Abolition and Democratic Public Finance

By Will Beaman

Reconstruction is in the air. The 2026 midterms have dramatically reopened the electoral possibilities of the South, where Black voters, candidates, and organizers have demonstrated the political capacities that Democratic Party leadership has long neglected to cultivate. The party’s victories, alongside unexpectedly competitive races that national Democrats largely wrote off in advance, are bringing the consequences of that underinvestment home to roost. Angie Nixon’s account of her underfunded campaign and broader criticism of Democratic underinvestment in minority candidates underscore the stakes of this failure. Meanwhile, the public reckoning with Trump’s immigration enforcement regime confronts liberals with a related contradiction, where the growing willingness to contemplate abolishing ICE sits uneasily alongside the dismissal of prison abolition and demands to defund the police as too radical. Both developments raise questions about the institutions through which political participation is sustained and social exclusion is reproduced. They therefore invite us to consider Reconstruction as a project of transforming those institutions, rather than merely correcting the excesses or failures of an otherwise intact social order.

The recently published The Reconstruction Papers from Liberal Currents offers an ambitious liberal response to this moment. Its contributors contemplate sweeping constitutional and administrative reforms, with Anna Law explicitly calling for the defunding and dismantling of ICE and the Department of Homeland Security. Yet the collection contains no comparable engagement with prison abolition or the abolitionist critique of policing. Its fiscal imagination presents a related limitation. While the contributors envision substantial new public investments and more effective institutions, the collection’s most explicit account of fiscal sustainability, Ed Dolan’s “Sustainable Fiscal Policy for America”, remains organized around the stabilization of public debt and the management of expenditures within an inherited monetary architecture. The institutions of public finance themselves are largely spared the reconstructive scrutiny directed elsewhere.

At Money on the Left, we have been developing an approach to monetary politics called Democratic Public Finance (DPF), which we believe necessarily entails an abolitionist politics. DPF challenges the neoliberal conception of public expenditure as a discrete cost incurred on behalf of an identifiable beneficiary, whose claims must be weighed against those of competing constituencies. This understanding presupposes that individuals and groups possess independently constituted interests and capacities, which public institutions subsequently intervene to support or redistribute. The expenditure is thereby isolated from the ongoing institutional activity through which those interests and capacities are constituted in the first place. Carceral governance performs a comparable operation by locating social problems within identifiable offenders or populations, whose confinement or removal is supposed to correct a deficiency without implicating the surrounding social order. In both cases, the intervention is made to appear bounded and exceptional, while the institutional relations that produce the conditions requiring intervention recede into an apparently neutral background. The discretization of social subjects thus makes possible a corresponding containment of institutional responsibility.

We propose bringing DPF into dialogue with abolitionist critiques of carcerality to illuminate this shared logic of institutional exculpation and develop a more expansive conception of Reconstruction. From this perspective, abolitionist politics and democratic public finance converge on a reconstructive understanding of public responsibility that treats institutional provision as constitutive of shared social capacities, and seeks to democratically expand the relations through which those capacities are sustained. Our aim is to explore how public finance might support that project by making public credit an enduring, responsive infrastructure for collective life.

This encounter invites a return to the Reconstruction Amendments themselves. Ratified in the aftermath of the Civil War, the Thirteenth, Fourteenth, and Fifteenth Amendments transformed the constitutional organization of American citizenship and political participation. Yet their significance has always depended on the contested meaning of enforcement. Section 2 of the Fifteenth Amendment grants Congress the power to enforce voting rights through appropriate legislation. As Jamelle Bouie has observed, the amendment emerged from debates over more expansive possibilities for guaranteeing suffrage, even as its final language preserved important limitations. The question of how rights become effective was therefore present from the beginning.

Yet enforcement carries a carceral connotation, suggesting the identification of discrete violations and the imposition of corresponding corrections. What if we understood enforcement instead as provisioning? The underlying constitutional insight, after all, is that rights do not reproduce themselves. Their exercise depends on the continuous institutional provisioning of the capacities through which rights become effective. Reconstruction, in this sense, concerns more than the correction of violations against an otherwise settled political order. It concerns the ongoing constitution of the institutional conditions through which democratic life becomes possible.

This distinction illuminates a broader carceral logic. Consider how the carceral imagination organizes the relationship between wrongdoing and institutional intervention. By attributing a violation to an identifiable offender, the carceral imagination isolates wrongdoing from its conditions of emergence and makes a correspondingly localized sanction appear sufficient. The intervention is supposed to correct the deviation without implicating the institutional order within which it occurred. Indeed, its apparent legitimacy depends partly on this containment, where punishment is presented as a limited response to a particular transgression rather than an occasion for reconsidering the social relations that produce it. The carceral logic thus localizes problems and remedies so that interventions appear as bounded corrections without broader institutional implications. Disenfranchisement becomes the misconduct of a particular official; poverty becomes the deficiency of a particular household. In each case, the intervention presupposes an otherwise intact social order against which the problem appears as a deviation.

But this supposedly neutral background is itself an institutional accomplishment. The localization of intervention actively reproduces its apparent innocence, obscuring the ongoing institutional reproduction of the conditions that interventions purport to correct. Carcerality thus operates through a more general logic of institutional exculpation, the fiction that institutions can intervene in problems without recognizing their participation in the reproduction of those problems.

Abolitionist theorists such as Angela Davis and Ruth Wilson Gilmore have long challenged this logic of institutional nonimplication. In Are Prisons Obsolete?, Davis questions the familiar demand to identify what would replace prisons, arguing that the search for a single institutional substitute already presupposes that imprisonment performs a discrete social function requiring an equivalent replacement. She proposes instead a constellation of alternative institutions and practices capable of transforming the social relations that sustain incarceration. Gilmore’s understanding of abolition as a project of institutional presence, which she connects to the unfinished reconstructive work explored in W. E. B. Du Bois’s Black Reconstruction, likewise emphasizes the creation of life-sustaining capacities alongside the dismantling of institutions organized around abandonment and confinement. The alternative to prison is thus an expansive and elaborative conception of public responsibility, whose realization necessarily exceeds any single institution or intervention. The demand for a discrete replacement reproduces the very logic of containment that abolition seeks to overcome. This raises a corresponding question for public finance: why should the provision of shared social capacities be organized as a succession of discrete expenditures, with each justified only in reference to a discrete beneficiary or return?

This provides an anti-carceral foundation for democratic public finance’s critique of the discretization of public expenditure. Conventional fiscal reasoning treats expenditures as separable interventions into an otherwise self-sufficient economy. Each expenditure is assigned to an identifiable beneficiary, whose supposed dependence on public resources becomes the basis for calculating its cost and demanding a corresponding return. The public institution appears to surrender resources from a preexisting stock to correct some external deficiency.

Yet endogenous credit unsettles this sacrificial understanding of expenditure. Monetary capacity is generated through institutionally authorized operations of credit creation, rather than merely transferred from previously accumulated holdings. And monetary payments are institutionally mediated operations through which financial claims are created and reconfigured. Expenditure is therefore evidence of institutional presence, rather than absence. Whether a particular expenditure entails material constraints or foregone capacities is a further question requiring investigation rather than an inference from its nominal size.

The carceral fiscal imagination reproduces its logic of localization by discretizing both public expenditures and the social relations they sustain. Just as carceral enforcement isolates a violation within an identifiable offender or population, conventional fiscal reasoning isolates expenditure as a transfer to an identifiable beneficiary, abstracted from the wider institutional relations through which social life is reproduced. Society consequently appears as an aggregation of competing individuals and stakeholder groups, each making claims upon a limited stock of public resources. Expenditure is understood primarily as a cost incurred on behalf of one constituency, rather than as an expression of institutional presence that may constitute capacities shared across the social fabric. The apparent separability of beneficiaries reinforces the apparent separability of expenditures, and vice versa. What disappears is the additive character of public provision, where the provision of one set of capacities can enlarge the possibilities for collective activity elsewhere. The carceral logic thus renders collective life as a succession of localized deficiencies and competing claims, obscuring the ongoing institutional participation through which society is constituted.

Democratic public finance treats accounting distinctions as instruments for coordinating institutional activity, rather than as boundaries that delimit the social significance of expenditure. Additivity begins from the constitutive mediation of social relations. Public provision enlarges collective capacities through institutional connections that precede and exceed the identification of particular beneficiaries. Its effects are therefore understood through the development of these relations, rather than as incidental benefits accruing to otherwise independent individuals. Public expenditure is among the practices through which social and constitutional life are continuously reproduced.

From this perspective, enforcement understood as provisioning makes public responsibility reconstructive, where constitutional rights become effective through the ongoing institutional creation and reproduction of the capacities required to exercise them. The political question becomes how we democratically constitute the institutional presence through which collective life becomes possible.

What would it mean for public spending not to discretize social life in this way? Non-discretizing fiscal policy would involve using administrative differentiation to coordinate an institutionally interdependent social world. It would recognize expenditures as moments in the ongoing reproduction of shared capacities, rather than as isolated concessions to competing claimants. Such institutions could establish enduring rights and crediting capacities responsive to changing social needs. A public right to employment, for example, could enfranchise community organizations to create socially necessary jobs as needs emerge, drawing upon a standing public credit commitment whose monetary capacity adjusts to the work that communities democratically undertake. Political contestation over public priorities would thereby take place within the democratic organization of collective capacities, rather than presupposing their scarcity.

Money on the Left proposals such as the Seattle Loop and public grantmaking banks illustrate how monetary obligations can become instruments of continuing public coordination rather than demands for external repayment. The Seattle Loop’s implications for additive coalition-building further illustrate how public commitments can reinforce one another across institutional boundaries. More broadly, democratic public finance seeks to distribute the authority to create credit across institutions so that their differentiated activities can mutually expand the possibilities of collective provision. Public credit conceived as a malleable and responsive standing infrastructure is better suited to the texture and specificity of social life than a fiscal architecture organized around selective, discrete investments. Rather than requiring local needs to be abstracted into competing budgetary claims, such an infrastructure could sustain their changing and heterogeneous expressions in ongoing coordination with wider scales of public authority. Local specificity and encompassing public responsibility would become mutually constitutive. The authority to create credit would make room for distributed forms of initiative, while those initiatives would continually inform and transform the purposes of public finance. The distinction, ultimately, is between a fiscal imagination organized around the containment of institutional responsibility and one organized around its democratic expansion.

Featured Image: jackie sumell, The Solitary Gardens. This participatory public sculpture project replicates the 6×9 foot blueprint of a standard US solitary confinement cell. Instead of a cage, the walls are constructed from biodegradable materials—such as sugarcane and limestone—and the interior is filled with a garden designed through letters exchanged with individuals currently held in solitary confinement.

Dispatches from Philadelphia: Inside the Public Banking Movement (In the Loop, Ep. 5)

Patrick Loftus (Modern Money Lab U.S.) joins Tyler Suksawat and Scott Ferguson to unpack their experience at the Public Banking Institute’s national conference, “Public Banking for Public Prosperity: A Declaration of Financial Independence,” held October 22–24, 2026 in Philadelphia. Reflecting on the palpable energy of the weekend, the hosts revisit the excitement of finally sharing a room with a diverse, nationwide network of advocates. They highlight the overwhelming sense that attendees were there to fight for social and ecological justice—anchoring the movement in community and environmental needs rather than getting lost in the technocratic sauce of banking for its own sake.

Sampling the weekend’s highlights, challenges, and generative debates, the conversation explores the profound challenge of translating ideas across different activist discourses and habits of thought. The group navigates the simmering tensions and polysemic ambiguities surrounding the concept of “endogenous” money that floated throughout the conference.

They reckon with the varied receptions to Money on the Left’s Democratic Public Finance framework, which positions money as an inexhaustible, legally designed public utility. Touching on specific interventions—from the “Loop” model for recapturing municipal bond interest, to the push for public banks to issue grants rather than just interest-bearing loans, to the recognition that pricing is always socially administered—the hosts discuss how these ideas were variously applauded, debated, or unheard.

The episode captures a standout spontaneous moment at the conference when Tyler began mapping out strategies to circulate more capital to minority-owned banks, drawing an ever-growing crowd of attendees to collaboratively puzzle through the problem.

Additionally, the hosts weigh the possibilities and limits of the new National Infrastructure Bank movement, supporting the initiative while critiquing its problematic Hamiltonian reliance on private treasury bond capitalization over the federal government’s own full faith and credit.

Finally, the discussion broaches Scott’s proposal for the prospective Los Angeles Public Bank to establish an Independent Media Facility, a strategic intervention aimed at rescuing small- and medium-budget Hollywood productions amidst the industry’s current investment and employment crisis.

Tune in for these dispatches from the frontlines of the public banking movement.

Visit our Patreon page here: https://www.patreon.com/MoLsuperstructure

Original music by Josh Klinghoffer

Public Banking for Public Prosperity: A National Conference

This month, Money on the Left shares audio selections from our participation at the Public Banking Institute’s national conference: Public Banking for Public Prosperity: A Declaration of Financial Independence. The conference took place in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania from October 22 through October 24, 2026.

Convened in the city where American banking started almost three hundred years ago, the event featured vital contributions from progressive leaders, including Congresswoman Rashida Tlaib, Ralph Nader, and over twenty others from around the United States and Canada. Building upon the U.S. tradition of public self-financing through the creation of bank credit, academics, bankers, regulators, politicians, and civic activists engaged with intensive presentations designed to catalyze a national movement now underway in over thirty locales.

The episode begins with Scott Ferguson presenting Money on the Left’s overarching vision of Democratic Public Finance in which he argues against zero-sum logics of austerity that treat money as a scarce, privately hoarded resource tied solely to public and private revenues. Instead, Ferguson frames money as an endogenous, malleable public architecture of credit and debt capable of bypassing the revenue chokepoint to directly finance social and ecological care. Because his live address was condensed due to time limitations, listeners are encouraged to read the unabridged manuscript here, which features Money on the Left’s full argument for Public Grant-Making Banks, designed to grant public money in addition to making traditional loans.

The episode then transitions to a panel featuring Tyler Suksawat, Benjamin Wilson, and Billy Saas, who expand on the practical and theoretical horizons of Democratic Public Finance. Suksawat details our proposal for “the Loop,” explaining how establishing a sub-federal public bank to buy municipal debt stops interest payments from leaking to Wall Street creditors, thereby transforming public debt into a self-growing circuit that finances public goods. Wilson then challenges how the public uses language, metrics, and accounting to value communities, lands, and infrastructures. He implores us to get creative with how we value our shared world in order to drastically expand what the public sector presently harbors and can do. Finally, Saas explicates Money on the Left’s historical commitments to both critical and generative thought. He notes that while we share the broader left’s “hermeneutics of suspicion” to unmask exploitative power structures, we equally insist on actively pursuing a “hermeneutics of provision,” which imaginatively mobilizes money’s inexhaustible public powers to solve today’s urgent social and environmental crises.

Video footage of the full conference is still being edited, but the raw session recordings can be viewed on the Public Banking Institute’s YouTube channel: Day One, Day Two, and Day Three.

Visit our Patreon page here: https://www.patreon.com/MoLsuperstructure

Music by Nahneen Kula: www.nahneenkula.com

Transcript forthcoming …

* Thank you to Zachary Nosbisch for the episode graphic, Nahneen Kula for the theme tune, and Thomas Chaplin for the transcript.

Democratic Public Finance & the Future of Public Banking

By Scott Ferguson

The following text was composed as an address for the conference Public Banking for Public Prosperity: A Declaration of Financial Independence, held at the Friends Center in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, October 22–24, 2026. Published here is the original, unabridged manuscript of the talk, which was subsequently condensed to meet the time constraints of live delivery.

We who gather here today agree: public banking is an indispensable instrument for reclaiming governing power and economic capacity from a rapacious financial sector and a feckless federal government. We have endured decades of anti-democratic austerity, compounding private wealth, and now, brazenly authoritarian fiscal sabotage. The time has come to break the duopoly of Wall Street’s private credit and a paralyzed federal purse by establishing a nationwide network of democratically accountable public banks—an infrastructure that operates explicitly in the common interest and treats credit as an inalienable public resource, rather than a vehicle for private exploitation and profit.

My name is Scott Ferguson. I am an Associate Professor in the Department of Humanities, Arts, & Film at the University of South Florida and a co-founder of the Money on the Left Editorial Collective. Our mission at Money on the Left is straightforward, but formidable. Money, we insist, is an inexhaustible public utility and, faced with nearly insurmountable social and environmental crises, there is no more urgent task today than reconstructing the global monetary system. However captured or abused by private interests, we argue, money remains a thoroughly malleable public instrument for social and ecological care. For this reason, we place money’s public design at the center of left thought and organizing, bridging political economy with law, culture, and aesthetics. Money, we contend, is neither a neutral medium of private exchange nor an irredeemable device of class domination that should be abolished. Whatever its historical entanglements with capitalist apologetics and political violence, money is the primary medium through which we organize our eco-social interdependence—and our most powerful tool for collective stewardship.

Following Modern Monetary Theory (or “MMT”) and Christine Desan’s “constitutional” legal theory, we understand money to be fundamentally public and endogenous. Monetary forms do not bubble up spontaneously from private barter or market exchange; they are active products of political governance and legal design that are rooted in the public sector. Money is an endogenous architecture of credit and debt, issuance and redemption—a dynamic legal institution that continuously brings monetary forms into existence and retires them through public authority. Money on the Left explicitly rejects dogmas that see money as exogenous: a scarce, privately hoarded value governed by immutable economic laws that no one supposedly controls. MMT correctly demonstrates that issuance always precedes redemption and that currency-issuing governments can always afford to mobilize idle resources and labor. Yet while standard versions of MMT restrict such capacity to what it defines as national “monetary sovereigns,” Money on the Left extends this logic across the entire institutional landscape. We see fiscal and crediting capacity everywhere—no matter how smothered by balanced-budget amendments, bond-market discipline, or ideological defeatism our public institutions appear to be.

My colleagues and I are honored to join this conference alongside such an extraordinary lineup of thinkers and organizers. If Money on the Left has a distinct contribution to offer this room, it lies not in technical banking mechanics or financial law, but in an overarching political-economic vision: what we call Democratic Public Finance, or DPF. DPF is designed to energize, guide, and protect our movement over the long haul. Public banking in the United States will necessarily be heterogeneous, modular, and adaptive, coordinating struggles across municipal, state, and federal scales. Yet as we embrace pragmatic strategies tailored to distinct political terrain, we must ensure that tactical flexibility does not degrade into technocratic compromise, complacency, or capitulation.

Replicating the Bank of North Dakota across all fifty states would be a monumental political triumph. It would claw back billions in public wealth from Wall Street and revitalize local economies. Still, such a triumph leaves the underlying logic of the commercial loan model more or less intact. This model casts cash-strapped institutions and organizations as perpetual debtors, forced to squeeze scarce revenues out of local communities to service principal and interest. A public bank that functions only as a benevolent lender, we warn, actually short-circuits money’s true social power. This is where DPF proves indispensable: by refusing to accept zero-sum logics of scarcity as inherent to monetary design, Democratic Public Finance keeps our movement’s horizon maximally open, experimental, and ambitious.


“Money is not a thing,” wrote Karl Marx in The Poverty of Philosophy, “it is a social relation.” This familiar gesture aims to de-naturalize money, recasting political economy as a thoroughly social, and therefore contestable, domain of collective life. The trouble is that most modern political economy—Marxism included—promptly betrays its own constructionism, reducing money’s social functionality right back to a private, alienable, and ultimately exogenous thingliness. We know very well that money is not an inert fact of nature; yet we continue to envision its possibilities as if it were a freestanding token caught in a closed, quasi-physical system. Whether pinned to marginal utility, behavior, or abstract labor time, money is envisioned as a finite chit moving through real or virtual space, carrying a scarce substance from here to there via invisible market forces. Monetary value is always tethered to the past: either to yesterday’s accumulated revenues or to debts mortgaged against future earnings. In this prevailing credo, spending–and especially public spending–remains forever prisoner to money’s supposed pastness. Shackled to tax receipts and bond yields, government is warned incessantly that ample fiscal investment will only “crowd out” private capital or trigger runaway inflation.

