”a simple monthly check-in that tallies aggregate issuance/redemption and settles leftover imbalances in kind or small dollars. Pair the mandate push with continuity planning so participation does not stall under pressure. Recast the dues drive as an inclusion drive, allowing Roses to cover a defined share of dues for undervalued labor while widening who can stay in the work.

Most importantly, a coalition-credit layer lets expenditure come before โ€œtaxation.โ€ Partners provide rooms, care, transit, and trainings first; credits are retired at use. What changes for dues is their function. Instead of serving mainly as a direct financing stream for a small slice of on-the-books activity, dues become a way to make organizational credits desirable and to retire them. If members can satisfy a defined share of dues in creditsโ€”and those credits are earned through undervalued labor and paired with pathways into responsibilityโ€”then dues policy helps distribute work more fairly and lowers barriers to participation for working-class members. Month to month, remaining imbalances are settled through reciprocal acceptance, in-kind capacity swaps, or small dollar transfers (dues/donations). This reverses the choke-point logic and lets the coalition go bigger when needed, while keeping issuance aligned with real capacity through simple public totals and regular check-ins. 

How it could work
Branches and partners issue Roses for defined uses they can already provision (rooms, childcare, transit support, trainings, groceries via co-ops). Members earn Roses for undervalued labor and use them where a posted menu says they are accepted. Most redemption is in kind at the point of use; a periodic check-in reconciles leftovers through reciprocal acceptance, capacity swaps, or small dollar transfers (dues/donations). Individual use stays private; only aggregate totals are published. That is enough for the coalition to keep its rhythm during a fiscal blackoutโ€”or when one is threatened.

Coalition credits during a fiscal blackout

If Albany triggers a fiscal blackout on Monday, field still runs because canvassers use credits for transit that night; parents attend trainings because childcare is payable in credits; translators keep meetings accessible; branches book rooms with partners who accept credits for a portion of fees. On Friday, the coalition tallies aggregates and schedules settlement in kind or dollars. The rhythm holds; the showdown does not become a shutdownโ€”and the coalitionโ€™s continuity demonstrates a model for city government to emulate and support.

Coalition credits here, Blue Bonds there

Coalition credits work in tandem with another fiscal strategy for city and state governments we have called Blue Bondsโ€”a Money on the Left proposal to politicize municipal debt issuance without inventing a new medium of payment. Blue Bonds are ordinary municipal or state bonds issued for dollars, but placed and held differently: small-denomination subscriptions for residents and workers, anchor orders from public-sector pensions and union funds, and distribution through public-facing portals and community finance partners. The goal is to reconstitute the investor base so funding for transit, housing, food, care, and education depends less on ratings agencies and Wall Street gatekeepers, especially under federal hostility.

Blue Bonds are deliberately national-politics friendly. To cautious audiences, they read as familiar โ€œborrowing.โ€ To a coalition already practicing public credit through organizing, they read as democratic control of the buy-sideโ€”who holds the bonds, on what terms, and to what public purpose. Figures like Mamdani can pursue a Blue Bonds drive now within existing law and disclosure rules, while narrating it as a community subscription to the cityโ€™s future.

Coalition credits shape the horizon for Blue Bonds in two ways. First, they surface concrete pipelinesโ€”rooms, routes, trainings, childcare, kitchens, and clinicsโ€”that make bond use legible and urgent to everyday subscribers. Second, they organize the constituency that will buy and hold the debt: union locals, tenant unions, co-ops, cultural institutions, and small savers who already coordinate through credits. In practice the two tracks can move in parallel: coalition credits keep participation pay-able during fiscal showdowns; a Blue Bonds drive democratizes the dollar side of public finance by anchoring ownership with residents, unions, public pensions, and mission-driven institutions. Together they reduce veto power over public investment and align financing with the people building the city.

Stakes for Tax the Rich

Right now, Tax the Rich campaigns that lack insurgent credit infrastructure are organized around a choke point constructed and enforced by the enemy: state-controlled revenue and the threat of impoundment. A coalitional strategy treats finance and credit not as a single fix or a strict sequence but as overlapping layers that operate together:

  • Coalition credits keep participation pay-able inside the movement and across partners during a fiscal blackout.
  • Agency receivability extends that continuity into public programs by accepting a defined share of credits for defined uses.
  • Blue Bonds do not act as a complementary currency; they democratize the dollar side of public finance by shifting ownership to residents, unions, and public pensionsโ€”including national small savers and cross-state pension solidarityโ€”reducing gatekeeper vetoes.

These layers can start in any order and reinforce one another. If a city moves first with Blue Bonds, coalition credits become lived on-ramps for community engagement and political backing. If coalition credits move first, they generate partners, practices, and evidence that strengthen a public bond constituency. Agencies can pilot both at once by posting narrow receivability menus while bond subscriptions gather. In every configuration, the campaign holds two fronts: it pushes the revenue demand and it operates a governable provisioning network that keeps rooms, rides, childcare, trainings, and pathways into responsibility open. If Albany concedes, additional resources flow into a system already working. If Albany stonewalls, the public sees that capital flight is an empty threat because the people, the infrastructure, and the organizing are hereโ€”and there is already a way to pay and a way to borrow without handing Wall Street a veto.

Call to organizations and campaigns

We invite neighborhood branches, WFP affiliates, unions, tenant unions, mutual-aid networks, cultural partners, and chapters to formalize the credits you already use informally and to connect them across partners and agencies. Begin with modest, concrete steps that fit local capacity:

  • Map the work that already earns trust (care shifts, translation, logistics, training) and publish a minimal receivability menu (transit, rooms, childcare, trainings, a small grocery line through partners).
  • Pair earning with pathways into responsibility so credits open access to facilitation, spokesperson preparation, and strategy roles.
  • Keep individual use private; publish simple public totals and regular check-ins; settle leftover imbalances through reciprocal acceptance, capacity swaps, or small dollars.
  • Invite one public partner to accept a defined share for a defined use; document what works; share the pattern so others can copy it.

Money on the Left stands ready to support this work. We can convene briefings and co-design sessions; help draft receivability menus, pilot MOUs, and privacy policies; publish case notes and templates; host clinics with organizers and public partners; and coordinate shared measures so successes are visible and portable. Projects that follow the principles of coalitional responsibility outlined above will be prioritized for reporting, toolkits, and ongoing advising.

By 2027, New York could have a base that already lives the alternative: public capacity organized as public credit, embedded in daily life, with municipal and state partners joining where they can and following where the coalition has shown the way. The aim is not to wait for capital to return or permission to be granted. It is to recognize that we are already building the world we needโ€”and to make that work payable.

Blue Bonds: Duck or Rabbit?

Chronicle of a Summer

by Will Beaman

We are living through a strange reversal of the monetary story many of us have spent the last decade telling. Modern Monetary Theory helped a broader public see that the federal governmentโ€”the so-called โ€œmonetary sovereignโ€โ€”does not fund itself like a household and should not be bullied by austerity myths. That framing made sense when we could imagine a democratic or progressive White House using those capacities for public purpose. But in a Trump 2.0 world, sovereignty thinking hits a wall: the very office that issues and coordinates the currency is run by an executive who can impound appropriations, starve local services, and force austerity by other means. The question shifts from what could a benevolent sovereign do to how do we keep democratic life funded while the โ€œsovereignโ€ is hostile?