Trapped in this worldview, collective life is forced to operate within perversely narrow and punitive limits. Care for the many is made dependent upon the taxable gains of the wealthy few. Framing public provision as mere “redistribution” pits interdependent communities against one another as antagonistic voting blocs. At the center of this theater stands the all-powerful figure of the “taxpayer”—the mythic, hardworking, and tacitly white American around whom all legitimate public finance supposedly turns. Right and left polarize around mutually defining resentments. ‘Me first’ or ‘thee first’? ‘Taxation is theft’ or ‘generosity toward the unfortunate’? Inevitably, economic divides metastasize into cultural antagonisms: ‘High T’ versus ‘bleeding heart.’ NASCAR or Broadway? Kid Rock or Chappell Roan? Raw milk or oat-milk?

In this warped reality, abandonment is baseline. Nurture is the rare exception—born of impossible choices within a rigged game ruled by artificial scarcity. From this vantage, our most vulnerable communities count primarily as liabilities. Though replete with heterogeneous potentials and desires, they are entered into the ledger primarily as costs. Women of color, immigrants, the unhoused, disabled people, trans kids: in the eyes of orthodox finance, they are perpetual drains on the public purse, whether pitied, despised, or simply ignored. Assisting one community requires starving another. Pitched as zero-sum sacrifices, tenuous public investments in such areas rarely survive the next fiscal crisis. Last year, we funded disability services, so replenishing urban tree canopies had to wait. Next year, we will correct decades of library neglect, which means the light-rail line passed five years ago is indefinitely on hold. Want property tax relief for fixed-income seniors? That requires gutting budgets for public schools, who are then told to cross their fingers, protect their credit ratings, and beg Wall Street for bond financing.

Whereas the luminaries of Ancient Greece adopted a complex allegorical view of the gods, modern economic commentators across the political spectrum worship revenues as deadly literal deities, imagined to be the supreme fulcrum of all future finance. This is zero-sum metaphysics in extremis. According to today’s revenue fundamentalism, tomorrow’s activities are intrinsically constrained by yesterday’s returns. We at Money on the Left are sympathetic to left critiques of the profit motive as, at best, inadequate and, at worst, poisonous for collective flourishing. What such criticisms regularly overlook, however, is the far more tenacious fantasy that revenue constitutes the sole chokepoint for future provisioning across public and private domains. The tragedy of the neoliberal “bailout state” is not that it courts “moral hazard,” violating the apparently sacred principle that all institutions and organizations should be self-funding without public assistance. Rather, bailouts are unjust simply because they mobilize public credit exclusively to rescue big capital, while abandoning the rest of us to austerity.

Consider defenses of the US Postal Service. Critics rightly point out how the 2006 mandate to pre-fund retiree benefits sabotaged a viable public agency. Yet notice the trap: defenders scramble to prove the Post Office can be profitable, the right screams for privatization, and the conventional left demands taxing the rich to plug the deficit. What remains unthinkable across the board is uncoupling public provisioning from revenue collection altogether. Through this twisted prism, collective care is forced to wait on private accumulation, rather than answering the urgent needs and democratic desires of the body politic.

Under neoliberalism, fiscal sabotage becomes a routine sacrifice: a ritual bloodletting designed to coax private revenues out of sluggish markets. Someday, we are promised, we will tax away private surpluses for the common good. In the meantime, belt-tightening remains our penance. Somehow, interminable austerity will conjure the resources upon which our collective survival depends.

Enter contemporary fascism. Today’s fascism is neither an unnatural perversion of market forces nor simply their authoritarian triumph. Instead, it takes neoliberalism’s zero-sum callousness and strips away the polite fiction of economic neutrality—touting austerity not as an unfortunate market necessity, but as an overt, cruel, and often vengeful political choice. Fighting corrupt oligarchs and authoritarian puppeteers is necessary, but in doing so we also need to repudiate the fatal premise that revenue is the primordial origin of human capacity. Never forget: because, at bottom, money is not a zero-sum game, redistribution collective life need not wait on private permission to thrive.

Herein lies the core revelation of Democratic Public Finance. If, according to DPF, money is a fundamentally public and endogenous infrastructure of credit and debt, then it arises not from the needle’s eye of past returns, but rather as a function of ongoing politics and the wide berth of systemic legal design. Credit, in this view, represents the broad granting power at the heart of monetary issuance. It is not a micro-scale agreement between two parties, nor is it predicated upon scarcity. When a government, institution, or organization provides credit to recipients, it gives community members permission to carry out specified social activities. Though shaped by quantitative measures, the power of credit is thoroughly qualitative, malleable, and inexhaustible. Debt is equally plastic. Obligations can be structured in any number of ways. What is a grant but a form of credit that prioritizes qualitative commitments over quantitative returns? From this perspective, revenue is not a scarce token hoarded and spent; it is an operation of redemption—the settlement phase of the monetary circuit, not its restrictive wellspring. In our current system, revenue concentrates staggering purchasing power in private hands. Yet that distribution is not an immutable economic law; it is an active political design that must be radically contested. Revenue is neither the spontaneous outcome of market efficiency nor the indispensable precondition for future investment. To reduce left politics to revenue redistribution is to surrender our greatest instrument of collective coordination before the struggle even begins. Redistributionism, in other words, is inherently weak, like pointing a pocketknife at a firing squad.


Democratic Public Finance demands that we thoroughly re-engineer how the public sector variously grants and obliges. Stop trying to “find the money” as if it were a finite hoard buried in the sand. Our task is to design monetary architectures that are public, capacious, and democratically accountable. At Money on the Left, we articulate this project across five strategic areas: First, we challenge the dominant fiscal rhetoric, exposing existing tax and debt limits as both arbitrary and politically irresponsible constraints. Balanced-budget amendments, statutory borrowing caps, and debt ceilings are not laws of nature; they are legal straitjackets designed to enforce artificial scarcity and devalue our collective labor. We have everything to gain by unmasking these rules and showing the public how these institutional bottlenecks are constructed to suppress human capacity and ecological renewal.

Second, DPF directly confronts and aims to dismantle the deep legal architectures that enforce neoliberal austerity and protect authoritarian power. These structures are etched into federal and state constitutions, designed precisely to preempt public power and discipline democratic ambition. To leave these legal boundaries unchallenged is to resign before political mobilization even starts—conceding the myth of monetary scarcity and preemptively suffocating what our communities imagine to be possible.

Third, we seek to creatively multiply public crediting operations across the monetary hierarchy. In doing so, we redefine what counts as socially valuable by deploying complementary crediting tools across the public sector. By establishing diverse crediting channels, we can drive a planned, sustained expansion of public investment. We can revalue care and reproductive labor, mobilize neglected community capacities, and repair ecological harm. Though taxing billionaires out of existence remains a vital responsibility for any democratic movement, DPF ensures collective flourishing and participation without robbing Peter to pay Paul or deepening electoral divides over taxpayer money. Crucially, this proliferation also serves a profound pedagogical purpose: it demystifies finance in practice, proving that money is an alterable political technology open to democratic imagination and disputation.

Fourth, DPF politicizes and democratizes pricing. Supply, of course, matters. Demand is just as important. But pricing has little to do with the widely held fantasy that somehow together supply and demand naturally gravitate toward a market equilibrium that is fair, efficient, or  inevitable. Prices are, in truth, always administrated, playing a key part in money’s ongoing design. The question is not if or when pricing is administered; it is how, by whom, and for what social purpose. Should we allow a corporate oligarchy and algorithmic software to raise prices in the name of maximizing private profit? Or, ought we to set a strong floor on pricing through robust public options, legal regulations, and community pricing boards?

Nowhere is the private administration of prices more aggressive—and more hidden—than in the logistical corridors of corporate e-commerce. When Amazon.com controls the marketplace, the warehouse, and the delivery network, pricing becomes a private tax on the whole world. This is why Christopher Armitage proposes a municipal alternative. “[Amazon] doesn’t manufacture anything,” writes Armitage. “It provides a website, a warehouse, and a van. In exchange, every transaction drains money out of the seller’s community.” By contrast, a municipal alternative to Amazon can directly provide such services to the public: a web interface, public couriers and, when necessary, storage for locally-produced goods. “A municipal platform has no incentive to manipulate search results, bury competitors, or launch private-label knockoffs of its own vendors’ best-selling products. The platform works for the community because the community owns it.” Implied in Armitage’s vision is that it puts pricing in the hands of the public sector, re-appropriating pricing from corporate gatekeepers and transforming it as an instrument of democratic governance.

Fifth and finally, DPF demands far-reaching experiments in public banking and digital payment systems. Today, banking and payments are dominated by commercial banks, private equity, shadow banking, credit card companies, Silicon Valley apps, and payday lenders. If crediting operations engender our collective future, then we must place democratizing such operations at the core of political organization and action. By chartering public banks, we wrest public funds from Wall Street, deploy stabilizing credit during downturns, channel investment into historically divested communities, and eradicate the banking deserts manufactured by financial consolidation. Alongside these banks, we need to establish free public digital payment rails. These systems will liberate small businesses and workers from predatory transaction tolls and expand public clearing. A robust public payment apparatus is what brings our municipal alternative to Amazon to life—keeping prices low, eliminating middleman fees, and allocating wealth locally through transparent public ledgers rather than private conduits.


Democratic Public Finance enthusiastically champions every initiative to establish public banks. Yet it also challenges us to reach further—to stretch far beyond the conventional boundaries that have historically hemmed in the movement. What, after all, is a public bank? What can public banking truly achieve? Rather than assuming a single, uniform template—or merely redirecting commercial loan protocols toward benevolent ends—DPF treats public banking as an adaptable, modular project. Above all, it shatters the zero-sum fallacy that sees revenue as an absolute barrier to collective flourishing rather than as an adjustable coordinate of public policy.

A dazzling example of what DPF offers public banking is what we at Money on the Left term the Loop. First developed by our colleague Tyler Suksawat, the Loop resolves several systemic crises in a single stroke, while uncovering money’s public endogeneity for all to see. The core problem is simple: every year, billions of public dollars exit our cities, counties, and states into the vaults of Wall Street. Whenever a state or municipality issues debt to build schools, fix transit, or repair water systems, it is forced to surrender massive interest payments to private underwriters and investors. This continuous financial depletion is a primary cause of regional austerity, cementing the manufactured illusion that the public is forever broke, even as our communities overflow with real capacity and urgent needs.

By establishing a government-owned public bank, we propose, a state or municipality can not only expand public investment through municipal lending; it can also purchase its own bonds and “loop” the interest back to the government itself, rather than to Wall Street. Over time, the Loop promises to reclaim the public interest in at least two senses. First, it quite literally saves states and municipalities—not to mention school districts, universities, housing authorities, and any number of sub-federal public institutions—hundreds of millions, if not billions of dollars in interest payments annually. In doing so, it turns bond issuance into a self-reinforcing system of public finance, capable of addressing community and environmental suffering far more democratically and robustly than ever before in the history of the United States. Second, the Loop recuperates the public interest in the sense of collective concern and will, asserting democratic control over debt allocation from Wall Street gatekeepers, punishing rating agencies, and fickle investors. Ultimately, the Loop reveals what hegemonic forces conspire endlessly to conceal: namely, that money is a boundless and contestable public utility that can always be reorganized to serve community and environmental endeavors. We need only to cultivate enough knowledge, creativity, and grit to unlock money’s repressed ecosocial potentials.


For the final movement of my talk, I wish to expand public banking’s horizon of possibility even further by considering what we at Money on the Left have taken to calling the Public Grant-Making Bank. As I suggested at the outset, establishing Bank of North Dakota-style institutions across every US state and territory would represent a monumental achievement. Yet such an effort nevertheless leaves the standard, loan-based approach to banking completely unquestioned. In this model, underfunded community organizations are turned into debtors, impelled to compete for scarce revenues in the marketplace simply to repay their loans

The problem is systemic, extending well beyond the world of public banking. The difficulty stems from two interlocking factors of monetary design. First, the United States has historically outsourced and privatized money creation–a state fiscal function–to commercial finance. Rather than reducing private finance to mere competitive enterprise, that is, our analysis underscores the fiscal role of commercial banks in creating, disbursing, and redeeming the public dollar. Through this lens, the vast majority of funds emitted in the U.S. dollar system enter existence as private bank loans, placing private balance sheets at the center of the country’s fiscal architecture.

Second, because this fiscal architecture is structured primarily to maintain positive balance sheets, it harbors inherent tendencies toward austerity, default, and crisis–both within and beyond the banking sector. To be sure, banks sustain investment by continuously creating new credit, paying interest on deposits, funding operations, and supporting public debt transactions–all of which, in turn, occasion further investments. At a structural level, however, and over the long term, banks subtract more from the economic system than they add precisely because they are legally mandated to conform to a politically constructed definition of solvency. However ideologically justified by those in power, the resulting fiscal system is debilitating by design. The good news, however, is that we can always construct more nuanced and democratically responsive definitions of “solvency” and inscribe them into law.

The conventional solution to this faulty structure is so-called “counter-cyclical” spending by the state. Such spending, however, only goes so far, as it remains beholden to shifting legislative priorities, rigid budget calendars, and political turnover–not to mention the twin myths of tax-payer redistribution and bond market “borrowing.” Public outlays, moreover, typically pale in comparison to the structural deficits induced by private finance—which, as a systemic necessity, relentlessly collects more than it spends. In addition to robust state spending, then, what is needed is an ongoing, nimble, and locally sensitive fiscal infrastructure that can serve as an automatic stabilizer and answer community challenges in real time.

This is why Money on the Left proposes the creation of Public Grant-Making Banks, designed to counter and, in certain cases, even replace private banking’s regressive model of fiscal austerity. The primary pillar of this model involves restructuring finance as direct grants, rather than as loans. Instead of relying on future repayment, public banks would issue grants to projects based on their public mission. A Public Grant-Making Bank evaluates proposals by assessing their anticipated social and ecological effects. For example, funding the establishment of community-owned broadband networks would be evaluated on their contribution to equitable digital access and educational opportunity, not on a financial return model. If the qualitative assessment is strong, the grant is made. On this logic, a grant is still debt; only, it is a qualitative obligation to improve social and environmental conditions, rather than a quantitative obligation to repay a financial sum. The devil, of course, is always in the details. Yet it is essential to remember that public banking is however we design it to operate–and there is no natural or necessary law that says banks must exclusively lend at interest.

Money on the Left’s own maximalist vision calls for revising and passing the Public Banking Act at the federal level, giving public banks full discretion to create and disburse grants based directly on community needs. Instituting this authority requires overhauling federal banking statutes—from Prompt Corrective Action rules under the Federal Deposit Insurance Act to the Community Reinvestment Act—legally substituting qualitative social metrics for conventional balance-sheet metrics. Such reform needs to be paired with a statutory liability shield for bank directors, protecting them from fiduciary duty claims when making mission-aligned grant decisions. Regulatory oversight would thus undergo a structural transformation: shifting away from punitive capital adequacy ratios toward what we envision as a Public Mission Fulfillment Index. Instead of narrowly auditing balance sheets for commercial solvency, such an Index would help evaluate a bank’s adherence to its public mandate—measuring substantive progress toward full employment, public health milestones,  carbon-emission benchmarks, and transparent governance. Performance is judged not by profit margins, but by documented strides toward communal problem-solving, making the social mission, not a zero-sum ledger, the legal measure of success.

The Public Banking Institute’s own Ellen Brown seems to support public grant banking at the federal level. In From Austerity to Prosperity: The Public Bank Solution, for instance, she affirms granting over loaning when comparing U.S. banking to the Chinese system. I quote her at length:

“Although the Chinese state-owned banks may have more [so-called] ‘non-performing’ loans than private Western banks, the Chinese economy itself is performing better than Western economies dominated by private sector banks; and this superior performance is supported by a public sector banking system that functions very well for its intended purposes. … [T]he Chinese government did not actually expect repayment of these funds. They were simply credits created on the banks’ books for the purpose of paying for infrastructure and services. They were in the nature of “contingent grants.” If they generated income, great. If not, they were written off as a cost of running an economy. They were government-issued money stimulating economic development. Western politicians call these unpaid loans ‘deficits,’ ‘debts’ and ‘fiscal cliffs,’ and they engage in endless debates over how to get rid of them. Meanwhile, China and its neighbors carry on building, growing and producing. They recognize that the government’s debt is the people’s credit and that a freely-flowing national credit is the key to a flourishing national economy.”

For us at Money on the Left, this very lesson must be extended to sub-federal finance, to say nothing of international finance.

Still, we do not need to wait for Washington: states and municipalities can commence experimenting with Public Grant-Making Banks right now, with or without federal support. Ideally, a revised federal Public Banking Act would obligate the Federal Reserve to provision corresponding reserves whenever a sub-federal public bank issues a grant. With this, grants allocated by state and municipal banks will achieve universal receivability throughout the U.S. economy without inducing destabilizing reserve drains within the sub-national public banking system. In a bottom-up approach, however, state and municipal banks can still be empowered to issue grants in addition to loans. Such institutions can begin establishing a designated Public Grant Reserve Account, the outgoing payments from which will be at first covered by assets in other areas. After meeting mandatory operating expenses, credit-loss reserves, and statutory capital preservation benchmarks, boards of directors can disburse a defined percentage of remaining net income as direct, public-purpose grants. What is more, those same public banks can deploy forgivable loans, recoverable advances, convertible public equity, zero-cost credit lines, and blended finance windows, proving that granting is not a single, narrow technique, but an expansive toolkit of bespoke financial architectures.

Especially in large states like California, we can then move beyond the self-limiting horizon of earnings-covered grants into pure endogenous credit creation. In this case, the California Public Bank would simply credit the accounts of public entities, social housing developers, energy cooperatives, and ecological remediation projects, expanding the public equity of the commonwealth without imposing the discipline of commercial debt amortization or revenue raising. Operating at this scale without federal coordination immediately encounters the structural impediment of the payment system and, in particular, the loss of reserves. Overcoming this constraint requires pairing public grant-making banks with a dedicated state or inter-state public clearinghouse—a companion network that maximizes internal settlement to minimize reserve flight, while pooling state public assets to interface cleanly with the Federal Reserve. Thus, far from a rigid, one-size-fits-all formula, there are myriad paths to launching Public Grant-Making Banks. The essential task, we contend, is to foreground grant-issuing as an aspirational horizon–one that drives pragmatic local campaigns today while constantly reminding our movements of all that public banking can make possible.


Money on the Left does not claim to hold every answer—political, legal, social, or aesthetic. Instead, our vision for Democratic Public Finance offers a guiding ethos for collective activism and structural transformation. We offer it to inspire the public banking movement to remain inventive, resilient, and undeluded by prevailing creeds of scarcity, ensuring that even when tactical compromises are necessary, we never mistake provisional constraints for the outer limits of what is possible. At last, we must reject myths of austerity and revenue redistribution that keep millions of our neighbors impoverished, unhealthy, and disempowered. Conceding to this canard today only tightens oligarchy’s clamp on tomorrow’s political imagination. Our communities and ecologies brim with unrecognized capacity, which the present order casts off as mere costs. If money is truly public, endogenous, and inexhaustible, then it is our shared democratic responsibility to ensure that all are cared for, all are sustained, and all are empowered to author a common future.

Thank you.

Featured Image: Augusta Savage, Lift Every Voice and Sing (The Harp), 1939. This photograph depicts a small contemporary bronze souvenir cast of Savage’s monumental sixteen-foot plaster sculpture, originally commissioned for the 1939 New York World’s Fair. Inspired by James Weldon Johnson’s Black national anthem, the sculpture depicted twelve singing Black children forming the strings of a harp, cradled by the arm of God. Savage had taken a leave of absence from her role as director of the Harlem Community Art Center—funded by the Works Progress Administration—to realize the commission, only for the masterpiece to be bulldozed after the fair when neither the fair corporation nor public authorities allocated the funds required to cast it in bronze or store it. The destruction of the work emblematizes the racialized and gendered austerity Democratic Public Finance aims to redress. For this feature, the original photograph has been cropped and recomposed against a solid monochromatic field using Adobe Express.

No, Public Banking is Not a Nicer Way to Lend Money

By Will Beaman

Public banking is often misdescribed as a nicer way of lending money. Instead of depositing public revenues in private banks, the sales pitch goes, governments can place their revenues in a public bank that will try its best to lend money in ways that support a progressive agenda. All while making a profit, of course.

This vision misses the political significance of endogenous money. An unfortunately technocratic-sounding term, endogenous money simply means that money is created through lending. It is not “borrowed” from the future, nor is it lent out from an existing stock of bank deposits. Instead, a private bank loan creates an asset and a liability from thin air at the same time in such a way that makes it look like the passive intermediation and recycling of private funds.

Seeing this is a lot like noticing the editing cuts in a film that create the appearance of continuous space-time through its opposite—discontinuous cuts that hide their own seams. We produce continuous cinematic space-time because that’s the genre convention*, not because it’s necessary for the cinematic experience to be “sound” or valid. With banking, hiding the plasticity and infinitude of money is a genre that limits the public demands we might make of the monetary medium. And that’s the whole point: investment banking joins together large-scale industrial policy driven by credit creation with asset-bubble dynamics designed to provision an oligarchy, while we debate fiscal policy through the hydraulic image of tax-dollars being recycled from suburban breadwinners.

All money is created before it is seemingly “recycled” through this fiscal kayfabe. The reason this creative capacity is laundered through private banking is to shrink fiscal policy to the size of periodic showdowns with reactionary state legislatures and governors, while tech and other industries effectively grow and expand as much as they want. So, when public banking is conceived on the basis of widely debunked economic models of private banks lending and multiplying other people’s deposits, it concedes basically everything to the profit motive. Sewer Socialism is dead on arrival.

*Not coincidentally, the historical emergence of self-effacing continuity techniques is associated with early racial melodramas that likewise laundered a reactionary moral worldview through a visual and narrative naturalism.

“Piggy Bank being Smashed with Hammer” by Images_of_Money is licensed under CC BY 2.0.
“IOU in a piggy bank” by Images_of_Money is licensed under CC BY 2.0.

Endogeneity without Exception: Modern Monetary Theory & the Promise of Heterodoxy

Billy Saas and guest-host Will Beaman speak with Money on the Left’s own Scott Ferguson about his essay, “Endogeneity Without Exception: Modern Monetary Theory and the Promise of Heterodoxy,” published recently in the Journal of Economic Issues.  

Across the episode, Ferguson re-examines the longstanding debate between endogenous and exogenous money theorists to rethink the foundations of heterodox economic analysis and politics. While orthodox economists understand money to be largely “exogenous,” rendering it external, scarce, and uncontestable, heterodox traditions celebrate money’s “endogeneity,” insisting that monetary forms are fundamentally social, institutional, and generative. Still, Ferguson argues, heterodox economists in Post-Keynesian and related traditions consistently slip into exogenous assumptions that distort political economic analysis and undercut money’s capacities to provide for all. Identifying endogeneity primarily with volatile private markets and treating revenue and debt service constraints as external, fatalistic limits, heterodoxy often naturalizes the very capitalist narratives of scarcity it seeks to overcome.

The conversation turns next to Modern Monetary Theory (MMT). By extending endogeneity to public finance, MMT recasts money as a fundamentally generative and contestable public utility, which remains irreducible to private markets. This school arguably goes furthest to correct the exogenous assumptions in heterodox theory, Ferguson claims, only to introduce new exogeneities into its approach. Such exogeneities come to the fore principally in MMT’s opposition between “monetary sovereigns” that issue money and “currency users” that merely recycle funds that sovereigns issue. In contrast, Ferguson recommends replacing the zero-sum language of monetary sovereignty with more fruitful terms like “agency,” “capacity,” “power,” “authority,” “capability,” “care,” “sustainability” and “resilience.”

Ultimately, Ferguson contends that, despite powerful political, legal, and ideological constraints, all institutions and actors play meaningful roles in monetary generation, rather than functioning as mere recyclers of scarce funds. By embracing endogeneity without exception, he concludes, we open up vital, yet formerly repressed horizons for public provisioning, social experimentation, and anti-imperialist reparation.

Visit our Patreon page here: https://www.patreon.com/MoLsuperstructure

Music by Nahneen Kula: www.nahneenkula.com

Transcript

This transcript has been edited for readability.

Billy Saas

Welcome, listener, to Money on the Left. We are here today to talk with Scott Ferguson about his recently published article, “Endogeneity Without Exception: Modern Monetary Theory and the Promise of Heterodoxy.” Scott is, of course, the regular co-host of the show. In order to have a full conversation, though, we feel like we did need to have two people in the host seats.

So we invited our good friend and comrade, Will Beeman, to join us. So, Will Beaman, welcome to Money on the Left.

Will Beaman

Hey, there. It’s gonna be hard to fill Scott’s shoes interviewing Scott. 

Billy Saas

Hey, Scott, how are you doing today?

Scott Ferguson

I’m good, I’m good. Thanks for having me on my show.

Billy Saas

You know, it has been a long time coming. We did not sit down ever and talk about your wonderful book, Declarations of Dependance, when that came out.

Will Beaman

Can I also say you were a nightmare to get a hold of.

Billy Saas

Scheduling was atrocious. Your people weren’t getting back to my people.

Will Beaman

They were rude. They were us.

Scott Ferguson

I was hiding from myself. Yeah.

Billy Saas

Well, let’s talk about it. Yeah, obviously, in characteristic Scott fashion, this article does a tremendous amount. It does it very compellingly and is a brilliant read that we suggest everyone go check out. Its intervention is substantial to ongoing debate that I know from having been on this side of…well I guess not this side. Within this side of broader endogeneity.

Scott Ferguson

Which side are you on?

Billy Saas

We exist, of course, at Money on the Left in any broader ecology of MMT thinkers and commentators and the problem of sovereignty has been definitely front of mind and at the top of group chats for a while now. This, among other things, stages a really important intervention into that discussion. So I wonder just by way of setting up our conversation to come, could you situate and contextualize your own background or history of encounters with sovereignty as you came to encounter it eventually in MMT, and why this has stood out recently as such a significant problematic for you?

Scott Ferguson

Oh that’s interesting. I didn’t expect you to begin there!

I’ll say a little bit about that, but then I also want to step back and do some pre-situating as well. So, the modern monetary theory or modern money theory view is that money is a public utility and that currency issuing governments that are responsible for a monetary form that create and maintain a unit, can always afford what they would like to spend on, they cannot run out of their own unit of account. This, for us, at Money on the Left, for years, has had tremendous potential and power for left and progressive action and theorizing, and we’ve been pretty committed to it.

I think, in a deeper sense, for us at Money on the Left, we take MMT’s refusal of zero-sum thinking at the macro political economic level as a provocation to extrapolate that refusal across all spheres of society and history from studying ancient cultures to the varieties of modern art. We refuse zero-sum thinking every which way.

I think at a certain point, probably around 2018 for me, around the time that my first monograph, Declarations of Dependance was coming out, I began to become uncomfortable with Modern Monetary Theory’s appeals to sovereignty. They tend to be very nuanced and they’re not unsophisticated or uncomplicated, as I’d like to flesh out – maybe you can help me later on in this conversation – but they still rely on this logic of exceptionality and exclusion and opposition that denies money’s public creativity to certain spheres into certain actors. Something just didn’t sit right with me, and that violates our extrapolation of this non-zero-sum thinking to all spheres of history and society.

I think this especially became problematic once we were catapulted into the moment of the Covid 19 crisis, and suddenly many of our own institutions, most of us are in higher ed, not all of us, but many of us were in higher ed, were being threatened by premature threats of austerity, closures, firings, furloughs and we suddenly realized that this sovereignty logic and sovereignty constraint, which says, “well, only the federal government that issues the currency can afford to help everyone during moments of instability. The sub federal level and even the supra-federal level must be constrained to recycling finite funds that are supplied by the sovereign.”

We saw that this is not only theoretically problematic, but it is actively harming us in the present tense. Now, granted, it’s been actively harming us in the present tense forever. It’s not like it just came out of the woodwork during Covid and it wasn’t harming us. I just think it became acute and it came to our attention. I think as students of Modern Monetary Theory, I think for the first few years, we all just wanted to understand it and kind of extrapolate from it and ask a bunch of questions and figure out exactly what its implications were.

I just think it took a long time to kind of be able to get to the point where we were comfortable enough with thinking in this way in general, to turn back around and say, “oh, this paradigm isn’t perfect. It still needs some work, even though it’s very powerful.” I don’t disavow it. I think it’s still fundamental to what we do. So that’s what brought me to rethink sovereignty and to be rather critical of sovereignty. But I like to put a pin in that and just kind of step back and talk about how I got to this particular project. There’s probably a few origin stories, I think.

One is that, I’ve had a sense of, let’s say, frustration, working in this collective with my friends and comrades like you all and there’s many more of us, where we are trying to think out and through the MMT provocation in and beyond what MMT as an original school has permitted. I think we’ve done everything like just extending it to other spheres, nuancing places in the theory, in its original treatments, it might have been a little bit too rigid.

Or, in certain ways, MMT has been reduced to a series of slogans. What do those slogans even mean? We’ve complicated some of those slogans. So we’ve been doing all this work and I want to say, as a collective, this article takes a village, this is no exception. I thank plenty of people at the top of this article. I was especially helped by a burgeoning heterodox economist, Kyle More, who is an all but dissertation PhD student at UMKC, University of Missouri-Kansas City, one of the epicenters out of which the MMT project kind of coalesced and grew. He’s currently teaching at Bard College and works with Pavlina Tcherneva there.

He helped me a lot and you all helped me a ton. So, you know, standing on the shoulders of friends and giants and all sorts of creatures. But it grew out of a frustration that, to be perfectly honest, we just kept being ignored and I felt like some of the main MMTers ignore us, and some are nicer than others.

But I think where I got really frustrated was when I would read critique after critique by non-MMT people who were out to get MMT, certainly in the popular press or the leftist journalism and commentary, but also in academic articles. Left and critical heterodox economists who would come after MMT and essentially submit it to the same tired trial, which is posing the question, “Is MMT right or wrong? Does it apply to the world or not? Does it apply to X scenario? Does it apply to the Y scenario? Indeed it doesn’t. Or maybe kind of, but not really. It’s wrong. So, you know, good old institutional economics reign supreme. Let’s go back to our regularly scheduled programming and not be unsettled by this weird MMT thing.”

I was frustrated by that. Especially getting into 2019, 2020, 2021 because I felt like we at Money on the Left were — and it’s not like we’re alone, the MMTers themselves offer their own responses and nuances and sophisticated answers, but I felt like we were developing collectively all kinds of innovations and nuances that sometimes they were a little critical or put pressure on certain elements of Modern Monetary Theory.

But we treated Modern Monetary Theory as a living, breathing, what I started calling a “problem space” at a certain point. I felt like there were some kind of brute, or maybe inflexible formulations that circulate about MMT in MMT discourse that maybe don’t go as far as they could or aren’t as nuanced as they could be.

I felt like we at Money on the Left were coming up with nuances that actually defended MMT. Defended the paradigm. It bothered me that again and again I would read, whatever it was, left commentary or critical heterodox economics journal articles or books that would just keep attacking the worst straw man of these rigid truisms from MMT and just being big bullies and punching and swatting at these straw man, when I’m sitting here going, like, “Look, you’re not actually fighting the strongest articulation of these claims. You’re not.”

I felt like I had to get us into a heterodox journal. I have to stop publishing in humanities journals for a second, and I’ve got to publish the Money on the Left view, which is that money is public and it is endogenous.

We’ll talk about what that means for the uninitiated in a moment. Money is fully public, fully endogenous in its bases, and it is non-zero-sum at its core. What does that mean for political economy? And what does that mean for being in the world? So that was one of the biggest motivations for writing this and trying to place it in a heterodox economics journal. The first heterodox economics journal that I sent it to — I suppose I’ll be polite and not say the name of the journal — the peer reviews came back and they were really telling, they didn’t understand the article whatsoever. You know that they didn’t understand it because they weren’t able to recapitulate the main argument at the top and then go on to critique it. Instead, they just critiqued it.

One dismissed the article because they seem to be pro MMT. And they said, I don’t understand MMT and clearly MMT says this and you don’t understand that. And then the other person said they were anti MMT and they said MMT is wrong and how dare you defend it. 

Will Beaman

The two genders.

Scott Ferguson

Yeah, the two genders. The editor was just like, “Thank you for your time. We’re done with you.” The editor didn’t want to work with me. The reviewers had spoken and that was it. So I sent it to a second journal, and that second journal was the Journal of Economic Issues.

That went through the process and that went a lot better. I managed to be able to publish it, and we’ll see. I mean, it’s still very new, but I guess I feel like at minimum now it will be conspicuous when a heterodox economist publishes a journal article or a book and comes at MMT and is just pretending like we don’t exist, pretending like our intervention isn’t part of the conversation.

So they can continue to do that and nothing is preventing them from doing that. But at least we have the solace in knowing that, “no, now they are actively doing it.” As academics, they should be doing literature reviews where they round up all the things that have been published about the topic and then respond to them.

If they keep ignoring us, we know that this is active ignoring and not just a result of just ignoring people that aren’t in their field and they don’t owe us a response because we’re just a bunch of humanities freaks who just care about movies and paintings and music and rhetoric.

Will Beaman

And one more thing, we’re not bitter. 

Scott Ferguson

I am trying to be smiley and happy.

Will Beaman

We will put in the show notes that you’ve been smiling the whole time.

Scott Ferguson

I’ve been smiling. I have been smiling through my bitterness. Yes, yes.

Will Beaman

Well, let’s talk a little bit about the interventions in this article, and I’d like to actually start with the title, because I think that it ties together how Billy began by asking you about your history of critiquing and problematizing monetary sovereignty. This phrase, “Endogeneity without Exception,” I’m wondering if you can use that title to sort of give us some traction to define endogeneity and what does it have to do with exception. For listeners who are not quite following along, exception is often how sovereignty is defined so there’s some very fun wordplay going on here.

Scott Ferguson

Yeah. In fact, the original title had even more fun wordplay, but it got a little too confusing, I think. I didn’t want to have to write a whole other section to explain the word play, so I got rid of it. So originally the title was “Endogeneity without Reserve,” but then this raised all kinds of questions around the Federal Reserve System and reserve requirements and this kind of thing.

And I didn’t have room to explain that. Okay. So let’s begin with endogeneity. So endogeneity, the root of the word, basically the endo part means inside or internal, right? Geneity, it’s the same root that we get the word genesis. It means the origin and generation of some things, some entity, some system.

Historically the mainstream schools of economics, various breeds of neoclassical economics and those who follow them tend to treat money as exogenous, as an exogenous variable coming from somehow outside. Coming from the outside, it remains no a generative factor. In fact, most neoclassical models will exclude money, its creation, its design from all of their analyses. We hear all the time from them, in their writings and in their textbooks that money is a neutral veil over something else, whether that’s exchange or that’s utility or some kind of value. Then you can kind of put it to the side and not really deal with it. Then they can also treat money as a mere external exchange between individuals that get aggregated up into a massive system and on these premises, the mainstream is able to cast off governance and law and design as itself external, as itself interventionist in ways that tend to get in the way of the real operations of the market, which is where utility and exchange really belong and this all supports an ideology and a governing and legal regime of austerity, zero sum trade offs, punishing policies for the poor people of color, for our planet, etc..

What the heterodoxy has tended to do and especially post-Keynesians, these are Keynesians who followed Keynes, more closely than the neoclassical Keynesians that cropped up in the United States in the mid-century. Keynes’s program also began with an understanding that money is endogenous. But this got kind of stamped out when Keynes was absorbed by the neoclassical schools in the United States during the mid-century.

We like to talk about how Keynesianism ruled during the mid century and it was part of the era of the compromise between labor and capital and there was relatively, at least comparatively, robust government spending. So-called deficits weren’t so much of a problem, countercyclical spend. But this was all done really through a neoclassical prism that continued to really think exogenously.

So, the post Keynesians, following Keynes, but then carrying it over through mid-century all the way into the 60s and 70s, were trying to take endogenous money seriously. So for them, money is not a finite external quantity that goes up and down, and when there’s too much of it, that causes inflation and competition for government borrowing, etcetera, etcetera.

But instead, money is credit, it’s credit and debt relationships, and money expands internally and contracts internally, largely in the private financial system when there is more and less demand for credit. This changes the way that we not only think about money, but we also think about markets, the way we think about political economy writ large, the way we think about crises.

The post-Keynesians continue to think this way all the way to the present. The problem, as I see it, with post-Keynesian endogeneity, or what’s good about it, is they recognize that essentially money is a credit relationship. It’s socially constructed. It can be expanded and contracted in contingent circumstances and it opens up possibilities for policy and even design that would not just take the market at its word. At the same time, my sense in doing the reading and in consulting others like you all, but also some hardcore economists like my friend Kyle Mohr, that the post-Keynesian view really restricts what they think of as endogeneity to the market. It’s really about the financial market. It’s really about financial institutions. So financial institutions will expand and contract the amount of credit and debt in the system.

They have all kinds of ideas about government policies to react to or shape the endogenous world of financial markets, but they largely exclude government from the ambit of endogenous creation and design. So I want to be careful here. They’re not saying let the market do what it wants to do. No. They have all kinds of policies and those policies fly in the face of the mainstream. They mounted really strong, not accepted, but strong defenses in the 70s against the monetarists, when the Fed was being operated by these monetarist principles and they were jacking up interest rates with the idea that they were going to curb stagflation.

We all know how that went. They were saying, “don’t do it that way.” This is not to say that the post-Keynesian heterodoxy and then the heterodox schools that all subscribed to this view of endogenous money are just bad or they’re just so shortsighted. I mean, they have plenty to offer us and to teach us.

We should still think with them, but when they say money is endogenous, it tends to be just a reframing of the market. I would say, they naturalize, even if it’s socially constructed, they naturalize —  or to use the Marxist term —  they reify the market as a self standing sphere that expands and contracts on its own.

Then, yes, the government can intervene or shape things from the side or go in and out of the market in what I call “a game of hokey pokey.” The article is actually designed to take that on and to say, “okay, heterodoxy, we all say that money is endogenous, right?” I quote this one article by (Louis-Philippe) Rochon and (Sergio) Rossi from 2013, where they write, “Money has always been endogenous, irrespective of the historical period or of specific institutional arrangements.”

This tells you that the post-Keynesians think they’re just maximally endogenous. They think that they’re thinking, endogeneity without exception, without caveats. That quote says it’s always the case, it doesn’t matter. You could be under a gold standard or a metal standard. It doesn’t matter. It’s still endogenous. It’s still being generated as a function of the social construction of these financial institutions. It is not a finite thing that’s a quantity that acts like an external entity. So I’m taking the post-Keynesians and the heterodox at their word and saying they want to think, “endogeneity without reserve.”

That’s what they want to do. That’s what they say. But then I step back and I say, but “You’re not, you’re excluding you are excluding whole spheres.” One of those major spheres is monetary governance and the construction of law. Then I turn to MMT and I say, you know, MMT, as many of us on this podcast know, MMT develops out of the post-Keynesian tradition.