The answer is not to throw out MMTโ€™s core insight, but to bring it closer to how people actually experience money. What matters is endogeneity: money is created inside our institutionsโ€”up and down the hierarchyโ€”through ordinary acts of issuing, accepting, and managing public claims. Banks and credit unions create deposits when they buy public paper; pensions rebalance portfolios; the Federal Reserve can support municipal markets if it chooses. And when it comes to the timing and terms for redeeming bonds and other public assets, that is a contested political outcomeโ€”not an act of nature. A municipal lending facility does not have to mimic a short-term loan; it can be set up for steady, long-term support. In a healthier political order, state and city bonds could be treated more like U.S. Treasuries held at the central bank: not โ€œborrowingโ€ in the household sense, but one among many tools for organizing public investment.

Money on the Left has been known in MMT circles for pushing back against โ€œmonetary sovereigntyโ€ framings, even the โ€œspectrum of sovereigntyโ€ version meant to address critiques that MMT only applies to the U.S. federal government. Those frames still tend to narrow the conversation to nodes of power for whom sovereignty is the natural goal. But much real-world monetary authority is improvised, contested, and backstopped at sites of issuance and receivability that we would rather see as responsible than sovereign. That is why ideas like the Uniโ€”a complementary credit issued for large university fiscal circuitsโ€”are not about making universities โ€œmore sovereign.โ€ They are about structuring public responsibility across the institutions that already knit democratic life together.

Now that traditional monetary sovereignty is, for practical purposes, off the table for progressives in U.S. national politics, this shift in emphasis feels less like a theoretical tangent and more like a necessity. Keep the endogeneity; drop the sovereignty reflex; and show how democratic institutions at many scales can provision the peace now, while building toward a political order where honoring public commitments is routine.

Two Tracks

When we began talking about what to propose in this moment, we quickly realized we were thinking on two tracks at once. On the one hand, we think it is important to promote experiments with complementary currenciesโ€”local scrip, university credits, and other tools that give communities fiscal space when dollars are scarce or deliberately withheld. On the other hand, when we imagined what someone like a Mayor Zohran Mamdani in New York or Illinois Governor J. B. Pritzker might plausibly get behind in the near term, the memory of war bondsโ€”and the image of a public bond driveโ€”already had wide cultural recognition. People know what it looks like to line up, to contribute to a shared fund, and to get a certificate in return.ย We called our proposal “Blue Bonds” in recognition that they would mostly be issued by Democratic -controlled “blue” states.

Which Bonds?

That familiarity is why we first reached for bonds, but it did not stop there. While bond issuance is commonplace for US cities and states, the idea of a bond drive for democracy evokes the memory of World War II bonds. 

This raised a question for us to consider internally: what are the ideological implications of the wartime analogy?

Coretta Scott Kingโ€™s observation about the United States never confronting the idea of a peacetime economy became a kind of touchstone in our discussion. We asked ourselves: if we lean on the war bonds image too heavily, are we quietly reinforcing the idea that full employment and public belonging only make sense when there is an enemy to defeat? If so, that would be a dangerous starting point for democratic renewal. We do not want to bring people into public life only to leave them adrift when the โ€œthreatโ€ disappears.

Then another, more practical worry surfaced. While the idea of a โ€œnational debtโ€ owed to Chinese bond vigilantes sounds to many Americans like a cartoonish boogeyman, the public perception of bonds as debt feels more real at the state and local level. Here, concerns about bond ratings, refinancing terms, and investor confidence do not seem so far-fetchedโ€”they are the stuff of budget fights, service cuts, and โ€œtough medicineโ€ austerity campaigns. We have seen the same pattern play out internationally, where postcolonial governments are labeled โ€œirresponsibleโ€ and punished through capital flight and IMF conditionality.

One Personโ€™s Debt โ€ฆ

From our perspective, bonds are always endogenous. But the way they are experienced depends on the political and institutional surround. Sometimes they feel like a millstoneโ€”a debt plus interest hanging around the neck of some unfortunate city agency whose finances are under water. Other times, they feel more like a savings versus checking account: an interest-bearing claim in the broader circulation of public credit. The standard MMT framing would call this the difference between being the sovereign issuer of a currency and being a user. Yet it is just as accurate to say that the difference is designed into the political context. When, in the early days of COVID, the Federal Reserve created a facility to make municipal bonds receivable for dollars, it turned debt into cash almost overnight. โ€œTrade your debt for moneyโ€ sounds impossible until politics makes it happen.

That realization shifted our sense of what the war bonds analogy could do here. We are not trying to win a war (hopefully). The โ€œvictoryโ€ is a post-neoliberal government that can retire bonds or convert them to other kinds of assets without much fanfareโ€”because they have already done their job of keeping democracy funded and public employment steady.

The Duck-Rabbit Problem

And here is where what we call the duck-rabbit problem comes in, named after the famous optical illusion. The duck-rabbit illusion is an illustration that looks to some people at first glance like a rabbit, and to others like a duck. While the drawing is purposely ambiguous, it illustrates a universal premise in Gestalt psychology: our first impressions are โ€œwholesโ€ before we can perceive parts, new combinations and new assemblages. You see a duck or a rabbit first, and then with a bit of time you can see both images.

The duck-rabbit idea is central to how we move and learn in coalition. Members of a coalition see the same policy in their own terms, idioms and vernacularโ€”if not completely differently. By narrating these thoughts publicly, we hope to do coalitional communication more democratically. At Money on the Left, we will always say out loud that bonds are just another form of credit. Rather than borrowing funds that must be paid back at interest, bonds initiate new circuits of spending and receivability that can be structured in all kinds of ways. But whether the public understands them that way is not fixed in advanceโ€”it is something that the actual experience of Blue Bonds will shape. If they are used to provision a peacetime full-employment economy, and people see with their own eyes that this can be done whether or not Trump and his billionaires agree, then the idea that bonds must be โ€œpaid backโ€ in the punitive sense will look like the cruel joke that it is.


That, at least, is the horizon we are trying to open up: not just a fiscal tool to survive the present, but a lived demonstration that our capacity to provision the peace is real. Because that unfolds across many institutions and ledgers at once โ€” cities, states, unions, universities, and the central bank โ€” our strategies and designs should be multiple. Focusing here on Blue Bonds is not an attempt to subordinate other strategies and designs to this one. The opposite: complementary currencies and the public discourse they generate help set the long-term trajectory for Blue Bonds, making them more legible, inclusive, and durable. So when it comes to weighing our options, the more the merrier will deliver better, more democratic outcomes.

Coalition as Credit

Reading the Mamdani-Lander-Warren Coalition as a Credit Event

by Will Beaman

How do you keep governing when opponents try to stage a fiscal loss? In New York, that will be the fight: not just what to do, but how it will be underwritten as Albany and national actors slow-walk budgets until the calendar finishes them off. Our claim is simple: the technical โ€œhowโ€ is not a bolt-on. It is being rehearsed right now in coalition practice. Approach the Mamdaniโ€“Landerโ€“Warren moment as a crediting eventโ€”a scene where political credit and underwriting are made receivable across roomsโ€”and a near-term instrument, politicized bond issuance (Blue Bonds), stops looking like a leap and starts looking conceivable.

This is not the old, self-effacing triangulation that goes hunting for โ€œpolitical coverโ€ to appease moneyed interests and a โ€œsilent majorityโ€ of conservative voters. What we are seeing is public underwriting: recognitions offered in distinct idioms, in public, so claims are accepted where they would otherwise be blocked. โ€œCoverโ€ here is not borrowed; it is openly provisionedโ€”co-signed by diverse validators and accountable to diverse audiences.

Over the last months, old cues have misfired and new playbooks are being improvised. Coalition is shifting from ritual pledge to daily practiceโ€”who can speak for whom, in which rooms, without pretending to be the same. The Mamdani campaign crystallizes this shift: it may be the democratic-socialist leftโ€™s most consequential electoral win yetโ€”even including AOCโ€™s upset. Yet at the same time that it has sparked striking new instances of left-liberal solidarity, it has convened a soft collaborationist bloc linking Cuomo, national party figures, and The New York Times to Donald Trump himself.

We can interpret these gestures as a crediting event that contains multitudes, with implications across time. For the present political moment, such a reading re-credits the recent historical archive, stages usable contradiction in the present, and opens a near-future move: a democratic bond drive built from todayโ€™s coalition habits.

Past โ€” Reparative credit, loosening the archive

There is a kind of coalition work that begins by loosening the archive of political memory. It asks, generously, where should credit for movement victories go, and what have we discredited with too much finality? The Lander and Warren gestures toward Mamdani invite exactly that move. They do not pretend the Sandersโ€“Warren split never happened; they treat it as a record that can be re-read. What looked like incompatible strategies in 2020โ€”movement populism and structuralist reformโ€”can now be recast as twin rehearsals of a capacity we can use today. Warren praises Mamdani in her own idiom of affordability and household relief; Mamdani accepts the recognition without translating himself into technocratic prose. Lander, after his loss, extends his political credit to Mamdaniโ€™s project, not to equate the two of them, but as an acknowledgment that the organizing he did and the organizing Mamdani did could be recorded on the same page. This is a reparative politics of citation: restoring names and credit without forcing sameness.

Reparative citation matters because neoliberal politics rehearses competitive jockeying that narrows who can be seen. Liberal progressivism often tried to insulate technocratic expertise from the unruly work of experiential pedagogyโ€”treating spreadsheets, rulemaking, and fiduciary language as if they could do politics by themselves. On the other side, certain theories of mass organization cast groups like DSA as an autonomous subject accountable only to its own inside, tasked with building โ€œindependent powerโ€ that could then be imposed on coalition partners.

Each camp protected its strategyโ€™s dignity by discrediting the otherโ€™s. Technocrats dismissed movement language as naรฏve; Jacobin polemicists dismissed everything administrative as capture. Rituals of self effacement would accompany traversals between these two camps: left intellectuals discrediting their subject position as less โ€œorganicโ€ than an imagined working class audience; official policy spaces and legacy media gatekept from activists by rituals of genuflection to seriousness and moderation. The result was a historical archive that made it too easy to tell the story of 2020 as pure antagonism rather than divergent practice.

The Lander/Warren/Mamdani moment reanimates this archive with renewed depth and potential possibility. Landerโ€™s cross-endorsement recognizes that his organizing built capacities the coalition can now mobilize through Mamdani; Warrenโ€™s praise credits Mamdaniโ€™s coalition with strengthening the very affordability politics she champions in a different register. In both cases, political idioms are preserved and props are given both ways. That is what a swap line looks like in public: interoperability without assimilation. Read this way, the point is not metaphor, but practiceโ€”who can underwrite whom, in which roomsโ€”the same kind of practice a bond drive will require.

Seeing the past this way also clarifies why these credit analogies are not just rhetorical. Progressive campaigns really are provisioning authorities that mark up all kinds of creditโ€”small dollars, volunteer hours, public endorsements, private reputationsโ€”routinely narrated as commensurable forms of contribution. Money on the Left has argued that such ecosystems function like complementary-currency arrangements: unlike claims can be recognized together without collapsing into a single accounting identity, precisely because institutions learn to value one thing in terms of another. Treating cross-endorsements as crediting acts makes the practice legible. It is not sentiment; it is the political equivalent of marking accounts up and down to update how the coalition recognizes and underwrites political credit across its own differences.

What the reparative frame accomplishes, then, is simple: it dignifies both technocratic craft and movement pedagogy as distinct forms of credit worth carrying forward. It asks us to re-value strategies written off in the heat of a political split, and re-read losses as rehearsals. It keeps the archive open so prior work can be credited againโ€”nowโ€”to advance shared projects.

Present โ€” Staging contradictions as capacity

What is striking about the Mamdani moment is how plainly it was made possible by the cross-endorsement strategy with Brad Lander. The alliance was not a late truce; it created a channel where each camp could honor the other in its own language and have that recognition count in public. Lander used his standing to say, in effect, โ€œthis also belongs here,โ€ and people who trust Lander started acting like it does. That is the practical core: Mamdaniโ€™s credit in movement spaces and Landerโ€™s credit in institutional spaces were made to count across rooms without either campaign changing its voice.

The Israel/Palestine line makes this clear. Mamdani speaks with moral clarity about Zionism as an ethnonational project and steadfast about Palestinian rights. Lander, a liberal Zionist, did not pretend to agree. He gave a contradictory (but earnest) set of affirmations: โ€œIsrael has a right to exist,โ€ Mamdaniโ€™s critiques of Zionism are not antisemitic, and Lander can vouch for his moral seriousness. Mamdani did not translate himself to fit Landerโ€™s phrasing; he named the difference and kept moving. That is coalition as a working practice: two voices introducing each other across rooms and making each other receivable where they might otherwise be gated.

Landerโ€™s arrest outside immigration court deepened the point. He was detained and released, which is not how most detentions in that building go. Instead of treating that gap as something to hide, he said it out loud and used it to sharpen the gesture: I have credit with power that you donโ€™t, so Iโ€™m going to spend it on this. The asymmetry was not scrubbed for purity; it was mobilized. That is what solidarity looks like when it treats differences in proximity to power as a resource to be mobilized, not an embarrassment to be denied. And it builds a memory: if Lander runs for another office, the Mamdani field operation now has reasonโ€”and practiceโ€”to show up for him.

Elizabeth Warrenโ€™s partnership with Mamdani works the same way in another register. She does not adopt his cadence. She takes his affordability politics and says, in her idiom of consumer protection and competent administration, this belongs in the agenda I fight for. People who track Warrenโ€™s signalsโ€”career public servants, party operatives, legacy journalistsโ€”are more likely to give Mamdani a fair hearing. The long term effect is more coverage, more open doors, fewer knee-jerk vetoes.

Put simply: the present tense of this coalition is not unison; it is harmony. Lander vouches for Mamdani where his word reaches; Mamdani honors Lander without pretending they share every premise; Warren stamps the ticket in yet another venue. Each move keeps the differences intact and makes them usable together. That is why it feels durable rather than transactional. And because these introductions hold across rooms, they also prepare the validators and venues that a democratic bond drive would rely on when the budget is made to stall. 

Before we go further, a brief note on scope. These two sections have been descriptive: how political credit is being extended across rooms. What follows is more prescriptive. It asks how that same practice might be carried into administration if obstruction is engineeredโ€”so that the coalitionโ€™s habits remain usable when the setting changes.

Future โ€” Extending todayโ€™s coalition to tomorrowโ€™s Blue Bonds

Across unions, community groups, city agencies, and neighboring jurisdictions, similar gestures happen all the time: people with standing in one room are co-signing work from another, and audiences are learning to treat that co-sign as valid.

For political campaigns, these gestures are not atmosphericsโ€”they are capacity.

They answer, concretely, how someone like Mamdani was able to win as a democratic socialist: by having validators introduce his commitments across rooms where their word travels, so the campaignโ€™s promises begin to count in more places. And they are practice for recognizing political and economic capacity writ large when Trump tells everyone from opponents to junior partners that he holds all the cards.

This last section is therefore less descriptive and more invitational. It proposes one way to carry todayโ€™s coalition habits into governance if the play is to stall and demoralizeโ€”say, by slow-walking โ€œTax the Richโ€ until the calendar delivers the final blow. Taxing the rich is worth fighting for. But when it is treated as the only pathโ€”as if money were a finite substance to be recycled before anything else can happenโ€”it becomes a Hail Mary acceleration that invites the right to run out the clock. The alternative we propose is not to abandon that fight, but to pair it with a financing route that is increasingly legible in the coalitionโ€™s own practice.