It also has influences in the institutionalist tradition. It has influences in even Marxism. It borrows from feminist economics, black economics. It’s a heterogeneous genesis, so to speak. But MMT does in many ways grow out of post-Keynesian endogenous monetary thinking. My claim is, and I’m not sure if I’ve read any MMTer put it this way, but my claim is that one way to characterize MMT and one of its major interventions or innovations is to broaden the domain of what counts as endogenous money creation, and to extend it to government and governance and law and legal construction.

I would say, not only does it extend, there’s something even wrong about that, because I wouldn’t even want to say that it extends endogeneity from the market to the government, but rather I also think it displaces the center of causality. Right. It says, “actually, this is a whole governance regime that is legally constructed and that sets up institutions that then create money endogenously all the time.”

It’s created and destroyed as claims of debt and credit that are interdependent and interlinked. It shifts the center and says, “look, the sphere of endogeneity is so much bigger.” Essentially, it is coincident with the problem of politics. This is, to me, reading MMT at its most maximal, which is to say that, if there are entities called markets or systems called markets, they’re a contingent construction of this broader public endogenous system.

You could imagine a public endogenous system that doesn’t have what we would call markets. Or maybe you could construct a system that has markets that look very different than the ones we have. That’s the general kind of setup and framing. I’m saying, we as a heterodoxy say we want endogeneity without exception, but we don’t quite get there.

MMT expands this to say, “actually all money is a public endogenous utility.” Then from there, I ask the question, “does MMT go far enough?” Ultimately, I say, “no, it doesn’t go far enough because it has its own lingering attachments to what I consider to be an exogenous logic and that’s where sovereignty comes in.”

But then there’s also all kinds of other issues along the way in heterodoxy, writlarge, in addition to MMT, about variables, what kind of variables are treated and what counts as a crisis and things like that.

Will Beaman

Thank you for that explanation. It occurred to me while you were speaking that there’s a little bit of a tension that I’m wondering if we can dwell on and situate your article within, where the kind of post-Keynesian story does not theorize law, particularly, and relies on a tacit liberal imagination of a kind of negative space that is the market and demand bubbles down from there and drives all of these endogenous cycles and dynamics. On the other hand, we have this monetary sovereignty discourse, which has been very productively complicated with respect to law. In the law and political economy space, there is thinking about, “maybe sovereignty is a spectrum,” rather than simply something that you either have or you don’t.

Maybe you have relative amounts of it and it’s relational. I’m wondering where your intervention fits within that broader landscape that’s not just reducible to post-Keynesianism.

Scott Ferguson

First of all, I want to say not just in the law and political economy space, but within MMT itself, you have thinkers like Pavlina Tcherneva, Fadhel Kaboub, and others like Nathan Tankus, all former guests on this program who have a very sophisticated approach and a nuanced approach to what they call, “monetary sovereignty.”

So first of all, they distinguish monetary sovereignty from sovereignty. They’re very explicit about that. Monetary sovereignty is a very particular kind of category. I think, for them, they would say it’s like an aspect of or a subcategory of political sovereignty, and it shapes political sovereignty. But it is not just the same as political sovereignty.

I wouldn’t say that’s my understanding. They all, as you suggested, and as I pointed out in the article, this is not a question of accrued having and not having. Sometimes MMT discourse as it circulates in popular circles online and elsewhere, sometimes, we here talk of, “the US and Japan have monetary sovereignty because they issue their own currencies, but, you know, X and Y countries in the global South, after suffering hundreds of years of imperial and colonial domination, they don’t have monetary sovereignty. They don’t have it. There are those who have it and then it’s a battle between the one group and the other group,” or something. You know, that’s not how they talk.

That’s not how they write. That’s not how they reason. I think that both explicitly and implicitly, I think they refuse maximalism on either end. I think they don’t say that, if the United States is a global hegemonic and we have, since the Bretton Woods agreements, we’ve basically presided over what’s often called a dollar standard or a dollar reserve currency system.

I don’t find that MMT discourse says, “Ah. Therefore, the US has an unlimited maximum monetary sovereignty where it can just do what it wants at any given moment.” They acknowledge not only are there political ideological limits, but, using their language, I wouldn’t necessarily talk this way, but, there’s a real constraint and that is real resources and if you spend in excess of real resources’ ability to be mobilized, you’re creating inflationary pressures. Like I said, I think I have a more nuanced understanding of that now, but that’s typical.

Will Beaman

Well, maybe we can pause right there. I think that this actually connects quite well to the type of nuanced move that you’re doing in this piece, and kind of insisting on no exceptions to endogeneity, because the rhetorical appeal that we hear to real resources, it both expands the conversation and in the same move, buttons it back up around a kind of given array of real resources.

The kind of, what I would call, an endogenous definition of what is considered a resource or not is sort of bracketed from that analysis in order to appeal to the idea that the economy has a speed limit that is sort of set by this underlying material substrate that money only represents. Then we’re back in something a little bit more conventional.

Scott Ferguson

Yeah, exogenous, right. I mean, this is a bit of a deep cut, but I don’t mind. We can dive into the crevasse and then come back to slightly shallower waters. We all have had these intuitions for a long time. I think our original audio engineer, Alex Williams, who is now a heterodox economist in his own right, recommended this classic heterodox economics article in the institutionalist tradition by a scholar named (Thomas R. De) Gregori from 1987, and the title of his essay sums it all up: “Resources are Not; They Become.”

So what is that arguing? That’s arguing, not that resources aren’t material or that you can just make them up out of thin air. This article instead suggests that, in order to even recognize something or constitute something as a resource, a material resource, that’s a social project.

We had to figure out that fossil fuels could be an enormous resource. Before science and technologists and politicians and all kinds of discourses came along and said, “various fossil fuels can do all this work for us,” it wasn’t a resource at all.

Then research in green energy is essentially pushing the boundaries of that and saying, “what can we socially construct as a resource?” The false move here is to have a kind of clean binary between, “social construction, which isn’t real, it’s just fake. It’s just language and words or just dollars or something. Then there’s real material, hard things that you can touch.” Instead, they’re always bound up with one another. I’m speaking into a microphone right now. I can’t just say, this microphone could power my car, and I’m going to try to stick it in my car and see what happens.

It’s not that anything can be socially constructed as a resource, but resources are socially constructed. They’re not inert things with a finite limit as exogenous entities that provide a natural speed limit to spending. Instead, the speed limit is precisely social construction, which is endogenous. Actually, that leads me back to where I was going to go, which is to say that, to give credit where credit is due, the sophistication of monetary sovereignty as theorized by the main MMT economists, they do often think of it as a speed limit.

Like a pacing issue. Not a hard constraint, but just a question of, “How things are being cultivated? How is policy activating resources and at what pace?” That matters as well.

Will Beaman

Yeah. That can turn an inert kind of vulgar speed limit argument into one that is much more about how we sequence dilating social provisioning processes to whatever we want them to be qualitatively.

Scott Ferguson

Right, exactly. On the other end of the spectrum, to pick up the thread, I’m actually shocked that I’m able to do this. I don’t think they’re ever going to say that there is a people, a country, an entity that is so abject and so excluded that it could never participate in public endogenous monetary creation.

Especially for our friends who work on postcolonial or decolonial economics from an MMT point of view, people like Fadhel Kaboub and our friend Ndongo Samba Sylla. That’s precisely their claim. Their claim is to say that, there’s always hope. A people, a country, a governance structure can always start issuing credits.

Is that going to immediately, overnight, erase centuries of oppression and extraction of physical resources and neglect of collective cultivation, or put all the global powers to rest? Absolutely not. But we are falsifying the situation if we just depict any country or any peoples as utterly powerless. We’re cutting ourselves off at the feet.

We’re our own worst enemy. The spectrum perspective in MMT says there’s no actual maximum. There’s no actual minimum to the point where you know that an entity, a group, a nation, whatever it is, is just powerless. Instead, what you have is various degrees of capacity of resource mobilizing potential given the current situation. So that’s really sophisticated, and that and that’s not always represented in critiques. So that’s what I’m trying to honor. But then I say, at the very same time, many of the same thinkers are going to lean into the political understandings of sovereignty, and they’re going to quickly naturalize the deep implications of the logics of sovereignty that have been around since the late Middle Ages-early modernity, when that term arose. Something that I figured out with the help of somebody else who’s been on the Superstructure podcast with me, Brendan Cook, who is my colleague at the University of South Florida and knows languages like no one else. He’s fluent in Latin. He can make his way around Greek and most of the romance languages he has some facility with. So he helped me see how, when scholars will say that Aristotle had a theory of sovereignty, that’s just not true. He didn’t talk about sovereignty. That’s a later word. It’s a romance language word that comes about in early modernity or late medieval, whenever you make that break, basically. The medieval world was organized around many terms, but the highest term was this term, imperium.

It just means rule. It just means political and legal ordering. Later on, it would become the basis for empire. We don’t like empire. We would never support empire. But that’s not what imperium meant. It didn’t have that negative connotation. Which is not to say that the medieval rule under imperium was some kind of glorious democracy. It wasn’t. Nevertheless, the understanding of imperium was that it was all kinds of interdependent, nested, overlapping domains and purview and responsibilities and obligations and capacities. There wasn’t just one entity, one single source of power that stood above them all. You had just to quickly sketch it. You had the Roman Catholic Church. You had the Holy Roman Empire. These are two different entities. Then you had all kinds of kingdoms and manners and townships, and they all had their own purview, their own domains, their own ambits of responsibility. They would be contested all the time, and there would be all kinds of crises where the Pope’s trying to flex power against the emperor and they’re arguing about who can appoint bishops. These are huge battles of the late Middle Ages. But the idea is that everybody kind of understood that even if everyone’s jockeying for relative power, there’s an understanding that we’re all kind of entangled in this mess together.

There’s no outside. The theory of sovereignty is that it started to get articulated in late medieval, early modernity, tried to disentangle that and tried to find a kind of Archimedean point outside of the system and would say, “look, political rule has to be above it all and outside of it all,” essentially what I would call exogenous.

Very often, these theories of sovereignty then led to enlightenment understandings of and justifications for political rule that would rely on these fantasies that would start in a state of nature where there was no society, it was just a bunch of individuals or little family units or clans.

Then somehow they had to come together and then decide what would be a legitimate form of rule and hold up the sovereign above everybody else as a kind of representative of all of us. That’s sort of the Thomas Hobbes’ Leviathan approach. Or there is the more imminent, bubbling up approach, from below. The John Locke kind of approach where we all just kind of tacitly agree that we’re going to live in society together.

Our government can be sovereign in that way. So to me, this is all just a fantasy. It’s just not true at all that sovereignty as an understanding of political rule is somehow outside of not just social, political, but also ecological and even cosmic interdependence. It’s utterly BS.

There’s nothing true about it. Everything is dependent on everything else. It’s heterogeneously dependent. It’s not flat, but there’s no outside. There’s no outside, there’s no acting from outside. The problem becomes, when MMT brings that logic of exceptionality and ‘the outside’ to thinking about monetary capacities and powers and responsibilities at different scales of governance…

So there’s two things here: One, there’s a danger of just the intimation. Why even use that word in the first place? You’re using a word that means exogenous thinking. That means outside. That means absolute power. Your own nuanced thinking doesn’t necessarily have to take us there. You could just be using the word, but semantically translating it and using it in a different way.

I would say, “you, MMT, do that to an extent.” The problem is when they start talking about the difference between monetary sovereigns and non-sovereigns, that gets codified in this opposition between monetary sovereigns as currency issuers versus monetary users as non-sovereigns, then that language of exceptionally has a semantic grip that is detrimental to any kind of left-monetary-thinking and really gets in the way of the the broader post-Keynesian supposed commitment to endogeneity without exception.

When an MMTer will say the federal government and the United States can create as much money as it wants to and give it to someone. Actually, that’s Alan Greenspan, but that’s another story. The question is just the available resources to mobilize. But then everyone else; our states, our municipalities are nonprofits. Everyone else has to simply recycle the finite funds that have been emitted through the government or the licensed financial institutions that create the dollar on behalf of the US government.

I think to myself, “Wait a minute.” It’s not just me. We all think to ourselves on Money on the Left, “Wait, it’s either all endogenous or it’s not.” If it’s all endogenous, then states and municipalities, they’re participating in this endogeneity as well. There are strong laws and ideologies that tell us: “No, no, no, they are mere currency users that merely recycle funds.”

I think our commitment in this research collective of ours is to say, “no, it’s not.” Which is not to say that the state of Connecticut has the same monetary capacities as the federal government. You could say that the government has, in a crude, quantitative way, more capacity or has a larger ambit that extends across the entire globe.

On the other hand, you might even say that the state of Connecticut has, in certain qualitative ways, more monetary capacity because they can respond to local needs and local institutions and local requirements in a way that the federal government, maybe at this time, cannot. So the point is not to flatten things. The point is not to say, “Oh, everyone’s a monetary sovereign and everyone should print as much money as they want.”

The point is to say, if we’re going to really, really take seriously this call to think ‘endogeneity without exception,’ then of course, we have to go with MMT and say that it’s public, it’s publicly designed, even the private parts. Haha. Private parts. But also we have to get rid of this sovereignty language because it’s re-introducing new logics of exogeneity that are hurting us and are not only getting in the way of truth, but are getting in the way of fighting for a better world.

Will Beaman

It also, I think, shapes where our attention is distributed in terms of different horizons. Because, we have talked, for example, about universities issuing bonds or in the context of the Seattle Loop, which we have talked quite a bit about. I encourage readers to check out our writings and podcasts about it. We get into coordination between different public institutions in order to sell and purchase municipal bonds and this kind of thing. Even the spectrum version of sovereignty, it says basically, “well, so is the goal to make a university sovereign.”

Scott Ferguson

Right. People have responded that way.

Will Beaman

Yeah. Or is the goal for Seattle to secede from the union or is this relative degrees of secession. You have this imaginary of sovereignty as a relation between a will and space that it can act upon and it glosses over a ton of coordination and dependence that is necessary to make that happen as an effect.

But also it has a much more capacious horizon because you’re no longer trying to theorize a world where, “liberate all the entities, make them all sovereign and unrelated to each other.” It leads to these sort of odd places at scale, where then you then have to reinstall some kind of correct distribution of silencing. Otherwise where this would actually lead would just be to cancel out dependency at a bunch of sort of arbitrary nodes.

Scott Ferguson

Something else I wanted to point out for anybody who’s paying attention to this record is that I wrote this text and revised and edited it largely during the second two years of the Biden administration. It came out halfway through Trump 2.0. We were back in this moment where a kind of neoliberalism with a human face. The first couple years of the Biden administration, because of pressure from the left, because of Bernie’s influence, because of the squad’s influence, because of the way that electoral power and shenanigans went down, I think the Biden administration was more open to some more capacious fiscal policy and industrial policy, even as they were continuing to play by a neoliberal playbook and spending a lot to incentivize private innovation, yada, yada, yada.

This is tabling a lot of the early Covid spending under Trump and Biden as well. Then, of course, the latter half of the Biden administration started to drag, to feel more and more neoliberal. I’m not here trying to characterize everything. I’m just talking about, in a narrow sense, fiscal policy kinds of ideology and talk and policy.

I guess I just didn’t think that after January 6th that Trump would be reelected. I wasn’t thinking in terms of a resurgent fascism, or authoritarianism and the kinds of extremism and illegal fiscal sabotage that would ensue.

Even though this article has come out, it feels like I wrote this article at a very different moment than when it was released. I just want to acknowledge that and I want to say that I feel like I was speaking to a world of a sluggish neoliberalism, rather than the kind of extreme environment that we find ourselves in the Trump 2.0 administration where, as we’ve learned very well many times over in different ways from Will, your writings, the neoliberal logics of fiscal sabotage, which rely on exogenous ideology and laws and methods, have been maximalized to become authoritarian fiscal sabotage.

I think I’ve learned from you, especially watching you think this moment through, that Trump is not, while, yes, he’s an exception in certain ways, yes, MAGA is an exception in certain ways, but in other ways you can say that what the fiscal sabotage under Trump 2.0 is revealing is that it’s just being unabashedly and ruthless and avowedly evil and ideological, but doing the same thing that neoliberal finance does.

It’s just that neoliberal finance hides behind natural laws and necessities and an exogenous paradigm where it can kind of tuck its values and its agendas between its proverbial legs, so to speak.

Will Beaman

I find it amusing that in a certain way, what you’re saying is after January 6th, you overlooked fascism’s endogeneity.

Scott Ferguson

It’s true, it’s true. Yeah.

Will Beaman

To flesh out that kind of bad joke, one of the things I’ve been developing in my writings for the Money on the Left Vertical about this moment, is that there’s all kinds of neoliberal habits of governance that have furnished Trumpism with all kinds of rhetorical playbooks and journalistic reporting habits and the kind of stupefaction with which everyone approaches the market and what the market wants to do is affectively very inhabitable by an authoritarian who wants to stupefy people and turn hard choices into shakedowns and all of that kind of thing. But yeah, it is funny to me that the culprit ultimately is that fascism is not fascism, and that’s why it’s still here.

Scott Ferguson

Yeah. That’s right and that neoliberalism is already a kind of a kind of fascism in disguise.

Will Beaman

Which I think really reframes helpfully a lot of the kind of tired debates that try to periodize this moment and say, “are we under neoliberalism or under fascism?” Really, what you’ve had the whole time is multiple legibilities that relate dynamically to one another.

Billy Saas

Right. This has been great. I’m trying to put on the habit of the erstwhile fan of MMT reviewer who found cause to reject your paper, and I imagine that part of what might have made them uncomfortable would be, no one is essentially safe here. Hyman Minsky’s own work, which is so critical to MMT.

Scott Ferguson

He’s a bit of a sacred cow.

Billy Saas

He’s a bit of a sacred cow.

Will Beaman

Yeah. Too big to fail.

Scott Ferguson

Yeah.

Billy Saas

His work on crisis is subject to the Fergusonian scrutiny that we love you for. I wonder if you could say a little bit about the importance of your examination of the theory of crisis as it plays out in MMT and its interplay with the exceptional endogeneity that you identify in the broader MMT discourse.

Scott Ferguson

Yeah. I mean, I guess what I would say is, the way I frame it is more in terms of heterodoxy centered around post-Keynesianism. My sense is that many of the institutional economists too have an endogenous theory. They more identify through the institutional tradition.

I feel like I’m more speaking about heterodoxy writ large and then MMT is a part of it. I guess I would say that MMT in certain ways counteracts this tendency that I will identify in a moment. My main target isn’t even necessarily MMT itself, even if there’s an ambivalence or, I don’t think they get off scot free here. I guess pun intended. 

Will Beaman

Endogeneity without Scott.

Scott Ferguson

Something I’ve been concerned about for a very long time and to be honest, this really grew in me in terms of my critique of Marxism —  only later did I come to understand that it also very much informs the broader heterodoxy, post-Keynesianism and fellow travelers — which is this sense that, “Okay, we reject the mainstream, we reject general equilibrium theory, we reject perfect information, we reject anything that suggests that there’s no time, there’s no power imbalance, there’s no opacity of information.”

The heterodoxy is good because it puts pressure on all those mainstream claims. That’s an important thing to do. The problem is, at least as I see it, they then turn around and have this romantic, gothic imaginary that romanticizes crisis. They’ll say that instability is constantly on the horizon, and it’s always tending toward crisis.

Different heterodox traditions do this differently. Marxism has its own versions of doing this. The entire system is built upon contradiction after contradiction after contradiction, whether it’s the contradiction between, so-called, use value and exchange value, or the contradiction between the owners of production and the proletarian class. I mean, the contradictions are endless. All those contradictions lead to instability and crisis necessarily because of the, so-called, capitalist mode of production.

Like I said, I had a pretty strong and growing critique of the reifying of the necessity of crisis in Marxism, because I had MMT over here telling me that, “You don’t ever have to have a crisis. You can always create more public money to address things when things are becoming unstable.”