Call that route politicized bond issuance. Neoliberal common sense has trained us to hear โ€œbondsโ€ as the city equivalent of household borrowing that must be paid back before any other thought is possible. The neoliberal story about bonds can make it seem more realistic to seek the consent of Trump-aligned donors and reactionary statehouse leaders for tax increases than to mobilize ordinary bond issuance at a political scale.

But the coalitional practices weโ€™ve been tracing make it possible to tell a different story. If coalitional gestures are carried forward, then the board will already be set up for a bond drive for democracy: radical democratic sentiments, urgent public works projects, trusted validators speaking in their own idioms, and a wide base that treats small sums and steady participation as meaningful. If agencies say in advance what the bonds will fund; if unions and civic institutions publicly invest in them, and if neighboring jurisdictions open reciprocal pathways, then bonds are a safe and stable feature of public life. In other words, we can politicize bonds to say that their viability is defended and expanded through the same cross-room vouching that is already underway in coalitional politics. 

Once politicized bond issuance is on the table, it changes the politics of taxation before any showdown. โ€œTax the Richโ€ stops being a plea to gatekeepers and becomes a negotiation in which the coalition already has a working alternative to fiscal suffocation. The message is simple: we will finance transit, clinics, housing stabilization, wages, and care on timelines set by public need. You can meet us there with durable revenue, or we will proceed while continuing to organize for that revenue. Either way, the work continues.

There is presently a massive desire for public gestures of solidarity between governing bodies. For someone like Illinois Governor J.B. Pritzker to have the backs of Texas Democrats who have the back of our entire democracy. And for ordinary people to be able to invest small dollars in fighting the oligarchy. A national Blue Bonds campaign between states and allied cities makes both desires actionable. It would create channels for residents to subscribe across jurisdictions and for issuers to coordinate acceptance and timing so that solidarity can spread in policy. In short, Blue Bonds could underwrite the emergence of a cross-state, urban front capable of sustaining public life against impoundment politics.

None of this requires the movement to know every technical step in advance. It requires that the legibility we are building nowโ€”about who vouches for whom, how unlike contributions add up, and why differences do not have to be flattenedโ€”be carried into administration and policy. A small Blue Bond holding then reads as another channel in a familiar architecture: small dollars, small labor, endorsements, and now a publicly named savings instrument tied to visible projects and campaigns. The more intelligible this becomes in the present, the less it will feel like a leap when it becomes a necessity. The coalition will be extending a practice it already recognizes, not inventing one from scratch.

Credit Events

If neoliberal governance taught a reflex, it was the Hail Mary face-off: stage a crisis, wait for things to deteriorate, come in with a bad solution or none at all. We propose a different ending. When coalition is treated as structure rather than exception, then crisis is no longer the only game. A democratic bond driveโ€”organized issuance, tax receivability, union and civic subscription, cross-jurisdiction supportโ€”becomes thinkable now because the recognitions that would sustain it are already public.

We should consign the Hail Mary to the dustbin with the rest of our neoliberal relics. Keep organizing to Tax the Rich, but pair it with instruments that todayโ€™s coalition already renders receivable. Waiting for the next showdown is not a strategy; treating the face-off as fate hands initiative to opponents who script defeat through delay and procedural choke points. The stall is built, and it can be countered by arranging capacities the politics has already brought into being.

Credit events are not events in the neoliberal senseโ€”not economic or political crises. They are scenes of public underwriting that re-credit the archive, make claims receivable across rooms in the present, and name near-term administrative capacities that follow without a leap. Blue Bonds are the near-term test of this stance: coordinate issuance with acceptance for taxes and fees, union and civic subscription, and reciprocity across jurisdictions so public work continues while longer-run revenue struggles proceed. No brinkmanshipโ€”keep recognitions public and portable, and build the instruments that enact democratic values.

The Unofficial Lives of Public Money

by Will Beaman

Recent Money on the Left proposals for endogenous credit campaignsโ€”like Unis or Blue Bondsโ€”often run headlong into an unspoken but deeply rooted distinction between โ€œofficialโ€ and โ€œunofficialโ€ money. This distinction can make such projects seem peripheral, even when they are designed to work alongside and strengthen existing public infrastructures. Clarifying how this distinction works, and how it might be reframed, is essential to building a narrative in which these proposals make intuitive sense as part of a broader democratic vision.

Perhaps a more helpful axis for thinking about currency is not official versus unofficial, but democratic and publicly responsible monetary practices versus rogue and publicly irresponsible ones. This framing helps us see how the dollar itself contains multiple layers of issuance and coordination that are neither fully centralized nor always democratically accountable. It also allows us to recognize that some soโ€‘called โ€œunofficialโ€ currencies may, in fact, make their connections to public infrastructure more visible and accountable than many โ€œofficialโ€ practices do.

We have inherited contradictory public imaginaries that reinforce the official/unofficial binary. The legacy of federalism and constitutional demarcations of โ€œsovereignโ€ public authority over issuing moneyโ€”the gold standard fantasy that implies a natural, finite supply of currency, and tacit ideological assumptions about what kinds of work count as legitimateโ€”all feed the belief that there is a โ€œrealโ€ quantity of money to which everything else must conform. Each of these imaginaries narrows our sense of what money is and what it can do.

The dollarโ€™s apparent seamlessness emerges from an ongoing choreography in which multiple institutionsโ€”from Congress to municipal courtsโ€”issue and reissue credit, coordinate payments, and manage its acceptance. This takes many everyday forms: congressional appropriations, loanโ€‘originated bank deposits, markedโ€‘up reserve balances and Treasuries, and municipal bonds. It also happens through public rituals and discoursesโ€”such as the oftโ€‘repeated claim that government must tax before it can spend, or moments when state governments refuse to draw on appropriated funds, as though hoarding balances were a mark of fiscal virtue. These narratives and practices naturalize the idea of the dollar as finite, preโ€‘existing, and selfโ€‘contained, when in fact its continuity depends on countless points of issuance and coordination. The question is not whether these points exist, but whether their issuance and functions are democratically accountable.

Sovereignty and its Doppelgรคnger 

When we reframe the landscape in terms of democratic and publicly responsible versus rogue and publicly irresponsible monetary practices, sovereignty becomes a revealing figure. In one register, it names the institutional intransigence that locks fiscal authority inside gatekept procedures and narrow definitions of โ€œlegitimateโ€ spendingโ€”congressional supermajorities, balancedโ€‘budget amendments, debt ceilings, and appropriations that never reach the people they were passed for. This is sovereignty as a state of affairs: insulated, resistant to public challenge, and wielded to forestall democratic fiscal contestation.

In another register, sovereignty animates a frontier fantasy. Here it becomes the outlaw dream of escaping any collective obligationโ€”a dream with deep roots in the settlerโ€‘colonial โ€œfree bankingโ€ movements of the Jacksonian West. In the nineteenth century, โ€œfree banksโ€ were celebrated in some quarters as engines of independence, issuing notes supposedly backed by local initiative and unshackled from federal oversight. In reality, they operated inside a broader federal and state monetary order, often failing spectacularly and leaving communities to absorb the losses. This history has been reโ€‘stylized in the twentyโ€‘first century as Silicon Valleyโ€™s crypto imaginary: Manifest Destiny reborn in code and venture capital, promising a โ€œsovereignโ€ infrastructure of value beyond the reach of government.

Both registers disavow their entanglements with the wider monetary system. The first enshrines continuity ritualsโ€”like taxing before spendingโ€”as natural limits, masking the many points where the dollar is already issued and reโ€‘issued. The second glorifies breakaway issuance, pretending it can float free of public infrastructure while quietly relying on it for convertibility, legal enforceability, and market credibility. In different ways, both treat accountability as a threat rather than a foundation.

By holding these two faces of sovereignty together, we can see how rogue and publicly irresponsible currencies cut across the official/unofficial divide. The dollar itself can be made to act like a rogue instrument when its points of issuance are hidden behind sovereigntyโ€™s gatekeeping. And many โ€œunofficialโ€ projects, from speculative crypto tokens to Trump Coins, rehearse the same fantasy of unaccountable freedom that drove the free banking frontierโ€”right down to their selective nostalgia for collapse and reset.

What this framing makes possible is a different horizon: one where new currencies, like Unis or Blue Bonds, work precisely by making their embeddedness in public infrastructure visible and contestableโ€”expanding the field of fiscal coordination rather than evading it.

Postscript: On Naming and Silencing

Jakob Feinigโ€™s concept of monetary silencingโ€”the process by which institutions and experts render money apolitical, finite, and beyond democratic contestationโ€”offers a powerful complement to the framing here. His historical work shows how silencing deepens when coalitional struggles over public money recede. Though he most often applies the term to mainstream institutions, Feinig has also noted how crypto imaginaries obscure their reliance on legal and infrastructural scaffolding.

My own framing begins from the other end: the outlaw, herrenvolk ethos of cryptocurrencies and the free banking movements before them. But we converge in showing that these are two sides of the same coinโ€”each eroding democratic governance when left unexamined. That convergence highlights a deeper point: naming is not just rhetorical. If monetary silencing thrives in the absence of coalitional imagination, then how we describe monetary practices helps form the context in which public futures can be seen.

Jim Crow to Trump: Reconsidering the Psychological Wage

by Will Beaman

W.E.B. Du Boisโ€™s โ€œpsychological wageโ€ has long been treated as a metaphor. In Black Reconstruction, he describes how white workers, denied meaningful economic uplift, found compensation in racial status. Many have read this as a bribe, or as a symbolic reward for class betrayalโ€”something less real than money, but no less effective in dividing the working class.

That reading rests on a familiar split between the psychological and the material. Racial esteem appears as an illusion, set against the tangible structures of wages, land, and capital. Even more sympathetic interpretations tend to preserve that hierarchy: psychology may be powerful, but money is what counts.

But Du Boisโ€™s phrase does not merely point to a parallel between money and status. It stages something more robust and flexible than a metaphor: an analogy. Not a substitution of likeness, but a choreography between forms. The psychological is not โ€œjust as realโ€ as the material. It is staged as material across institutions.

This is not quite Du Boisโ€™s own argument. He did not frame whiteness as a currency, nor was he writing from a theory of endogenous creditโ€”that is, a view of money as something issued, distributed, and coordinated from within social and institutional life. But his formulation invites such a reading for those who are looking for it. This is a reparative approach: not an attempt to retrofit Du Bois into a monetary theory he did not share, but to extend the intuitions that his concept makes available to us, and to trace how they resonate within a broader politics of credit and recognition.

The psychological wage, on this reading, is not a stand-in for economic life. It is one of its currencies: a system for distributing value, legitimacy, and access. It operates within, against, and alongside the dollarโ€”sometimes underwriting its effects, sometimes shaping them in more violent or distorted directions. Whiteness, in this frame, functions as a rogue issuance structure: a mode of provisioning that overlaps with official systems, but is never fully secured by them.

To trace this choreography is not to reduce value to a single structure or contradiction. It is to notice how value is staged and restaged across domainsโ€”how public life is assembled through overlapping genres of credit and belonging. Whiteness is one of those genres, and its wage is not a metaphor. It is a script, a system, and a currency. And it is improvised, rehearsed, and enforced in unequal measure.

Rogue Issuance and the Choreography of Credit

If the psychological wage is a currency, it is one that does not circulate on its own. Like the dollar, it must be issued, accepted, and reissued. Its legitimacy is never self-evident. It relies on ritualsโ€”public scripts that coordinate belief, recognition, and value across domains. What Du Bois observed was not just a compensatory self-image, but a system of provisioning: a choreography of credit that names, elevates, and withholds.

This is the sense in which whiteness acts as a rogue issuance structure. It confers permissionsโ€”who is employable, electable, presumed competent or harmlessโ€”and it denies them. It rehearses who can be trusted with leadership, housing, and grace. Its credit regime is rarely codified, but it is widely rehearsed and reinforced through credentials, reputations, and soft evaluations. It sanctions not only behavior but being, reinforcing a sense of deservedness through moral idioms like work ethic, family values, and lawfulness. Whiteness, as a set of public rituals, permits the dollar in some contexts, supplants it in others, and blocks it elsewhere.

To name whiteness as a currency is not to ennoble it, or to deny the fragility and violence of the value it provisions. The forms of receivability it sustainsโ€”access to housing, credibility, or bodily safetyโ€”are pathologically unstable, rooted in exclusion, resentment, and myths of deservedness rather than in durable public life. This instability is not a flaw but a feature of its affective infrastructure. As Du Bois recognized, it binds social life by staging threat and reward along racial lines. But whiteness does not merely console the dispossessed. It conditions value itselfโ€”including among the wealthy, who are often provisioned not with security but with paranoia, grievance, and moral license. Its currency scripts legitimacy through volatility and rehearsed threat, across contexts differently staged as privilege or precarity.

None of this occurs outside the terrain of the dollar, as this suggests. But the dollar itself is not a coherent entity. It is already a choreography: a composite of coins, notes, deposits, reserves, and credit instrumentsโ€”issued across the balance sheets of banks, treasuries, courts, and municipal governments, each with their own histories, idioms, and institutional rhythms. It has never been a single thing.

Its seeming continuity is an effect of coordinationโ€”an aesthetic and procedural labor that must be sustained. Whiteness and the dollar, then, are not the same. But they are not separable. They pass through one another. From the redlining of neighborhoods to the algorithmic scoring of creditworthiness, monetary systems have always embedded racial logics of credibility and threat. The infrastructure of whiteness has helped determine which expenditures are seen as investment and which as waste, which lives are worthy of public guarantees and which are overdrawn by default.

To understand this convergence requires attending not just to violence and exclusion, but to narrative and form. Whiteness functions not as an illusion or conspiracy, but as a genre of continuity. It makes disjointed provisions feel seamless. It codes asymmetric inclusion as natural legitimacy. It smooths over the cracks between property, personhood, and security. In this way, it choreographs the alignment of public life with itselfโ€”not through mastery, but through the repetition of a script that demands constant performance.

And because that performance disavows and conceals itself, whiteness as a currency is always under stress. What whiteness stages as self-evident has to be vigilantly enforced, patrolled, and defended. It improvises stability by invoking threats and scapegoats. It requires moral panics and narrative resets to cover over its breakdowns. Its continuity is not a given, but a fragile project. And when its claim to stable continuity falters, its most invested participants improvise new affective infrastructures to make the pain go away. That is Trumpism. But before Trump, this logic of continuity has been traceable across diverse aesthetic forms: homeownership, suburban coherence, and the smoothing operations of narrative itself.

Staging Continuity

Whiteness does not operate only through forceโ€”it relies on form. Across the 20th century, institutions stylized continuity: mortgages, suburban zoning, credit markets, and municipal budgets did not just allocate resources. They offered genres of legitimacy. Financial scripts taught people how to live, while aesthetic scripts trained them to see value, coherence, and threat.