Then I was realizing more and more that post-Keynesian and heterodox analysis tends, even though they’re saying money is endogenous and it’s being created by financial institutions all the time, they tend to still that the financial system and the financial markets as extending into commodity markets, they have their own kind of inertia.

They have their own kinds of tendencies toward instability. They operate in a semi-autonomous way. There they have a kind of, what I call, an “automaticity” to them, which is also Marxist language. What this does is this puts money creation, money design, transformations in the monetary system outside of the so-called natural tendencies of the system.

Everybody has been talking about the bailout society or the bailout state. I think for good Marxists, it’s like, “see, I told you, capitalism doesn’t work. Now it’s gotten so bad that we have central banks around the world that are constantly…”

Will Beaman

“Now capital’s borrowing from itself to save itself.”

Scott Ferguson

All of that requires you to naturalize this thing, this entity, this system called a market that has its own internal laws. If you’re a critic, you’re like, “look, those laws lead to terrible things and they and everything breaks down and it tends toward crisis.” This just doesn’t allow for, not only like so-called government intervention, and which we wouldn’t even call it intervention, but it doesn’t even allow for the fact that, look, if money is endogenous, then it’s constantly being invented and reinvented all the time.

It’s never about a private, finite stockpile that has to be earned in the form of revenue or borrowed in the form of credit and then recycled. But I think that all of that is exogenous thinking. I think that revenue constraints, depletion of savings, borrowing constraints, all of these become what I would redeem as exogenous variables that heterodoxy redefines as necessary, rather than looking around and saying, “okay, you know, what are the variables?”

Well, one variable is that we have a federal insurance system, FDIC insurance, that only insures up to $250,000. Then that causes all kinds of pressures to create a shadow banking sector. What if we just change the rules and then certain crises will go away.

Certain variables count as these hard determining factors and then there’s often a tipping point. If enough competing agents in the market can’t meet their debt service, then it’s a domino effect and then one is going to collapse after the other after the other.

Instead of saying, “no, no, no, there’s all kinds of variables and really crises are actively socially constructed by financial journalists, by financial experts, by the current design of the system. Also the current redesigning of the system, the system is never just designed and then stays still. It’s constantly being fiddled with even in micro-ways all the time. So my critique is that heterodoxy ends up having this romantic, dark story of a necessity toward crisis that brings a worldview to bear on problems of political economy and social provisioning that should not be there. It just creeps right back in and essentially disciplines us and says what we can and cannot do.

I like the speed limit language when it’s used in certain ways because it recognizes that there are political, social, aesthetic, ideological, and affective obstacles. I mean, for sure. No one’s saying that there aren’t. There’s rhetorical ones. That’s what our show is all about. It’s trying to reframe the rhetoric, reframe even how we think about this in the first place.

So the point is not, we can do everything and anything. We can just have magical fixes to any problem overnight. That’s not the point, because we can’t. Even in a world where we snap our fingers and suddenly everyone thinks like we do, that’s still not going to work that way. The difference is; is the paradigm, is our collective understanding of what the problem is, is it relying on reified variables that necessarily lead us into crisis, or are we actually treating a whole host of variables as endogenous and manipulable and we can prevent a housing crisis from devolving into a really, really, really big problem?

Billy Saas

We get to identify, of course, in the exceptional endogeneity frame, phenomena, crises, we might say, of, as you do in the article, black unemployment as not remarkable enough to merit any significant intervention, or not threatening the system in a systemic way.

Scott Ferguson

I’m still nervous about this kind of counterexample. I bring up the fact that, there’s all kinds of phenomena that we could equally call crises. MLK said on any number of occasions that there is a Great Depression in the black community.

A Great Depression should be a systemic crisis of apocalyptic proportions. He said that about black employment throughout the 20th century until he was assassinated. Heterodox economics wants to kind of, I’d say, fetishize and even reify the tendency toward crisis when it comes to debt leveraging and all these kinds of things and say, “there’s a tipping point, a certain point where there’s enough credit default swaps and then people can’t pay other people, and those people can’t pay other people, and the whole pyramid comes tumbling down.” As far as I know, no heterodox economist puts it in that way. Like that there is some tipping point that when the black unemployment rate reaches a certain level, that it’s somehow unsustainable.

I mean, I would just say, “yeah, double digit black unemployment has always been unsustainable.” But nobody has ever said that that violates some kind of metaphysical principle and that that should be the ultimate horizon in which we are thinking about political economy and policy answers to ongoing problems.

Will Beaman

Yeah. I mean, it’s the contrary. There is supposedly, in neoclassical economics, a natural rate of unemployment that is within the context of perfect markets’ narrative that disavows or at least disavows crises as systemic, but then it also is sort of obsessed with what needs to be disciplined in order to prevent crises. Unemployment then fits in there as something that, far from being a crisis, is —  in the MMT language — an automatic stabilizer that goes up and down in ways that control distribution and demand and prevent the economy from running too hot and all of that kind of thing.

One of the things that I’m hearing that’s interesting, just kind of dwelling a little bit more on this the speed limit language as you are transvaluing it versus the crisis version, when we talk about a speed limit, not as a tipping point beyond which bad things will happen that are irreversible, but instead a kind of sequencing problem.

We then end up reframing what you might call limits, but that word feels less and less helpful. We start to look at them more as design problems and design provocations. In a certain way that sort of thing, whether it’s Marxist explanations or certain institutionalist explanations, their version of how institutions form endogenously in relation to crises, is in relation to an exogenous crisis that requires capital to conspire to make a new institution to bail itself out.

In a way, I feel like that is sort of the dark doppelganger of what it is you’re describing, which is a much more above board and inclusive problem space of limits as design problems and prompts for new institutional design.

Scott Ferguson

Yeah. And I mean, let’s take the Money on the Left, “Loop” project that was inaugurated by Tyler in our collective. It is something we’ve been thinking through and promoting and talking to people on the ground in Seattle and in Maine and in Orlando and the San Francisco Bay area. If you are not familiar, if you’re just dropping into this podcast from elsewhere, our proposal is that states and municipalities, at least starting in the United States —  feel free to take this and run with it, everyone else — states and municipalities should create public banks. That usually means the state legislature creating a legal framework for doing so and then actually establishing these public banks. Then they could move all public money and all public holdings out of the private, speculative, high cost Wall Street banking system into their own banks.

That’s how you would capitalize the bank. Then we can essentially end the extreme austerity, the extreme, Henny Penny, the sky is falling, “our budgets are getting too big” hysteria, by having our public banks be the single designated buyers of our public debt. So a state or a municipality, like Washington state or Seattle can issue bonds and have their public banks buy them, and then if they want to, they can do —  what we are calling —  “loop” the interest payments right back to the state or municipality in the first place.

What this does is take the current legal system of credit creation, tweaks it a little bit in order to provide a low or no interest form of money creation, of credit creation, out of thin air for the sub federal level without actually breaking any laws. Now, are we for smashing the liberal and neoliberal legal order in this country and around the world?

Absolutely. This is a policy that’s meant to be a kind of point of leverage in that system that is doable for those who don’t want to start day one by saying let’s have a constitutional amendment to the US Constitution and allow our states and municipalities just to create credit directly. I mean, I think ultimately that’s what we would like.

So this is a kind of strategic way up that mountain, so to speak. Is there a private banking lobby that would get in the way? Sure. Is there a limit to public understanding of these things? Sure. But those aren’t reasons not to try and not to educate, not to get out the word, not to strategize, not to fight for this future. From a post-Keynesian perspective or even a maybe more crude MMT 101 perspective, the reality is there are certain variables and they are the present state of the economy in these different states and municipalities, their taxing power or how much they can tax at any given time, both legally, but also just politically.

What do they feel like they can get away with, taxing-wise? Also bonds and bond rating agencies and the rules about what kinds of expenditures you can use bonds to pay for. A kind of typical heterodox analysis of the present situation would say, “yeah, you know, states and municipalities can only go so far and there is a crisis. Washington state is overleveraged and they better get their house in order because they just recycle the endless money that is…

Will Beaman

Because they’re not Washington, D.C. — the federal government, that is.

Scott Ferguson

Yeah, exactly. Yeah. I mean, Washington, D.C. itself is fucked.

Will Beaman

Washington, D.C. is even more disempowered

Scott Ferguson

It’s even worse.

But yeah, right. They’re not the feds. I think that the “Loop” proposal says, “hey, let’s not refine the same damn variables that the orthodoxy does and then just say, ‘we’re screwed.’” Instead, the public, endogenous, “without exception” perspective of Money on the Left says, “no, there’s always something you can do.” If there’s trouble, or if Washington state needs to spend money on social housing because people are without homes, if it needs to spend money on ecological crises, then there are ways to make that happen. We just need a full blown endogenous public money imagination to actualize new forms of design that are going to meet those troubles. My critique is not to say there are no crises. My critique is that the paradigm naturalizes crises by only paying attention to certain variables and essentially tacitly treating them as exogenous.

Will Beaman

Yeah. And I think this “Loop” example, and also just what you’re saying about your critique of exogenous crisis thinking, illuminates what is both a historical and theoretical problematic in post-Keynesianism and heterodox economics, that is not always fully historicized or its historicism is not followed through in all that it implies, which is that money creation has been relocated to banking as institutions.

Typically then, where post-Keynesianism will go with that is, “So, then we need to study the dynamics of banking in order to understand this money creation power that has been usurped.” Whereas what I’m hearing from you is that, you can exploit that it has been relocated to banking by following it into banking in a constructive institution building way.

You can transvalue the public underpinnings of banking in the institutional arrangements and institutional functions that it performs, rather than having that insight become just a proxy for, “So, let’s defer to the banking sector.” Which, I think, frankly, was why we were a little bit late to the game on public banking because the language of banking is so reified and is so historically complicit in monetary silencing. From our perspective, it’s all fiscal, anyway. I think it was easier ten years ago to be like, “you know, well, let’s talk about fiscal politics rather than going a step down from that in terms of reification.” Yeah, I think that we’ve learned a little better.

Billy Saas

Now I just want to flag an acronym that I think will be really useful moving forward. It’s “FBEMPMC” (Full-Blown Endogenous Mode of Public Money Creation).

Scott Ferguson

It just rolls off the tongue.

Will Beaman

I thought you were gonna tell me STFU

Billy Saas

No, not this time. Not on microphone. Maybe one way to kind of wind our way to a conclusion here would be to ask, what would you like to see and what might we stand the most to gain from in a change in the way MMT — your public facing, well-known, MMT economists — talk about and do MMT in public instead of sovereignty. What do we say?

Scott Ferguson

Oh I see. Okay. I thought you were asking a question that I wasn’t really prepared to answer, but you targeted. So I appreciate it. Yeah. So something that I’ve argued actually in several papers, several works, but this is the first peer-reviewed, fancy publication. We can rely on any number of terms.

And to be honest, MMT already does it. It already does. When they talk about fiscal sovereignty or they talk about monetary sovereignty, they define that by saying, “oh, that means a certain amount of capacity. It means a certain speed limit. It means a certain kind of ambit of responsibility.” We might talk about when an MMTer says, “Let’s reclaim monetary sovereignty,” something you could say is, “what they really mean is they’re reclaiming agency and they’re reclaiming resiliency and they’re reclaiming the creativity that public endogenous money allows. So I actually think that’s not that hard. I’m all about coining a million terms. “Word printer go brrr.” I’m all for it.

I kind of feel that we’re sitting pretty well, I just think, let’s get rid of the sovereignty word and the sovereignty logics. To be honest, I would even be okay — uh, maybe — I guess I would sit on my hands if the sovereignty language was around but it wasn’t actually flexed semantically.

If it wasn’t like, “there are users and issuers and all the users have to recycle finite funds, and they’re basically trapped in this system of perpetual crisis.” If they wanted to use the word sovereignty but not presuppose that or argue that, then I suppose that would be okay. But yeah, we use all kinds of words like capacity and resilience and agency that we can use instead. To speak to the broader question, we want to unlock the public monetary imagination, both for diagnosing the world and the problems that we heterogeneously share together —  whether that’s climate change or radical inequality or exploitation — but also at the very same time as we’re diagnosing those problems, we are empowered collectively through our paradigm, through our imagination, through our ability to mobilize words and imagery, to constantly come up with solutions, constantly come up with, “wow, our system of states and municipalities are really struggling under the thumbs of the bond rating agencies and this kind of thing, let’s have a whole system of what we’re calling ‘loops’ and let’s just put the municipal bond market out of business.” There’s no really good argument for the municipal bond market to exist.

It’s not really serving any public purpose. It’s just serving Wall Street. Why would we do that? Let’s not do that anymore. And again, then the fight begins. I’m not saying that the powers that be, the vested interests aren’t going to —  as I sometimes will put it — crush us like little bugs.

That might happen. But the point is, we’re not crushing ourselves like little bugs before we even open the front door to confront the problems of the world. That’s what I want.

Will Beaman

Are you a currency issuer or a currency bug?

Scott Ferguson

I am both. Thank you for asking. I’m on record as saying I am both.

Billy Saas

Well, great. Scott, I think that’s a good place to leave it. But, you know, as a co-host, what do you think?

Scott Ferguson

I think it’s a good place to leave it. There’s more, so there’s reasons to keep reading. We didn’t really talk about the international sphere very much. We can table that if you want it. There’s more little gems in the essay. I recommend it. You’ll either enjoy it or it’ll make you extremely mad. Enjoy

Will Beaman

Well, I thought you dodged most of my questions, but, I guess we’ll let viewers decide.

Will Beaman

Thank you.

Scott Ferguson

Thank you.

* Thank you to Zachary Nosbisch for the episode graphic, Nahneen Kula for the theme tune, and Thomas Chaplin for the transcript.

Crafting the California Public Banking Act with Sylvia Chi (In the Loop: Revolutionizing Public Finance, Ep. 4)

In this episode of In the Loop: Revolutionizing Public Finance, we sit down with lawyer, organizer, and policy architect Sylvia Chi to unpack the landmark passage and radical possibilities of California’s AB 857, the California Public Banking Act of 2019.

The conversation opens by tracing Chi’s political trajectory, showing how her early activism during Occupy Wall Street and the resistance against the Dakota Access Pipeline developed into a structural critique of modern public finance. Witnessing public tax dollars continuously invested in mega-banks that bankroll the fossil fuel industry, Chi turned toward public banking as a practical mechanism for municipal divestment and reinvestment, reimagining finance not as an engine of extractive accumulation, but as a public utility serving social and environmental justice.

From there, we examine the legal and legislative construction of AB 857. Chi walks us through the strategic compromises demanded by Sacramento, offering a candid post-mortem on what it took to get the framework signed into law. Getting into the policy weeds, we challenge conventional regulatory orthodoxies around FDIC insurance, analyzing how federal deposit insurance often functions less as an objective financial necessity for public depositories than as an ideological safety stamp and political alibi for risk-averse lawmakers. Chi outlines a democratic counter-model to this dilemma: the potential for an interstate deposit insurance institution designed explicitly to shelter and federate a nationwide public banking network.

Broadening the scope to current regional efforts, we discuss the multi-municipality coalition pushing forward the East Bay Public Bank, while dissecting the aggressive misdirection deployed by corporate banking lobbies. In particular, we expose how commercial banking associations routinely deny the existence of banking deserts and underbanked communities to block democratic alternatives, and we examine the urgent need for public banking infrastructure to safely bank California’s cash-heavy cannabis industry, a sector systematically shut out by Wall Street. We conclude with a look at Chi’s present role as Senior Counsel for Public Grids, discussing how community organizing and public power expertise are uniting across the country to build a clean, publicly owned energy future.

Visit our Patreon page here: https://www.patreon.com/MoLsuperstructure

Original music by Josh Klinghoffer 

A Rhetorical History of Modern Money Theory with John T. Harvey

We speak with John T. Harvey about a new article he co-wrote with Billy Saas titled, “A Rhetorical History of Modern Money Theory,” out this month in the September 2026 issue of the Journal of Economic Issues. Harvey is Hal Wright Professor of Economics at Texas Christian University. We discuss his recent publication in the context of his broader career in heterodox economics. 

Modern Money Theory (MMT) (otherwise known as Modern Monetary Theory) is a heterodox macroeconomic school of thought that recognizes currency-issuing governments cannot run out of the money they create. Because the state issues the currency and requires taxes to be paid in that unit of account, it is never revenue-constrained. Instead, public spending is bound only by real productive capacity and available resources (labor, technology, materials), with inflation—not solvency—serving as the true economic limit.

In “A Rhetorical History of Modern Money Theory,” Saas and Harvey trace how MMT emerged not merely as a set of first principles, balance-sheet descriptions, and policy prescriptions, but also as a deliberate discursive and rhetorical intervention against dominant neoclassical paradigms and institutions. Orthodox economics relies heavily on moralizing metaphors of household frugality, naturalized market scarcity, and the false specter of government insolvency to enforce fiscal austerity. In response, MMT theorists developed new vocabularies, pedagogies, and public-facing rhetorical strategies to demystify money as a creature of law and public governance, demonstrating how public finance can be reclaimed for democratic purpose.

Throughout our conversation, Harvey reflects on the communicative struggles of heterodox economists, the pedagogical challenges of unseating entrenched neoclassical assumptions, the relationship between Post-Keynesian and Institutionalist traditions, and what a rhetorical history reveals about the future of political economy and public provisioning.

Visit our Patreon page here: https://www.patreon.com/MoLsuperstructure

Music by Nahneen Kula: www.nahneenkula.com

Transcript

This transcript has been edited for readability.

Billy Saas

John Harvey, welcome to Money on the Left.

John Harvey

Thank you very much. Thank you for inviting me. I’ve been looking forward to it.

Billy Saas

We’re going to talk a bit about some work that we collaborated on over some span of time. An article that just came out in the Journal of Economic Issues called “A Rhetorical History of Modern Monetary Theory,” but before we do that, tell us a little bit about your research background, how you came to do the work that you do at TCU (Texas Christian University) and otherwise.

John Harvey

Well, if I go all the way back to the University of Tennessee, where I went to undergrad, just because my dad got transferred to Knoxville halfway through my sophomore year of high school. But oh my gosh, what luck it was for me. So, I went to Tennessee initially as a physics major. It turns out physics is god awful boring. Then I went to political science, and I kind of missed the modeling stuff, you know? And I took an econ class, and at Tennessee, it was full of institutionalist, Texas institutional. I say, full, you know, there were 4 or 5, which even in the big department, that was a big concentration and the very first class I took was History of Economic Thought at the intro level.

And I was like, “wow, this is what I’ve been looking for all my life. I love this class. I’ll bet everybody else loved this class too.” Apparently, no, a lot of people don’t like economics. So that was Hans Jensen. Really nice man. Danish. Got his PhD at the University of Texas and fought in the resistance in World War Two. So, a really cool guy and absolutely hilarious. I ended up taking three more classes with him as an undergrad, and then I met some girl, who’s in the other room right now, in my senior year. So she still had a couple more years to go and I thought, “I’ll go here for my PhD. I love economics. I’m gonna do the PhD.”

I took the institutional list again for “Economic History” and “History of Economics,” but then I started taking the upper level macro and, god, it was awful. It was all mainstream stuff. One of the things I remember learning was that the Great Depression was because the money supply fell, which drove down prices, which caused firms to lower wages, which caused people to quit their jobs.

So apparently we had 25% unemployment because people quit their jobs. This, strangely enough, made no sense to me. So one day I found a book on my desk, Introduction to Post-Keynesian Economics, and I started reading. Then I was like, “this is what I want to do with my life.”

Scott Ferguson

Can we pause here? I have a couple of questions. One is, you know, it’s pretty special to have a department in the United States that has a handful of institutional economists. So I’m kind of curious about, do you have a sense of the politics of the formation of that department? 

The second question is, at what point did you realize you were in a relatively exceptional place? That this isn’t the econ degree that everyone gets in run of the mill departments across the country. 

Then the third question is, I want a little more detail on, “Oh, a post Keynesian book came across my desk.” So how does that even happen? 

John Harvey

I can do all three of those. The first one is easy because I don’t know. I don’t know how they ended up with a group of institutionalists there. Presumably somebody got there. Maybe it was Terry Neal or Anne Mayhew, who was the editor of the JEI back then. Not immediately when I started there, but she did eventually become that.

She was department chair and then Hans Jensen ended up there. I think [Christoph] Boehm went to Texas as well. Bill Cole, I don’t know how they all ended up there. But it’s kind of like, why is Chicago the largest Polish population in the world outside of Warsaw? Well, a couple of Poles got there and said, “this place is pretty nice, you ought to come over.”

I assume it was kind of the same way. As far as when I discovered it was something different, I guess it was in the middle of those, and it wasn’t even totally clear in the middle of those graduate level macro classes when we’re learning Barro-Grossman disequilibrium models and money illusion and stuff and it was so boring. It wasn’t like the undergrad macro that I had taken from institutionalists. These were all neoclassicals. I really had no backup plan. I wasn’t sure what I was going to do because this is really boring. I don’t want to spend the rest of my life doing this. 

Okay, so the backstory I do know about the book. I know why the book was on my desk. Right? So apparently Paul Kubik, one of the guys in my cohort, had left his book on my desk at some point and wandered off. I see this book on my desk, A Guide to Post Keynesian Economics, edited by Alfred Eichner.

I said, “hey, who owns this book?” And nobody answered and said, “well, let’s have a look at it.” I like to think it was the hand of God working through Paul Kubik that gave me this out. It kept going on about, “sure, we want to use math and structure, but we are kind of worried about the real world, about how realistic the model is, that unlike what [Milton] Friedman says, it does matter how unrealistic the assumptions are, because you’re not going to get a good model otherwise.”

To jump ahead to my first job, the department chair at Tennessee at the time was Bill Cole, his office mate in grad school at University of Texas was Dick Wates. Dick Wates was the chair at TCU and Dick Wates calls – we had no email back then – and said “have you got anybody decent coming out?” He said, “Well, not really, but I guess you can have a look at Harvey.” I haven’t even applied toTCU because they wanted the writing sample and I didn’t want to have to bother putting one together. I thought, “Okay, I’ll apply to TCU.” Well, it was full of institutionalists. I mean, Texas and Oklahoma were back then. So little did I realize, this is when it kind of slowly sinks in that you’re doing something different. I didn’t realize I couldn’t just do the research I thought made sense anywhere, and still get tenure and promotion.

At TCU, I was fine. Publishing in the Journal of Post Keynesian Economics (JPKE) and Journal of Economic Issues (JEI) was perfectly fine. But man, if I went almost anywhere else, I wouldn’t have gotten tenure, let alone full professor. So anyway, I went to TCU. Today was the beginning of my 40th year at TCU, by the way. 

Scott Ferguson

Congratulations. 

John Harvey

Thank you. Class started today. I’ve been lucky, that it was a place where you could do research in a different school of thought and be rewarded. Now, I don’t know how long that will still be true after I leave, because the department is becoming increasingly neoclassical. Some of them are self-consciously wanting to keep it that way. Others don’t really care either way, but don’t really know of other schools of thought. Well, I will say we do have one really unique thing in our department. We have a class on Contending Perspectives and Economics. Not only do we have a class in that, which is incredibly unique, but it’s required of every major. You must take that class to get an econ degree.

I assume that will go away at some point after I’m gone, but at least right now. Oh, and by the way, in our annual or semester leave senior survey, when we ask what is our greatest strength, Number one reason is they say, “faculty,” which is a nice thing to hear. We do have a lot of faculty, regardless of school thought, who really care about teaching.

But number two is that class, “really glad you taught us different schools of thought.” That was really interesting. So, it’s something that they’re missing out on in other places. So, my research initially was that I’ve always been fascinated by business cycles, but it’s hard to compete in post Keynesian and institutional economics to get publications in something that is so well researched in both of those areas.

So I ended up doing exchange rates for a quarter of a century. I did nothing but exchange rate research. Nobody had done it in and from our school of thought. So, I was like, “okay, well, I’ll try to carve out a niche here.” So I did that. As I said, it’s my 40th year. So for about the first half of my career, I did exchange rates. I just got done publishing a book on business cycles and now I feel like I’m done with that. I finally felt like I could compete in the journals and in the volume and I’m going to go back to exchange rates now. Oh, in the first ten years of our fantasy football league, from 1989 to 1998, I won five championships. No one else won more than one. 

Scott Ferguson

I hope that’s at the top of your CV.

John Harvey

I used to put that on my syllabus for my students, “the owner and general manager of the West Cliff Colts.”

Billy Saas

Oh, yeah. You’ve actually written a book that corresponds with that course that’s so popular with the TCU econ students, Contending Perspectives in Economics. I can say that I’ve found that useful in my teaching with students in communication as well. I appreciate it particularly, and I think readers, if they haven’t looked at it, or listeners, if they haven’t looked at it, would also appreciate that. I think this is part of the reason that our collaboration has worked well, and we ended up in the places that we ended up together, was that you’re very sensitive to the argumentative structure and, the sort of the premises and the warrant of the claims of the different schools and how those function. Less overt in the book, but more overt in your other commentary and scholarship is how ideology sort of factors in and that being a major part of that real world story that you were searching for.

I would include that in the list of accomplishments and achievements. You were also the president of pluralism.

John Harvey

Yeah, the International Confederation of Associations for Pluralism in Economics (ICAPE).

I did that for about six years. It’s funny how the book came about, by the way. We already had created the class and there was no decent book out there, so I went to the Edward Elgar booth at the conference, and Edward Elgar, the guy after whom that thing is named, was still actively managing it at that point. And I said, “hey, have you guys got a book?” 

They had one that was like 20 years old. 

“Is there a newer one in this?”

And he did like a Jedi mind trick on me, because as I walked away I said, “yes, I need to write that book.”

It was nowhere on my radar that I was going to write that book. It was exhausting to write somebody else’s school of thought. Then one of the things I did with the book is that I sent every chapter except the neoclassical one. I was like, screw them. I sent every chapter to somebody, at least one person, sometimes two, in that school of thought to check it for me.

I was like, “hey, Austria!” I sent it to a couple Austrian friends of mine. “Would you be okay with this chapter and everything?” They suggested the change, and I changed everything. I went right along with it. The Marxist chapter. Oh my God. I can’t think of his name right now… Andrew? I can’t think of his last name.

Anyway, he sent me like six single spaced pages of what I had done wrong. It took me several weeks to work up the courage to actually read what he had said, and he was right. I cited everything and fixed it all up, but, man, I almost quit that book several times because it was a lot of work.

But I’m glad I did that now. It was totally different from anything else. I’m really into exchange rates and business cycles and that was just kind of a side trip that I took that worked out really well. So anyway, I’m glad that it is of some use.

Billy Saas

Yeah. The Austrian perspective on human nature is probably not super germane to your exchange rate research.

John Harvey

Not usually, yeah.

Billy Saas

Part of the charm and usefulness of that book and that project is those moments where you pause and say, “okay, well, what does this tell us about their perspective? Or what do we know, what have we seen, what has been written by advocates of this perspective on human nature?”

John Harvey

By the way, that came from Hans Jensen, the guy that I took the first econ class from when he taught “History of Economic Thought,” he made a big deal out of it. Okay, these people weren’t just these people, they had hopes and dreams and visions and these things fed into what became their theoretical models and so forth.

I took that. In fact, I even cited it in the book, but that came from him from the very first class I ever took in econ.

Billy Saas

Very cool. To talk about how you and I first got to know each other from. I was aware of your work, and, at the time, was a member of a new division of the National Communication Association called the Economics Communication Society. We were going to hold a pre-conference at our 2017 meeting in Dallas and I was part of the organizing effort of that pre-conference.

I knew you were at TCU, I reached out and said, “hey, would you be interested in talking to us comm scholars, most of us in rhetoric about econ and maybe even specifically about Modern Monetary Theory (MMT),” because by that time, I think through your platform on Forbes, you had been pretty outspoken about MMT, and engaged their ideas in a fair and honest way. 

You said, “Sure.” We got together in Dallas that year, and you gave a talk that I think went down very well and was introducing much of the crowd to MMT. This is a bit of a snapshot in time. We’re in 2026 now. This was almost ten years ago. You would have been talking about MMT in front of a crowd that, for many of whom, had not even encountered it yet.

For all of MMT’s relative rise in that decade, there are still academics in other fields who would not have heard of it. I don’t know if that’s the case anymore.

Scott Ferguson

Oh, I say that it is. It’s okay. I encounter that all the time. You can never take that for granted. It’s been in every major news publication, but some people still have never heard of it. But I digress.

Billy Saas

So the paper that you presented there, I guess I would invite you to talk about your recollection of that pre-conference, your project in that paper and get us started on how we got to where we got to in RGA.

John Harvey

2017 is right. I was like, “oh, yeah, that’d be really cool to go over to Dallas.” I find that non-economists are much more open to what I have to say than economists or people who are trained in a certain way in economics. So I thought, “well, this would be really fun.”

Everyone was really nice. I remember when we went out to lunch afterwards, and chatted with various people. But I wrote a paper to go along with the presentation to kind of organize my thoughts and I do a lot of general background on economics. I think I showed how often certain search terms showed up in mainstream journals. Did you know, by the way, that if you go to look at their standard economics journal listing of their top ten journals? Seven do not use double blind review. Now, that’s kind of what science is built around, isn’t it? The double blind review.

Seven of the top ten journals supposedly in mainstream economics don’t use double blind review. One of them is by invitation only. Okay. All right. So you’re gonna have journals like that. Then six out of the remaining nine, they know who sent that paper and the referee knows who sent the paper.

You’re not going to tell me that there’s not a reason for that. So anyway, it’s terrible. So I went through things like that, sort of a general background in economics. But, I didn’t want to leave it there. I thought, “well, I’ve done all this work.” If I can jump into a little bit of background, I’ve coauthored papers before. Not very often. I’m usually on my own schedule, my own time, and I don’t do it much. But never, ever have I coauthored with somebody where there’s no way I could have written their part of the paper, and there’s no way I could have understood the things that you understood about the “A Rhetorical History of Modern Monetary Theory” piece that just came out in an issue with one of Scott’s papers.

For example, when you talked about Milton Friedman, and his “free to choose” and how you can see some parallels with the success of MMT. I would never have thought of that. Papers I’ve coauthored with economists, I probably could have written their part, and they probably could’ve written my part, but it was a lot easier to do it together.

Now, as you pointed out, it took us about ten years from the beginning of the idea to it actually being published. It went through a lot of changes over those years. This was the last round of sending it out, which took place about this time last year.

Then we got these massive comments from the referee that, oh my God, how will we ever address all this? But we did. And to me, it is one of the most unique papers I’ve ever written for the reason that there’s no way I could have done your part. I could not have had those insights. In the academy, we talk all the time about interdisciplinary research.

Wouldn’t that be great if we did it? This actually worked, we actually did it. We were more than the sum of the parts, and it worked out really well. I’m sorry that I’m talking about the creation of it without the content.

Billy Saas

No, no, I think that is interesting. For me, a huge part of the content is this meta content of its production and publication. Thank you for the kind words. I was deeply flattered in 2017 when you asked me after the pre-conference if I’d be interested in tuning it up for publication in a communication journal.

I guess the meta content that I would fill in is that those ten years and the many submissions to many different journals included submissions to communication and rhetorics focused journals with varying results, and varying contexts. So we had to pull it from one for disciplinary reasons. And then another one was a split review where the editor went the way of the second reviewer.

We ended up not giving up on that, but trying our luck and turning to a respected, long running, more squarely economics journal. We look at the other articles, it’s definitely an economics-ass economics journal in very straight ways. So we’ve ended up here now, and I’m super excited. I hope you would consider after those ten years, writing and coauthoring again, although I wouldn’t blame you if it didn’t ever again.

John Harvey

Well, let’s see some time in 2036.

Scott Ferguson

Yeah.

Billy Saas

So, a tremendous amount of fun. Very frustrating. Glad it’s out. And in fact, the day we’re recording this – we didn’t plan it this way, but – it came out today.

John Harvey

It came out today. It’s really neat, very exciting.

Billy Saas

So I’m going to step aside here. As one of the authors, I guess I’ll open up for some questions.

Scott Ferguson

I’ll step into the breach, because I want to know what this article is about. I mean, obviously I know because I read it, but we’ve been talking about the kind of meta history of how it came to be, which is interesting for all kinds of interpersonal, institutional reasons. But okay, so the title, just to say it again, “A Rhetorical History of Modern Money Theory.”  

So why is it titled that? Maybe that’s one place to start. And why does that matter? Why isn’t it called, “A History of Modern Money Theory?”

John Harvey

Well, let me toss in first, real quick. Over those ten years, there were a couple times where we both just kind of gave up on it. 

“Well, it was interesting, but, well…no, let’s give it another shot.”

“Ah, it didn’t work again, but let’s give it another shot.”

Another reason why I’m really proud of this piece is that we really worked really hard on this. Okay, so I had a piece come out in the JPKE last year and I wrote it in two weeks. It was pretty good. It was a survey article, and I had done a lot of the background research already, and I was on sabbatical. I like the article, but it took me like two weeks. I mean, maybe six months, if you count all the time I spent collecting the articles. I made a spreadsheet of the articles because it was going to be a survey piece.

So I wanted to say, “Okay, these articles fell into this category, these into this category.” This one, man, was hard, hard work. And I think it turned out great, but, I’m going to let Billy answer the question of why it’s title is that, because that’s his title.

Billy Saas

Yeah. Yeah. Well, I mean, I’m first of all a big fan of “no colon” in the title. This accomplishes that. It’s pretty straightforward. I think it does what it says on the tin and what it promises on the tin is connected with a kind of area of scholarship in rhetorical studies, in the kind of communication tradition where the discursive outputs and habits of a specific community are tracked over time in order to derive some kind of lesson or other.

As somebody who had been variously involved with on-the-ground arguments, but then from initial like early dissertation times, just very compelled by the arguments themselves made by Randall Wray, Stephanie Kelton and other MMTers. So this would have been the early 2010s when I came into contact with their scholarship. This is a history that I’ve outlined in the Liminalities piece that was published a couple of years after John would have given his keynote.

But we published a special issue of Liminalities from Money on the Left, where I describe some of this background. Anyway, a lot of research over time, a lot of reading of the blogs and kind of coming through my continuous contact with not only the blogs, the podcasts, the posts, the editorials, the comments in the comments section of the New York Times of MMTers.

Following that stuff very closely as sort of an interested party, but then also as a student of communication and someone interested in rhetoric, noticing that this seems to be a, if not entirely novel, certainly a deviation from the norm of how economics is done. I got interested in MMT from that perspective and started to try to bring to bear some of the tools and concepts that I got throughout my graduate studies on studying and trying to learn something from all of this reading and participating through conferences and otherwise, and this kind of broad discourse community. I think John brought the perspective in his keynote that was, I think, very much from a member of that sort of discourse community, from a more central perspective. I would actually like to put the question to you, John, how did you first come into contact with MMT? 

How did it meld with your institutional background? My entry into this was naive, and then educated and then, eventually, I guess not cynical, but tired encounters with all of this rhetoric over the years, and trying to make sense of it, also coming into contact with John, who was just a great person to offer additional perspective on how this stuff works and basically why MMT became so notable as a school of economic thought in the 2010s when it seemed like it had been a very long time since any school of economic thought had made such a splash on the national stage and international stage.

John Harvey

As Saas and Harvey say right here, “…progressed from a state of total obscurity to widespread notoriety, including mainstream economic discourse.” When I was in grad school and I realized I wanted to do non-mainstream stuff, Tennessee hired Paul Davidson, who was a huge name in post Keynesian economics.

I’d already finished my classes, so I talked to him by the copier and that was about it. But, we were all invited out to lunch – I say all, it’s just the two of us — with Chris Brown, who later became the editor of the JEI. We were there with Anne Mayhew and Terry Neal, two giants in institutional economics, and Paul Davidson and his wife, Louis and Alfred Eichner, who was another giant. I loved his stuff.

We’re sitting there and we’re not saying anything because we’re scared. The famous economists are all chatting and they said, “remember back when we thought we could make a change and we didn’t,” and I thought, “oh my God, that is not what I wanted to hear when I’m just about to finish my PhD and go out in the world.”

And so, these MMT people made a change. That’s what you’re pointing out. What makes it so unique is “wow, they were able to make inroads in a way nobody else did. I wonder how they did it?” That’s your rhetorical history of modern money theory. I wonder how they did it?

What remains to be done? What were the successes? What were the defeats? And I think we really do a good job. Having reread it last night, having not looked at it for at least a year, we do a good job pointing out what it was that was unique. That happened.

You asked about my introduction to MMT. It’s kind of funny, actually. Randall Wray and I got our PhD’s about the same time, so I’ve known him since way back then through institutionalist organizations. I’ve known Stephanie Kelton, I think, since she was Stephanie Bell and maybe before she got her PhD.

Pavlina Tcherneva, I can remember visiting her in her graduate school office when she was there. So I’ve known these people for years. I had never heard of MMT until I was having some discussion on, like an old person or a boomer, on Facebook and somebody said to me, “how long have you been into MMT?” I was like, “what does that stand for?” And then they told me I was like, “well, I just thought that was the right way to do macro.” I didn’t know that we had a name for it. I say this when Randall Wray’s book, Understanding Modern Money came out, whatever year that was.

I was one of the first reviewers of it for the Review of Social Economy. So I knew what the ideas were. I just didn’t know we had a name for it. So anyway, that’s how I just thought it made sense from a macro perspective. Now, I used to teach that the government had to eventually balance its budget.

Yes, I did, I used to teach that. Yeah. So did Randall Wray and so did Stephanie Kelton. We all did, because that’s what you heard. So it takes a while to figure these things out. Actually, one of the articles that made a big difference to me was one Randall Wray wrote. It was a Leading Institute piece on Social Security of all things.

He was talking about, “what if we were to hand out tokens to ride the subway to elderly people right now, or, they’d save up some tokens for later, but the main difference is, if there’s not a subway, there’s not a subway. Having the tokens is irrelevant.” That really hit me.

It took me a while to think through. In fact, in my review of Understanding Modern Money, I said, “it’s one of those books where you’ll read a paragraph and you just want to sit the book down for a while and think, ‘I don’t know what you just said, but wow, I’m going to have to think about that.’”

Scott Ferguson

How resistant were you? I’m always fascinated by people’s — I mean, this isn’t always the best way of putting it because it’s a religious term — conversion stories, right? Like how were you persuaded? Was it like, “oh, this seems to make sense, but I’m still a little confused. I have to figure it out.” Or did you have violent rejections of it and then have to kind of come back around?

John Harvey

I was excited to hear another viewpoint. I don’t think it’s just that because, you know, I could read an Austrian viewpoint that’s different and exciting and say, “I just didn’t sit with me.” But, I am always excited. Let’s see, today’s the 25th. In two weeks, I’m going to see the Sex Pistols in Dallas. Then I’m going to see The Damned in Dallas and then the Buzzcocks in Dallas. So I was always into different stuff. Everyone else was going to see Journey and Rush when I was in college and I was like, “Blaah,” and was gonna throw up, but, I’m going to go see the Dead Kennedys. 

Scott Ferguson

This is the best way to answer this question. Yes, yes. How did you take to MMT? “Well, let me tell you about my Sex Pistols.”

John Harvey

That’s right, that’s right. I was always open to it and don’t forget the first people that taught me were institutionalists. So that was my first introduction to economics. It was Adam Smith and Marx and Ricardo. So that’s what got me excited. I was always far more excited about the subject matter than I was about the tools.