Homeownership was central to this process. As historian David M. P. Freund shows in Colored Property, federal housing policy did not simply grant white families access to homes. It constructed a credit-based infrastructure that linked whiteness to financial credibility. Banks, zoning boards, and insurance tables embedded racial exclusion into public finance. What appeared as market rationality was a selective choreography of trustโ€”coded as neutrality, rehearsed as meritocracy.

Creditworthiness, in this landscape, became a moral genre. Beyond shelter, homeownership staged stability, future orientation, and civic belonging. It made whiteness appear prudent, deserving, and low-risk. Public life was organized around this appearance. And to sustain it, credit systems needed ways of managing discontinuity: foreclosure, disinvestment, labor displacement, racial integration. These ruptures had to be smoothed over or re-narrated.

That smoothing work did not begin with housing policy. Earlier techniques for managing discontinuity appeared onscreen, where the visual grammar of cinema trained audiences to perceive order in the midst of fracture.

The institutions of housing and credit were accompaniedโ€”and often conditionedโ€”by visual forms that taught people how to recognize coherence where there was asymmetry. Chief among these was cinema. As the dominant narrative medium of the 20th century, film did not just depict public lifeโ€”it organized its legibility. Its techniques of continuity editing taught viewers how to register coherence, resolve conflict, and align emotionally with dominant scripts of legitimacy.

These techniques were crystallizing across early cinema, but The Birth of a Nation (1915) gave them their most influential and violent expression. The film did more than mythologize the Ku Klux Klan as redeemers of white civilizationโ€”it showcased an emerging grammar of cinematic continuity. Techniques meant to weave spatial and temporal continuity like match-on-action cuts, establishing shots, and crosscutting were becoming common across the industry, but here they were marshaled to render racial violence as narrative resolution. Early narrative films often staged trials, domestic order, and mob justice, turning moral panic into moral clarity through continuity techniques that led viewers through an unambiguous and seemingly undoctored social world.

The grammar of cinematic continuity was not incidental. It mirrored and anticipated the grammar of white fiscal governance. Where mortgage finance aligned whiteness with financial coherence, cinema rendered racial violence as narrative closure. Together, these infrastructures naturalized the distribution of value and threat. They made racial credit logics feel intuitive: who deserves a home, who appears as a threat, who merits rescue or redemption.

Like all systems of credit, narrative continuity requires labor. It must be sustained, defended, and updated. When dominant scripts break downโ€”through economic crisis, political rupture, or affective dissonanceโ€”new infrastructures rush in to compensate. Trumpism was one such improvisation: a recalibration of whitenessโ€™s issuance crisis.

Trumpism and the Collapse of White Credit

By the time Donald Trump descended his golden escalator in 2015, the infrastructure of white credit had begun to buckle. The housing collapse of 2008 had already exposed the racial asymmetries baked into homeownership and finance. Many white homeowners experienced foreclosure for the first timeโ€”an experience long familiar to Black communities. And yet the fallout was not interpreted as a failure of whitenessโ€™s credit regime, but as its betrayal. What followed was not a reckoning with that regimeโ€™s selective provisioning, but a furious attempt to reclaim its authority.

Trumpism emerged as a performance of that reclamation. Its aesthetic was not continuity, but improvisation. It did not restore faith in institutions, but acted out their collapse. Its power came not from restoring legitimacy, but from redistributing permission: who could speak, who could offend, who could disobey. This was a shift in genre. If whiteness had long functioned as a currency of propriety, responsibility, and quiet entitlement, Trumpism offered its rogue variantโ€”a high-yield bond issued in the voice of grievance and spectacle.

Trump did not invent this genre. He inherited it from decades of white reaction and expanded it into a total aesthetic. His rallies resembled wrestling matches more than speeches. His governance was theatrical and erratic. His authority came not from coherence but from affective asymmetryโ€”punishment without principle, entitlement without responsibility. He flipped the script of white creditworthiness. No longer the silent majority, his base became the loud minority: proud to offend, eager to humiliate, impatient with anything that delayed gratification.

Trumpism did not restore the psychological wage. It performed its inflation. What once operated through subtle cues and institutional choreography now erupted into spectacle. This was not a revival of confidence in whiteness-as-creditโ€”it was its liquidation.

Yet Trumpism also revealed what whiteness had always required: staging, repetition, narrative, and rehearsal. Even its most chaotic expressions still followed a script about grievance, betrayal, redemption, and retribution. And like all currencies, it demanded belief. The improvisation only worked because it felt authorized. It gave its audience not new power, but the feeling of having never lost it.

What came into view in this moment was not the end of white issuance, but its reformatting. Trumpism did not undo the dollar. It did not replace the mortgage or the budget or the suburban imaginary. It added to them a new affective overlayโ€”a vigilante infrastructure of vibes and vengeance, broadcasting its legitimacy through volume and pain.

The Tea Party movement began reissuing the psychological wage in a new fiscal and affective register. In the wake of the 2008 housing crash, white grievance congealed not around foreclosure itself, but around the fantasy that โ€œundeserving othersโ€ had disrupted the moral logic of debt and reward. The Obama administrationโ€™s efforts to manage the crisisโ€”via stimulus, bailouts, or mortgage reliefโ€”were reframed as theft from the โ€œrealโ€ public: a racialized middle class whose creditworthiness had long been naturalized. Birtherism, with Trump as its most theatrical spokesman, extended this suspicion from the mortgage to the presidency. It questioned not only Obamaโ€™s origins, but the very legibility of Black legitimacy within white fiscal order. This was not yet Trumpism, but its grammar was already there: suspicion, spectacle, entitlement, and the demand to be visibly re-centered.

Trump did not introduce spectacle into whiteness; he made visible what had long been disavowed. Earlier forms invited white audiences to consume racial violence as spectacle in order to condemn itโ€”reveling in fantasies of threat and punishment while insisting on their own moral distance. Trumpism recasts that enjoyment as its own justification.

That shiftโ€”from disavowed enjoyment to open indulgenceโ€”is not a departure from whitenessโ€™s affective infrastructure but a symptom of its breakdown. Trumpism draws on fantasies long rehearsed in unconscious form, but restages them compulsively, as volatility, grievance, and spectacle become the means by which whiteness shores up credibility to itself and others.

But the improvisation did not come out of nowhereโ€”and it did not arrive fully formed. It built on existing scripts of entitlement and threat, pushing them past narrative restraint into open-ended spectacle. What had once been managed through veiled cues and institutional choreography now roared through crisis aesthetics. The story no longer resolved; it repeated, frayed, and spiraled.

Trumpism and the Performance of Collapse

Trumpism did not restore the psychological wage. It performed its โ€œinflationโ€โ€”or at least, what felt like one. The term is often used to suggest that too much credit has flooded the system and eroded its value. But that is not how credit works. Value does not dilute from over-issuance alone; it breaks down when the systems that provision and coordinate meaning begin to fail. What we call inflation is often just that: a crisis in infrastructure, not in quantity.

Trumpโ€™s spectacle emerged in precisely this context. The longstanding infrastructures that sustained whitenessโ€”housing, employment, national mythโ€”had begun to collapse under their own contradictions. Epsteinโ€™s exposure did not just implicate Trump personally. It broke the script. It made visible the gap between permission and legitimacy, between continuity and the structures that had always provisioned it. Trumpโ€™s response was not to restore order, but to stage its unraveling as catharsis.

This was not a revival of confidence in whiteness-as-credit. It was a performance of collapse: flags, chants, humiliation rituals, and gaudy excess. The affective architecture of whiteness, long managed through understated cues and institutional discretion, now roared through spectacle. Not because whiteness had been devalued by overuse, but because its continuity could no longer be convincingly choreographed.