I didn’t want the tools of analysis because, like I said, I started in physics, went to political science, and I enjoyed it. I majored in political science, but I like model building. So I like the structure and the math. I enjoy that, it’s the way my brain works. But I was always really interested in understanding the actual problems, regardless of whether the math can work it out or not with regard to how complicated it is. There’s some stuff in MMT that I don’t think makes any sense. So I will say that right there. Now, I have had people press me in interviews before, “what is it?” And I refused to answer it because as long as we’re under siege, there’s no point in picking on each other.

When we’re on top, then I’ll say, “by the way, I don’t think that makes sense. That was a silly idea.” So there are things I don’t think make sense. Just because it’s new and different, I don’t jump onto it. But it’s an interesting point, Scott. I never thought about that before.

I was excited to read something like that. The build up to the main point all made sense to me. And then the main point blew me away. I was like, now if the build up had made sense, like, for example, the thing I told you about what I learned in grad school that the money supply fell during the Great Depression, which caused prices to fall, which caused wages to fall, which caused people to quit their jobs. So 25% of unemployment was volunteer unemployment. That was unique and different. It was also stupid and so that one I didn’t jump on to. But the Randall Wray book, every time I would come across one of these ideas, “Oh, yeah. That’s good, that’s good, that’s good, that’s good. What? Okay, I got to think about that for a while, but that’s really interesting. I never thought of it that way before.” It sank in after that. So maybe it’s not just the Sex Pistols. Maybe it’s also that I thought that it made sense.

Scott Ferguson

That’s a great answer. The MMTers will often say, in the early days you could count on, maybe two hands the number of people who even knew about what they were up to, let alone agree with what they were up to.

Then we’ve seen this exponential growth over the years and you guys do a really great job at charting not only that growth, but the rhetorical strategies that are taken up and then the kind of rhetorical situations that crop up that help expand this discourse. So I’m wondering if you could take us back to the beginning and maybe we can just walk through this rhetorical history a bit, and we can pause at some emblematic moments.

John Harvey

Right. Well, Sass and Harvey say that it really came out of the post Keynesian thought listserv. This was back in the days of the early-ish internet. I was really excited about it. I was one of the first ones to present a paper that was very exciting on the Post Keynesian thought listserv.

It was on heuristic judgment theory. It was actually very helpful. It’s one of my most cited articles. I’m not sure why. I thought it was okay, but anyway, this was back in the 1990s, right Billy? 

Billy Saas

1993-ish.

John Harvey

Warren Mosler, who I finally met by the way, I’d never met him before. I was in Edinburgh.

Scott Ferguson

You met him in 93? 

John Harvey

This March. I never met him before. We exchanged things, but he came up to the Scottish Economic Festival that was in Edinburgh in March. I was speaking there. So he came up and we met. It was really nice. So anyway, he was a fund manager, and he was bringing up all these ideas that we associate with MMT.

Now, basically, a government that’s on a flexible exchange rate with a sovereign currency faces no budget constraint. They face many, many, many other constraints, but they don’t face a budget constraint. That’s where you get the straw man, “They say you can print money and there’s no consequences.” No, they don’t say that.

Nobody says that. Anyway, he’s pushing that and Randy and some of the others are like, “yeah, I don’t know…maybe,” and then it finally sort of congeals into this. There’s a bit of a history behind it. I just saw that last night, Billy, as I was reading through this, all the folks that Randall Wray cites as folks that had blazed this trail earlier.

Well, Abba Lerner, I guess, and others talked about this before, and then, Sass and Harvey say that this eventually evolved into a literature. We have Randall Wray’s Understanding Modern Money. Then we have Louis-Philippe Rochon write some stuff, all coming out of this conversation.

Then I think initially on the post Keynesian thought listserv, they were missing each other, at first. Then it kind of came around to, “Oh, wait, I see what you’re saying, and that all makes sense. But, yeah, I guess you’re right.” That’s the 1990s. I happen to have here on page 850 of Sass and Harvey, the Google hits for Modern Monetary Theory from 2000 to 2004, there were 191. And I won’t read every line here, but from 2020 to 2024, say, another five year period, there were 21,700. So 191, to 20 years later, 21,700. It outnumbered the hits of things like Austrian Business cycle theory, stuff like this. I’m sorry, I’ve skipped a couple of stages here.

We end up with these scholars from the post Keynesian thought list, writing scholarly stuff about what later is called MMT and then — and this is Billy’s idea entirely — Steve Keene, who is sort of associated with the MMT stuff, but more just sort of post Keynesian thought, he writes a book called, Debunking Economics.

He’s sick and tired of trying to argue with the mainstream. This is sort of separate from the whole MMT thing, but it ends up feeding into it. He’s sick and tired of trying to get into their journals. They’re not gonna pay any attention. They’re not going to listen to us. “So screw you,” as he says, “I’m taking the gloves off. We’re going to have a knock down, drag out fight.” One of my favorite things that Billy says in here, not me, he says he talks about some of the reviews of the book when it first came out, and he says they missed the point. They missed the important thing he did.

This is from the rhetorician. The really big thing he did was he took the fight to the street. He changed the level at which we’re going to take this fight. “You know what? Screw you. Do your stupid economics. Go ahead and assume away unemployment. All right, that’s fine. But I’m going to tell people that you’ve been assuming away unemployment. I’m going to tell people that.”

Steve Keen has a fantastic article on the economics of climate change and the horrible job that mainstream economics has done in examining climate change. “I’m going to tell people.”

By the way, we asked Steve Keen and Randall Wray if they would read the article for us and let us know if there were any factual errors or whatever.

Steve Keen apparently was a little nervous to read it. Then when he was done, he was like, “Oh my God. Thank you.” He had been put in such a central place of having shifted the argument.

Scott Ferguson

Something I want to point out just for our listeners. I mean, this is a deep cut, I don’t even think we’ve defined modern money theory. For the people who are listening, anybody who isn’t already a little bit on the inside. What I do want to suggest for people who are groping and trying to find anchors here, is what’s crucial here about what Keene did with Debunking Economics.

Debunking Economics is a popular book. It’s a trade press book. We’re talking about talking to the general public using non jargony, non specialized language in order to debunk economics for and to the general public. That’s the essential move here. So instead of fighting on the terrain of academic conferences and academic journal articles alone, he took this to the people and to the commercial press and put on his boxing gloves in that arena.

So the move was to expand the arena and change the medium.

John Harvey

Because you were never going to beat the neoclassicals in their own journals. I mean, that was just never going to happen and so he shifted over. Then there was the financial crisis, which created a leverage point for those who were arguing that neoclassical economics, especially the macro stuff, was really flawed.

They, initially, had all kinds of mea culpas and, you know, “oh, we didn’t know this could happen.” They eventually got over that and decided, “yeah, we know what was going to happen.” But, Steve Keene jumped in on that and then that’s it. Roughly speaking, I believe this is when all the other blogs started up as well, right? All the MMT…what’s the one at UMKC?

Billy Saas

New Economic Perspectives.  But I would say that part of the story, too, is Bill Mitchell.

He had started a blog as well in the early 2000 and Steve Keene also, before New Economic Perspectives, Keene and Mitchell both had their blogs going. Each, in a way, could make a claim to anticipating what happened in the GFC (Global Financial Crisis) and then afterwards would make claims to having seen it coming and cashing that in.

John Harvey

For Steve, there was an academic article on who did predict the financial crisis, and he laid out some really strict considerations and, he said, “well, you know, Keene did. Keene wasn’t always saying the sky is falling. He was saying, ‘the sky is falling for these specific reasons, based on a mathematical computer simulation I built back in 1995.’”

This is now 2007, and fairly accurate. Then, this created the opportunity for people who were critical of the mainstream to come in and talk, but not to talk to the mainstream. They all took off with blogs, and as it says in the article, Stephanie Kelton was the first one for New Economic Perspectives.

Another really important thing that is pointed out in the article is that non scholars, lay people, were welcome to the discussion. They were welcomed in and it created this grassroots support. There’s this one piece by Paul Krugman where he says, “this might be a bit wonkish.” 

Scott Ferguson

In parentheses.

John Harvey

I hate that! “I’m sorry, this is going to be a little bit too big for y’all. I’m going to try to dumb it down if I can.” They didn’t do that. They had conversations with people who weren’t professional economists and they spoke with them with respect and bothered to answer them. This created something that probably had never been possible before without the internet.

Scott Ferguson

A lot of that took place on social media and I was part of that. I was part of that project. There were several Facebook groups and many of the key MMT economists like Stephanie Kelton and Matt Forstater, they were there and Warren Moser was there, and they were explaining and they were engaging.

I mean, it was really a rhetorically rich situation. It was pretty amazing. It was interesting for me because I’m a trained scholar, but I’m not a trained economist. I felt it was an interesting position because I knew they were the academics and everybody was sort of looking to them to explain.

I had my own questions, but I was sort of the layperson in the group. It was a weird position for once. 

John Harvey

They did a fantastic job. Well, there’s this thing I just went to in Scotland, held by William Thompson, and it is all coming out of the whole MMT movement. They had all these policymakers or people that were interested in climate change and so forth.

It wasn’t for scholars, per se. But it was a fantastic meeting that took place over the course of 3 or 4 days. This wouldn’t have happened without these scholars, primarily from UMKC (University of Missouri-Kansas City). Here’s the other thing that’s great about the MMT stuff. As you said earlier, Scott, we haven’t really explained exactly what that is.

I mean, it’s just basically going to be there. As I said very briefly earlier, right now everyone’s freaking out over — what is it — $40 trillion of debt? 

“What are we going to do?” 

Oh, the same thing we did when it was $20 trillion, which is absolutely nothing. You can find so many quotes, even in mainstream economics on this. It’s impossible for the United States of America to default on debt in its own currency. It’s impossible. Now, have we wasted resources by using those $40 trillion or whatever he’s contributed by using those to attack Iran rather than address climate change? Yes. I mean, we have places to complain here.

Scott Ferguson

Are there distribution problems? Is this welfare for the rich? Yes.

John Harvey

That’s right. Yeah, absolutely. Are we running out of money? No, we’re not running out of money. When the federal government creates this money, they use it to command resources. 

I have a YouTube series, “The Cowboy Economist,” where I try to explain various concepts. The favorite one I ever made was on World War Two, because there is this myth in that fantastic Ken Burn’s World War Two series (The War). He went on and on about how America paid for the war itself, that we had the bond drives, and that’s how they pay for the war. 

Scott Ferguson

In the middle of a Great Depression.

John Harvey

So you’re telling me Ken Burns, that in 1941, when U.S unemployment is still almost 10%, that if we had not been able to borrow the money from grandma and granddad, who had just had their farm foreclosed on, if we were able to borrow that money, that regardless of our ability to produce goods and services, Hitler would have been marching down Broadway.

No, the money was irrelevant. We made up the money. It’s one of the good things that Covid did. That first summer of Covid, nobody argues that we just made it up. I mean, who did we borrow it from? China? That’s kind of where the whole thing started. Europe was in worse shape than we were.

We just made the money up. Are there consequences to that? Absolutely there are. Is bankruptcy one of them? No. That is a core concept. The federal government is not going to run out of money. What we do need to worry about is where it is placing its priorities in producing goods and services and activating resources and so forth.

Then a big part of that has become part of the whole MMT approach is the job guarantee. This goes a little bit further back into post Keynesian economics and institutionalists as well, the private sector does not automatically create a job for everyone who wants a job. Now that absolutely is the opposite of what mainstream economics believes, mainstream economics believes it does.

We don’t think it does. We believe that to the private sector, labor is a cost to be minimized. So, when they put in a screen in McDonald’s to put your order in, they laid somebody off. Now, I like to think, “Good. Now my Big Mac is cheaper.” That is good, as long as we’ve given something else for that person who got laid off to do.

That’s where the job program comes in. What the government should be doing is maintaining a continuous, “oh, you can’t find a job in the private sector? We’ve got one for you over here.”

“Oh. Am I going to be making hamburgers again?”

“No, because hamburgers are profitable. We leave that to the private sector. Now we’re going to have you help kids after school, or we’re going to help you address climate change. We’re going to have you rebuild the dikes in New Orleans or whatever there are.”

When we run out of social problems that are not profitable, then we can work. But until then, we’ve got all these things we could be using these resources for, and we don’t need the frickin Democrats telling us we need the tax first before we can do it.

We don’t need that, it’s just driving me insane. So anyway, that’s my rant on the MMT stuff that I think makes perfect sense. In fact, Melanie, my wife, is a huge fan. I was telling her in the car one day, “yeah, there’s some post Keynesians that don’t like the job guarantee.” 

She’s like, “What? What’s their idea?”

“Well, they don’t really have one.”

“Well, that’s why. They don’t have one!”

By the way, for those listeners who don’t really know what MMT is about, and is going to take a deep dive into it now, Melanie lives with me, it turns out, and had to see me give a talk on it three times before she said, “oh, now I get it,” because it is challenging so many conventional wisdoms all at once. It’s too much.

Scott Ferguson

It takes a while.

John Harvey

It does, it does. It takes a while. Then once it locks in, though, you’re like, “wow, this seems so obvious now.”

Scott Ferguson

You can’t unsee it.

John Harvey

Yeah, that’s right. In fact, we even have a quote in here from Stephanie Kelton where she says that very thing, that once you explain it to people, they’re like, “why didn’t they tell me this before? It makes so much sense.” Anyway, I’m sorry I went off on a little explanation of what MMT is.

Scott Ferguson

No, I love it, we need it. We needed it. We’ve already mentioned our dear friend Paul Krugman, who, I think, is actually getting more interesting in his post-New York Times ventures. But, you all provide a rhetorical analysis of a pretty critical role that he plays in amplifying the microphone for MMTers despite himself. So maybe you want to talk a little bit about that.

Billy Saas

I would say, this was observed at the time by Matt Forstater too. It’s not completely novel but MMT is doing its thing in the blogs and many of the everyday readers of New Economic Perspectives made their way over to Krugman’s editorials and into the comment section and  that kind of pissed him off a little.

He started to respond to them, not by responding to them directly, but to respond to the ideas that he understood them to be proposing. Over a series of rejoinders from not just MMT but also Kean. I think the other part of the story that’s important is, Steve Kean was in his sights in these as well.

By responding to their arguments, by talking about them by name, he gives them a high profile that wasn’t available to them until then.

John Harvey

They have nothing to gain by engaging with us other than beginning to validate us. 

“You’re worth talking to. You’re idiots, but you’re worth talking to,” but totally ignoring us otherwise.

That’s one of the other things that’s the point of that in the article, is that Keane and others took aim at specific mainstream economists.

They didn’t just say, “well, the idea of the nonlocal fund theory of interest is flawed. And so-and-so said it and so and so was an idiot.”

Okay. Well, not quite like that, but it’s flawed. Well, as a matter of fact, I can point out pieces that Krugman has written where he clearly is buying into the Loanable Funds Theory of interest, which I won’t bore people with, but, my God, that didn’t make sense 200 years ago, let alone now. That’s not the way the financial system works. So anyway, yeah, they were taking specific aim, and most people didn’t take the bait, but Krugman did. Then we end up with, I think, Kenneth Rogoff actually says something about it.

Let me mention one other thing here that I don’t think we ever mentioned here. I don’t think we needed to, what’s his name? Romer. Paul Romer, who eventually won the Nobel Prize in economics. No, we don’t have it here. Paul Romer wrote a piece a few years ago, 2016, I think it was, on “The Trouble with Macroeconomics.”

He’s writing about his own school of thought, macroeconomics, and he literally says it is so bad it no longer qualifies as scientific research. Now, there’s not much more damning thing you can say to another supposed scientist, that it is not even science anymore. He says that modern macroeconomics in their school of thought no longer deals with the way human behavior works. He ends up making up names like fairies, you know, and so forth. They’re the things that are causing business cycles and so forth. Now, I would not agree with Romer’s final conclusion. That is, we should go back to an old style neoclassical Keynesian approach. But, man. I was at a conference with him, thanks to Steve Kean, actually, and I asked Romer about the article he wrote that blasted Milton Friedman and Rober Lucas and all these mainstream economists.

He said, “oh my God, I got so much hell for that. Not for what I said. But, ‘how dare you say something bad about Milton Friedman?’” Well, that’s not the way science is supposed to work. I know that scientists are people too, and that there’s absolutely going to be politics and personality conflicts.

I’m writing a chapter right now for a friend’s book, Louis-Philippe Rochon, on American Post Keynesian economics, and one of my sections in there is about how Joan Robinson at Cambridge simply wasn’t talking to this other economist and they marched out, and I’m like, “oh, God.We’re already under siege. Why are we fighting with each other?”

It’s interesting to me that somebody who later won a Nobel Prize, not for his work in macro, but elsewhere, he was like, “man, our macro is awful.” Many neoclassical economists hate their own macroeconomics. I’m not crazy about the micro either, but, at least it gives us some common ground to talk about these things.

But yeah. So the MMTers and Keane took specific aim at these individuals who were big names in neoclassical economics. Krugman at first, and then a couple of the others actually shot back and this helped. We’re in The New York Times, being made fun of, but nevertheless. 

Scott Ferguson

Then people get curious and then the blogs grow. I think another thing to point out here that I don’t think ended up in the final paper, because you can’t put everything in, is in the wake of the global financial crisis you also have students rising up. They want explanations. They’re like, “Why are you teaching us all this? This is BS that can’t deal with the crises that are breaking our world right now.” Several student organizations cropped up.

John Harvey

Paris was one of the first ones, I think. A French University, and then Cambridge.

Billy Saas

Well, I would say so you mentioned anger, Scott. While we don’t talk specifically about the student uprising, and I would say that we don’t get too deep into affect, but I think that that is very much part of the story. One of the earlier iterations of this piece was more about affective dimensions of MTV’s appeal.

Backing up just a little bit, part of what I find so fascinating and have found so fascinating about MMT’s rhetorical history is, so much of the thinking and self-reflection was done in public.

John Harvey

It’s a good point. It’s a good point. 

Billy Saas

Randall Wray’s blog is out there repeatedly trying to point out and consult readers for their feedback on ideas about how best to counteract the arguments of neoliberalism and so on.

There’s good evidence that that thinking ends up playing out in their public facing, it’s all public facing, but in some of their more high profile talks, papers and otherwise. So I really love that one of the invitations to this project, one of the inviting things about it was so much of it is the thinking behind the strategy is performed in public.

John Harvey

Yeah. I hadn’t thought about that, but that’s absolutely right. Of course, that endeared these people to the folks that were first reading about it. It was like, “Wow, I mean, Paul Krugman isn’t responding to my comments in The New York Times, but Randall Wray is, and that’s really cool.”

Billy Saas

I would say so, too. If I can put you on the spot a little bit here, John, when you gave that keynote talk, I remember what the affect was and the ad hominem and the way that MMT advocates were comporting themselves online was making you quite nervous and a little bit upset. As your collaborator on this for so long, it seems like there’s been some adjustment.

I guess maybe you can reflect on that. In what ways has that changed for you?

John Harvey

Yeah, you’re exactly right, Billy. Back when I was doing that talk, I was a bit worried about some of the grassroots people being more like assassins than ambassadors. They didn’t always have a really good understanding of the economics. They had some information about it, but not enough to really carry on a good argument.

That worried me. In part, I think it’s changed, and in part, I’ve changed my view. I think we need assassins as well as ambassadors, if that’s your personality. I’m not good at that. I’m more, “Well, thank you so much. It turns out I’m not a bastard. My parents were married when I was born, but, you know, on to your question.”

That’s what I used to do on my Forbes blog when I used to answer every comment. “You owe your students their money back!” 

“I’m going to get on that right away. I appreciate that, you know, also…”

That’s more my style. Other people, it’s not. Other people are going to attack. This is going to be a crazy analogy here, but I love military history. Part of the Soviet’s strategy for World War Three, had it happened, was, they were just going to attack everywhere at once. They were going to find out, “ooh, we are making some progress over here by Hamburg, let’s reinforce that.” So, alright, let’s attack everywhere at once.

There are going to be some people being assassins, some people being ambassadors, some people doing academic work, some people doing grassroots organizing. 

We’ll all do this and go “hey, where are we making some progress? Because you’re making use of your personal strengths and weaknesses in your approach and then, you know, we’ll push forward wherever we seem to be making progress.” I’m really excited about what William Thompson has been doing up in Scotland. But also, I think it’s changed somewhat. I don’t know if maybe I’m just hanging out with different people, but I know that Torrens University in Australia now offers that MMT based — it’s not really MMT based but it’s certainly one of the foundations of it — master’s degree in sustainability.

And a lot of those people who were really fired up about the ideas initially are now getting educated about them and getting a really good, solid foundation in macroeconomics and not just a few of the bumper sticker slogans from MMT, and that’s all they really know.

I think they’re just getting a lot more educated about it. By the way, the book I just came out with on business cycles is really boring. Especially the chapter I wrote the whole thing for, chapter four is why I wrote the book, and it’s a history of the US from 1954, I think, to 2020, which is our last recession.

It goes through, “Nixon did this and Reagan did that,” and so forth. That’s why I wrote the book. I wanted to write that part, which is probably the most boring part to anybody else. But that’s why I wrote the book. The beginning of it, however, is a theory of what causes business cycles.

I kind of wrote that for MMT people, but I didn’t write it for other economists. I have an appendix where I do the math and stuff. I wrote it to make it understandable, so that when they get into an argument with the mainstream economist, they can come back with some stuff. They can understand that.

And then chapter five is my policy chapter. That’s all the MMT job guarantee stuff. I thought they were lacking a deeper knowledge. They were full of enthusiasm, but I think that’s changed. I think that that’s actually changed. So you’re right, that was worrying me. It’s not worrying me now because, A) I think the people have changed and B) because I’m thinking, “well, maybe we need some assistance too, on the other hand.”

Billy Saas

Yeah. One more thing I’d say about the structure and maybe the to wrap up the story, bring us current to where we end off in the article, which is fairly contemporary. It would be to say that, I imagined and worked with throughout the writing process, I imagined Fred Lee’s A History of Heterodox Economics as a launching off point and also a foil for the kind of history that we were doing, because in that book, which is great and tells an amazing story of the sort of institutional history of heterodox economics and its multiple schools throughout the 20th century and into the 21st. It’s very much about sticking to the script and building an infrastructure for journals to be more successful as heterodox economists. Basically sticking with the model that had been tried and tested throughout the 20th century. What we have with MMT is an example, not the only example, but an example of a heterodox school getting off script and going — wildly at times, as Steve Kean put it — into the streets.

John Harvey

Right. Yeah.

Billy Saas

It’s not all about “into the streets” because after the Krugman moment and into the mid 2010’s, we have the first appointment of an MMT person to a significant high profile federal position like Stephanie Kelton, as the budget advisor for Bernie Sanders. Then we have our uptake in the conventional policy circles for, albeit unconventional candidates, like Alexandria Ocasio-Cortez and others who would end up hearing from Stephanie and others. As a result of the work that had been done making noise and the street team that had been developed right through conferences and other means, who would be going to some of the public meetings that these politicians would be participating in and asking them about things like the jobs guarantee or about MMT more specifically. Where I think we end up in the article, and starting in the introduction, the relative ascension of MMT. What’s been interesting about writing this over such a long period is that there were definitely some rises and falls and some rises and falls within that time period. As John said, the early days of the Covid era seem to have validated and elevated the MMT perspective and then subsequent…

Scott Ferguson

Mainstream commentators saying things like, “we’re all MMTers now.”

John Harvey

And blaming MMT for inflation.

Scott Ferguson

That’s right.

Billy Saas

I would say inevitably and somewhat predictably doing that. This piece, big picture, is an opportunity — in its ultimate form here — to reflect on the state of early MMT and MMT 1.0’s project today. What remains to be seen, what remains to be done, and especially in light of the apparent disregard for the fiscal situation for the public that is on display in the current administration.

John Harvey

But, the Democrats are driving me insane because they want to criticize Trump. Okay. Fair enough. But, you know, the $40 trillion debt is being talked about by just about every other person on Facebook. Several times I’ve started to type a comment, “I was like, oh my God, I don’t have the energy.”

There’s a local politician here, a very nice man who is no longer going to be a politician because they redistricted his area. So he’s no longer going to be able to win. But he’s a hard core, “Oh, we have to keep these Bernie Sanders types out, because they’re our MAGA.” I don’t know, I guess I’m in a stage where I just don’t have the energy right now to go in there and fight these fights.

This is where we need our assassins to go in there and say something about this. This has been really distressing to me the last few weeks, all the attention from the left on the debt. I saw somebody else sharing something, “the debt created by all Republican presidents, the debt created by all the Democratic presidents.”

We’ve got to shift that. We’ve got to shift it. Where we ended up in the article was, it seems that the big thing we haven’t been able to overcome is the fact that mainstream economics still holds the high ground. Every time, what would you think if you weren’t knowledgeable about all this?

Let’s use the analogy of cigarette smoking and cancer and if every time we tried to say cigarette smoking causes cancer, if the American Medical Association said, “no, it doesn’t,” well, what would we think? 

“I haven’t done any research on lungs in years. So, I have no idea whether that’s true or not.”

As long as the American Medical Association keeps saying “no, it doesn’t cause cancer,” then I’m going to think, “well, I don’t know who these jerks are that are saying it’s causing cancer, but they’re idiots,” so flip that around. 

“We can’t go bankrupt.” 

Then we have the American Economic Association say, “Yeah, you can.” 

Then you’d say, “I mean, yeah, we’ve got to have a balanced budget.” 

So who would I listen to if I weren’t an economist? I’d listen to all these other folks. So somehow they have to be discredited that their climate change research is terrible, that they’re macro research is saying, “let’s assume away unemployment.” Let’s hit that over and over and over and over. I don’t know exactly where. Maybe we do like the Soviets in World War Three and push in a lot of places at once and see where we make some progress. But until we can get rid of that last word from these economists who are going to say, “No, that’s not right, and we’re united on that,” I don’t know how we’re going to win this.

One of the things we do in this paper, by the way, and that was one of the last things we added, was, “what do you need to do to make a scholarly idea into policy?” We pulled this from the literature in public health, I think, where they have a lot of that. The scholars have done this research and are trying to actually make a difference in the real world.

There were four things that they talked about: 

1) Attract the attention of one or more friendly policy makers. 

Okay, we got that. All right. 

2) Convention the propriety of the desired policy. 

We mostly have that with Bernie Sanders, who was never an MMTer, but close enough. 

3) Persuade them to write, propose and promote appropriate legislation.

We haven’t done that yet, but maybe we can get there, but

4) Garner sufficient support from other legislators for this to become policy.

That’s not frickin happening, because the American Economic Association is going to step in and stop us every time. They’re going to say, “no, cigarette smoking doesn’t cause cancer.” Obviously, the American Medical Association had a positive role in that context, but, to me, that’s what’s stopping us.

That’s where our focus needs to be. Okay, so let’s bring up something depressing, as is if this wasn’t already. I was at a conference at University of Texas where Jamie Galbraith was. A fantastic economist. Great person. This is the part of the conference where we’re all just drinking beer.

And so I said to Jamie, “you know, well, what do you think our odds of winning are?”

“Oh, we’re not going to win.” That’s what he said. “But what else are we going to do? What else are we going to do but fight for what we think makes sense? But yeah, we’re not going to win.”

All right, I actually take some strength from that. I don’t have to measure my success by whether or not I got this policy in place. I want to measure it by the fact that I’m still fighting and we’re still pushing back. So I don’t know if listeners now are very sad or very happy. I hope it’s both at the same time. Clear your head of that idea. It’s like in Band of Brothers, and I believe it’s episode three, where they’re trying to talk to that fella Blithe who won’t fire his gun. He’s really scared. I think it’s Winters who’s talking to him. He says, “look, the problem is you already think you’re going to live. You need to think to yourself, ‘I’m not going to make it through this’ and then you’ll be able to do what you need to do.”

So, maybe that’s us. Maybe we’re the Private Blithe of the economics communication discipline. Look, don’t measure your success by whether or not you win, measure your success by whether or not you stay true to what you know academically, scholarly and morally.

Morally. It is immoral to see people as we do all the time here in Fort Worth, I know you do in New Orleans, I assume in Tampa, all the homeless people. That is a policy choice. There is no reason that has to exist. It is a choice. As long as you keep fighting on the right side, I’ll tell you something else too now that I’m on this soapbox. When those economists I mentioned earlier, when Chris Brown and I went to lunch with these four famous economists and they said, “oh, no, remember, we thought we could make a change and we didn’t.”

Yes, you did, four famous economists, because you kept the idea going to where eventually people like Stephanie Kelton could put it into play because she learned from John Henry.

Nice man. Institutionalist. I don’t know if you know her story or not. She was not majoring in econ. She was majoring in, like, accounting. She took an econ class from John Henry, and John was like, “you know, you’re really good at it, and you should minor in it.”

“Oh, okay.” So he got her hooked, right?

He’s like, “you know, you’re doing really well on this minor. You should major in it. Then you should go to grad school in this.”

So she did. Does John Henry have a New York Times bestselling book? No, but he made it happen. He kept those ideas alive. He was a great teacher. He excited her, and she pursued that.

Scott Ferguson

You walked into the point I was going to make, which is, clearly there are rises and falls, and we can talk about the way that in mainstream discourse MMT was having moment after moment after moment. It kind of peaks during early Covid and then falls off and everybody blames it for the inflation, which for the record, is utter BS.

But I think you brought us back to what I think is the most important, which is not just that it is politically and morally righteous to keep fighting, but also to keep building and to keep nurturing. You know what, we do. We keep doing that. That has its own kinds of ups and downs that don’t track when they follow different narratives.

For example, something you guys don’t talk about in the article is MMT adjacent economists are central bank advisors to central banks all around the world. Nobody ever reports on that or freaks out that Scott Fulwiler is talking to the Central Bank of Indonesia. I don’t know if that’s exactly right, but that kind of stuff has gone on throughout.

That’s not as spectacular as Kelton becoming Bernie’s top economist. This work keeps going on, the pedagogy continues, it evolves, the institution is reproducing itself. We have multiple going-concerns. That isn’t such a clear story of success or failure. That’s living.

That’s collective action. That’s reproducing ourselves.

John Harvey

Right. They’re doing such a great job at Torrens with educating people about these things. So yeah, we just have to keep going. New people are finding out about this all the time. Policy activists, who are leaning our way but don’t see an answer because all they’ve ever heard is what the Democrats view or the equivalent in their country of economics, which is just a sort of slightly left mainstream economics version that is still handicapped by the idea that, “oh, but the economy takes care of itself. We have to balance the budget.”

At the end of my book, in the policy section I’m talking about how the Democrats say, “small business, small businesses are the job creators.” The big job creator was the Cold War and the big job creator was World War Two.

Our problems were gone overnight. 1.9% unemployment. Now, granted, there’s a lot of war stuff going on, but otherwise. Think about it, what if we had built all that stuff and just pushed it off into the ocean, which we did at the end of the war. Imagine all the planes and tanks that got destroyed.

What if we had just built them in Detroit and pushed them into Lake Michigan? It still would have created this much employment as we had anyway.

Scott Ferguson

That’s your version of the Keynes line about digging holes and filling them up.

John Harvey

That’s right, that’s right. There’s no need to do that because we have lots of social problems that we could be addressing. It’d be nice if people in Gary, Indiana, had electricity.

Billy Saas

Well, as Coretta Scott King put it, this nation has never dealt, honestly, with the question of a peacetime economy. I think it’s fair to say that aligns with where we land in the piece and where we will move forward — with hope and despair in equal measure. Yeehaw.

Yeah. Thank you so much, John.

John Harvey

Thank you guys.

Billy Saas

Thank you for joining us. Really appreciate you joining us for Money on the Left.

John Harvey

May the force be with you.

* Thank you to Zachary Nosbisch for the episode graphic, Nahneen Kula for the theme tune, and Thomas Chaplin for the transcript. 

Reclaiming Money’s Public Powers for Imaginative Intersectional Politics

By Rob Hawkes

Alongside my Money on the Left colleagues Will Beaman and Tyler Suksawat, I recently joined Gus Dunn-Hindle of the Maine People’s Alliance to discuss public money and public banking on the Beacon Podcast. During the conversation, I cited our podcast’s regular opening announcement that Money on the Left is ‘a monthly interdisciplinary podcast that reclaims money’s public powers for imaginative intersectional politics.’ The imaginative part of this is especially important – when we free up our imaginations to think about monetary design in new ways, we can begin to move beyond the austerity mindset that condemns millions to poverty, even in the wealthy societies of the global north, while treating extreme inequality and social exclusion as natural and inevitable facts of life.

Many of today’s most intractable challenges, from crumbling public services to the accelerating ecological crisis, look very different when we cease to view them through the orthodox prism of monetary scarcity, privation, and limitation. For the former Green Party leader Caroline Lucas, ‘the failure to rise to the challenge of the nature and climate emergencies’ is reflective of an ‘imagination deficit’ and ‘a failure to imagine that a better world is possible’. Indeed, as Cory Doctorow points out, the ‘true meaning’ of Margaret Thatcher’s famous slogan ‘There is no alternative’ (TINA) ‘isn’t “No alternative is possible,” but rather, “Stop trying to think of an alternative.”’ Speaking as a sci-fi writer, Doctorow likes to quip that ‘thinking of alternatives is literally my job.’ In Doctorow’s fiction, most notably in 2023’s The Lost Cause, the envisioning of an alternative future engages directly with the emancipatory potential of democratic public finance, when a character recalls a moment in the past when ‘Towns and universities started minting their own currencies’ (a nod to Money on the Left’s Uni Currency Project). In the novel, this ‘wildcat money’ becomes an engine of democratic possibility and change.

This is one of the many reasons why cultural analysis – from the MCU to literary modernism – has always been central to the Money on the Left project. As I wrote last month, ‘what connects my approach to the interpretation of cultural, monetary, and political forms to our group’s proposals for public banking, municipal bond issuance, and university finance’ is the framework we at MotL call ‘the public money paradigm’. And ‘when we understand that inequality and exclusionary violence are built into the logic of private money we can begin to imagine new possibilities for monetary design founded on democratic inclusion, collectivity, and care.’

This is also why the intersectional part of ‘imaginative intersectional politics’ is vital. From the perspective of the private-money-based orthodoxy, the pursuit of justice appears as a series of either/or battles where the liberation of the marginalised can only ever come at another’s expense. It is, perhaps, not a coincidence that this summer’s hounding of Jason Arday, an autistic black professor, first out of British academia and then to his shocking and untimely death has taken place in the midst of an increasingly brutal financial crisis in the UK’s higher education sector (which, as The Sunday Times recently revealed, saw universities collectively spending over £400 million excluding people from its workforce through redundancy schemes in 2024-25 alone). This is not to suggest that the austerity wrecking ball that’s currently trashing courses, departments, disciplines, and institutions across UKHE was responsible for Professor Arday’s death in any direct or uncomplicated sense. As Kieran Rose argues, the ‘ONLY reason’ Jason Arday’s story became a ‘story’ after he was publicly accused of plagiarism by a known eugenicist was ‘because of racism’. Nevertheless, the fact that UKHE has been systematically starved of funds while simultaneously facing relentless attacks on its commitments to equality, diversity, and inclusion, has undoubtedly damaged the already precarious safety of marginalised groups and individuals such as Arday within our academic communities.

The vision of zero-sum exchange that defines the private money paradigm also corresponds closely with the rationale underpinning attempts to split the queer community by pitting LGB against TQIA2+ as well as the ‘overdiagnosis’ panics that, in the UK, have coalesced around Dame Uta Frith’s divisive and exclusionary views on autism and Channel 4’s irresponsible documentary ‘The Great ADHD Myth?’ Since March, when a piece appeared in the TES titled ‘why I no longer think autism is a spectrum’, Frith, an autism researcher since the 1960s, has repeatedly been given a platform across new media (including podcasts), legacy media, and academic publications from which to take issue with the present interpretation of the diagnostic criteria for autism and especially to question the validity of late diagnosis. Meanwhile, ‘The Great ADHD Myth?’ aired on 18 August and asked ‘whether ADHD is a genuine neurodevelopmental disorder, or a social construct’. As Rose explains: ‘These aren’t isolated stories, instead, they sit within a much wider journalistic ecology in which Autism and ADHD repeatedly appear alongside welfare expenditure, SEND budgets, NHS demand, school absence, social-care pressures and questions about who genuinely deserves support.’

In each of these cases, then, those whose full participation in society is impeded by racism, transphobia, and/or ableism are regarded as competing for scarce resources in a world where there is never enough to go around. In a private money universe of barter-like trade-offs, care for the vulnerable must always come at the cost of someone else’s suffering. By contrast, reclaiming money’s public powers for imaginative intersectional politics means recognising that monetary design choices shape and condition everything from our hierarchies of academic privilege to university funding crises, battles over trans rights, SEND provision in schools, and the wider recognition, accommodation, and support afforded to disabled people. Picturing another world is not the same thing as bringing one into being, of course, but freeing our imaginations from the austere limits of the private money paradigm is an important first step towards a better, more inclusive, and sustainable future.

Money Is Weird

by Rob Hawkes

Isn’t it strange that social inclusion and climate justice appear unaffordable, but not the status quo?

In July, I presented at the Weird Modernisms conference at Loughborough University. My talk (which you can read here) argued that money is weird. This may sound like a rather bizarre claim; let me explain.

The word ‘weird’ suggests strangeness or oddness but, of course, also carries connotations of the magical and the supernatural (think of Macbeth’s ‘weird sisters’). Indeed, evidence of money’s uncanny ability to ‘emerge from thin air’ is all around us, from government spending to bank lending, from complementary currencies to video game coins, and from high street store credit to crypto. And yet, our media and political debates remain dominated by the insistence that there is simply not enough money to fight economic injustice or to avert climate catastrophe. Stop trying to imagine a different, better world, they scream at us. We’d all like to see less poverty, properly funded/functioning public services, a liveable planet, etc., but what can you do if the markets aren’t in favour? Sure, we can always pay for wars, but a socially inclusive and ecologically sustainable society is unaffordable. Weird, huh?

Perhaps it is unsurprising that the inherent strangeness of money and the language we use to discuss it is ignored, overlooked, and repressed in mainstream discourse. Just as the economic orthodoxy functions to preserve existing social hierarchies – which are simultaneously patriarchal, white supremacist, imperialist, classist, ableist, hetero- and neuronormative – the way we routinely discuss public finance and the limitations we impose on monetary design are thoroughly normative and rest on the exclusion of the inexpressible weirdness of money and the humans who create it.

At the conclusion of my talk in Loughborough, I turned to the words of the neuroqueer theorist Nick Walker, who explains in Neuroqueer Heresies (2021) that: ‘Neuronormativity and heteronormativity, in essence, are systems of artificial restriction on human potential. By their very nature, they limit our possibilities. To neuroqueer is to refuse to be constrained by those limits.’ It is no coincidence that neurodivergent people have often been dismissed and/or vilified as weird (and, by extension, as magical, uncanny, supernatural, even monstrous), but as Walker also affirms, ‘anyone can liberate themselves from the strictures of normativity.’ In asserting that money is weird, it is my hope that we can all ‘unzip’ our ‘normal-person monetary imaginations’ and refuse to be constrained by the artificial restrictions the economic orthodoxy imposes on our understanding of money’s limitless creative potential. The status quo relies on the exclusion of weirdness, strangeness, and otherness to maintain its illusion of affordability. To build an inclusive and sustainable future, we’ll need to recognise and celebrate money as malleable, redesignable, and thus much weirder than we’ve been taught to think.