Like housing and like cinema, Trumpism attempted to stage coherence out of fragments. But where Hollywood once smoothed those fragments into a narrative of order, Trump leaned into the jaggedness. Scandal did not replace plot; it rose to the fore. Early narrative films indulged spectacle, exploitation, and scandal, but housed them within melodramatic storylines that gave audiences a way to feel unimplicated in those indulgences. Trumpism abandoned that narrative containment. The story no longer resolved; it repeated, frayed, and spiraled.

If the psychological wage was always currency, Trumpism was its dramatic foreclosure notice. Not a new issuance, but a desperate demand for back pay. The spectacle was not redemptive. It was an attempt to feel like something still backed that credit, even if all that remained was grievance and noise.

That script cannot remain the same. The infrastructure that once choreographed legitimacy through restraint and propriety now improvises through excess, repetition, and pain. Trumpism did not sever the provisioning of whitenessโ€”it restructured it around performance, resentment, and spectacle. The credits are still being issued. The roles are still being cast.

Rogue Affect and the Aesthetics of Issuance

The fantasies of rogue issuance that simmered beneath mid-century white prosperityโ€”always latent in the figure of the self-made man, the bootstrapped homesteader, the frontier entrepreneurโ€”took on new affective labor during the neoliberal era, sustaining belief in whiteness-as-credit even as public imaginaries narrowed. After the 2008 collapse, these imaginaries found new institutional form in the rise of seemingly extra-institutional cryptocurrencies, which promised not only freedom from government but a sovereign infrastructure of value. These systems echoed white credit logics: exclusionary, performative, obsessed with authenticity and deservingness. Their fascist alignments sharpened over time, culminating in open grifts like Trump Coinsโ€”herrenvolk fantasy made liquid, a brazenly scammy frontier issuance of whiteness that made the scamminess the whole point.

The rise of crypto markets trading on โ€œvibesโ€ marks not the liberation of affect from institutions, but their rearticulation in unaccountable form. What looks like freedom from governance is really a displacement of itโ€”reducing infrastructure to spectacle, and public trust to speculative mood. Affect has always helped coordinate credit, legitimacy, and trustโ€”but within the racialized order of whiteness, it has been repeatedly disavowed: dismissed as mere sentiment when it surfaced outside sanctioned scripts, cast as volatility, mood, or threat. Crypto runs with that disavowal, converting scenes of trust and belonging into extractable fluctuations in sentiment.

Even on the left, affect is often prized for its escape from institutionsโ€”its ambiguity, unruliness, or refusal of legibility. But to treat affect as excess is to surrender its infrastructural power. What appears radical in its unruliness may unwittingly echo the rightโ€™s romance of unaccountability. Both suppress the need for accounting. Both rehearse an aesthetic of issuance that disavows responsibility. Crypto does not reject institutions; it reifies their coordinated exclusions as market outcomes, staging freedom as deregulated feeling and coherence as vibes.

The Next Script

The psychological wage was never a fixed promise or a permanent station. It was a fragile choreographyโ€”improvised, enforced, and rehearsed through everyday scenes of trust, threat, and belonging. Its power came not from what it was, but from how reliably it passed for something natural.

That reliability is faltering. Trumpism did not invent the breakdown; it emerged from it. As the institutions that once sustained white continuity began to unravelโ€”housing, policing, media, civic orderโ€”so too did the ability to naturalize those provisions. What remains is not the absence of a script, but a scramble for new ones. A scramble to renew the feeling that one still belongs to something self-evident.

This collapse clarifies not only how whiteness operates, but what the concept of a wage might help us see. Du Bois named a structure of compensation and enforcement that was never merely symbolic, and never purely economic. He gave us a figureโ€”a felt, distributed wageโ€”that can be reread today as a clue to how value, legitimacy, and belonging are provisioned through institutional life. This essay has followed that clue, not to recover his meaning, but to build on its resonances: to reimagine the psychological wage not as a metaphor, but as a currency in its own right.

There is no undoing that history. But there is a responsibility that comes with knowing it. If whiteness has operated as a rogue monetary infrastructure, then refusing it means more than critique. It means building differently. It means designing public life with an eye toward recognition that does not demand erasure, toward coordination that does not require scapegoats, and toward accountability that is scripted through shared participation, with room for revision, complexity, and care.

A Forgotten Letter to W.E.B. Du Bois: Monetary Populism and the Scapegoating of Black Political Life

by Will Beaman

In July 1934, W.E.B. Du Bois received a letter from an Atlanta resident named Gus Reich. We are excited to share both Reichโ€™s letter and Du Boisโ€™s short reply below. 

A lay theologian and self-styled monetary reformer, Reich in his letter proposes a spiritual plan for economic renewal. He urges Du Bois to support a vision of Christian financial reform led by the Black church. Condemning the interest-based banking system as โ€œdevilish,โ€ Reich calls for a new kind of moral economyโ€”one rooted not in gold or markets, but in collective virtue and spiritual confidence.

Du Bois responds with a single line: โ€œThe process of curing ills by printed money has been tried many times but never worked.โ€

It is a short exchange, but a revealing one. It surfaces a longstanding tension in American political life: Who gets to issue moneyโ€”and under what terms? Reichโ€™s proposal may seem eccentric, but it reflects something serious. It points toward an alternative to gold-backed or market-driven money, one where credit is issued as a public act, grounded in shared belief and moral purpose. In short, it imagines what many now call endogenous moneyโ€”money that enters the world not from economic exchange or nature, but from institutional decisions and collective commitments.

But even imaginative ideas can carry baggage. Reich frames the Black church as a vessel for national redemption. In doing so, he risks casting Black communities not as equal participants in public life, but as moral stand-insโ€”invited to lead only when they can purify a broader system in crisis. In our reading, Du Boisโ€™s response resists this framing. It is not necessarily a rejection of public credit itself (we hope), but of the burden placed on Black leadership to deliver redemption on someone elseโ€™s terms.

This moment makes more sense when seen through two overlapping histories. First, the legacy of Black-led fusionist coalitions after the Civil War. And second, the turmoil of Depression-era monetary reform.

In the decades after Reconstruction, Black Americans joined multiracial alliances across the South, including fusionist tickets that brought together Black Republicans and white populists like the Greenback and Peopleโ€™s Parties. These coalitions briefly held real power in states like North Carolina, pushing for land reform, public education, and voting rights. They were met with relentless opposition: not just Jim Crow laws and disenfranchisement, but racist violence like the 1898 Wilmington massacre. The memory of these movements, along with the political backlash they triggered, shaped how Black politics was perceived and enlisted in the decades that followed.

Fast forward to the 1930s: the U.S. had abandoned the gold standard at home and was experimenting with new forms of federal spending. But the role of money itselfโ€”how itโ€™s created, who controls itโ€”was still treated as a technical issue. Into that vacuum stepped a range of populist proposals. Some, like Reichโ€™s, drew from moral and religious sources. Others, like those of Father Coughlin and Huey Long, veered into conspiracy and authoritarianism. Still others gestured toward the greenback tradition, but often fell back on old fears of inflation and dependency, sometimes thinly veiled in racial terms.

Reichโ€™s letter reflects this tangle of influences. It combines spiritual populism with economic idealism, yet still relies on tropes about virtue, self-sufficiency, and moral rescue. Du Boisโ€™s reply, we think, is not just about the feasibility of printed money. It is about the weight of these narrativesโ€”and who is expected to carry them.

That said, Du Boisโ€™s position is not without its own limits. His skepticism about public credit reflects a broader intellectual traditionโ€”especially among Marxistsโ€”that treats government-issued money as risky or false, especially when it is not directly tied to labor or production. While that tradition offers powerful critiques of capitalist violence, it also tends to echo Jacksonian suspicion of credit as unearned or parasitic. In doing so, it often misses how public credit has functioned historically: as a way to coordinate social life, not just to reflect economic output.

Du Bois, as always, is careful. But his reply reveals how even the most perceptive critics can find themselves caught between traditionsโ€”rejecting the burden of credit for an oppressorโ€™s redemption without fully seeing the possibilities of credit as enfranchisement. Rather than dismiss his letter or take it at face value, we offer a reparative reading: one that holds Du Boisโ€™s skepticism in tension with the deeper political insight his reply also contains. We interpret his response as shaped by a moral position grounded in historical experienceโ€”one that can, and should, be reincorporated into a renewed, critical monetary populism.

We share this exchange not to praise or dismiss Reichโ€™s proposal, but to show why these questions still matter. At Money on the Left, we believe that reimagining how we provision public life is one of the central challenges of our time. That means taking bold monetary ideas seriously. But it also means paying attention to how those ideas are framed, and who is expected to redeem what.

Too often, communities already marginalized by economic crisis are recruited to fix it on someone elseโ€™s behalf. That is not enfranchisement, but deputization. And it risks reinforcing the very exclusions it seeks to overcome.

The same dynamics are resurfacing today. As Modern Monetary Theory (MMT) is metabolized across publics, its core insightโ€”that money is issued into existence through political decisionsโ€”is being cautiously integrated across the ideological spectrum. But not all uses of this insight are emancipatory. Right-wing populists like Thomas Fazi, Tucker Carlson, and Marjorie Taylor Greene are already experimenting with expansionist monetary rhetoric to serve nationalist and exclusionary agendas. Their message is not that money is public. It is that public money belongs to โ€œus,โ€ not โ€œthem.โ€

This is why we argue that monetary politics needs to be contested from within. It is not enough to point out that the state can spend. We have to ask: for whom, through what institutions, and on what terms? The risk is not just bad spending. It is moralized and conditional spendingโ€”credit extended as a reward for loyalty and withdrawn as punishment for dissent. What could be more Trumpian?

In that light, the question is not whether we โ€œsupportโ€ endogenous money. All money is already issued endogenously before it is moralized as scarce commodities or white tax-dollars. The question is what kind of world it is made to sustain. Who is trusted to issue? Who is seen as creditworthy? Who gets invited in? And who gets blamed when the system cracks?

These are not idle questions. As Carlson and Greene turn toward Christian nationalism, using the state to draw lines between insiders and outsiders, they are improvising on old themes: using money to grant absolution to some and withhold care from others. The MAGA movementโ€™s collapseโ€”exacerbated by scandals like Trumpโ€™s attempt to shut down the Epstein scandalโ€”has produced a frantic search for new conspiracies to stop the creeping sense of guilt and responsibility for Trumpโ€™s open cruelty. Monetary politics becomes one place to stage that search.

We have seen this play out before. In 1930s Germany, the Social Democrats rejected the WTB Plan for state-backed public credit, clinging to fiscal restraint. That created an opening the Nazis filled with their own vision of nationalist credit. Sound money did not save the Weimar Republic. It helped to end it.

If we want to avoid repeating those mistakes, we need to name whatโ€™s already happening. Public money is real. It is already shaping our lives. The only question is howโ€”and for whom. We need credit infrastructures that are open, democratic, and resilient. Not credit as a judgment, but credit as a commitment. Not a test of worthiness, but a project of shared responsibility.

Letter from Gus Reich to W. E. B. Du Bois, July 4, 1934

Dr. W.E.B. Dubois

Editor, The Crisis

Dear Sir:

Enclosed I send you[r] clipping from the Epworth-High road, giving me your address & that of your organ The Crisis; when you find my answer correct, I suggest that you print it in the Crisis for the advancement of colored people & the benefit of all to the glory & honor of our Lord Jesus.

In that article Color Caste in the U.S. the writer adds up all the rights of the white man, which the negro lacks, but he offers no practical solution how to cure the dilemma with benefit to both & harm to none. 

The white man in U.S., especially the Southern planter suffered loss indeed, when they gave up slave labor & the South feels its hardships yet to some degrees; however that was a blessing from the Lord which He gave to Abraham Lincoln & helped him put it through, for without it, our Declaration of Independence would have been a lie indeed & of no lasting power, but for the colored race, this blessing from the Lord brought upon them a new duty which means thankfulness & service; have they found Him today? 

It is a fact that today the white man all over the world is in far greater distress than the negroes were at the time when the civil war started & nobody has offered a solution yet, faithful & true; when my following statements are found correct, I beg to remember that the truth comes from the Lord, thank Him & use it in His name.

Todayโ€™s depression which spreads over all countries, is not caused by nature; there is enough to eat & commodities for sale; scarce is only the money in peopleโ€™s hands & the work with which they acquire it, & yet these people who lack this money today, are really the only ones who actually produce such value, with the work of their hands & the Lordโ€™s blessing, while the other fellow, who keeps it today, has to get it from them first, to get hold of it; has to take eager care of it, that he might not loose it again & has to carefully tend to it, that they may not slowly work it off again & deprive him of it. 

That is the character of our money-foundation, our banking & credit, our interest system; it is all selfish, devilishโ€”the only cure ? make it faithfully truth, brotherly-loving.

It is alltogether ridiculous to expect such a change however from men, who are accustomed to have prospered under the old system; the Lord wouldnโ€™t give truth to them; it has to come from men who know their Lord better, who are willing to serve Him & use Faith & Truth in all their work & give Him the glory & when I propose to the colored mrace today, to announce to the World repentence & reform, faithful & true, it is an opportunity given to them by the Lord to prove to their white brethren their equality & earn their thanks. 

It is impossible to make our finances true, if we are not willing to be true Christians ourselves first; our various denominations do not honor our Saviour but mostly other men; even Martin Luther, though he pronounced his faith in one Holy Christian Church โ€œwas done more harm than honor they made that church lutheran.โ€ To give glory to our Saviour, we must re-establish that Holy Christian Churchโ€ again, which the first Christians had & where they brought all they made & the church cared for them. 

That is another item our church lacks today & doesnโ€™t exercise control over our banks, to make them work straight-true, but that does not prevent, that we have to suffer today from the consequences of our neglect & that is the cause of our depression; the real cure, the only one,  is to create a perfectly christian banking system, abandon all of the old one, it is devilish from A to Z & if the president & senate refuses, make it privately, it will be even more profitable & it is exceedingly simply, just use bank-cheques instead of gold & silver, accounts for currency; it will give everybody all the money he needs, make abnormal riches a burden instead of a privilege & will make crime & wars unnecessary & undesirable. Being given to me by the Lord, it will receive His blessings also & if put into action by the colored race, will certainly win them the admiration of their white brethren. President Roosevelt has asked already for criticism & suggestions, practically admitting his failure; only the Truth will last eternally & putting it into finances will change our whole life. 

Settling the war-debt question, we should give up our demands for them; wouldnโ€™t need them anymore, but demand from our allies that they in turn give up their colonies & make the world free. We gave up slaves, they must do the same, it is either Christ or the devil!

Further details & information gladly furnished when wanted. 

Yours truly

Gus Reich

Letter from W. E. B. Du Bois to Gus Reich, July 10, 1934

Mr. Gustus Reich,
c/o Heywood Avenue, S.E.,
Atlanta, Georgia.

My dear Sir:

I thank you for your letter of July 4. I regret to say that I am no longer editor of The Crisis and therefore cannot publish your views. If I did, however, I would point out the process of curing ills by printed money has been tried many times but never worked.

Very sincerely yours